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## Landmines Remain Issue in Korea

Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst

THREE YEARS AGO THE international community joined forces to ban landmines. While the majority of the countries of the world worked to reach an agreement, several countries remained opposed to the effort. Nonetheless, today the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines has been signed by 137 countries and ratified by 95. The Treaty entered into force in March 1999, becoming binding international law more quickly than any treaty in history.

Although the international community has made great progress on the landmines issue, some of the countries that have not signed are the most deeply involved in the continued use of landmines. Among this group are the United States, North Korea, and South Korea – three countries whose position on landmines is linked by political and military conditions arising out of the Korean War. These three countries maintain that landmines are a crucial component of their military strategy. All sides used landmines in the Korean War, and mines are still called a key and “legitimate” weapon in maintaining the precarious division between North and South.

Initially, the United States was one of the leaders in promoting a landmine ban. But as the Ottawa Treaty took

shape, so did U.S. objections. These centered on the prohibition of mixed-system mines – mines with both anti-tank and anti-personnel components – and the international community's refusal to allow a “Korea exception” that would permit the U.S. and South Korea to continue to use mines along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in South Korea.

### A “Crucial Weapon”

The United States claimed at the time of the Ottawa Treaty negotiations, and maintains today, that landmines are a crucial component of the U.S. military strategy in Korea and that the one million mines along the DMZ help maintain the delicate peace by deterring a North Korean attack. Critics of the U.S. position argue that the DMZ minefields cannot and would not deter an invasion by either side.

According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the United States has an enormous stockpile of landmines in Korea, including 40,000 Air Force Gator Mines, 10,000 Army Volcano mines, a small number of man-portable Modular Pack Mine Systems (MOPMS), and 1.2 million M16 and M14 dumb mines. The ICBL reports that “U.S. war plans call for the laying of approximately one million new dumb mines in Korea within a few

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*“The United States, North Korea, and South Korea ... maintain that landmines are a crucial component of their military strategy.”*

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days at the onset of conflict. These mines will be laid not in the existing DMZ but throughout the 20-mile area between the DMZ and Seoul. Smart mines would presumably be scattered by air, artillery, and vehicles in both South Korea and North Korea.”

In March, 2000 U.S. State Department Official Bob Beecroft reiterated the U.S. position on landmines in Korea. “The North Koreans have more than a million soldiers poised only 35

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#### QUESTION:

How much over its 2001 budget does the Pentagon want for each of the next six years?

*for answers see page 7*

## LANDMINES

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kilometers north of Seoul. The U.S. and the Republic of Korea bear the responsibility for holding that line. Therefore, we deploy anti-tank mines that are not compliant with the Ottawa Convention, in spite of the fact that they self-destruct in a matter of weeks. There are prices to pay for being the 800 pound gorilla. But no one else can take over our responsibility, and we will maintain it for the time being.”

### U.S. Policy

The Clinton Administration says that the U.S. will sign the Ottawa Treaty by 2006 if suitable alternatives to the mines used in Korea and in mixed-mine systems are developed. However, progress on developing those alternatives has been slow, in part because the Pentagon’s focus and money are elsewhere. The military has asked for funding for the RADM mine system, an artillery-fired anti-tank mine that includes anti-personnel landmines. This mix makes RADM illegal under the Ottawa Treaty, but the Administration still maintains its commitment to President Clinton’s earlier pledge to develop alternatives. Beecroft stated that the United States is “now conducting research on technologies that could replace the mines in Korea by 2006. If we meet that goal – and I am optimistic that we will – then we will sign the Treaty.”

### The Numbers

North and South Korea rely on mines in their “peacetime” military and security policies to stop border crossings. An estimated 1.2 million landmines litter South Korea today.

The South Korean Defense Ministry reportedly confirmed that 1.05 million anti-tank and anti-personnel mines are laid in “major defense areas north around the civilian control line and the demilitarized zone. In the rear areas, about 75,000 anti-personnel mines [are] installed for security.” North Korea has also placed approximately 1 million “dumb” mines along their side of the DMZ. Experts do not believe that North Korea has laid mines in any other areas.

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*“Landmines will continue to be a major component of...strategy on the Korean Peninsula for the foreseeable future.”*

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The two Koreas have a history of landmine production. The ICBL reports that South Korea has produced two copies of the U.S. Claymore mine. Both versions – the K440 and KM18A1 – are directional fragmentation mines. The ICBL claims that North Korea’s production is “neither extensive nor sophisticated.” North Korea is believed to have produced versions of the Soviet POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M fragmentation stake mines. Human Rights Watch reports that North Korea may also have produced wooden blast antipersonnel mines.

Neither North nor South Korea has been classified as a mine exporter, but both have imported mines. Between 1969 and 1992 South Korea imported 40,324 mines from the United States.

North Korea’s primary mine sources were the former Soviet Union and China. Human Rights Watch and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation believe that North Korea’s greatest source of mines during the Korean War was captured U.S. mines.

The size of the stockpiles of landmines maintained by the two countries is uncertain. South Korea’s stockpile is believed to be approximately 2 million, almost twice the number of mines it has already laid. North Korea also maintains a stockpile of landmines, but the stockpile’s size is unknown.

### The Casualties

While civilians are not allowed in or along the DMZ, landmines have taken a toll. According to the South Korean Defense Ministry, at least 38 South Koreans, the majority of them soldiers, have died and 40 have been injured because of landmines placed along the DMZ. In addition, the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) has reported that at least 1,000 civilians have been killed or injured by landmines that washed out of the DMZ during seasonal flooding. The effects of flooding on mines have become so severe that the South Korean Air Force initiated a program in 1999 to remove 2,700 landmines from four defense bases outside of Seoul. The project is anticipated to take 4 years.

Mines from the Korean War still present a problem in South Korea. Some war-era mines remain buried throughout the countryside, posing a more random, if limited, threat than the mines planted along the DMZ. On the North Korean side, injuries and deaths also occur along the DMZ, as

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# Results of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)

IN THE THIRD DEFENSE MONITOR of 2000, we highlighted the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, pointing out the issues and urging you to express support of the NPT to your elected representatives. This article summarizes the results of the NPT Review Conference.

Judging by the press release from the United Nations, the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) Review Conference was a great success. In form it undoubtedly was, as the 155 nations present (of the 187 signatory states) were able to achieve consensus on the final communique – but only after intense negotiations involving the U.S. and Iraq that caused the Conference to go 24 hours beyond its original deadline of May 19. Yet it was the first time in 15 years that a consensus was achieved

## The U.S.-Iraqi Dispute

The nub of the dispute was America's insistence that the final document contain references to Iraq's refusal to allow inspection of its declared nuclear weapons facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as prescribed by Security Council Resolution 687. Iraq initially insisted that Resolution 687 and the NPT were separate issues. However, in the interests of consensus – while not budging from this point – it finally agreed to allow the Conference report to note the IAEA's April 24, 2000 statement that "[a]lthough the Agency had been able recently to carry out an inspection in Iraq, it could not...at present

provide assurances that Iraq was in compliance with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions."

(IAEA inspections, along with those of the U.N. Special Commission designed to uncover and destroy Iraq's stockpiles and capability to produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weap-

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*"The Review Conference was short on substance."*

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ons, were halted just prior to Operation Desert Fox, the four day U.S. bombing campaign in late December 1998.)

## Minimal Progress

While procedural norms were resolutely observed, the Review Conference was short on substance on the Treaty's three main objectives: nuclear cooperation, nuclear disarmament, and nuclear non-proliferation.

On nuclear disarmament, the five avowed nuclear weapons states – Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States – jointly renewed in an "unequivocal undertaking" their previous commitment to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons. But as in the past – most notably in 1995 – no timetable was set either to measure progress or to achieve the final destruction of all nuclear weapons. Such an omission

essentially renders the "undertaking" meaningless.

Similarly, no progress was made on renouncing or modifying the U.S. and Russian declarations that nuclear weapons are the "cornerstone" of each nation's military security. Neither country backed away from its current posture of "launch on warning" nor did either suggest abandoning the "option" of first use of nuclear weapons. Russia's January 2000 declaration that it reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in war if other means of "resolving the crisis have failed," together with the U.S. position that America might use nuclear weapons to retaliate for a chemical or biological weapons attack, were unchanged coming out of the Review Conference.

With regard to non-proliferation, the Review Conference called on India, Pakistan, and Israel – all of which have nuclear weapons – to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. Cuba, the other non-signatory state, was also encouraged to become a party to the NPT.

Finally, as U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in his remarks at the Conference's opening, nuclear cooperation has lagged because "much of the established multilateral disarmament machinery has started to rust...a problem due not to the machinery itself but to the apparent lack of political will to use it." The CTBT has yet to enter into force (the U.S. Senate refused to ratify it last October); negotiations on fissile material cut-off are

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## NPT CONFERENCE

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incomplete; deep cuts in existing stockpiles remain suspended because START II Treaty ratification by the Russian Duma had conditions attached that were not part of the U.S. Senate ratification deliberations – and these differences in ratification language are holding up START III negotiations that would reduce deployed strategic weapons even further. Nuclear cooperation also is retarded by the apparent intent of the U.S. to field a national missile defense

system even if discussions with Russia fail to achieve agreement on modifying the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

As a number of delegates to the Review Conference pointed out, the 1995 Conference extended the NPT indefinitely, not the right of the five major powers to retain their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Thus Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and especially the United States, are obliged under the Treaty to end the production of nuclear weapons and their components (tritium gas and plutonium “pits”), dismantle existing weapons and their means of delivery,

and to assist non-weapons states in the peaceful development and use of atomic energy.

The Review Conference’s greatest achievement may be that none of the 187 States parties withdrew from the NPT despite fears that some might be prepared to opt out in the absence of any meaningful progress toward nuclear disarmament. The “unequivocal undertaking” may have been enough to keep everyone within the Treaty’s fold in 2000. Absent genuine progress to implement that undertaking, even this language may not be enough at the next Review Conference in 2005. ■

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## LANDMINES

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they do in the South, but the extent of the problem is unreported.

The landmine problems facing North and South Korea differ from those encountered in other countries afflicted with large numbers of mines. For the most part, mines in Korea are concentrated in well-designated “fields” along the DMZ and surrounding areas and do not affect farming, industry, or other segments of “normal” life. Removing mines planted on the Korean Peninsula potentially is a less laborious process than mine-clearing operations elsewhere since, for the most part, both sides know exactly where the mines are located. While the costs of demining will always remain high – the technology and manpower is still specialized and time-consuming – the enduring danger from landmines in Korea, once the known fields are removed, ought to be much less than in countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam.

### The Prognosis

Landmines will continue to be a major component of the military and political strategy on the Korean Peninsula for the foreseeable future, as no shift in the position of the three countries is likely. South Korea has announced that it will “retain mines until there is no longer a threat from North Korea, or until an effective alternative to anti-personnel mines is found.” North Korea has said that it is “impossible for it to join the Mine Ban Treaty owing to the complicated security situation of the Korean Peninsula.”

Although the situation in North and South Korea for the time being remains under control, the impact of landmines around the world is real. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, landmines claim 26,000 new victims each year. In some of the countries most affected by this scourge, landmines kill and injure civilians, render farm land useless, and devastate local communities and

economies. Every twenty-five minutes someone around the world steps on a landmine.

If the U.S. lived up to its pledge to develop a real alternative to landmines, a “Korean exception” would not be necessary. In fact, both the U.S. and South Korea could end their reliance on mines in their military strategies, thereby contributing to a lessening of tensions on the peninsula. A number of U.S. military officials, including retired General James Hollingsworth, the former commander of U.S. troops in Korea, believe that landmines in Korea are no longer necessary and have called upon the U.S. to rethink its position.

North and South Korea have thus far been fortunate that, for all the mutual hostility over the last 47 years, the DMZ has not become a killing field. But “fortune” is notoriously fickle, and to tempt it unnecessarily is foolhardy when the promise of a different, better course is so near at hand. ■

# START III, Nuclear War Plans and the Cold War Mindset

Dr. Bruce Blair

LAST MONTH, SEVERAL LEADING newspapers reported that the Pentagon is reviewing U.S. nuclear force “requirements” in connection with ongoing U.S.-Russian talks on the outlines of a third strategic arms reduction treaty (START III). A “senior” Pentagon official who spoke with The New York Times and who is familiar with the review said: “We are not looking outside the [2000-2500] range, and no one has come to us yet with pressure to say, we need to go below those numbers.”

Why can't the Pentagon accommodate a lowering of the START III floor to a level below 2,000 strategic weapons? The answer is actually quite simple, algebraic actually. It is because the strategic war plan – known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) – consists of a very long and redundant list of targets in Russia and a shorter list of targets in China that Pentagon planners say the U.S. needs to be able to destroy in order to meet the latest presidential guidance on nuclear war planning (Presidential Decision Directive 60, issued in November 1997).

## Nuclear Target Proliferation

Oddly enough, the targeting list has been growing instead of contracting since START II was originally signed in 1993. The target list has grown by 20% over the last five years alone. The vast bulk of the targets are located in Russia. The former nuclear republics of the USSR (Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) were dropped from the SIOP in 1997, but nevertheless the list grew from 2,500 in 1995 to 3,000 in the year 2000.

There are about 2,260 “vital” Russian targets on the list today, divided into the four traditional categories – nuclear (1,100), conventional (500), leadership (160), and war-supporting industry (500). It is important to consider that there are 500 nuclear weap-

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*“The target list has grown by 20% over the last five years alone.”*

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ons aimed at a Russian army on the verge of a nervous breakdown; that there are 160 nuclear weapons aimed at leadership targets in a country that is practically devoid of leadership; and nuclear weapons aimed at 500 factories that produced almost zero armaments last year.

As a rule of thumb, U.S. strategic planners historically set the required level of damage against vital targets at the 80% “damage-expectancy” level. This is tantamount to requiring our strategic forces to be able to destroy 80% of the 2,260 Russian targets, which in turn requires the ability to deliver approximately 1,800 warheads to their targets.

It is no accident that we have about 2,300 strategic missile warheads on launch-ready alert at this very moment (98% of the Minuteman III and Peacekeeper land-based force on 2-minute launch readiness plus 4 Trident submarines, two in the Atlantic and two in the Pacific, on 15-minute launch readi-

ness). The land-based missiles need to launch on warning to ensure the survival and launch of U.S. forces that are sufficiently lethal against very hard targets such as Russian silos to meet the damage requirements.

If U.S. strategic forces have to quickly deliver at least 1800 warheads, then the Pentagon says we need a larger arsenal in total because of the unavoidable demands of replenishment and maintenance. For instance, typically, 6 out of the 18 Trident submarines are port-bound at any time and cannot be counted upon to survive and deliver nuclear warheads. Thus, the U.S. needs one-third more sea-based strategic weapons than it can expect to deliver in wartime.

## New Targets for American Nuclear Bombs

Additional targeting requirements drive up the numbers of total strategic weapons in the U.S. arsenal. In 1998-99, the Pentagon put China back into the SIOP after a hiatus of about 20 years. (This was the result of President Clinton's 1997 nuclear guidance.) There are now two “Limited Attack Options” (LAOs) involving a handful of U.S. Trident sub and bomber weapons in each case assigned to attack Chinese leadership, nuclear targets, and critical industries. By comparison, the SIOP consists of 65 LAOs against Russia, each ranging from 2 to 120 weapons; and a handful of Major Attack Options, the smallest of which would send more than 1,000 U.S. strategic warheads to attack Russia's nuclear complex.

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## START III

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In addition, there are hundreds of non-SIOP targets in China, Russia, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea that have been assigned to the U.S. strategic forces (so-called strategic reserve forces). This targeting requirement further drives up the size of the U.S. strategic arsenal.

Add it all up, and you get 2,500 U.S. warheads at minimum that are deemed necessary to fulfill the SIOP goals against Russia and China (the two countries that, as Vice-President Gore says, represent our “vital partners,” not our “enemies”). The START III floor may be lowered somewhat because several hundred hard targets (silos) in Russia will disappear as a result of START II or III reductions or obsolescence over the next decade.

### Toward A More Sober Nuclear Policy

Getting below 2,000 will be difficult unless the SIOP target requirements are eased by new presidential guidance, which of course they could be. No sober U.S. general, much less a political leader, really believes that deterrence depends on the present scale of massive nuclear operations in wartime. Almost without exception, they regard the “Major Attack Options” that unleash thousands of

nuclear warheads as absurd and grotesquely massive. They do not believe that a cold-blooded, deliberate nuclear

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*“Deterrence would remain robust with far smaller arsenals on far lower levels of alert.”*

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strike by Russia or the United States against each other is remotely plausible. The only plausible scenarios for them are usually contingencies that involve the use of one or a handful of

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*“2,500 U.S. warheads...are deemed necessary to fulfill the SIOP goals.”*

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U.S. nuclear weapons (usually tactical rather than strategic weapons) against a country other than Russia.

There is no doubt whatsoever that deterrence would remain robust with far smaller arsenals on far lower levels of alert. The United States could easily drop to 1,500 warheads – the

force ceiling under consideration in the START III talks with Russia. Such a force could consist of: 10 Trident submarines armed with 24 missiles each, and 2 warheads per missile (480 in total); 300 Minuteman III land-based missiles with one warhead apiece (300 warheads); 20 B-2 bombers with 16 weapons apiece (320 in total); and 50 B-52 bombers modified to carry 8 warheads apiece (400 in total), for a grand total of 1,500 warheads.

Alternatively, the Trident submarines could carry START II loadings of 5 warheads per missile, for a total of 1200 warheads, in lieu of the B-2 and B-52 bomber force, which could be retired from the strategic arsenal. However, U.S. strategic planners cringe at the thought of removing a leg from the vaunted TRIAD, a vestige of Cold War-era inter-service rivalry. Various intermediate loadings offer practical alternatives.

U.S. nuclear deterrent “requirements” could be adequately met with 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons. This force level would be more than necessary to assure the destruction of 250 targets of any choice in retaliation for any sudden strike under normal conditions, and assured destruction of 1,000 targets in retaliation to an attack in crisis conditions. If this degree of nuclear threat projection does not deter a prospective adversary, it is difficult to conceive of a retaliatory threat that would. ■

### Prevent War: A New Strategy for America *MGEN Jack Kidd, USAF (Ret.)*

General Kidd’s book is timed to reinvigorate the national political debate on critical issues that affect decisions about peace and war. He writes from the perspective of an active duty officer during three of the five U.S. wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, plus 10 years in the Pentagon during which time he worked on war plans for World War III. To order a copy of *Prevent War*, call 1-800-247- 6553.

# KOREA: QUOTES AND NOTES

## The Beginning...and the Beginning of the End?

"I doubt if at the time we went in, Truman...could foresee that it would be 50 years and we would still be there."

— Senator John Warner (R-VA), March 7, 2000

"After deliberation, we can determine whether it's time to bring them out. It's too early for anybody to say we ought to...bring them out now."

— Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), answering a question on removing U.S. troops from Korea  
June 18, 2000 (Evans, Novak, Hunt and Shields, CNN)

## The Military Assessment

"70 percent of North Korea's active duty force, about 700,000 troops, 2,000 tanks, 8,000 artillery pieces, are deployed within 100 miles of the Demilitarized Zone."

— General Thomas Schwartz, U.N. Command, Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command, March 7, 2000

"I think an ICBM with a return address and its signature is not a very good recipe for regime survival by a rogue regime like North Korea...."

— Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, March 7, 2000

"There are about 500 SCUD missiles that North Korea has that are aimed at the Republic of Korea. They also have the No Dong, about 100 missiles, and are now developing the Taepo Dong I and possibly the 2. So theater missile defense has to be and remains one of my priorities."

— General Thomas Schwartz, U.N. Command, Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command, March 7, 2000

## Rogues are Out, Concerns are In

"We are now calling these states "states of concern" because we are concerned about their support for terrorist activity, their development of missiles, their desire to disrupt the international system. They remain – North Korea remains on the terrorist list and we are going to really be looking at how this relationship develops...."

This [the North-South Korea summit] is clearly an important development. We want to see how the North-South relationship evolves from the statements that they signed. We have to make sure that North Korea is not a threat."

— Secretary of State Madeleine Albright answering a question on U.S.- North Korean relations  
Diane Rehm Show, WAMU-FM Washington, DC, June 19, 2000

## REVISED KOREAN WAR CASUALTY FIGURES


Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the total count of U.S. Service personnel who died from all causes during the War has stood at 54,260. In June, the Office of the Secretary of Defense announced that the actual figure for war-related deaths from all causes was 36,940 Americans.

The error occurred in non-battle deaths. The original figure of 20,617 non-battle deaths included all such deaths worldwide during the period of the Korean War. The actual number of Korean War related non-battle deaths is 3,275.

Missing/unaccounted from the Korean War number over 8,100.

## ANSWER:

\$30 billion annually. This is a 10% increase over the 2001 total and \$180 billion over six years.



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