

THE DEFENSE MONITOR



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The NPT Review — Last Chance?

Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, USN (Ret.)

JUST FIVE YEARS ago the United States led a strong global effort to achieve indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 which was due to expire on its 25th anniversary in April, 1995. U.S. leaders exerted substantial diplomatic pressure on nations less than enthusiastic about extending the NPT regime in order to ensure perpetuation of this critically important element of the global arms control structure, one very much in U.S. security interests.

*After more than 25 years
of talking about reductions,
the world's nuclear
arsenals had increased
by 3,500 weapons.*

The primary resistance to extending the Treaty in 1995 came from nations which complained about the failure of the five nuclear powers (China, France, Great Britain, Russia and the U.S.) to satisfy their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty.

Article VI was written into the Treaty originally as a major inducement to

non-nuclear states to renounce their right to develop nuclear weapons even though the five nuclear powers were allowed to keep theirs. At the same time, however, Article VI clearly and unequivocally committed the nations with weapons to genuine efforts leading to nuclear disarmament.

The absolute failure of the nuclear weapons states to meet this commitment is evident through a straightforward comparison of nuclear arsenals in 1970 and 1995. In 1970 there were an estimated 39,700 nuclear weapons of all types in the arsenals of the five nuclear states. In 1995, despite the end of the Cold War, the totals stood at 43,200 weapons after 25 years of talking about reductions. Furthermore, the delivery systems for families of newer weapons had all been improved repeatedly to produce greatly increased lethality through greater range, accuracy and reliability. In short, after 25 years nuclear weapons posed an even greater threat of cataclysmic destruction, if not the very survival of the human race on earth.

Talking the Right Talk

This continuing threat produced concerted criticism of the nuclear haves by the have-nots and active resistance to approval of the indefinite extension of

ARTICLE VI

"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

the NPT. In an effort to placate the critics, the five nuclear powers joined together to reaffirm their obligation under Article VI to move away from reliance on nuclear weapons for their own security. They did this in a statement

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QUESTION:
Between 1940 and 1996,
how much did the
United States spend to
develop, build and
deploy nuclear weapons
and for partial clean up of
the resulting radioactive
and toxic waste?

for answers see page 6

THE NPT

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entitled, "Principles and Objectives For Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament." Among other promises, this joint commitment pledged the five nations to "the determined pursuit by the nuclear weapons states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons...." This, the first unequivocal declaration of the goal of total elimination of all nuclear weapons, will unquestionably be the focus of non-nuclear states during the forthcoming U.N. conference in April and May 2000 to review compliance with the NPT.

What will the conferees "officially" discover at this five year review of the NPT? Most regrettably, they will learn that the United States, which used powerful leadership in 1995 to obtain indefinite extension of the NPT, has become an active threat to the entire non-proliferation regime.

Walking the Wrong Walk

The most powerful evidence of this threat is in a document titled Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDD 60) approved by President Clinton in November, 1997. Although highly classified and never formally released for consideration or debate by Congress or American citizens, certain provisions were selectively disclosed to the media. The first and most ominous decision in the directive is to retain nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of American security for the foreseeable future. It is difficult to conceive of a precept more contrary to the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. If the most powerful nation on

earth declares nuclear weapons to be the cornerstone of its security, how can the other nuclear weapons nations be induced to cut their existing weapons stocks or those countries with no weapons be convinced not to create and possess them?

As if this U.S. stance were not threat enough, PDD 60 also includes other provocative provisions:

- The U.S. will maintain its Cold War nuclear weapons delivery triad of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and long range bombers.

*The United States . . .
has become an active
threat to the entire
non-proliferation regime.*

- The U.S. will maintain a launch-on-warning posture with its strategic nuclear missiles. This will perpetuate the hair-trigger alert regimen maintained throughout the Cold War.
- The U.S. asserts the right to make first use of nuclear weapons, including the right to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states in retaliation for chemical or biological weapons attacks.
- U.S. targeting plans will focus on Russia and China but will also include prospective nuclear states which might threaten U.S. interests in the future. Authoritative sources indicate that the U.S. has actually

increased the number of targets in Russia since PDD 60 was issued.

Renewing Nukes

There is ample evidence that PDD 60 is not merely a policy statement. The Clinton administration has taken or reaffirmed a number of decisions that sustain and enhance U.S. nuclear war fighting capabilities and can maintain them indefinitely:

- Efforts to enhance the capability to design and test new nuclear weapons in our national laboratories using sub-critical explosive testing and advanced modeling procedures.
- Completing construction of the costly National Ignition Facility (NIF) at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.
- Resuming tritium production, using for the first time civilian power generating reactors for this purpose. By this action, the U.S. will breach the barrier between civilian and military use of nuclear power which the NPT is intended to maintain.
- Resuming limited production of plutonium pits for new or redesigned nuclear weapons.
- Rejecting Russian proposals to consider deeper reductions in the number of strategic warheads than the 2000-2500 range proposed by the U.S. during prospective START III negotiations.

Moreover, in an interview at Offut Air Force Base on March 16, 2000, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre reportedly reaffirmed the U.S. position that "nuclear weapons are still the foundation of a superpower," thereby inviting other nations to de-

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THE NPT

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velop and retain their weapons. A new U.S. Nuclear Mission Management Plan is expected to call for further modernization of the 550 Peacekeeper and Minuteman land-based missiles and 430 submarine-based Trident missiles.

In summary, five years ago the United States saw, clearly and correctly, that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was an important contribution to efforts to contain the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. Responsible leaders of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, backed by the Department of Defense and Department of State, worked forcefully to ensure that it would be extended indefinitely to provide a critical element of nuclear stability. Unfortunately, almost before the ink was dry on the NPT extension agreement, pro-nuclear arms factions in the Pentagon and White House began vigorous efforts to undermine the NPT. To our nation's shame, the 1997 PDD 60 embodies their success.

Fallout from PDD 60

It is no coincidence that India, long a critic of the NPT because it imposed restrictions on non-nuclear states while granting nuclear weapons license to five nations, decided to resume nuclear testing and weapons development in 1998. Although India claimed that threats from a nuclear armed China were the reason for the tests, the cynical disavowal by the United States of its obligations under the NPT obvi-

... if the NPT is to remain effective, the U.S. must lead the way ... to live up to our obligations under Article VI.

ously enabled India to assert equal rights to develop nuclear weapons for its national security. Pakistani nuclear tests inevitably followed, using exactly the same justification.

There will be more Indias and Pakistans in the world's future if the United States fails to satisfy well justified demands by the 182 non-nuclear signatories of the NPT to show genuine progress towards nuclear disarmament. The review conference beginning at the U.N. on April 24, 2000 could well produce significant withdrawals from the NPT regime if the United States continues to sustain and enhance its nuclear warfare capabilities as it is now doing. Furthermore, U.S. preparations to deploy a national missile defense system (even if it means abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) and rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.S. Senate are alarming signals to the rest of the world.

U.S. Responsibilities

The inescapable truth is that 55 years ago the United States initiated the

nuclear era and created the danger of global nuclear war. We are the only nation ever to use nuclear weapons against an adversary. Throughout the Cold War America led the nuclear arms race every step of the way. Today we remain the unchallenged leader in nuclear warfighting capabilities. Given this record, it is undeniably true that if the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to remain effective, the U.S. must lead the way with positive measures to live up to our obligations under Article VI of that Treaty and to comply with the goal of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons as set forth in the 1995 statement of "Principles and Objectives." Until America leads the way, the rest of the world will follow what we do, not what we say.

What You Can Do

There is very little time remaining for readers of *The Defense Monitor* to register their views on this critical issue before the U.N. NPT Review Conference officially ends on May 19, 2000. If you wish the United States to take the lead at that conference by committing our nation to live up to its obligations to stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the world, you should act now. Write, phone or e-mail the White House, your Senators and your Representative to do the right thing while there is still time.

Our children and grandchildren will be far safer in the future if America leads the way to nuclear disarmament at the NPT Review Conference. ■

Nuclear Dealerting: A Solution To Proliferation Problems

Dr. Bruce G. Blair

WHEN PRESIDENT CLINTON announced in 1994 that Russian and U.S. missiles were no longer aimed at our children, he seriously misrepresented the effect of his so-called de-targeting pact with then President Yeltsin. This pact did not add a single second to the time needed to fire missiles at each other's country.

The missiles retained their wartime targets in computer memory, which can be activated in seconds by a few computer keystrokes. If either country's leader ordered a launch, the message would flow in seconds to launch crews. The land-based missile crews would take a few seconds to decode and validate the order, a few more to transmit a target plan to the missiles (thereby overriding the Clinton-Yeltsin pact), a few more to enable the missiles to receive a launch signal, and a few more to turn keys to fire them. Within a couple of minutes, missiles would be leaving their silos en masse. Submarine crews would take about ten minutes longer to process the launch order.

How many Russian and U.S. missiles remain on hair-trigger alert, poised for immediate firing? If the launch order were transmitted right now, more than 2,000 strategic warheads on each side (the equivalent of about 100,000 Hiroshima bombs in total) could be promptly unleashed and delivered to targets around the world in 30 minutes.

Deterring a cold-blooded deliberate Russian or U.S. nuclear attack is not that hard. Deterrence can be satisfied by far smaller arsenals on far lower levels of alert than is presently the situation. The hair-trigger alert practices

carried over from the Cold War need to be ended if we are really serious about reducing tensions, reducing risks of mistaken or unauthorized launch, and strengthening our diplomacy in the area of non-proliferation.

By beginning to stand down nuclear arsenals and taking all forces off alert – ideally by removing the warheads from missiles so that none could be fired on a moment's notice – the United States and Russia would send a strong and welcome message

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to the rest of the world. These dealerting actions would downgrade the importance of nuclear weapons, demonstrating with deeds the commitments made in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to their further reduction and eventual elimination. Such actions would not be lost on reviewers of the NPT who have been scouring the record of the past five years looking for signs that the nuclear pacesetters intend to meet their obligations under Article VI.

To show good faith and initiate the

dealerting process, President Clinton could issue a unilateral proclamation that henceforth all U.S. ballistic missile submarines would assume a low level of alert. The four boats currently carrying a total of 480 warheads on 15-minute notice-to-fire (two in the Atlantic and two in the Pacific) would adopt the same "modified" alert stance as the other eight boats that the U.S. routinely keeps at sea. This change would not diminish the invulnerability of the sea-based U.S. forces.

In embarking on a course leading to the full dealerting of their arsenals, the United States and Russia would not only assume higher moral ground in their efforts to inhibit proliferation, they also would create a norm of operational safety that prohibits any country from placing or maintaining their nuclear forces in a launch-ready configuration.

Our leadership, for example, could well encourage South Asian nuclear states to refrain from crossing the next critical threshold of danger: the arming of missiles and bombers in the field. In accordance with this new international norm of safety set by the U.S. and Russia, countries such as India and Pakistan would keep their nuclear bombs in storage indefinitely. This configuration of South Asian arsenals would help defuse the nuclear confrontation there and buy a large margin of safety for scenarios involving a failure in their command and control. The dangerous alternative – that these regional adversaries will mate warheads to high alert missiles under deficient control, thereby creat-

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New Opportunities in U.S. — Russia Relations

David Johnson

RUSSIA HAS A new leader in Vladimir Putin who replaced Boris Yeltsin, Russia's dominant figure since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Putin is young and energetic, a former KGB agent who rose from obscurity to be the elected president of Russia in less than a year. He is still a mystery both at home and abroad.

Can Putin restore public confidence and stop Russia's slide into chaos? While there are many uncertainties some observations can be offered about what lies ahead for Russia and for U.S.-Russia relations. Most important: What lessons should be learned from the past and what opportunities can be seized?

Putin comes to power in a country that has experienced catastrophic economic and social decline. A third of the population lives in crushing poverty and most others face a daily struggle to make ends meet. There has been a massive deterioration of the social infrastructure. While elections have become an accepted feature of political life, power has been centralized in a corrupt elite who control the country's major economic assets and much of its media. A sense of powerlessness and despair has become widespread as Yeltsin's repeated failures of leadership dashed early hopes that life would get better in the new Russia. Putin is a repository of the rekindled aspirations of Russians for positive change.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Russians were very pro-American. But the United States' role as an enthusiastic supporter of Yeltsin has damaged America's reputation. Russians associate the U.S. with the failures of economic reform and the corrupt

privatization program that was implemented with American advice and financing.

Compounding the disillusionment has been the expansion of the NATO military alliance and occasions, such as the war in Yugoslavia in 1999, when Russians felt their vital national interests were ignored. As relations soured and Yeltsin's health declined, progress became stalled as Russians rejected

Russia cannot afford indefinitely to maintain even its diminished nuclear forces.

paternalistic American directions about how to order their economic and political life.

The dominant and enduring U.S. interest in Russia has been to help secure and remove the huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union. Even in its decline, Russia remains a nuclear superpower. Nuclear safety has been an important area of constructive cooperation between the two countries. But Russia's continuing economic catastrophe threatens to undermine attempts to address the nuclear issue.

Putin has been sending mixed messages about what he stands for and what he will do. The brutal war in Chechnya has been his main focus since Yeltsin appointed him prime

minister in August 1999. His close connection with security and intelligence agencies and his call for a "dictatorship of law" create anxieties even among Russians. On the other hand, Putin says that "Russia is a part of European culture" and clearly wants Russia to be integrated with the world economy and to secure foreign investment to help achieve economic growth. He has even suggested that Russia might join NATO some day.

The Putin government has adopted a new national security doctrine calling for a more assertive foreign policy and maintaining the central role of nuclear weapons. Along with China it insists on a multipolar world not dominated by the U.S. There is more emphasis on promoting the country's economic interests. But the focus remains on the dangers from economic weakness and threats at home. It is unlikely that Russia will try to restore the Soviet Union or pose a military threat to its neighbors. Economic progress at home is the number one priority.

On the immediate agenda of U.S.-Russia relations is progress on arms control. The START II treaty has been languishing unratified in the Russian parliament but will likely be approved as a prelude to the further, more drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals sought by the Russians. Russia cannot afford indefinitely to maintain even its diminished nuclear forces. The U.S. also seeks to amend the U.S.-Russia ABM treaty that limits missile defenses, but Russia has strongly opposed any such step. Putin has given some indications of flexibility on the matter, but the issue could potentially derail further

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NEW OPPORTUNITIES

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arms control measures if the U.S. pushes too hard or too quickly.

Another danger lies in NATO expansion. Yeltsin's Russia acquiesced in the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, but Putin's Russia is adamantly against any further expansion, particularly into the Baltic states that were once part of the Soviet Union. The U.S. needs to take great care in its next steps in European security so as to ensure that legitimate Russian interests are respected. Russian military forces have been taking part in peacekeeping in Kosovo, but relations could be aggravated again if conflict reignites in the former Yugoslavia.

Russia is burdened with a huge foreign debt, some inherited from the So-

*Russians want order
and stability . . . not
dictatorship or the
rule of oligarchs.*

viet Union but most generated in the Yeltsin era as Western governments and international financial institutions expressed their support for Yeltsin with money. Easing this debt burden will be very helpful to Russia as it tries to achieve economic progress.

Both Russians and Americans hope that President Putin will pursue policies at home that promote growth and stability. It remains to be seen whether

this will be done while ensuring that the independence of Russian media is strengthened and new democratic political institutions evolve and are respected. Russians want order and stability, but they do not want dictatorship or the rule of oligarchs.

The U.S. has a real opportunity to work with Russia to diminish and perhaps eliminate the role of nuclear weapons. We need Russian cooperation on proliferation issues and to help resolve conflicts in many parts of the world. If this is going to happen, however, we need to respect the capacity of Russians to generate solutions to their problems that may be different than our preferences. In our current preoccupation with our role as "the world's only superpower," such restraint may be difficult – but it is necessary. ■

NUCLEAR DEALERTING

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ing a higher risk of sparking a war through miscalculation or unauthorized use – should not be casually accepted by the world community.

The founding members of the nuclear club – United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France – subscribed to the principle of equity in advancing the NPT with an article calling for total nuclear elimination. Their past nuclear indulgences – 2,000 test explosions (400 in the open air) and

*. . . past nuclear
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be replaced by higher
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and fairness.*

125,000 nuclear bombs fielded during the Cold War, among others – and double standards must be replaced by higher standards of restraint and fairness. The big five should recognize the paramount importance of standing down the world's arsenals and extending the principle equally to all nuclear states – including themselves. Developing and putting into practice a new global consensus on dealerting would go far to induce other nations to cooperate on the host of other vexing proliferation and safety hazards that still beset the nuclear universe. ■

ASIA ON THE WEB

CDI's home page, www.cdi.org, now links to the CDI "Asia Forum" containing featured articles, short analyses of events in a "Behind the News" section, and a "Your Response" forum. Coverage of U.S. relations with Japan, North-South Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan is updated weekly.

ANSWER:

\$5.8 Trillion
(\$5,821,000,000,000)

Source: "Atomic Audit,"
Brookings Institution, 1998. 2000

FY 2001 Discretionary Budget Request

Christopher Hellman


THE FISCAL YEAR 2001 budget request includes \$622 billion for discretionary spending (the money the President and Congress must decide and act to spend each year), \$305 billion of which will go to the Pentagon. The “National Defense” category of the federal budget for FY’01 accounts for 49 percent of all discretionary spending.

Or will it? Based on figures included in the FY’01 request, education

and housing assistance programs will receive major funding increases from this year’s levels -- a 36% increase for education and a 59% jump for housing. Simply put, there is no way that the GOP-led Congress will accept these increases. Once these unrealistic projections are removed from the FY’01 request, the Pentagon will continue to account for over 50% of the discretionary budget.

The other category of federal spending is mandatory spending, money that is spent in compliance with existing laws which govern the particular program or function. Mandatory spending includes entitlements, money or benefits provided directly to individuals such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Federal Retirement. It also includes interest payments on the national debt.

PRESIDENT CLINTON’S PROPOSED FY 2001 DISCRETIONARY BUDGET



Note: Discretionary funding for Social Security and Medicare covers various administrative costs, and is not related to benefits mandated by law. Sources: Office of Management and Budget. Chart prepared by the Center for Defense Information.



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