



THE DEFENSE MONITOR

The Center for Defense Information believes that strong social, economic, political, and military components and a healthy environment contribute equally to the nation's security. CDI opposes excessive expenditures for weapons and policies that increase the danger of war.

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Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Update

In a year dominated by NATO's Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Congress added significantly to the Administration's request for increased military spending. Both the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 and the Pentagon appropriations package boosted spending for everything from military pay and training to high-tech weaponry.

The Defense Authorization Bill

On October 15 Mr. Clinton signed the Defense Authorization Act for FY'00, which adds roughly \$8.3 billion to the Administration's original \$280.8 billion request for the military. Together with increases in the original request, this represents about \$20 billion more for the Pentagon than in FY'99.

The package includes funding for major Pentagon programs at or above levels requested by the Administration. The legislation also calls for a 4.8% military pay raise, effective January 1, 2000. This is 0.4% more than was requested by the Pentagon.

The Administration's FY'00 budget request contains \$1 billion for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), including \$475.5 million funded through DoD. CTR, also known as the "Nunn-Lugar" program, assists Russia and the former Soviet Republics safeguard and eliminate their stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological

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The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The October 13 United States Senate vote defeating ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) triggered a veritable earthquake that severely rocked the global structure of nuclear arms control.

An examination of the Senate debate clearly reveals that many members simply failed to understand the strategic benefits of the CTBT as well as the increased dangers created by U.S. rejection of the Treaty.

Locking in U.S. Technology Lead

The most important benefit of the CTBT is that it locks in place the tremendous technological advantage the U.S. now possesses in our nuclear arsenal. A fundamental aspect of developing new nuclear weapons is confidence in the reliability of the weapon design, which can only be determined by extensive testing to make sure that every component, both nuclear and non-nuclear, works. Over the course of the nuclear age the U.S. has conducted 1,054 atmospheric and underground tests, more than all the other nuclear powers combined. The CTBT, when implemented, would forbid all testing intended to produce a nuclear chain reaction, thereby effectively freezing any further development of nuclear weapons by other nations.

Number of Nuclear Weapons Tests By Country	
United States	1054*
Soviet Union/Russia	715
France	210
China	45
United Kingdom	45*
India	3
Pakistan	2

*24 tests were joint U.S. - UK (Congressional Record, October 12, 1999, pg. S12408).

Source: Physicians for Social Responsibility

Stockpile Stewardship

Such a freeze would not affect the current U.S. arsenal which is being maintained under the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) at an annual cost of \$4.5 billion. SSP is a computer-based, highly technical verification process that checks the continued viability of weapons by using simulations and tests that do not produce a chain reaction ("sub-critical" tests permitted by the CTBT). And despite Senate testimony from the experts – the directors of the weapons labs – that SSP can assure the reliability of the nuclear arsenal, the program's complexity, combined with the highly abbreviated and partisan

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Question:

How much money must the U.S. pay the UN by December 31st to retain our voting rights in the General Assembly?

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No Treaty, But No Testing

"We will not abandon the commitment inherent in the [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] and resume testing ourselves."

President Clinton

October 14, 1999

("CTBT" continued from page 1)

hearings and floor debate, probably contributed to the CTBT's defeat.

It is significant that whatever the precise degree of reliability U.S. weapons might have after a prolonged test ban, it is certain to be higher than the weapons of all other nations. No nation can begin to match America's ability to simulate nuclear explosions through modeling, sub-critical tests, and computer analysis. Our great nuclear superiority can only increase under a non-testing regime.

In short, viability of U.S. weapons would continue to be assured while other nations could not move forward with their programs. Russia, China, France, and Great Britain – all signers of the CTBT and none of which have tested a nuclear weapon since 1996 – would fall under the Treaty restrictions. The Treaty would also restrict India and Pakistan, neither of which have signed, from following their May, 1998 tests with new explosions. In fact, India has declared its willingness to sign the CTBT once the U.S. ratifies it and Pakistan has said it will sign when India does.

CTBT and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

India's position reflects a second strong argument for U.S. ratification of the CTBT. By the terms of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which, under intense U.S. pressure, was extended indefinitely in 1995, non-nuclear states agreed to forego development of nuclear weapons in return for a guarantee by the five nuclear weapons powers that they would make concerted efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals. As with

all treaties which the U.S. has ratified, the NPT is a legally binding document whose conditions must be carried out in good faith for as long as we remain a partner in the treaty. The CTBT, by preventing new nuclear testing, clearly is an agreement that falls within the common understanding of a "concerted effort to reduce nuclear arsenals." In this light, India's insistence that the U.S. ratify the CTBT can be seen as an effort to induce the U.S. to begin carrying out its obligations under the NPT.

Lacking U.S. action, India will be free to resume testing. Considering Indo-Pakistani tensions, renewed testing could compel Pakistan to match India's actions and could induce China to restart its program. With the dramatic decline in Russia's conventional forces, Moscow might also restart testing. Furthermore, North Korea might be tempted to renounce the 1994 Agreed Framework by which it froze its nuclear weapons program.

Improved Detection and Verification

The third benefit the U.S. would have reaped by ratifying the CTBT is an improved ability to verify whether any nation is cheating. The verification improvements would have included an increase (to 337) in the number of seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound international monitoring stations. These new stations, which would be added to those already in place, would have enhanced the ability of the U.S. intelligence community to detect explosions, including the sub-critical tests permitted under the treaty.

Under CTBT, should an unexplained event be detected, any nation could request an on-site inspection of the suspected location. Upon approval of the request by 30 members of the Treaty's 51 nation Executive Council, the nation on whose territory the suspect event occurred has to allow an inspection, including the taking of earth and air samples. The Treaty imposes

# Countries that have Signed	155
# Countries that have Ratified	51
# Of the 44 Nuclear Power/Nuclear Weapons States that have Ratified*	26

*All 44 must ratify for CTBT to go into effect.
Source: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers

strict time limits for action by the Executive Council and for compliance by the suspect nation. Other provisions include a series of actions to enforce compliance, including a sanctions regime and a mechanism for resolving disputes.

"Supreme National Interest"

The shallowness of the CTBT debate was apparent in the frequently heard criticism that once the U.S. ratified the Treaty it would be bound in perpetuity by its provisions. Certainly, treaties are designed to be long-standing, and the CTBT is no exception. But no nation signs a treaty or remains in one unless it believes the treaty is in its best interests. While the CTBT is designed to be of unlimited duration, it specifically allows for withdrawal if a nation believes that extraordinary events (such as another country conducting nuclear tests) threaten its "supreme national interests." What is also significant in this regard is that the Treaty does not require nations to dismantle their nuclear test facilities. Thus, in the event weapons experts cannot certify that our stockpile is safe and reliable and the U.S. withdraws from the treaty, the basic means to resume testing will still be in place.

Ignoring Allies, Antagonizing Rivals

Underlying much of the Senate's opposition to the CTBT is the mistaken belief that America's military

On Reorienting Military Policy

"What we are doing now is talking the transformational talk, but not walking the revolutionary walk."

Senator Joseph Lieberman
(D-CT)

November 3, 1999

might is so overwhelming that we can afford to disregard our allies and discount our competitors and opponents. A strong public plea from Germany's Chancellor Schroeder, Britain's Prime Minister Blair, and France's President Chirac was ignored with the off-hand comment that these leaders knew nothing about the United States. And, of course, there is very strong congressional pressure to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system to defend against a nuclear attack from a "rogue state."

Understandably, nations such as Russia and China don't believe the U.S. will stop with a limited NMD system but will expand it to stop a large scale attack. Failure to ratify the CTBT reinforces these suspicions and in so doing increases the danger of nuclear war. If the U.S. is free to test to improve its nuclear arsenal and simultaneously builds a large, credible NMD system, what are other nations to believe? They will react to our deeds by building more nuclear weapons to be sure they can overwhelm any NMD system we build and to deter what they regard as aggressive U.S. political and military actions. Both the potential

weapons and related technologies. The legislation fully funds DoD's part of the program.

(A comparison of the White House's request for major weapons systems and the actual authorization is found on page 4.)

Pentagon Spending Priorities

Proponents of more military spending have been claiming for months that problems with military readiness and recruiting and retaining

costs and the dangers are staggering.

Where We Stand

In summary, failure to ratify the CTBT leaves the United States in the worst possible security situation. While we have no plans (or need) to resume nuclear testing, other nations are legally free to test as often as they choose without restraint or sanction. Furthermore, we will forego the improved means of monitoring tests which implementing the CTBT would provide. Uncertainty will grow as to the nuclear capabilities of potential adversaries and fears will increase that our present nuclear superiority is being eroded. In such an atmosphere, the Pentagon would press to resume U.S. tests and we could find ourselves in a new Cold War-style nuclear arms race – except this time with more potential nuclear-armed adversaries.

We should have learned from the Cold War that nuclear weapons do not respect national borders or national sovereignty. Long before transnational finance, mega-corporations, and the Internet, the threat of nuclear war welded the fates and the future of every man, woman, and child on the planet – and all their descendants.

We can never undo the evil knowledge of nuclear weapons, but we can curb and stop their development and proliferation. If we are to survive another millennium, we cannot afford to mutely accept many more debacles such as we have just witnessed in the rejection of the CTBT.

quality personnel require an increase in the Pentagon's budget. Yet the Administration's proposed budget raises spending on personnel by only 4% and for readiness by 5.5%, while money for the purchase of new weapons jumps by more than 8%. Congress' spending plan has even larger gaps, raising personnel funding roughly 2.7%, readiness by 6.8%, but weapons purchases by 15%. The difference becomes even worse in the future, with

the Administration planning to increase the procurement budget by a whopping 53% by 2005. Congress seems intent on going the White House one better.

Appropriations

Mr. Clinton signed the Defense Appropriations Act for FY'00, the last of the three annual spending bills that fund the military, on October 25. The legislation provides \$267.7 billion for the military, \$4.5 billion more than the Administration's request and \$17.3 billion above FY'99 levels (which doesn't include emergency supplemental appropriations of almost \$13 billion). Congress appropriated an additional \$8.4 billion for military construction and housing and \$12 billion for the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons programs in separate bills. All told, the Pentagon received nearly \$290 billion.

"Emergency" Spending?

Even as they took credit, along with the White House, for generating growing surpluses, congressional budgeteers faced a number of pressures. These surpluses – which actually represent unspent revenues in the Social Security system – are the result of budget cuts mandated by the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, which sets specific funding caps for both overall federal spending and specific accounts. Each year the BBA requires further reductions in federal spending, and these cuts, coupled with increased spending for the military and education, put Congress in the position of having to either gut other federal programs or invent ways to fund them without violating the BBA.

Because unexpected federal expenditures such as disaster relief often arise, the budget process allows for the enactment of special supplemental appropriations. Supplementals are generally funded by making cuts – referred to as offsets – in other areas of the budget. Thus,

The Indispensable U.N.

"Look around the world, from East Timor to Sierra Leone. Listen to the speeches last month at the General Assembly, on disarmament, development, discrimination, and other urgent issues. Think for a moment about the 20th century. You will see and hear and understand why the international community continues to turn to the United Nations for its unique and universal services."

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan

October 27, 1999

supplementals normally represent a reallocation of assets and not increased obligations. If, however, a supplemental is deemed an emergency by Congress and the Administration, offsets are not necessary and the cost of the supplemental can be added to the federal budget without violating any existing spending caps. Last October, in an example of budgetary "sleight of hand," Congress declared \$21 billion in federal spending as "emergency," \$8 billion for the Pentagon and the rest for federal domestic programs.

This year, Pentagon supporters employed a series of budgetary gimmicks and sleight of hand that would

have made Houdini proud. First, appropriators declared \$7.2 billion as "emergency spending" and thus not subject to the caps. Second, conferees agreed to defer payment on \$1.2 billion in FY'00 spending until FY'01. Other proposals considered included the use of as much as \$3 billion in unspent funds from the FY'99 emergency supplemental and delaying the last payday for military personnel in FY'00 by one working day so that it would fall in FY'01.

Similar "magic" occurred elsewhere during this year's budget process. For example, Congress declared \$3 billion for veterans' health care as "emergency." The State, Justice and Commerce Appropriations Act includes \$4.5 billion in emergency spending for the 2000 Census, even though, to quote Rep. Jose Serrano (D-NY), the ranking Democrat on the House subcommittee with jurisdiction over the legislation, "the census has been in the Constitution a couple of hundred years." In all, Congress declared \$35 billion as emergency spending in the last year, and is likely to do so for tens of billions more in the coming months.

In spite of all the budgetary shenanigans, Congress discovered that it would be impossible to stay within the spending caps. The Congressional Budget Office reported that the GOP spending plan would exceed spending limits by more than \$30 billion. To help resolve the situation, Republican leaders included in the Labor-HHS appropriations bill a cut of 1% in all discretionary programs. For the Pentagon, this meant a reduction of roughly \$2.7 billion. But as Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and a supporter

Congressional Add-Ons

	\$ in Millions
Unrequested Weapons Funding Added by the House or Senate	2,806
Unrequested Weapons Funding Added by Congressional Conferees	528
TOTAL CONGRESSIONAL ADD-ONS	3,334

of higher military spending pointed out, the increase in the Pentagon's budget made it possible for the DoD to absorb this reduction.

Not so many other federal agencies. Said Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), "These mindless cuts are going to put valuable education, healthcare and job training programs below last year's levels. They've cut education and health care to further bloat the Pentagon budget."

Congressional Add-Ons

While congressional leaders scrambled to fund requested military programs, members were as eager as ever to add money for weapons and equipment that the Pentagon didn't request. In all, the legislation includes \$53 billion for procurement, \$1.1 billion more than asked for by the White House. Of the total, over \$3 billion is for programs unrequested by the military. According to a study done by CDI, \$2.8 billion in unrequested funds were added by either the House or Senate. An additional \$528 million in new spending was added by the conferees that did not appear in either version of the original legislation.

(For more details, see CDI's factsheet "Fiscal Year 2000 Add-Ons: Congress' Unrequested Spending for the Pentagon," at

<http://www.cdi.org/issues/budget/add-ons00.html>)

The Kosovo Supplemental

In late April the Administration announced plans for funding U.S. military operations in Yugoslavia. The initial Administration request was

FY2000 Funding for Selected Weapons Programs

	Administration Request		Enacted by Congress	
	\$ in millions	#	\$ in millions	#
F-22	3,074	6	2,500	0
F/A-18 E/F	2,854	36	2,900	36
JSF	477	--	506	--
V-22 Osprey	986	10	1,123	12
CVN-77	752	--	752	--
DDG-51	2,928	3	2,700	3
"Virginia" SSN	748	--	748	--
LPD-17 Assault Ship	1,523	2	1,500	2
RAH-66 Comanche	427	--	583	--
UH-60 Blackhawk	103	8	176	17
BMD	3330	--	3,700	--
NMD	837	--	867	--
THAAD	612	--	528	--
Navy Theater Wide	330	--	420	--
Patriot PAC-3	330	--	542	--

roughly \$6 billion, including about \$1 billion for humanitarian assistance. All the funding was to be "emergency spending" and thus not subject to BBA spending limits.

GOP leaders quickly expressed their intention to add considerably to this request. In fact, the final package totaled roughly \$12 billion. This significant increase was not, however, due to congressional concerns that the Administration has underestimated the cost of the war in Kosovo. Instead, Congress once again seized the chance to use an emergency spending package to funnel billions of taxpayers' money into military programs neither requested by the Administration nor related to actual military operations.

One specific item in the Kosovo funding bill not related to combat operations was \$1.8 billion for military pay and retirement benefits. This provision is particularly interesting because it appropriated money in FY'99 that could not be spent until FY'00. In effect, what Congress did was free up almost \$2 billion in available new military spending in FY'00.

Actual Costs of Kosovo

While Congress appropriated \$5 billion for military operations in Kosovo as part of the emergency supplemental spending package, a preliminary cost estimate done recently by the Senate Appropriations Committee places the cost of the air war at \$1.8 billion. It also estimates that when the costs of U.S. participation in KFOR are totaled, they will come to \$1.5 billion for FY'99 and will run between \$2.5 billion and \$3 billion for a full year. Most experts agree that these estimates are low. Even Senator Ted Stevens agreed: "The trouble with rough estimates is they're always too conservative."

\$6 Trillion Surplus?

In June the Clinton Administration announced that future budget surplus projections had grown by \$1 trillion to a total of \$6 trillion over the next fifteen years. Both the Administration and congressional leaders regard this anticipated bounty as a source of funds for

A Question of Common Sense and Math

In justifying huge increases in military spending, the argument is sometimes made that the military budget has been declining as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

But those who would use GDP as the yardstick for figuring how much the U.S. should spend on the military never have an answer for the simple common sense question, "What on earth does the nation's GDP have to do with how much we should spend on defense?"

We all agree that our military strength should be sufficient to meet any military threat which we are likely to confront. The same common sense approach – having enough resources to do the job – should apply to other international (foreign aid, trade, NATO, the U.N.) and domestic (education, health, Social Security) challenges. The proper focus is on the challenge (or the threat, as the military likes to say) and has nothing whatever to do with how well the economy is performing.

At the Cold War's height in 1987, defense spending authority was \$287.4 billion or 6.2% of the GDP, which was \$4.605 trillion. Today, 6.2% of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 GDP, estimated at \$9.106 trillion, would be \$573 billion.

In short, everyone who thinks defense spending for FY2000 should be \$573 billion – \$284.2 billion more than the present budget – hold up your hand.

their agendas, with the GOP pushing for major tax cuts and the White House arguing that the first priority should be ensuring the long-term viability of Social Security.

Such long-term budget forecasts are notoriously shaky. Droughts, hurricanes, wars, changes in broad economic trends such as the 1998 Asian economic crisis, will all affect future surpluses. Further, these budget projections assume certain actions by the federal government, such as continued reductions in discretionary spending and paying down the national debt. Failure to do either of these things will have a direct impact on the size of any surplus. So too will tax cuts, which would reduce anticipated revenue.

CDI is pleased to announce the creation of a new interactive web site entitled "The Military Budget...In Terms You Can Understand." Visit the site at: <http://www.cdi.org/budgetgames/>

TEN YEARS AFTER

November 9, 1999 marked the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, an event that signaled the end of the Cold War and foreshadowed the collapse of the U.S.S.R. two years later.

Much has changed since that November, yet much remains the same. A question worth pondering is whether the world has made significant and hopefully irreversible advances over these past ten years. The record, as the following facts illustrate, suggests that we are in a transition period in which traditional diplomatic, economic, and military policies and relationships – even the organization of nation-states themselves – are changing. What will finally emerge remains unclear, but in the short run it seems we are beset by a somewhat better but bloodier world.

THEN

In 1989, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute recorded 32 "wars" (conflicts with casualties from conflict in excess of

Answer:
\$350 million, which is about 21% of the \$1.63 billion the U.S. owes and 27% of the U.N.'s \$1.268 billion budget for 2000.

1,000). This number included many in which the U.S. was directly or indirectly involved:

-Invading Panama (Operation Just Cause) to topple General Manuel Noriega.

-Providing \$165 million in arms and training to the right-wing government of El Salvador and its paramilitaries; in 1989 six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter were murdered by members of the army.

-Supplying money and arms to the Nicaraguan "contras" trying to topple the Sandinista government.

-Covertly supporting Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement in its attempt to wrest control of Angola's government from leftist Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

-Sending arms, including Stinger ground-to-air missiles, to the Afghanistan mujahideen in their war against the Soviet Union and the Kabul government; in 1989 the Soviets gave up.

Other measures of the state of the U.S. in 1989:

-The U.S. annual budget deficit was \$152.5 billion.

-GDP stood at \$5.35 trillion.

-The Pentagon's budget authorization for Fiscal Year 1990 (which began October 1, 1989) was \$303.3 billion. This represented 65%

of total federal discretionary spending (\$463.6 billion) for the year. (See Table 1 for a list of the main weapon systems being procured.)

Internationally,

-The total U.S. Foreign Operations budget (including funds for running the State Department) was \$18.8 billion.

-Terrorist attacks worldwide in 1989 totaled 375.

-The U.N., with 156 members, had fielded 18 peacekeeping missions since 1945; 8 had been completed. The five permanent U.N. Security Council members accounted for 80% of worldwide arms deliveries (see Table 2).

NOW

Ten years later the mayhem continues. New and renewed violence associated with the breakdown of ceasefires, ethnic-based brutality, and efforts to quell by military power some long-standing insurrections have pushed the number of wars above the 1989 level – to 37 from a low of 25 in 1997. U.S. military involvement seems little changed even though the Soviet Union and its empire are gone.

-Afghanistan remains wracked by civil war and the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan is trying to

prevent the fighting from spilling into its territory. Russia is battling rebel forces in Daghestan and Chechnya, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are fighting Islamic insurgents.

-Angola, if anything, is worse off. The civil war between the government and UNITA, which had been stopped by a tenuous peace accord, has resumed and become intertwined with the civil war in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo. This latter war at one point involved eight neighboring nations.

-The U.S. military is leaving Panama and handing over control of the Canal to the Panamanians. The Pentagon is examining the possibility of upgrading an Ecuadoran military airbase in return for access to the base.

-While El Salvador and Nicaragua are relatively peaceful, U.S. involvement in Colombia's civil war has grown. Assistance to Colombia has risen from \$96 million in 1989 to \$289 million in 1999. U.S. pressure threatens to undermine Colombian President Pastrana's efforts to negotiate with the largest rebel force in the country. In September, President Pastrana appealed for \$1.5 billion from the U.S. (and another \$2 billion from the rest of the world) to help in the fight against drugs.

-In Europe, NATO, founded as a defensive alliance, for the first time mounted a major offensive action. The target was the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia whose government had orchestrated and perpetrated mass deportations and massacred thousands of ethnic Albanians living in the province of Kosovo. The 78 day war was conducted almost exclusively from the air. When it ended, a NATO led force (KFOR) of 50,000, acting under a U.N. Security Council Resolution, entered Kosovo. While the air war was in full swing, NATO officially added three new members: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

-In Asia, troops and paramilitaries loyal to Indonesia conducted a Yugoslav-style scorched earth campaign in East

Table 1. Major Weapon Systems Being Procured, 1989 and 1999

1989/1990	1999/2000
F/A-18 C/D Navy Hornet fighter	F/A-18 E/F Navy Super Hornet fighter
F-15 D/E Air Force Eagle fighter	F-22 Air Force Raptor fighter
AV-8B Marine Corps Harrier Jump Jet	AV-8B Marine Corps Harrier Jump Jet
F-16 C/D Air Force Falcon fighter	F-16 C/D Air Force Falcon fighter
C-17 Transport aircraft	C-17 Transport aircraft
V-22 Marine Corps Osprey aircraft (advanced procurement)	V-22 Marine Corps Osprey aircraft
AH-64 Army Apache helicopter	RAH-66 Army Comanche helicopter
DDG-51 Navy Destroyer	DDG-51 Navy Destroyer
SSN-21 Seawolf attack submarine	SSN-21 Seawolf attack submarine
SSN-688 Los Angeles class attack submarine	SSN Virginia class attack submarine
SSBN Ohio class Ballistic Missile submarine	LPD-17 Marine Corps Landing ship
M1 Army Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles	Crusader Army Artillery system
Trident ICBMs and Tomahawk cruise missiles	Tomahawk and other cruise missiles

Timor after East Timorese voted for a return of the independence stolen from them in 1975. The carnage was stopped by the intervention of an Australian-led U.N. mandated force (INTERFET), but only after most of the Timorese capital had been burned, hundreds killed, and tens of thousands forcibly removed.

Other measures of the state of the U.S. in late 1999:

-Counting the Social Security Trust Fund, the U.S. budget had a surplus for FY1999 of \$115 billion.

-GDP stood at \$8.75 trillion and was expected to climb to \$9.106 trillion in 2000.

-The Pentagon's FY2000 budget was \$288.8 billion, which represented 50.2% of total federal discretionary spending (\$575 billion) for the year. Current projections are for increases for the U.S. military that will exceed the 1989 high in Fiscal Year 2003 (\$312.8 billion) and climb to \$333 billion in Fiscal 2005. (See Table 3 for U.S. force structure comparisons.)

Internationally,

-After President Clinton vetoed a \$12.6 billion appropriation for Foreign Operations, some \$2 billion below the State Department's request, Congress added \$2.7 billion, including funds to implement the Israeli-Palestinian Wye Accords. A mid-November deal pointed to payment of most of the \$1.6 billion owed the U.N.

-Terrorist attacks worldwide in 1998,

the last full year, totaled 273.

-The U.N. now has 188 members, an increase of 20 percent in 10 years. Its peacekeeping record as of November 1999 is 51 missions started, 34 completed, and 17 ongoing. (Two additional missions, in Sierra Leone and East Timor, have been authorized.)

These missions do not include major troop deployments by "coalitions of the willing" acting under a U.N. mandate: IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia (led by the U.S.), ALBA in Albania (led by Italy), KFOR in Kosovo (led by the U.K.), and INTERFET in East Timor (led by Australia).

Table 3. U.S. Military Force Structure 1989 and 1999

	1989	1999
Land Forces Army	-18 Active/10 Reserve Divisions -27 Separate Brigades -4 Special Forces Groups -1 Ranger Regiment -Strength* Active 764,259 Nat'l Guard/Reserve 1,063,000	-10 Active/8 Reserve Divisions -21 Separate Brigades -4 Special Forces Groups -1 Ranger Regiment -Strength** Active 479,100 Nat'l Guard/Reserve 562,650
Land Forces Marines	-3 Active/1 Reserve Divisions -34 Fighter/Attack (F/A) Squadrons -Strength* Active 194,860 Reserve 82,233	-3 Active/1 Reserve Divisions -25 Fighter/Attack (F/A) Squadrons - Strength** Active 172,517 Reserve 36,966
Navy Forces	-15 Aircraft Carriers -75 Active/Reserve F/A Squadrons -35 Ballistic Missile and 97 Attack Submarines -415 Deployable Battle Force Ships (including submarines) - Strength* Active 581,050 Reserve 241,448	-11 Active/1 Reserve Carriers -39 Active/Reserve F/A Squadrons -18 Ballistic Missile and 57 Attack Submarines -242 Deployable Battle Force Ships (including submarines) - Strength** Active 372,696 Reserve 88,961
Air Forces	-76 Active/42 Reserve F/A Squadrons -97 Conventional Weapons Bombers -Strength* Active 575,604 Nat'l Guard/Reserve 268,254	-49 Active/38 Reserve F/A Squadrons -93 Conventional Weapons Bombers -Strength** Active 360,574 Nat'l Guard/Reserve 177,334
Strategic Forces	-1,000 Land Based Missiles (Minuteman and Peacekeepers) -517 Submarine Based Missiles (Poseidon and Trident) -263 Bombers (B-52 and B-1)	-1,000 Land Based Missiles (Minuteman and Peacekeepers) -432 Submarine Based Missiles (Trident) -115 Bombers (B-52 and B-2)

*Strength Figures as of March 31, 1989.

**Strength Figures as of September 30, 1999.

("What It All Means" continued from page 8)

Russia but with China as well. The rejection of the CTBT by the Senate and the rush to deploy a National Missile Defense are merely the two most prominent pieces of a new wall. This time, however, it is a wall that the U.S. is building, one not just against Russia and China but even against our closest allies who are becoming more and more vocal in their criticism of our conduct.

The fact is that U.S. efforts to forge an impenetrable security wall around itself is a pipedream, not a vision. It will only spur our competitors and adversaries to increase their military spending, which in turn will provide ammunition for U.S. defense hawks to insist on tens of billions more for DoD. The upward spiral of a bloated military budget that heralds a new arms race has already begun. It will be mirrored by a soaring spiral of human deprivation and poverty, often causing revolutions and regional conflicts.

It is not a failure of vision that has brought the world so quickly to the edge of a new and more terrible 21st century arms race. It is a failure to translate the promise of ten years ago into the reality of what our nation has the power to do – lead the world away from continual confrontation and conflict.

Table 2. Arms Deliveries by U.N. Permanent Security Council Members as a Percent of World Total 1989 and 1998

Country	1989	1998
United States	16.48%	35.30%
Soviet Union/Russia	41.65%	6.70%
United Kingdom	11.02%	17.77%
France	5.29%	21.79%
Peoples Republic of China	5.95%	2.01%
COMBINED PERCENT OF WORLD TOTAL	80.39%	83.57%

What It All Means

Ten years ago, when the Berlin Wall came down, people in both the East and the West rejoiced. For the first time since the start of the Cold War there was hope that at last the world might be able to turn from confrontation to cooperation, from huge expenditures on military power to empowering humanity through bringing health, education, and economic opportunity to the hundreds of millions who had been kept in the shadow of war and the preparations for war. The promise of a lasting peace had never been greater.

Slowly but perceptibly over the past ten years, this vision of a world in which human dignity would reign supreme slipped from our grasp. Today we are on the verge of a new arms race – even a new Cold War – this time not just with

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