



# THE DEFENSE MONITOR

The Center for Defense Information believes that strong social, economic, political, and military components and a healthy environment contribute equally to the nation's security. CDI opposes excessive expenditures for weapons and policies that increase the danger of war.

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## Small Arms: A Post-Cold War Disarmament Challenge

In the post-Cold War world, the immediate menace of nuclear war seems to have faded from the forefront of national concern. Instead, politicians emphasize that the U.S. is now at risk from biological and chemical weapons, that the international community is subject to the threats of transnational terrorists, or that "cyberwar" could bring daily life as we know it to an absolute standstill without a shot being fired.

Conspicuously absent from this array of new threats to national and international security is a major weapons category that our leaders rarely mention but which profoundly affects every level of human security. Small arms and light weapons are perhaps the most deadly of all weapons because of their easy availability. With them, a small group can easily turn a peaceful country or region into a major zone of conflict and a humanitarian disaster. Small arms rend the fabric of civil society like no other weapons in the world.

### What Are Small Arms?

Small arms and light weapons include any weapon that can be carried by one or two people, mounted on a vehicle,  
*(continued on page 2)*

## Accidental Nuclear War

It was a simple bureaucratic oversight, but the world may never know how close we came to a cataclysmic disaster.

On an otherwise tranquil November day in 1995, a lone rocket roared skyward from an island off the coast of Norway. Monitors of the Russian Strategic Rocket Force at the Olenegorsk early warning radar sites registered the launch and automatically presumed the worst.

Looking across the landmass of northern Finland, Sweden, and Norway, they saw a missile over the Norwegian Sea only 470 miles away. If they could have waited until the missile reached its maximum altitude of 1,383 kilometers some ten minutes into the flight, the Russian duty officers would have seen that its trajectory was toward the Arctic, well away from Russian territory.

However, the officers could not wait ten minutes to decide whether this was a hostile missile. The entire Russian nuclear weapons chain-of-command had only ten minutes within which to decide whether the country was under hostile attack and give the orders to launch their own retaliatory counterstrike.

The speed and stage of separation made the object seem like a U.S. Trident missile. The missile was very near the

corridor that stretched from the Grand Forks North Dakota Minuteman missile fields to Moscow. Any object in that airspace had to be treated with special caution. In fact, senior Russian officers had envisioned an eerily similar scenario in which a solitary rocket on this trajectory would explode and blind Russian radars to hide a surprise first strike by the United States.

Understandably, preparations to counterattack proceeded at the frantic pace required to avoid a crippling strike on Russia's ballistic missile force. Launch sites went to full alert, which meant the next message could be the order to fire.

The notifications ultimately reached President Boris Yeltsin who was widely reported to have activated his "nuclear keys" for the first time in his tenure. At that point the fate of the world hung on Yeltsin's decision. Even he could not be absolutely certain that Russia was not under attack.

### A Crisis Arising From the Mundane

The bureaucratic oversight was a failure by the Russian Foreign Ministry to relay to the Russian military a

*(continued on page 3)*

## Question:

***How many false indications of missile attacks on the United States did our early warning system generate in one eight year period? How many false warnings in the U.S.S.R/Russia?***

*see page 5*

("Small Arms" continued from page 1 ) or carried by a pack animal. Easily available and lightweight, small arms can be obtained for a few dollars or in some countries even in exchange for a chicken. Examples of small arms and light weapons include machetes, axes, swords, military-style guns (such as AK-47s), grenade launchers, mortars, mobile anti-tank guns, rocket launchers, and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile launchers. Ammunition, grenades, missiles, landmines, and explosives are included in the term.

### **Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Small arms are responsible for 90% of today's war casualties.

### **Small Arms: Weapons of Mass Destruction**

The United Nations (U.N.) believes that small arms and light weapons are responsible for 90% of all war casualties. (Significantly, women and children represent 80% of today's conflict casualties.) All but three of the 49 conflicts since 1990 relied on small arms and light weapons as the only instruments of war. These weapons are being used increasingly in intra-state conflicts because they are cheap, portable, and readily available – which makes them particularly suitable for both governments and non-state actors fighting low-intensity conflicts. A considerable amount of devastation can be wrought by a weapon that may cost only a few dollars. Although

### **Selected U.S. Goals For Controlling Small Arms Proliferation**

1. Creation of an international center to collect and share information on arms transfers.
2. Development of a system to enforce sanctions and embargoes and establish penalties for violations.
3. Completion of a convention on illicit arms trafficking.
4. Restrictions on the export of shoulder-fired missiles.

the costs of small arms and light weapons are low, since the end of World War II they have caused much greater loss of life than have multi-million dollar aircraft, battle tanks, or billion dollar warships.

Perhaps the most sinister and calculated aspects of the trade in and use of small arms and light weapons by state militaries, militias, and insurgents is that children as young as eight years of age can easily be taught to fire an assault rifle or machine gun, making children effective combatants. And in nations where the majority of the population is under 15 or 16, the use of small arms increases both the duration and deadliness of war.

Small arms often remain "at large" when organized conflict ends. They become instruments for other forms of violence such as the disruption of development assistance and interference with efforts to deliver food, medicine, and supplies to people in dire need of relief. Refugees are often afraid to return to their homes because of the large number of weapons retained by fighters who have not been demobilized or who have secret weapons caches in former areas

of conflict. Small arms leave a devastating legacy long after a conflict has officially ended. The difficulty in disarming the Kosovo Liberation Army is a classic case in point.

### **How many weapons?**

The sheer number of small arms and light weapons in circulation around the world is staggering. The U.N. estimates that there are ten million small arms and light weapons in Afghanistan, seven million in West Africa, and another two million in Central America. Overall estimates range from 500 million to as many as one billion small arms in circulation around the world.

The reason for this wide range in estimates is the lack of reliable information regarding the manufacture and distribution of small arms and light weapons worldwide. Another factor is the lack of data on the estimated hundreds of millions of weapons designated for police or civilian use. Information on these weapons is rarely reported in official statistics on the arms trade.

Although new small arms and light weapons continue to be produced every year, the old ones don't go away. The long life-span of small arms means they can be just as lethal 50 years after manufacture as when new. And as the table on the following page concerning the production of assault rifles reveals, proven designs continue to be made.

### **What's Being Done?**

For too long, governments and policy makers have ignored small arms and light weapons, but recently there have been growing expressions of concern.

### **IRONY**

It is ironic that American servicemen in Kosovo face a serious risk of loss of life or limb to landmines and booby traps. The Defense Department has steadfastly opposed the Ottawa Landmine Treaty which has been signed by 135 nations and ratified by 83. No lives were lost during the 78 day bombing mission, but there is a probability that members of the NATO Peacekeeping Force will suffer injuries or death due to landmines.

Certainly Kosovo's children will be at risk of losing limbs or life for years to come. Every year, worldwide, 26,000 people are crippled or killed by landmines, a majority of whom are women and children.

The U. S. and Turkey are the only two NATO nations that have not signed the treaty, much less ratified it.

In August, 1998 the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency issued a Fact Sheet on "Small Arms Issues: U.S. Policy and Views." Since then, Secretary of State Albright has given two speeches in which she discussed the negative effects of small arms around the world and described what the U.S. and the international community should do to rid the world of these weapons.

This new concern for concerted action on small arms has produced numerous international meetings and calls for action. However, most efforts have been imprecise and ineffective because they attempt to cover too much ground. Furthermore, in some nations, the primacy of domestic gun ownership and gun use legislation has been championed to the detriment of international standards. Three of the most substantial initiatives underway – ones most likely to have a significant impact on small arms – are by the U.N., the Organization of American States, and West Africa. Even these, however, are heavy on talk and light on action.

### Global Action on Small Arms

Perhaps the most encouraging effort to control small arms has been the growing action by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to organize a unified international movement. A major step in this direction took place in August, 1998 when 45 individuals representing 33 NGOs from 18 countries met outside Toronto, Canada to explore collaborative efforts by the international NGO community to

### WHY WORRY NOW? WORRY LATER

The General Accounting Office (June 1999) in recommending against multiple year funding for the Navy's FA-18E/F fighter said it has identified 84 unresolved major deficiencies. While the Navy considers 50 of the 84 deficiencies to be resolved based on a "correction plan," it hasn't revealed the "correction plan" or specified the dates for incorporating and listing the corrections—and has no deadline or dates for incorporating and testing the corrections. As to the remaining 34 deficiencies, the GAO said, "We believe DoD's comments validate the OPEVAL (operational testing and evaluation) Preparedness Team's conclusions stated in our report that beginning OPEVAL without correcting these deficiencies results in a medium risk that the E/F will not successfully complete OPEVAL."

The Navy plans to purchase 548 of the planes at a presently projected cost of \$45 billion, a little over \$70 million per plane.

control the diffusion and misuse of small arms. In October, 1998 these same groups, plus over 150 additional individuals, met in Brussels, Belgium to finalize a platform and structure for this network. From these deliberations emerged the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). Launched at the Hague Appeal for Peace in May, 1999, IANSA is a network of more than 200 organizations dedicated to reducing demand for and supply of small arms, stopping the illegal trade of small arms, reducing the quantities of guns in circulation, and reversing the culture of violence. When one recalls the magnitude and force of the Nobel prize-winning global anti-landmines campaign, there is reason to hope that a similar movement can finally end the scourge of small arms that afflicts the world today.

("Nuclear" continued from page 1)  
routine notification of the time and place of the impending scientific missile probe of the upper atmosphere. What Russian radars saw was a Black Brant XII sounding rocket launched to gather data about the Northern Lights.

The Black Brant is a four stage NASA designed rocket. Its first two stages separated below the horizon of the Olenegorsk radar beams. Thus what the Russians first saw was the third stage burn out followed by separation of the spent rocket motor and its shrouds. They interpreted this as the first stage separation of a Trident D-5 missile followed by the jettison of the missile's shrouds.

Because radars do not show visual images, Russian operators saw only symbolic portrayals or blips whose principal cues are velocity and surface area. Given this lack of clarity and the compressed time in which to analyze the radar cues, Russian operators had to presume they were tracking a hostile submarine-launched ballistic missile and not an innocuous scientific probe that had been announced well in advance.

### The Slim Margin For Error

Throughout history, war has frequently been the unintended, unexpected or uncontrolled outcome of seemingly reasonable decisions. This risk could apply equally to

### Estimated Production of Automatic Rifles Since 1947 and the Nations Producing Them

AK Family (Russia, China, Bulgaria, Egypt, Iraq, Poland, Romania, North Korea)	Uzi (Israel)	M-16 (USA)	G-3 (Germany)	FAL (Belgium)
60-70 million	10 million	8 million	7 million	5-7 million

**Words, Words, Words**

“Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have created the widespread impression that U.S. and Russian strategic militaries no longer pose an immediate threat...because of an agreement...to stop aiming those missiles at one another after May 1994. In reality...neither removed the wartime aim points....Neither lengthened the amount of time needed to initiate a deliberate missile strike. And the risk and consequences of an accidental or unauthorized launch were not significantly affected by their pledge.”

Dr. Bruce Blair  
Brookings Institution  
March 1997

nuclear war, although its consequences would be vastly more devastating. The reaction to the Norwegian weather rocket revealed a disturbing dependence on imprecise and inadequate technology and graphically illustrated how much this whole fragile command system relies on only marginally less imperfect human interpretation. Considering the current turmoil and paranoia in Russia, the increasing likelihood of human error is a growing danger.

Because U.S. and Russian missiles have the range and accuracy to hit each other's nuclear weapon silos, each has the ability to destroy a large portion of the other's nuclear forces before they could be used. This danger led inexorably to the “reasonable decision” to plan to launch one's own weapons before they were hit. “Use ‘em or lose ‘em” was the mantra of the cold war era. Twenty minutes – based on an ICBM time of flight –became the deadline for “using ‘em” during the later stages of this very dangerous period.

The addition of submarine-based, sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) further reduced this already short decision window. From underwater positions offshore, submarine-based missiles require a mere ten minutes to strike their targets. Thus the panic at Olenegorsk and the misinterpretation of the data by the duty personnel that made them believe the Black Brant XII missile was hostile. If more evaluation time had

been available, they would have seen the missile reach its maximum altitude – and that would have been the end of the incident.

But in the inevitable fog of war and given the uncertainties of human interpretations of awesome events under great pressure, the ten minutes available within nuclear early warning networks is not enough time to be sure that the correct decision will be made.

### Gaps in Early Warning Accentuate the Risk

The narrow margin for error in nuclear war today arises from the convergence of nuclear weapons doctrine and Russia's woefully inadequate technology. A policy of launch-on-warning, together with the short decision-making cycle, and growing gaps in Russian radar and satellite coverage, all combine to dramatize the slender reed on which survival hangs.

From Russia's perspective, security from a U.S. ICBM attack requires it to monitor constantly a relatively narrow corridor stretching across the North Pole from the North Dakota missile fields. Should that corridor be obscured or, worse, not be visible at all, Russia would be open to a crippling

first strike. Such an attack could leave Russia with only a few nuclear submarines for retaliation. In what masquerades for rational thought in nuclear war theory, this might be judged a worthwhile risk for the attacker.

One way to obscure this missile flight corridor would be to detonate a single nuclear warhead high in the corridor's stratosphere. Gamma rays would ionize the air, creating a flash that would blind radar scopes. The glare would persist for tens of minutes – long enough for a surprise attack to arrive undetected from U.S. ICBM fields. This is precisely what the Russians believed was underway in the Black Brant XII incident.

Compounding the Russian paranoia is the lack of a reliable means for detecting ICBM launches. Russia has a spaced based satellite detection system which, when fully operational, could

#### Emergency Action Conferences to Evaluate Missile Attack Indications

Year	Routine Missile Display Conference (MDC) (Military Commands)	MDCs to Evaluate Possible Threats (Senior DoD Officials)	Threat Assessment Conferences (Senior DoD officials)
1977	1,567	43	0
1978	1,009	70	2
1979	1,544	78	2
1980	3,815	149	2
1981	2,851	186	0
1982	3,716	218	0
1983	3,294	255	0
1984	2,988	153	0

confirm that no first strike was under way. Unfortunately, Russia's early warning satellites are victims of that country's economic and political turmoil. They are positioned in overlapping elliptical orbits and provide the necessary field of view only during a portion of their orbits. But this array has shrunk from nine satellites necessary to provide twenty-

**“Safe” Launch-on-Warning?**

“[I]f any witness should come here and tell you that a totally reliable and safe launch-on-warning posture can be designed and implemented, that man is a fool.”

Dr. Fred Ikle  
Under Secretary of Defense  
Congressional Testimony 1979

four hour coverage to only five today. Russian paranoia about these early warning deficiencies is exacerbated by the knowledge that their U.S. counterparts are fully aware of their vulnerabilities.

Dependent on an aging nuclear warning system that is riddled with gaps, unable to afford the resources to fix the problems, and with a mere ten minutes in which to decide if a real attack might be underway, Russia more so than ever before holds the world hostage to the possibility of nuclear winter. While the Norwegian rocket incident is unlikely to happen again, it illustrates vividly the very real dangers posed to planet Earth by the risk of nuclear war.

**What Can Possibly Go Wrong?**

History shows that the false alarm created by Black Brant XII was not unique. Between 1977 and 1984, when the Defense Department was releasing such data, the U.S. early warning system generated 20,784 false indications of missile attacks against America. At least five percent of these were serious enough to require a second look. Six false warnings escalated to senior level emergency conferences, one step short of a “missile attack conference” involving the President.

Although no statistics have been made public by the Pentagon since 1984, General Lee Butler, former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, has indicated that circumstances have not improved much. In 1996 he said that he had “investigated a dismaying array of accidents and incidents involving strategic weapons and forces.”

Considering that the public data cover only eight of the forty-five years of the Cold

**HOW TIMES HAVE CHANGED**

On January 25, 1989, the Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings on former Senator John Tower’s nomination to be Secretary of Defense. Tower said if the Soviet threat were to diminish “[w]e could obviously reduce our dedication of resources to defense. If there were no threat we’d be spending enormously less than we spend now. We’d be maintaining the kind of army we had in 1938 [which was] about half the size of what the Marine Corps is now.”

War and reflect only what the Pentagon has chosen to release, this is a startling figure. Moreover, given the multi-layered complexity of the U.S. early warning nuclear launch system and the fallibility of human operators, even this number could be an understatement.

Finally, in the short term all these problems are potentially compounded by the millennium bug, the Y2K problem. Even the “experts” are uncertain about the effects of Y2K which, whether random or systemic, could play havoc with early warning networks. Russia’s systems are particularly vulnerable, largely because of insufficient funds, lack of top-down direction, and general indifference.

Considering that Russian nuclear tipped missiles constitute the only real military threat to America, it is highly unwise to continue to ignore these perils.

**Iraq:  
The Forgotten War**

After 78 days the air bombardment of Kosovo is over. Attention has shifted to the peacekeeping operation and the rebuilding efforts there. But the European Union and the United States have made it clear that they will not finance the reconstruction of the rest of Yugoslavia until Slobodan Milosevic has been removed from power.

What just occurred in Yugoslavia ought to seem familiar to Americans, for there are many similarities to U.S. actions with regard to Iraq, the “other American hot war.” Among the most prominent similarities are:

- massive air bombardments,
- the military means and tactics used,
- the repeated demonizing of leaders and calls for their removal,

**Answer:**

***From 1977 through 1984 a total of 20,284 false warning indications were processed, six of which stopped only one level below the President. The 1996 incident in Russia is the only one revealed but it went all the way to President Yeltsin. This is accurately described as living dangerously!***

- the long term use of economic sanctions,
- the need to rebuild a war-ravaged society, and
- the future territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation.

As the world considers its stance with regard to postwar Yugoslavia, its people, and its leaders, the world should reexamine its relationships with Iraq, its people, and its leader, relationships that essentially have remained unchanged – and unredeemed – for the past eight years.

### The Military Confrontation

Since the end of Desert Storm in February, 1991, the U.S. has been the dominant actor in a stormy struggle between Iraq and the U.N. There is no need to recount details of the various confrontations since that time but two issues predominate.

The first is the decision by the United States (abetted by the U.K. and France) to establish no-fly zones within Iraqi airspace, ostensibly to protect Shiite minorities in the south and Kurds in the North. This unprecedented exercise of military control within the airspace of a sovereign nation has been widely criticized by many nations. No apparent justification for such action exists in U.N. resolutions governing Iraqi post-war obligations. It is U.S. determination to sustain the no-fly zones which generate continuing attacks on air defense and communications facilities within Iraq.

The other major issue surrounds Iraq's expulsion of U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors who had been charged with monitoring Iraqi weapons facilities suspected of engaging in proscribed efforts to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons (weapons of mass destruction). This action poisons diplomatic efforts to ameliorate U.N.-Iraqi relations and bring about an end to economic sanctions.

## SHOOTING OURSELVES IN THE FOOT

The Chinese have almost certainly succeeded in penetrating our nuclear labs. According to the Cox Report, the major losses were of nuclear weapons designs. However, most physicists agree that a design is of much less value if it can't be tested. China has, for some time, said they would sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to ban all nuclear testing when the U.S. signed. The Treaty, strongly favored by 74% of Americans, is in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where the Chairman, Senator Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.), refuses to even hold a hearing on it. Meanwhile, the Chinese are free to take advantage of their espionage and test as often as they choose.

Efforts to enforce no-fly zone restrictions and Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions have now degenerated into punitive airstrikes, often on a daily basis. The results of these airstrikes are highly problematic because the Pentagon has adopted a very low-key policy in publicizing the attacks in order to avoid stimulating criticism by Arab governments in the region.

### Shifting Objectives

Having failed to force Saddam to allow UNSCOM's return to monitor Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, the U.S.-led air campaign has been reduced to two apparent objectives. In the short term, the U.S. wants to further weaken Saddam's military forces until they pose no threat to other Gulf states. The long term goal, often denied by the Administration, is to topple Saddam and replace him with a more compliant regime. On March 14, 1998, Secretary of Defense William Cohen made this latter objective crystal clear: "We will continue to talk to our Gulf friends about our long-term goal of helping to bring about a new government that would be fully integrated in the international community."

To further this U.S. objective, in 1998 Congress appropriated \$97 million to support Iraqi opposition groups. However, these groups are so divided and so mistrusted that to

date the Administration has not expended any of the funds.

### Views in the Region

American insistence notwithstanding, major U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf no longer believe that Iraq is a major security threat. Similarly, these nations question the effectiveness of the no-fly zones to protect the Shiites and the Kurds. In fact, appalled by the extent of suffering of ordinary Iraqis, two Persian Gulf sheikdoms, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, have begun shipping relief supplies to Iraq.

Even America's closest Gulf ally, Saudi Arabia, has become uneasy about the continued U.S. aerial campaign. The Saudis have declared that their airfields cannot be used to launch attacks against Iraq, forcing the Pentagon to rely increasingly on carrier-based aircraft and on air force units stationed outside Saudi Arabia.

One reason the Gulf states are uneasy about the continued air assaults is the fear that the no-fly zones suggest potential lines for possibly partitioning Iraq should Saddam Hussein be toppled. As in Kosovo, the western powers have declared that they do not want to partition Iraq. Yet, clearly, the aggressive enforcement of the no-fly zones leaves open the question of whether Iraq is susceptible to a post-Saddam division into a Shiite south, a Kurdish north, and a rump Iraq state in the center controlled by remnants of the current regime or by a new, less hostile, but much weaker, government.

## Resolving the Stand-off

Like it or not, the U.S. has lost almost all support for continued enforcement of the no-fly zones and is on the verge of losing support for continuation of the current economic embargo that excludes everything except food and medicine under the oil-for-food program.

Only concessions by both the U.S. and Iraq will alter the status quo. The fundamental issues are contentious but not intractable. What the United States wants is to prevent Iraq from resuming the production of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Iraq wants the end of economic sanctions and recognition

of its sovereignty within its geographical borders. Under current conditions, neither side can attain its objectives. The question really is: who will have to concede the most to break the current impasse?

### The Core Issues Concerning Iraq

1. United States: Satisfactorily account for nuclear, chemical, and biological materials and production sites and prevent reconstitution of these programs by the current Iraqi regime.
2. Iraq: End the economic embargo and restore Baghdad's sovereignty by ending the no-fly zones.
3. Regional: Stabilize the Gulf and Middle East through normalizing diplomatic relations between Iraq and other Middle East nations, especially its neighbors and other Gulf states.
4. Global: Reestablish the U.N. as the primary monitoring and verification body for all arms control and disarmament activities, particularly those dealing with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

("What Does It All Mean?" continued from page 8 )

millions of small arms and light weapons disproportionately involves non-combatants, women and children who should be spared the horrors of war. In a real sense, small arms are the most deadly weapons in terms of the innocent lives they take.

In Iraq violence has become routine. On a nearly daily basis American planes attack air defense installations within a sovereign nation for no logical reason. Not sanctioned by the U.N. and increasingly resented by Arab neighbors, these regular attacks do not promote any constructive movement toward settlement of outstanding political issues with Iraq. It seems almost that having started this pattern of violence, we don't know how to stop it. Violence for the sake of violence almost always begets more violence.

Then, when one considers the destructive power of the ultimate form of violence, nuclear weapons, it can be seen that ultimately the survival of the human race may depend on bringing an end to violence between nations. Accidental nuclear war remains the greatest threat to humanity today and avoiding one hangs by a slender thread. It could happen through human error, system failure, irrational acts or by the simple working of the laws of chance. Many people today tend to ignore the dangers of nuclear weapons because the "evil empire" is gone. They do so, however, at great peril because of the many ways in which continuing friction and active disagreements with Russia in places like Kosovo produce tensions, fears and misunderstandings. Another Black Brant missile incident in today's setting might not have the same fortunate outcome. The longer nations resort to violence as a means of settling differences in the world, the greater is the certainty we will all suffer the final violent cataclysm.

Only by reducing reliance on military weapons can we increase the chances of living together in peace.



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## What Does It All Mean?

The three subjects addressed in this Monitor are closely linked by a single theme. World affairs today are dominated by violence or the threat of violence in far too many situations.

The booming, pernicious international traffic in small arms foments violence within nations based on political, ethnic and religious issues. At the same time it supports violence directed at neighboring nations across borders to contest economic and territorial disputes. In both situations the ready availability of arms inhibits constructive diplomatic and domestic political efforts to resolve differences through non-violent means. Meanwhile, the violence engendered by

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