



# THE DEFENSE MONITOR

The Center for Defense Information believes that strong social, economic, political, and military components and a healthy environment contribute equally to the nation's security. CDI opposes excessive expenditures for weapons and policies that increase the danger of war.

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## What's Inside:

- **Landmines: Deadly Hidden Killers (page 3)**
- **Barbarism (page 2)**
- **Gender Gap (page 5)**
- **Spending Priorities? (page 6)**
- **CDI's 1999 Military Almanac (page 7)**

## Jump-START: A Way Ahead in Nuclear Arms Reductions

A violent air war against Serbia and the immense problems of dealing with the consequences of that war have dominated world news for months. Little attention is being paid to a much more dangerous problem, the enduring issue of too many nuclear weapons still maintained on high alert in both Russia and the United States. As incomprehensible as this fact may be, the two nations continue to face each other 24 hours per day with thousands of nuclear weapons atop long range missiles on a hair trigger, ready for use in as little as five minutes.

If this status quo were not bad enough, many authorities in both nations believe that chaotic economic and political conditions in Russia threaten the security and control of its nuclear weapons. Doubts are growing as to whether the Russian military, which has control of Russia's nuclear weapons, will continue to submit to civilian control.

It is ironic, but true, that as the numbers of nuclear weapons decrease, the danger that they may actually be used is increasing. It is folly, verging on madness, to perpetuate the Cold War nuclear confrontation at levels that threaten the survival of human kind.

(continued on page 5)

## Taiwan – the Other China Steps Out

Fully armed military aircraft from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan are racing over the 100 mile-wide Taiwan Straits that separates the two, each daring the other to make a mistake. What caused tensions to mount so high as to risk accidental war?

### The Background

Since the defeat of the Chinese Nationalists by Mao Zedong's forces in 1949, the U.S. has struggled with its desire to stand by a WWII ally and the reality that the world's most populous nation had become communist.

In the 1950s, with military tensions high, the U.S. patrolled the Taiwan Straits with aircraft carrier battle groups.

In the 1960s, as the U.S. became preoccupied with Vietnam, military threats in the Taiwan Straits declined. Then, in 1972, Asia's strategic ground shifted perceptibly when President Richard Nixon visited Beijing, publicly setting U.S.-PRC relations on a new footing. By the decade's end, the U.S. had extended full diplomatic recognition to Beijing as the government of all China, withdrawn recognition of the Republic of China on Taiwan, and accepted the principle of "one China." The PRC also assumed the U.N. Security Council seat reserved for China. Taiwan lost its seat even in the General Assembly because it was no longer regarded as a nation.

But an unhappy Congress passed the

1979 Taiwan Relations Act which declares the U.S. will continue to provide defensive arms to Taipei until the final, peaceful integration of Taiwan with the PRC is accomplished. The Taiwan Relations Act also committed the U.S. to aid Taiwan in the event it came under an unprovoked attack.

### The U.S. - China Triangle

An earlier Defense Monitor (No. 3, 1999) looked at U.S.- PRC relations. But U.S.-Chinese relations must account for a third player, Taiwan. Although the U.S. does not formally recognize Taiwan, American officials have frequent exchanges with their Taiwanese counterparts. America is Taiwan's main arms supplier: in the period 1994-1996 the U.S. sold Taiwan \$4.1 billion in arms, 81% of Taiwan's total arms imports.

Between 1993 and 1996, relationships with Beijing recovered from their low point after Tiananmen Square (June 1989) and the 1992 sale of F-16s to the Taipei government. In 1996 relations again deteriorated because of another arms sale to Taiwan that included Stinger ground-to-air missiles. Allegations of illegal campaign contributions by Chinese authorities and PRC espionage against the U.S., the delay in the PRC's accession to the World Trade

(continued on page 2)

## Question:

***How many potentially deadly cluster bomb "bomblets" remain unexploded in Kosovo?***

*see page 5*

**("Taiwan" continued from page 1)**

Organization, the U.S. bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade during the air war against Yugoslavia, and congressional moves to pass a new Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, continue to sour the diplomatic atmosphere.

### The Impact of Economics

Trade complicates all Taiwan-PRC-U.S. issues. China, with a population of 1.2 billion (Taiwan has 22 million), is a potentially vast market for U.S. products and services. U.S.-China trade already stands at more than \$90 billion annually, two thirds of which are Chinese exports to America.

At the same time, Taiwan's economy is Asia's fourth largest and the island ranks as the seventh largest U.S. trade partner. Economic relations between the PRC and Taiwan are growing. Taiwanese investments in mainland China exceed \$35 billion, and

Recent U.S. Sales of Major Combat Systems/Arms to Taiwan		
Equipment Designation	Year Ordered/License Approved	# Ordered
Perry Class Frigate	1989	7
F-16A Fighter Bomber*	1992	150
AH-1W Cobra Attack Helo	1992	42
AIM-7M Sparrow Air-to-Air Missile	1992	600
AIM-9S Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile	1992	900
M60A3 Battle Tanks	1994	160
Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) Ground-to-Air Missiles	1994	200
M109A Howitzer	1995	28
Avenger Surface-to-Air Missile	1996	74
FIM-92A Stinger Ground-to-Air Missiles	1997	1299
TOW-2 Antitank Missiles	1997	1786
Knox Class Frigate**	1997	5

\*In 1992 Taiwan bought 60 Mirage 2000-5 Fighter Bombers from France.

\*\*In 1996 Taiwan bought 6 La Fayette Class Frigates from France.

Sources: The Military Balance 1998/99; SIPRI YearBook 1998.

### Barbarism

The world watched in horror as almost 1,000,000 Albanians were forced from their homes in Kosovo to escape Serb brutality. Now almost 200,000 Serbs have fled Kosovo to escape Albanian brutality. Only 30,000 remain.

Random killings by anyone that targets people because of their ethnicity is barbarism at its worst.

although no direct trade occurs across the Taiwan Straits ("middle" countries and Hong Kong are used), the PRC is Taiwan's third largest trading partner.

### Dictatorship vs. Democracy

While economics can build relationships, differing political systems can divide. In 1996 Taiwan held its first direct presidential election. The PRC conducted large scale military maneuvers in Fujian province, directly across from Taiwan, including a simulated amphibious assault and major naval exercises in the Taiwan Straits.

More ominously, the Chinese fired four surface-to-surface missiles toward Taiwan, coming as close as 20 miles to the island. The U.S. sent two aircraft carrier battle groups which hovered just outside the Taiwan Straits in a not so subtle show of support for Taiwan.

What upset the PRC was the stance taken by President Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese native who became president in 1988 under the indirect legislative selection process then in effect. While expressing willingness to resume direct discussions with the PRC (broken off after 1993), Lee said that Taipei would seek both increased international recognition (it maintains diplomatic relations with approximately 30 nations) and U.N. membership. These statements, together with his call for a peace treaty between his island and the mainland, were indications that Lee was moving away from the facade of the "one China" policy.

### How Many Chinas?

Mr. Lee declared that Taiwan and China should conduct their future relations and discussions on a "state-to-state" basis. Although stopping

short of declaring independence, he set in motion a new dynamic – a two-China or a one China-one Taiwan position – which could be interpreted as the prelude to such a declaration.

President Lee's motivations are unknown. Some China experts cite Lee's desire to tilt next year's presidential elections in favor of his vice-president. Others cite his belief that the world ought to acknowledge that Taiwan is, de facto, a functioning democracy and grant formal diplomatic recognition, open membership status in international organizations, and even reinstate it in the U.N. General Assembly.

While these may both be significant factors, there may be another: as the first Taiwanese-born elected ruler, Mr. Lee may be asserting that native Taiwanese have a separate identity and separate destiny from the mainland.

### Defusing the Latest Crisis

Whatever Mr. Lee's motives, his statements and those of his aides infuriated Beijing, which regards Taiwan as a renegade province. Although Beijing has threatened to use force should Taiwan declare independence and has increased the number of surface-to-surface missiles opposite the island, mainland forces still cannot mount a credible amphibious assault against Taiwan.

In July 1999, President Clinton said that the U.S. fully supported the one China policy and the peaceful resolution of Taiwan-PRC divisions. He also reaffirmed that the U.S. would come to Taiwan's aid should it be attacked by the PRC. China then raised tensions by testing its new 5,000 mile Dongfeng 31 (DF-31) surface-to-surface missile in early August.

The U.S. has sent high level delegations to the PRC and Taiwan to try to diffuse the crisis. Washington also has postponed a visit to Taipei by Pentagon officials who planned to discuss including Taiwan in a comprehensive western Pacific theater missile defense system for South Korea and Japan. Nonetheless, a \$550 million arms sale that includes surveillance aircraft and spare parts for Taiwan's air force has been started.

President Lee says his remarks do not presage an independence declaration. Still, calling for a "special state-to-state" relationship with Beijing does not help attempts to reconcile differences with Beijing.

### What Lies Ahead

The U.S. is caught between the Scylla of being unwilling to abandon a vibrant democracy and the Charybdis of avoiding a new dispute with the PRC that might inadvertently lead to war. With reduced influence in Beijing and Taiwan's growing assertiveness, steering a safe course between these dangers will be difficult. These obstacles are magnified because a leading contender in Taiwan's 2000 presidential election advocates independence. Meanwhile, the U.S. Senate is debating a Taiwan Security Enhancement Act that would allow the sale of more U.S. arms – including ballistic missile defenses – to Taipei.

Perhaps the best the U.S. can do to calm the waters between the PRC and Taiwan is to stress U.S. policy continuities: there is only one China and a peaceful resolution of all PRC-Taiwan disputes is the best way forward.

Simultaneously, without abandoning fundamental positions, the U.S. must redouble its efforts to remove obstacles in relations with Beijing in human rights, democracy, and especially trade. America must also keep China fully engaged in security issues important to the U.S. – nonproliferation and the four-power talks on Korea.

## Landmines: Deadly Hidden Killers

### Where We Are Today

When the Ottawa Landmines Treaty was signed in December 1997, many thought the global scourge of landmines would be controlled. Unfortunately, that has not been the case. Many countries, especially the poorest, are affected by these hidden killers. The U.S. State Department believes there are still 60-70 million landmines buried in 68 countries.

The trauma that landmines inflict is unimaginable and indiscriminate. Landmines were responsible for one-third of all U.S. casualties in Vietnam and for 20% of U.S. casualties in the Gulf War. In Bosnia, landmines have maimed or killed 50 NATO personnel and are hampering the peace mission in Kosovo.

Landmines maim or kill every 22 minutes -- 26,000 people a year. Most victims are civilians; 30-40% are children.

### Ottawa Treaty

The Ottawa Treaty Banning the Use, Production, Stockpiling, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines was opened for signature in December 1997. It entered into force March 1, 1999. In May 1999, the States that are parties to the Treaty met in Mozambique to discuss progress on the global ban on landmines. At this gathering, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) issued the Landmine Monitor, a country-by-country report on treaty compliance, current national policies, and actions taken to clear mine fields. The report represents the first time non-governmental organizations have played the role of treaty verifiers.

The Landmines Treaty has been signed by 135 countries and ratified by 85. The U.S. has done neither.

### Continued Use

Although stressing that there had been no significant transfers of landmines since the Treaty signing, the

report noted that landmines continue to be planted. Evidence was presented of continued use of landmines in at least 13 conflicts. Three Treaty signatories – Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola – were accused of violating the Treaty. The Monitor also detailed evidence that landmines are still being used in many countries in Africa and Asia.

### Recent Confirmed Landmine Use

Country and Region	Used By
Africa	
Angola	Government and rebels
Djibouti	Rebels
Guinea-Bissau	Government, rebels, and Senegalese forces
Somalia	Various factions
Uganda	Rebels
Americas	
Colombia	Rebel groups
Asia-Pacific	
Afghanistan	Opposition forces
Burma	Government and rebel groups
Sri Lanka	Government and rebels
Europe/Central Asia	
Georgia	Partisans (in Abkhazia)
Turkey	Government and rebels
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	Government and rebels
Middle East/North Africa	
Lebanon	Israel and non-state actors in occupied south Lebanon

Source: Landmine Monitor Executive Summary

### Treaty Holdouts

A high priority of the ICBL is to get Treaty holdouts to sign, particularly Russia, China, and the U.S. All three recently have made positive statements about signing. At the G-8 meeting in Bonn this past June, Boris Yeltsin said that Russia would sign the Ottawa Treaty although he set no deadline. China has expressed

support for the concept of the Treaty, and the U. S. said it will sign by 2006 "if suitable alternatives are found."

Other regionally significant nations have not signed. The volatile Middle East could quickly become a "landmine wasteland" since only Jordan has signed and ratified the Treaty. In Asia, nations such as India, Pakistan, and North and South Korea have yet to sign.

Africa remains the continent most affected by landmines. Most nations signed the Treaty, but the eight that haven't – the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, and Morocco – are high risk areas for landmine use.

### Stockpiles

The danger of new use is fueled by the existence of large landmine stockpiles that can be moved all to easily between countries. Destroying stockpiled landmines costs only a few dollars per device whereas removing them from the ground can cost up to a thousand dollars each. Considering that at least 108 countries have stockpiled more than 250 million landmines – a number more than three times larger than the number buried – destroying stockpiles is a cost-effective way to control this problem. In fact, 30 countries have already destroyed over 12 million landmines.

The U.S. stockpile is stored in ten other nations: Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Spain, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. In seven of these ten nations that have signed the Ottawa Treaty, the U.S. is under pressure to destroy or remove its landmines because storage violates the spirit of the Treaty.

### The U.S. Policy Flip-Flop

At one time the U.S. led the effort to

#### Largest Landmine Stockpiles

China	110 million
Russia	60-70 million
Belarus	Tens of millions
United States	11 million

eliminate landmines. It was the first to take significant unilateral action to curb exports by enacting a one-year moratorium on such transactions in 1992. In 1994 President Clinton was the first to call for the eventual elimination of landmines. Further legislation imposed a one-year moratorium on using anti-personnel landmines except along international borders and demilitarized zones.

But in the last eighteen months, apparently at the Pentagon's insistence, not only has the U.S. withdrawn from the fight but it is now resisting controls on landmines.

A still largely confidential Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) governs current U.S. policy. From what is known, the PDD says that the U.S. will not use anti-personnel mines (except "mixed-use" or combined anti-personnel/anti-tank systems) anywhere except in Korea after 2003. The PDD also pledges that the U.S. will sign the Ottawa Treaty by 2006 if suitable alternatives to anti-personnel and mixed-use mines are developed by then.

The PDD incorporates the two U.S. objections to the Ottawa Treaty. The Pentagon argued that landmines are "crucial to stopping any 'human wave attacks' of North Koreans into South Korea." Therefore the option to use landmines in Korea cannot be ruled out. The Treaty also bans the "mixed-use system" on which U.S. forces rely extensively.

The Pentagon claims that finding alternatives to mixed-use systems is their first priority. In fact, following Mr. Clinton's May 1998 statement that the U.S. would sign the Ottawa Treaty by 2006 "if alternatives were found," the Pentagon pledged that development of alternatives would be completed by 2006. But looking at what the Pentagon is doing raises questions about their real priorities.

The Pentagon's Fiscal Year 2000 budget requests \$48.3 million for developing an artillery fired mixed-use

system called RADAM. The presence of anti-personnel mines in RADAM undercuts the language in the PDD which pledges that anti-personnel landmines will not be used after 2003. Any use of RADAM, whose estimated procurement cost is \$200 million, would violate the Ottawa Treaty which bans mixed-use systems.

On the positive side, the U.S. has budgeted \$100 million for demining, an increase from the 1998 budget of \$82 million. To its credit, the United States also provides millions of dollars for survivor assistance programs.

### Kosovo

In spite of diplomatic achievements and increased public awareness, landmines continue to wreak havoc on increasing numbers of people. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) puts the mine injury rate in Kosovo at 10 per 100,000 people, a rate comparable to Afghanistan and higher than that of Mozambique. Deaths and injuries will continue to mount as people return to bobby-trapped homes and to fields and woods strewn with mines. With hours of tedious work, the threat from landmines will diminish in Kosovo, but the consequences – physical, psychological, and social – are a legacy that will linger for decades.

Over 150 people have been killed or injured by landmines or unexploded ordnance in Kosovo. 71% of these landmine victims are under 24 years old.

### Next Steps

The Ottawa Treaty was a great international achievement. However, it is not the end of the fight against landmines. The Treaty can fulfill its promise only with the full support of the major powers. That is why U.S. ratification and a formal NATO "no-use" declaration are so important. Combining enlightened policies with continued funding for demining efforts and victim assistance just might produce a permanent reduction in the human devastation that landmines create.

(continued from page 1)

## The Record of Arms Control Efforts

For many years during and immediately following the Cold War, conventional wisdom dictated a formal approach to reducing the risks of nuclear war. During the Cold War bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR were conducted under the rubric of "arms control." Despite the appearance of progress, this arms control process did not check the Cold War competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and nuclear arsenals continued to become even more reliable, accurate and deadly as negotiations dragged on year after year.

In addition, the traditional arms control process contains an inherent stumbling block: the prolonged period required to implement massively detailed formal agreements. The current example of this problem is START II which was signed in 1993 but has yet to be ratified by Russia. Even when ratified it will not, at best, be fully effective until 2007 when each side will still have 3000-3500 strategic warheads fully deployed. In effect, 16 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia will still be locked in a deadly nuclear confrontation with no end in sight because of the shortcomings of the arms control process.

### Jump-START

The growing awareness of the increasing dangers of our nuclear standoff with Russia and the inadequacy of the classic arms control process motivated a group of experts to gather in Washington, D.C. in 1997 to consider practical measures to cut through the bureaucratic inertia which perpetuates the present nuclear confrontation. Meeting as the "Committee on Nuclear Policy," 39 individuals from Russia and the United States representing the views of academia, the military, governments and non-governmental organizations (NGO) carefully crafted a new approach to arms control. Their final report was entitled "Jump-START: Retaking the Initiative to Reduce Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers."

Following the Committee's analysis, the report frames its recommendations to

## Gender Gap

Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), Chairman of both the Appropriations Committee and the Defense Subcommittee, recently lamented the lack of "unified support for a defense increase in the United States." He clearly identified the recalcitrants, saying "women don't support large expenditures that are necessary to modernize the force," adding "there's all these touchy-feely things out there that they want to spend money on."

What the Senator really meant, said a spokesman, was that "there is a gender gap there, that women are not necessarily as supportive of defense issues as are men."

Perhaps American women know something Senator Stevens doesn't.

address three primary requirements to accelerate reductions in nuclear dangers: 1) Deep Reductions; 2) Removing the Hair Trigger; and 3) Fissile Material and Warhead Controls. These measures are entirely logical and progressive. First, drastically reduce the number of weapons on both sides; then make those remaining less readily available for use; and finally, install positive measures to insure the security and accountability of all warheads and fissile material removed from operational weapons.

The practical precedent for this approach is found in the actions of Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991 when Mr. Bush ordered the pull back of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons from deployed U.S. land, sea and air forces. President Gorbachev responded in kind, withdrawing all tactical weapons from Warsaw Pact territory and from the non-Russian republics of the USSR and designating thousands of these weapons for dismantlement. This reciprocal initiative to reduce nuclear dangers was taken without negotiations, formal agreements or delay – an example of positive

leadership which Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin would be wise to emulate.

### I DEEP REDUCTIONS

Recognizing that the formal treaty process is unresponsive to today's urgent need to reduce nuclear dangers, the Committee on Nuclear Policy recommended that the United States should lead in taking a series of five steps down the nuclear weapons' ladder.

1.) Supplement formal arms control treaties with parallel, reciprocal and verifiable reductions.

Rationale: Using the already existing framework of formal agreements to reduce nuclear weapons, simply proceed to much lower numbers of weapons than already agreed.

2.) Immediately declare U.S. intentions to reduce its nuclear arsenal, along with Russia, to 1,000 deployed strategic nuclear weapons within the next decade.

Rationale: For both economic and technological reasons, Russia recognizes that its numbers of strategic weapons are going to shrink steadily over the next 10 years. By committing itself to move downward in order to maintain rough parity, the U.S. opens the door for Russia to move more quickly in the direction they must go anyway. At the same time we signal a

## Answer:

***With an expected dud rate of 5%, 11,110 of the estimated 222,200 bomblets dropped on Kosovo by the United States remain unexploded.***

clear intention not to seek an advantage over Russia by exploiting its growing problems.

3.) Offer cradle-to-grave transparency on the status of all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons.

Rationale: If the Russians try to conceal their shrinking strategic strength, they will create uncertainty and generate instability in our strategic relationship. Both nations will be best served by maintaining a clear picture of their declining stockpiles.

4.) With transparency permitting effective verification, continue reductions to approximately 1,000 weapons each.

Rationale: 1,000 nuclear weapons are more than enough to deter nuclear adventures by either party. At the same time, this level of weapons would pave the way for approaches to the other nuclear armed nations to join in further steps to reduce nuclear dangers.

5.) Engage the other nuclear weapons states in multilateral talks on further reductions in deployed nuclear weapons.

Rationale: China has made it clear that it would be willing to entertain proposals for reductions, or elimination, of nuclear weapons when the U.S. and Russia reach levels comparable to China's. The U.K. and France would appear likely to join such discussions.

The goal of 1,000 weapons coincides with the proposed limit called for in a report by the National Academy of Sciences, The Future of Nuclear Weapons. It would also move the five nuclear weapons states significantly closer to meeting their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

### Spending Priorities for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?

Congressional Defense authorizers have added \$8.3 billion above the President's request to the FY2000 Defense budget. That makes this budget a handsome \$288.8 billion, an increase of \$20 billion over FY1999. With schools crumbling all over America, both parties tell us that defense spending must be increased. Why? Because neither side wants to be accused of "being soft on defense" in next year's elections.

What we're not told is what the threat is that warrants such an exorbitant increase in defense spending. Nor are we told how much will have to be cut in education, housing, health care and other programs to pay for the increases in defense spending.

### II REMOVING THE HAIR-TRIGGER

It is illogical for the U.S. and Russia to continue to maintain massive, destructive nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert eight years after the end of the Cold War. Because nothing would do more to end Cold War suspicions than removing this threat, the Committee called for four steps to signal a new relationship.

1.) Immediately stand down, alongside Russia, all nuclear forces slated for destruction under START II.

Rationale: The parties have already agreed that these forces are not required for the security of either state. It is a costly, dangerous mistake to continue them on alert up to the day they are removed from their launchers for destruction. Standing down these forces would immediately reduce the numbers of weapons on maximum alert in each nation to 500, an overall reduction of approximately 75%.

2.) U.S. and Russia simultaneously eliminate the launch-on-warning option from nuclear war plans.

Rationale: This option creates the greatest risk of nuclear war through system failure, human error, false

intelligence or terrorist actions. The U.S. already has, in effect, taken this action with respect to China – why not also for Russia?

3.) Begin discussions among all five nuclear states on verifiably removing all nuclear forces from hair-trigger alert.

Rationale: French and British forces already maintain low readiness status while China shows no indications of high alert status. Mutual, verifiable arrangements affecting all five would be particularly reassuring to Russia.

4.) Eliminate massive attack options from all nuclear war plans.

Rationale: This is a corollary to reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons and would acknowledge that premeditated, mutually suicidal strategic bombardments are both implausible and unthinkable.

### III FISSILE MATERIAL AND WARHEAD CONTROLS

As weapons are reduced and readiness for use lowered, mutual security interests require that nuclear weapons and the essential ingredients to make them do not then fall into hostile hands. With the escalating economic crisis in Russia, immediate action is needed to consolidate, secure, and account for all stockpiles of nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear materials. A comprehensive accounting and monitoring regime for warheads and fissile materials is critical to verifying that deep reductions are made and to making them irreversible. Such a regime would also provide an urgently needed defense against proliferation to other states or sub-national groups.

### Armageddon at the Ready

	TODAY		JUMP-START	
	U.S.	Russia	U.S.	Russia
Total Deployed Strategic Weapons	6,417	7,540**	1,000	1,000
On High Alert*	2,600	2,000	500	500

\*Approximate number ready within 5 minutes.

\*\*Declared Russian figure. Believed to exceed actual strength.

Toward these ends, the Committee proposed three steps.

1.) Help to shrink Russia's nuclear weapons complex by consolidating its weapons-usable materials into the smallest possible number of locations and by promoting alternative employment in Russia's nuclear production cities.

Rationale: Nuclear weapons and fissile materials are too dispersed in Russia and cost too much to keep secure. Alternative employment programs would do much to reduce risks of defection of nuclear qualified personnel to third world nations.

2.) Help to install modern security and accounting systems and provide the resources needed to create a cradle-to-grave transparency and monitoring system for all warheads and fissile materials.

Rationale: The chaotic state of Russian security procedures and nuclear records requires a major effort to account for all materials and install positive controls over all weapons and fissile material in order to reduce possible theft or sale of these items to other nations.

3.) Triple current U.S. funding to help Russia accomplish 1) and 2).

Rationale: It is vital to U.S. security interests to reduce the possibility of the spread of Russian fissile material and

scientific expertise to other nations bent upon creating their own nuclear weapons. Dollar for dollar, money spent on these tasks will reduce nuclear dangers far more than any other investment the U.S. could make in either offensive or defense nuclear programs.

### Jump-START Rewards

Jump-START is intended to supplement and expedite, not supplant or negate, the approach and accomplishments of formal arms control agreements by more timely, practical reductions in the dangers posed by the current U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. At the same time, it sets the stage for productive multilateral security arrangements among all nuclear powers. Jump-START also offers immediate practical rewards in two areas:

Cost – The U.S. alone spends as much as \$30 billion each year to maintain and enhance its nuclear warfighting forces. While Russia, the U.K., France and China spend far less,

they too would enjoy significant savings as nuclear dangers diminished.

Non-Proliferation – One of the highest security objectives of all the nuclear powers is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more nations. Having pledged again in 1995 to the ultimate goal of total nuclear disarmament, the five Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council could show their commitment to honor that pledge by taking Jump-START actions at an early date. This would go far to strengthen an effective global non-proliferation regime.

It is difficult to imagine a more constructive and comprehensive approach to increased security than a program which reduces nuclear weapons, reduces the hair-trigger nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and Russia, increases the security and accountability for nuclear weapons in Russia, saves money, and inhibits the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Jump-START is just such a program.

#### JUMP-START: GOOD FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD

- Reduces Nuclear Weapons.
- Reduces the number of U.S. and Russian strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert.
- Increases accountability and security of Russian nuclear weapons and fissile material.
- Saves U.S. dollars and Russian rubles.
- Inhibits the further spread of nuclear weapons around the world.

#### ("What Does It All Mean?" continued from page 8)

It isn't just the Chinese. A recent New York Times Magazine headlined a story, "Who Lost Russia?" – a takeoff on the 50 year debate on "Who Lost China?" During the Cold War Russians believed that NATO was a real military threat, but they also believed their hardships were largely the result of both their bureaucracy and the need to be strong militarily. Now Russian leaders, fearing a political backlash for toadying up to the U.S. to get billions in loans, are willing to let their people believe that their hardships are largely due to U.S. meddling in their internal affairs, a belief that reinforces their understandable antipathy about NATO expansion and the bombing of their long time ally, Serbia.

Even the Europeans are tiring of U.S. efforts to control both the U.N. and NATO. The European Union, mostly NATO allies, is building its own defensive alliance. While the effort is unlikely to succeed since it would require cutting popular domestic programs, the U.S. should regard the move as a healthy sign of a Europe willing to take care of its own security.

In short, one doesn't have to be isolationist to recognize that badgering others (especially Russia and China) to do as we tell them is a poor substitute for a vigorous foreign policy. Our time and money could more wisely be spent building a better, more just society of our own for other nations to emulate instead of trying to force our system on them.

As George Kennan also said, it is they who have to live with their solutions, not us.



**IT'S HERE AT LAST** - *CDI's 1999 Military Almanac. It has everything you need to know about the U.S. military. You'll find it one of the most enlightening documents you've ever read. Get copies for friends. Price is \$15. Order today from the address on this Defense Monitor.*



### What Does It All Mean?

Previous Monitors have used this space to link the main threads of each issue. While we will usually adhere to this practice, occasionally something comes to our attention which speaks to the kind of overarching view that Americans believe should help shape our nation's foreign policy.

A recent interview of George Kennan, one of the great historians and political thinkers of this century, is one such case. Mr. Kennan said, "I see no reason, in particular, for these ups and downs in our perceived relations with China. What do we expect of the Chinese?" He added that it is in ill grace for us to be talking down to them, implying that they "ought to learn to govern themselves as we do."

(continued on page 7)



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