



THE DEFENSE MONITOR

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What's Inside...

- Words vs. Bombs: Could Preventive Diplomacy Have Averted War In Yugoslavia? What Are the Options Now? (page 5)

Congress Moves to Boost Military Spending

In mid-April, both the House and Senate adopted the conference report on the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Resolution which set overall federal spending levels. While the two original versions varied slightly, both added \$8 billion to the President's proposed \$12 billion increase for the Pentagon.

Congress' decision to add \$8 billion to the President's military spending request represents the latest round of political one-upmanship between the Administration and Congress that started last September. In a letter to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, President Clinton indicated that he would support \$1 billion in additional funding for troop readiness and spare parts, although he indicated that the funding should be offset by reductions in other areas of the Pentagon's budget.

At the time, Congress was working on a supplemental spending package for military operations in Bosnia. The White House had requested these funds early in the year, saying the money should be treated as an emergency, which would eliminate the necessity of cutting other programs as required by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA).

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Do We Really Need Three New Fighters?

The President's budget for Fiscal Year 2000 gives only a tiny glimpse of the single most expensive military program in history. This is the planned purchase of three new tactical aircraft. Because the program spans approximately 20 years, the \$6.6 billion budget request for FY 2000 doesn't sound like much. But the plan is to purchase 3,800 of these new fighters, SO THIS IS ONLY THE TIP OF A \$350 BILLION ICEBERG. What makes this plan so highly questionable is the undeniable fact that the United States can maintain total global air supremacy well into the 21st Century with its present fleet of more than 3,800 unmatched Navy, Marine and Air Force tactical fighter/attack aircraft.

Status of Three New Aircraft

F-22 Raptor – The Air Force proposes to buy 339 of these air supremacy aircraft at the optimistic price of \$62.7 billion (\$187 million each). Several years behind schedule already because of the technological complexity of its design, this stealthy aircraft is intended to be the most capable fighter ever conceived, with the ability to cruise at supersonic speed, with unmatched maneuverability, and with ultra-sophisticated electronics for both offensive and defensive operations. All of these ambitious characteristics have been sources of engineering and

development problems which have seriously delayed the test program and increased costs. Despite the fact that less than 4% of planned tests had been completed, two "pre-production" models were ordered in 1998 and a decision to begin initial low-rate production is planned for November, 1999, when fewer than 600 hours (14%) of a 4,300 hour program of required tests will have been completed.

This rush to commence production of a high risk design aircraft with the lowest number of test hours of any plane ever purchased is noteworthy. There is no legitimate reason to expedite the procurement of the most expensive fighter ever produced. It was sold to Congress in 1990 as necessary to oppose and dominate two new generations of anticipated Soviet fighter aircraft which we now know will never be built. The pressure to expedite the purchase of this plane is due far more to lobbying by the prime contractor – Lockheed Martin – and congressional pressure, than to meet any existing or foreseeable military threat. According to the intelligence community, the F-15 Eagle, the world's finest fighter plane, will match any other fighter plane in the world through 2015-2020.

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Question:

How much does the United States propose to spend this year on preventive diplomacy?

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F/A-18E/F Super Hornet – The Navy and Marine Corps propose to buy 548 of these fighter/attack aircraft at an estimated total cost of \$46.1 billion (\$84 million each). Despite the fact that the new design has encountered substantial testing difficulties including control problems, initial low-rate production of 62 aircraft has already been funded. THIS DECISION IGNORES REPORTS BY THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) THAT TESTS HAVE SHOWN THE PLANE WILL NOT MEET INCREASED RANGE GOALS SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN CONTRACT. The Navy's own test reports found that the Super Hornet's flying performance was only marginally (15%) superior to that of its predecessor, the F/A-18C/D Hornet, in several measures and actually inferior in others.

Overall, it is difficult to justify the greatly increased cost of the Super Hornet compared to that of the earlier Hornet models because of its marginal superiority. The GAO actually recommended termination of the Super Hornet program and recommended production of the F/A-18C/D Hornet be resumed to meet future Navy and Marine Corps replacement aircraft requirements.

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) — The Joint Strike Fighter is still in the preliminary design phase with Lockheed Martin and Boeing Corporation. Each is under contract to design and build competing models in the battle to gain the lead role in the most expensive weapons program ever planned. The plane is to accommodate Air Force, Navy and Marine requirements. Final selection of the prime contractor will be made by the Department of Defense in 2001. Developmental costs are estimated to be \$22 billion, but even this extraordinary figure is in doubt because both contractors are already

reported to be experiencing cost overruns. THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE HAS WARNED THAT THE JSF MAY COST AS MUCH AS 46% MORE THAN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S PROJECTIONS. Bear in mind that there must be three different versions of the final design in order to meet the unique needs of the Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force. History suggests that substantial cost increases should be anticipated as problems emerge during design, engineering and development test phases.

DoD now plans to buy more than 2,800 JSF aircraft for the three services. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the probable cost at \$223 billion, although DoD projections are \$153 billion. The last time DoD attempted to develop a multi-service fighter aircraft, the TFX, the program was a colossal and expensive failure because of competing demands among the services.

Although it is too early to assess the JSF and how it might meet our valid military requirements in the future, the technological and performance problems, together with the growing costs of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F programs, raise a critical question. IS THERE ANY URGENT MILITARY

REQUIREMENT WHICH DICTATES RUSHING THESE TROUBLED NEW AIRCRAFT MODELS INTO PRODUCTION? THE ANSWER IS A CLEAR NO. The United States faces absolutely no military threat which it is not already fully prepared to meet in terms of both the numbers and quality of existing tactical aircraft. This is true today and for the foreseeable future.

This is not to say we should discontinue research and development on new model tactical aircraft. This work must continue. But to rush into producing these incredibly expensive new aircraft which are not needed for the next ten years is needlessly wasteful. The immensely capable fleet of F-14, F-15, F-16, F-117 and F/A-18 tactical aircraft which now exercise unchallenged control of the skies over Iraq and Serbia can continue to do so indefinitely because we don't have even a potential adversary building an advanced aircraft able to contest American air supremacy in the foreseeable future. Certainly, research and development programs should continue to ensure readiness to meet any unforeseen challenges ahead, but the huge investment required to fund present procurement plans is totally unwarranted.

The Center for Defense Information Recommendations:

1) Terminate the F/A-18E/F program with the 62 planes already funded. Additional F/A-18C/D Hornets should be built to meet replacement needs for the Navy and Marine Corps as the GAO has recommended.

2) Terminate the F-22 program immediately, using the already funded 17 aircraft for testing and development work on the advanced technology to be incorporated in those planes. Air Force replacement aircraft needs can be met with additional F-15 and F-16 production at much lower cost.

3) Continue JSF design and development efforts at an efficient pace. Produce 24 development models for extensive testing in order to identify and correct any deficiencies that arise during the testing process. Defer a production decision until such time as there is a valid military requirement and when reliable, militarily effective aircraft can be produced economically without further modifications.

This "step back and take a careful look" approach to the tactical aircraft needs of U.S. forces is guaranteed to save money and produce safe, reliable and effective fighter aircraft when they are needed, not before. To rush forward with premature replacements of the finest aircraft in the world puts the U.S. into an outrageously expensive arms race with ourselves — no one else is even close.

(continued from page 1 "Budget")

Congress, however, decided to up the ante. It declared all the funding to be an “emergency” and increased Pentagon spending by a total of \$8.3 billion dollars, including the funding for Bosnia and so-called readiness and spare parts. Also included was a “slush fund” of nearly \$1 billion in new spending for ballistic missile defense which nobody had ever requested.

Any remaining congressional opposition to the Pentagon spending increase was softened by the inclusion of \$13 billion in non-defense “emergency” spending. As a result, a number of members of Congress who might have opposed increased spending for the military supported the bill because it also included additional funding for domestic programs they supported.

While the White House was negotiating with Congress over the supplemental legislation, President Clinton recognized that support for even more dramatic increases for the military was growing in Congress. He urged Defense Secretary William Cohen to reexamine the Pentagon’s funding needs as DoD prepared the FY 2000 budget request. After reducing military spending each year since taking office, the Administration was now indicating its willingness to boost Pentagon funding.

The Result

Thus, the budget request submitted by the President in February, 1999, included \$12 billion in new spending for FY’00, and \$112 billion over the next six years. It included, among other things, a \$4 billion increase for the purchase of new weapons, \$1.3 billion for National Missile Defense, and \$6.6 billion for tactical aircraft modernization. (See accompanying article on tactical aircraft.) It also included a 4.4 percent pay increase for military personnel as a way to improve recruitment and retention of qualified people.

From the moment the President’s budget was made public, proponents of higher Pentagon spending began attacking the proposal as being woefully inadequate. In a highly unusual move, both the House and Senate increased the President’s proposed military pay raise from 4.4% to 4.8% in the first month of the new session. While pay raises are indeed important, such matters have traditionally been addressed as part of the annual authorization process. Congress’ singling out of this particular provision was viewed by many as a cynical attempt by the Republican leadership to “steal back” the military pay raise issue from the Administration, proving once again that jockeying for political advantage can be very expensive to taxpayers.

Even Defense Secretary Cohen criticized Congress’ action, pointing out that further pay increases, without corresponding offsets, would require the Pentagon to come up with an additional \$5 to \$10 billion from their current funding to cover the new proposal.

Tough Choices

The BBA set specific limits on annual discretionary spending — the money the President and Congress must decide to spend each year. In addition, the BBA set caps on the amount of total defense vs. non-defense discretionary spending and created “firewalls” between the two categories. The firewalls prohibit Congress from cutting defense and using the money for domestic programs such as Head Start, or vice versa. While the firewalls expire this year, they will almost certainly be reenacted.

To help fund the defense spending increases included in the FY’00 Budget Resolution, the House proposes a 19% reduction for community and regional development programs, which provide local governments with funds to promote economic development and job creation. The Senate version makes even deeper cuts, reducing these programs by 42%. Both the House and Senate cut the commerce and housing credit accounts by 32%. These funds support small and minority businesses and the Federal Housing Assistance (FHA) program. According to Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), a member of the Appropriations Committee and top-ranking Democrat on the Budget Committee, 100,000 summer jobs will be cut, as well as Head Start, environmental programs, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the FBI, and a host of other programs.

Most telling is the Senate’s proposal to cut the International Affairs budget

Budget Authority: (\$ in Billions)

	FY '00	FY '01	FY '02	FY '03	FY '04	FY '05
President's Request (050)	280.8	300.5	302.4	312.8	321.7	333.0
Budget Resolution	288.8	303.6	308.2	318.3	327.2	328.4
Difference	+8.0	+3.1	+5.8	+5.5	+5.5	-4.6

Total increase over President’s request = \$23.3 billion

(Function 150) by \$4.9 billion to \$12.5 billion, a reduction of 28%. The House goes even further, reducing funding by nearly 36% below the Administration's request. Among other functions, the International Affairs budget pays for U.S. participation in the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as international peacekeeping and refugee assistance.

The congressional leadership's spending priorities are clear – weapons at the expense of job creation and assisting low-income Americans, war-fighting at the expense of international diplomacy.

There are some practical ramifications of the proposed budget as well. According to some estimates, the budget resolution will require a 27% reduction in non-defense discretionary programs by 2004, yet it does not address the hard decisions about how to achieve this cut. There is a growing concern that when members of Congress are actually called upon to vote for the specific cuts needed to make this budget work, they will find the political choices too tough. Unable to reach agreement and pass annual spending bills, Congress may well be faced with additional government shutdowns. In fact, Senator Lautenberg recently referred to the budget proposal as “a roadmap to gridlock.”

Effect of Kosovo on the Budget

In recent years it has become the practice of the Administration and Congress to treat U.S. military operations such as Kosovo as emergencies and fund them outside the normal Pentagon budget. For example, while the Defense Department budget request for Fiscal Year 2000 includes funding

for peacekeeping in Bosnia and enforcing the “no-fly” zones in northern and southern Iraq, funding for operations in Bosnia for the two previous years was treated as emergency spending.

Congress is currently putting together a supplemental spending package to cover the costs of operations in Kosovo through the end of this fiscal year, as well as the costs of last December's operation “Desert Fox” — the four days of air attacks against Iraq. It is likely, given recent history and Congress' willingness to add significantly to the defense budget in order to fund “day-to-day” operations of the military, that much if not all of the additional spending will either be declared an “emergency” or be paid for by offsets taken from outside the Pentagon's budget. The President has suggested an appropriation of \$5 to \$6 billion. Republicans are suggesting \$13 billion, much of which would go to Pentagon programs not related to operations in Kosovo. Among other things, wars invariably result in a degree of waste that would not be tolerated in any other circumstances.

In reality, the costs of the air war in Yugoslavia could be paid for easily out of existing Pentagon funds. Yet the Pentagon tends to operate like a law firm which is kept on a sizeable retainer but then bills the client every time it goes to court on the client's behalf. However, anything short of a major protracted ground operation could easily be accommodated within the current budget. In fact, the reasons we are seeing shortfalls in the Pentagon's readiness and personnel accounts is because money is being squandered in other accounts. In particular, billions in wasteful spending is still going into the purchase of expensive, unnecessary Cold War era weapons systems and to maintain the Pentagon's two “Major Theater War” requirement.

Who Actually Benefits?

Ironically, while the current Pentagon spending increases are being justified as responses to problems with troop readiness, recruitment and retention of qualified personnel, a close examination of the numbers shows that the true priorities are quite different. Under the Administration's FY'00 request, funding for operations and maintenance, a major component of troop readiness, increases by 5.5%. Funding for personnel, which includes pay and benefits, goes up 3.9%. By contrast, Pentagon procurement funding, most of which goes for the purchase of new weapons, jumps 8.1%. Men and women in uniform will see a small increase in their living standards while most of the new funding will go straight to defense contractors. In fact, by FY'05, procurement accounts will grow a whopping 53.3%, more than twice the increase in any other major account.

Another striking element in the President's budget is in the proposed changes for funding military housing accounts. Housing represents a key component of recruitment and retention, particularly for younger service personnel with families. Yet while the military acknowledges that two-thirds of its housing units are “substandard,” funding for military housing actually decreases by 13.9% in FY'00.

Postscript

As you know, one of CDI's principal functions is to keep you and the public apprised of how much is being spent on the military and how effectively it is being spent. Any military operation has a tendency to make almost all spending, whether wasteful or not, acceptable. We'll continue doing our best to sort it out for you.

Words vs. Bombs: Could Preventive Diplomacy Have Averted War In Yugoslavia? What Are the Options Now?

In the midst of the war in Yugoslavia, Congress passed the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Resolution, agreeing to add \$8 billion to the President's \$12 billion increase for defense. This huge increase comes at the expense of several non-defense domestic programs, not the least of which is the International Affairs budget, which is cut by one-third. One might conclude that Congress prefers war to diplomacy.

The International Affairs budget, most of which is administered by the Department of State, pays for U.S. participation in the United Nations and in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the latter of which is currently trying to find peaceful solutions to the long-standing conflicts in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and other areas. State Department funds also pay for preventive force deployments in the Golan Heights and the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait as well as to finance the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Until shortly before the Yugoslav war, the State Department also maintained an information office in Pristina in the heart of Kosovo.

While the cuts in International Affairs do not specify which programs will be reduced or eliminated, the State Department's remaining activities aimed at promoting democracy, ethnic reconciliation, and a free media are unlikely to be spared.

Could preventive diplomacy have spared us the anguish of the war in Yugoslavia? The impact of preventive diplomacy is hard to assess, but there's an old saying that "as long as you're talking, you're not fighting."

The conflict between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo was telegraphed well in advance. In the mid-1980s Serbian police killed ethnic Albanians demonstrating for release of political prisoners and for Kosovo to have the status of a republic. Albanians, in return, bombed and sabotaged Serbian property. Dozens of Albanians died during the riots that followed Milosevic's proclamation abolishing autonomy for Kosovo. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an ethnic Albanian guerilla group, responded by launching their first attacks on Serbia in 1996.

Aggressive diplomacy at that point might well have resolved many grievances, but no one can say, given the volatility of the situation, that diplomacy would have spared the world the present horror in Kosovo. Certainly talking is preferable to fighting, but in this case it is clear that the Serbs were engaged in atrocities against the Albanians even while diplomatic efforts to reach an agreement were going on at Rambouillet, France.

The United States, through the National Institute for Democracy, did offer some assistance to Yugoslav opposition groups attempting to bring democracy to Yugoslavia by training a group of election observers in Serbia. The private Open Society Institute also funded efforts to promote an independent media in Yugoslavia. These efforts

were aimed at democratizing Serbia and creating a more conducive situation for settling the Kosovo conflict.

This modest U.S. support for democratic forces in Yugoslavia brought few results. Political opposition to Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic self-destructed because of infighting and jealousies in the opposition coalition. Independent radio stations and newspapers supported by the United States were silenced by the Yugoslav police. As a result, huge anti-Milosevic demonstrations became daily rituals. But he toughed it out, and once NATO bombs started falling, his support solidified as anti-NATO sentiment grew.

Few efforts were made to resolve the differences in Kosovo itself. "The [Kosovo] issue only got attention when it became violent," said James Hooper, a former senior State Department official who resigned in protest over U.S. Balkan policy. Hooper, who currently heads the independent Balkan Action Council, said that when the Dayton Accords on Bosnia were being hammered out, at a minimum Kosovo could have received some degree of autonomy. Autonomy was at the heart of the February 1999 peace agreement proposed in Rambouillet whose rejection by Yugoslavia led to the NATO bombing campaign.

There is a credible case to be made that though the U.S. was late in recognizing the volatility of the Kosovo situation, it postponed military action

Answer:

The annual budget for U.S. diplomatic programs and initiatives is \$16.7 billion. By comparison, this year's planned spending *increase* for the Pentagon *alone* is \$20 billion. In total, Congress now has available \$288.8 billion to spend on the military in FY '00.

several times in order to give diplomacy another chance. Interestingly, some members of Congress and some members of the

media criticized the President for his indecision and failure to confront Milosevic early on in a more strident and assertive manner. Many of those

same people now criticize the President and NATO for the decision to finally begin the bombing.

WHAT DO WE DO NOW?

1. NATO could announce that it had made a mistake, fold its tent and come home. This is hardly an option since it would be universally unacceptable and would destroy both NATO and America's credibility for a very long time.
2. NATO could continue the bombing. The allied coalition bombed Iraq for 44 days before the ground war started, but it was the latter that drove the Iraqis from Kuwait, not the bombing. While no war has ever been won by airpower alone, NATO could gamble that either Milosevic would give up or the people would rebel against him. Neither seems likely to occur any time soon.
3. NATO could continue "softening up" Yugoslavia until the alliance concluded it could employ ground troops with the least possible loss of life. But there would certainly be a loss of life, and public opinion in the U.S. could shift dramatically against the war—Vietnam *deja vu*. Furthermore, there are important questions to be answered. Does NATO invade Serbia proper or only invade Kosovo? After entering Kosovo does NATO declare Kosovo autonomous, independent, or think up some other status? Obviously these questions do not deal with the basic problem of the location for such an invasion. To the North, Hungary, a new member of NATO that has a common border with Yugoslavia, has said that NATO would not be allowed to use Hungary as a launch site. Montenegro, a part of Yugoslavia and that country's only outlet to the sea, cannot allow an invasion from her soil even though Montenegrans do not support Milosevic's policies. Macedonia, an independent state to the south of Yugoslavia, must maintain the delicate ethnic balance between its Serbian and Albanian populations. That leaves Albania to the west, where the terrain is predominantly mountainous and not well-suited to launch an invasion. Finally, NATO members such as Greece and Italy, and perhaps others, strongly oppose the use of ground troops without United Nations' authorization. Any invasion carries the strongest likelihood of the war spreading. So far, the Russians have shown remarkable restraint, but should NATO invade, at a minimum Russia would feel compelled to supply arms to the Serbs.
4. The course most likely to produce the most desirable solution is negotiations. The Russians would play a major role in such a process. Milosevic will have to believe that there is enough left of Yugoslavia worth salvaging, and Russia will have to believe that a continuation of the war would be dangerous to her international credibility and costly to her economic interests. Partition might be unpalatable to Albanians, but it must be one option to be explored. An international protectorate, *a la* Bosnia, is also possible, but that would involve high financial costs and possibly put peacekeeping troops in danger of attacks from both the Serbs and the ethnic Albanians.

Great New Videos From [America's Defense Monitor](#) are Perfect Companions to This Issue!

Fighter Jet Fix Episode 1233

The Navy and the Air Force plan to replace much of their aging tactical fighter fleets with two new aircraft models: the F-22 "Raptor" and the F/A-18 E/F "Super Hornet." While the capabilities of these planes remain unproven, we do know that the combined cost will be about \$110 billion. What impact will this massive expenditure have on America's fighting forces?

Why is Military Spending Going Up? Episode 1224

Leading members of Congress and officials at the Pentagon state clearly they want to spend more on the military this year and in the years to come. What are the forces in America that drive our politicians to spend more on the military at a time when dangers to the U.S. and its friends seem smaller? Can the rising cost of the military be controlled?

Stopping War Before It Starts Episode 949

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What Does It All Mean? (Cont'd from page 8)

The failure to bring to bear the full weight of U.S. and international diplomacy in Yugoslavia over the last decade has now come full circle. The indescribable sight of almost 1,000,000 refugees from Kosovo streaming into the surrounding safe haven countries after enduring barbaric treatment is a graphic illustration of the dangerous forces that inflamed ethnicity and religion can loose unless they are actively and continuously countered by the community of nations. History bears sad witness to the results of international inaction: peoples who have lived side by side as friends and who have together built communities suddenly, in a volatile and exacerbated atmosphere, turn hostile and engage in unspeakable cruelty against their neighbors.

Of course, the tragedy of Kosovo is not unique even in this century. Both Stalin and Tito forcibly relocated and mixed people of different ethnicity and religions in an effort to minimize the possibility of uprisings in a region or even formerly independent nations predominately populated by one ethnic or religious group. It worked – as long as armies were there to make it work. But history demonstrates that it doesn't work when problems are ignored.

Thus, while the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia gained their independence because Gorbachev permitted it, the Kosovar Albanians didn't because Milosevic prohibited it and even stripped them of their autonomy. Different problems affect Ireland, Israel, East Timor, India and Pakistan (perhaps the most dangerous of all) and where diplomatic attention, external support and mediation have been pursued, the level of violence has been controlled to some degree. But where political, ethnic and religious issues are allowed to fester without timely, effective intervention, all too often the contesting parties resort to military measures in order to promote their own interests. Frequently exacerbating such confrontations are conditions of crushing poverty which demagogues, charlatans, and despots exploit to fuel hatred and stimulate the barbaric violence which is now endemic in Kosovo.

The diplomatic and military costs of the current crisis will increase dramatically if ground troops are introduced without some prior political agreement between Milosevic and NATO. While Kosovo is not a classic parallel to Vietnam, introducing ground forces in a non-permissive environment would constitute an incremental step very similar to Vietnam. But in a permissive environment, there is ample justification for the goal of allowing the Kosovars, so cruelly and barbarously uprooted and forced to flee for their lives, to return to their homes and live without fear.

We must also recognize that every dispute is not the same, that every dispute or conflict does not warrant U.S. involvement. We are a powerful nation, spending close to \$300 billion each year on our military. The temptation to use that power is well nigh irresistible regardless of the merits of a given situation. That is precisely why we must be very discriminating. There are limits to our power, and there are limits to people's patience.

While the option of using troops in Kosovo should not be taken off the table, retaining that option should not automatically advance the argument that troops should be used. That decision needs to be carefully thought through and should, from the earliest stages of military and political review, contain a provision for the early exit of U.S. forces.

Every military venture, no matter how seemingly justifiable, carries its own set of dangers. The present situation in Kosovo demands an abundance of caution, particularly in terms of any further military escalation such as the introduction of ground troops in a non-permissive environment. While the use of ground troops may be momentarily popular, if polls are accurate, even more Americans would probably support a renewed, concerted effort at diplomacy by the United Nations, Russia, and other nations willing to mediate this crisis.

While preventive diplomacy may have failed to stop Milosevic, we must be careful not to ignore the power that diplomacy can wield even today if we truly get behind it.



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What Does It All Mean?

As the war in Yugoslavia drags on, the costs to NATO, to the U.S., and to the countries in the region grow. As noted in the articles in this *Defense Monitor*, the mounting bills associated with the war will be added to the Pentagon's already huge budget, a budget that is largely devoted to buying equipment ill-suited to the kinds of operations in which American forces have been engaged in the last few years and are facing in Kosovo today. Conversely, Congress continues to shortchange the tools of preventive diplomacy which, properly wielded, might have had a better chance of precluding military action in Kosovo.

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