• Since 1989 the number of active conflicts at the end of each calendar year has been decreasing. This downward trend in the number of active conflicts continued in 1997.

• Of the 21 active armed conflicts at the end of 1997, only two began after the end of the Cold War in November 1989.

• Despite this continuing downward trend, the Pentagon continues to insist that it must be ready to fight and win two major theater wars and retain 100,000 troops permanently deployed both in Asia and in Europe.

• None of the armed conflicts going on around the world today directly endangers U.S. military security.

• United Nations and regional multinational peacekeeping operations have been instrumental in resolving conflicts. There are now fewer UN operations than at anytime since the end of 1993.

• The United States should emphasize preventive diplomacy and carefully targeted economic aid to help preclude conflict from beginning and to induce warring factions and countries to come to terms.

THE WORLD AT WAR

Many long standing civil wars such as those in Angola, Bangladesh, and Northern Ireland have been halted by cease-fires. In some cases, events have moved to peace negotiations and even agreements. Most notable in this regard, even though it is almost 45 years since fighting ended, is the four power talks among North and South Korea, the People's Republic of China, and the U.S. to formally end the 1950-1953 Korean War.

Year end snapshots do not, of course, address the tragedy of wars that arise and subside within a calendar year. While of short duration, some of these conflicts are terribly brutal, particularly if battle lines are based on ethnicity. Such was the case in Rwanda, where over 500,000 people were killed in just three months. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), the U.N. is only now beginning its investigation into the "disappearance" of as many as 250,000 people, an investigation that was blocked for months by the government of Lawrence Kabila. And across the river in the Congo Republic, a bloody five month war ended when the elected president, Pascal Lissouba, was overthrown by the ex-president backed by Angolan troops.

The following chart depicts the decline in active armed conflicts since 1989 by major region. Note that the decrease has been across every region although Africa had an upturn in 1997 over 1996.

This table presents more detailed information on each of the 21 conflicts still active at the beginning of 1998. (This figure combines all of the Kurdish conflicts into one.)

World at War -- Ongoing Conflicts

Conflict: Main Warring Parties	Year Began	Cause(s)	Other Foreign Involvement
Middle East
Israel/Palestinians	1948	Independence	U.N., U.S.
Iraq govt./Shi'a	1991	Religious	U.N. No fly zone in South
Kurdish factions/govts. of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey	1961	Independence	U.N. in northern Iraq
Lebanon/Israel and surrogates	1975	Ethnic & Religious	U.N., Iran, Syria, U.S.
Asia
Afghanistan: Taliban/Other Factions	1978	Religious	Former Soviet Union 1978-89
Bangladesh govt./Chittagong Hill Tracts	1975	Ethnic & Religious	None
Myanmar (Burma) govt./ various factions	1942	Ethnic & Drug Trade	None
Cambodia govt./Khmer Rouge & Royalists	1979	Political	U.N.
India govt./various factions & Kashmiris	1947	Ethnic & Religious	U.N.
India & Pakistan	1948 (Sporadic Violence)	Ethnic & Religious	U.N.
Indonesia govt./ Revolutionary Front for East Timor	1975	Independence	None
Philippines govt./New People's Army, National Liberation Front	1969	Ideological & Religious	None
Sri Lanka govt./Tamil Eelam	1978	Ethnic & Religious	None
Africa
Algeria govt./Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	1991	Religious interpretation	None
Burundi: Tutsi vs. Hutu	1988	Ethnic	None
Rwanda: Tutsi vs. Hutu	1990	Ethnic	U.N.
Sierra Leone govt./ Revolutionary United Front, National Provisional Ruling Council	1989	Ethnic	Guinea, Nigeria
Somalia: factions	1978	Ethnic	None
Sudan govt./Sudanese People's Liberation Army	1983	Ethnic & Religious	Iran
Latin America
Colombia govt./National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia	1978	Drug Trade	None
Peru govt./Sendero Luminoso	1981	Drug Trade	None

Note that at most four of the above conflicts might be categorized as "cross-border." Three of these involve one side seeking some level of independence: Israel-Palestine (anticipating an independent Palestinian state), Indonesia-East Timor (reversing annexation at least to the extent of obtaining some autonomy for East Timor), and the Kurdish struggle (autonomy for the Kurdish ethnic group--assuming the factions could unite), although this occasionally involves cross-border actions among Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. The only clear case of cross-border conflict is in Lebanon where Syria still maintains occupation forces in the north and Israel conducts air raids (and occasional land and sea incursions) against suspected terrorist strongholds.

If the good news is that active conflicts have declined, there is nonetheless a cautionary note that must be sounded. There remain many sensitive areas where even a small miscalculation by one side or faction could reignite the killing and send streams of refugees fleeing across borders. All too often these areas of potential renewed conflict are in regions least able to cope with the effects of violence without outside help either in the form of non-regional peacekeeping troops or humanitarian relief.

The following table lists by region the areas where violence could resume or where there is infrequent violence.

Political Violence or Conflicts In Suspension That May Restart

Parties to Conflict	Duration	Cause(s)	Foreign Mediation/ Involvement
Asia
Armenia & Azerbaijan	1990-94	Nagorno-Karabakh	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Tajikistan/Popular Democratic Army	1992-97	Religious	U.N., CIS "Peacekeepers" from Russia & Uzbekistan
Africa
Angola/UNITA	1975-97	Economic & Ethnic	U.N. and South Africa
Cameroon & Nigeria	1994-96	Bakassi Islands	None
Chad govt./Muslim separatists	1965	Religious	None
Democratic Republic of Congo	1996-97	Ethnic	U.N.
Congo Republic	1997	Ethnic	None
Eritrea & Yemen	1995-96	Hanish Islands	None
Liberia govt./National Patriotic Front	1989	Ethnic & Economic	U.N., ECOMOG (West African Peacekeepers)
Morocco & Polisario	1975-96	Western Sahara	U.N.
Europe
Serbs, Croats & Bosnian Muslims	1990-96	Division of Bosnia-Herzegovina	NATO SFOR (Stabilization Force) under UN mandate
Russia/Chechnya	1994-96	Independence	None
Republic of Georgia/Abkhazia & South Osset	1992-93	Independence	U.N., Russia
Moldova/Trans-Dneister Region	1991	Ethnic & Economic	None
United Kingdom/ IRA and other factions	1969-97	Ethnic & Religious	U.S.
Spain & ETA (Basque Separatists	1968- (Sporadic conflict)	Ethnic	None
Americas
Guatemala govt./ Nat'l Revolutionary Unity (URNG)	1968-96	Ethnic	U.N.
Haiti	1991-94	Economic	U.N., U.S.
Peru-Ecuador	1995-97	Border	U.S.
Mexico govt./ Zapatista & Popular Revolutionary Army	1983 & 1993	Ethnic & Religious	None

Both the ongoing conflicts and those which have subsided have taken a huge toll over the years. A three year study by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, published in December 1997, says that since 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell, over 4 million people world wide have been killed in violent conflicts. Today, one in every 200 people in the world is a refugee or is displaced.

The extent of the deaths due to violent conflicts is detailed in the following table.

COUNTRY-COUNTRIES	DATE	CASUALTIES
Colombia-ELN, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia	1986-97	> 45,000
Guatemala-URNG	1968-96	> 140,000
Haiti	1991-94	3,000
Mexico-Zapatistas	1983-93	> 150
Peru/Ecuador	1995-97	< 100
Peru-Sendero Luminoso	1980-97	35,000
Armenia-Azerbaijan	1989-95	20,000
Former Yugoslavia-Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims	1990-96	260,000
Georgia-Abkhazia and South Osset	1992-95	6,000
Moldova-Trans Dneister Region	1991-97	1,000
Russia/Chechnya	1994-96	50,000
Spain-ETA	1968-97	> 750
United Kingdom-IRA and other factions	1969-97	3,200
Iraq	1994-95	> 30,000
Israel/Palestinians	1948-97	> 125,000
Kurdish factions-Iran, Iraq, and Turkey govts.	1961-97	> 120,000
Lebanon/Israel and surrogates	1975-97	> 60,000
Afghanistan-Taliban and other factions	1978-97	> 1,550,000
Bangladesh-Chittagong Hill Tracts	1975-97	> 3,000
Cambodia-Khmer Rouge and Royalists	1979-97	> 25,000
India/Pakistan	1948-97	> 35,000
India-various factions and Kashmiris	1947-97	> 40,000
Indonesia/East Timor	1975-97	> 150,000
Myanmar (Burma)-various factions	1942-97	> 21,000
Phillipines-New People's Army and National Liberation Front	1969-97	> 75,000
Sri Lanka-Tamil Eelam	1978-97	> 50,000
Tajikstan-Popular Democratic Army	1992-97	50,000
Algeria-FIS and GIA	1992-97	75,000
Angola-UNITA	1975-95	750,000
Burundi-Tutsis and Hutus	1988-97	170,000
Cameroon/Nigeria	1994-96	< 100
Chad-Muslim separatists	1965-97	50,000-100,000
Congo Republic	1997	< 100
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1997	250,000
Eritrea/Yemen	1995-96	< 50
Kenya	1991-95	1,500
Liberia-National Patriotic Front	1990-97	> 150,000
Morocco/Polisario	1975-96	16,000
Rwanda-Tutsis and Hutus	1990-97	1,000,000+
Sierra Leone-Revolutionary United Front and National Provisional Ruling Council	1989-97	> 30,000
Somalia-factions	1978-97	> 350,000
Sudan-SPLA	1983-97	> 1,000,000

Sources:
World Military and Social Expenditures 1996. Ruth Leger Sivard. 16^th Edition. World Priorities. pp. 18-19
SIPRI Yearbook 1997
SIPRI Yearbook 1996
Center for Defense Information

Because almost all active armed conflicts are internal guerrilla or civil wars, they neither pose a threat to U.S. military security nor constitute a significant military danger to the international community.

U.S. military authorities, however, continue to insist (as they have since the Bottom-Up Review in 1993) that the world is a "dangerous place" and the U.S. must be able to fight and win two major theater wars almost simultaneously and alone, if necessary. The Korean peninsula and the Persian Gulf are the two scenarios cited to justify this policy despite the political-military-economic realities in each locale.

The continued threat of wide-spread famine in North Korea, the two million men "under arms" in the South (over 600,000 of whom are in the active forces), the unchallenged air and sea supremacy held by the United States, and the beginning of talks on a peace treaty to end the Korean War have produced a positive if still cautious change in relations between the two halves of the peninsula.

In the Gulf, while Iraq continues to defy the United Nations, Iran's new President, Mohammad Khatami, is signaling a desire to end almost 20 years of hostility towards the West in general and the United States in particular. (At the December 1997 Islamic Conference in Tehran, attended by such close U.S. allies as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, Khatami declared, "We should never be oblivious to the positive accomplishments of the Western civil society.") Obviously, any warming of relations with Iran would ease world concerns about access to Gulf (and even Caspian Sea) energy resources.

From the above, two conclusions are apparent. While the U.S. must remain vigilant through an active intelligence collection and analytic effort, we no longer require a large, active, fully ready military structure oriented on classic 20th century force-on-force contingencies to protect U.S. territory and U.S. citizens. The stark lesson would-be hostile nations have drawn from the Persian Gulf War is not to confront the U.S. in the same manner as Iraq.

The second lesson, again drawn from the Persian Gulf War and reinforced by operations in Bosnia and Haiti, is that coalitions operating under international mandates can be successful if they follow fundamental principles of command and control and unity of purpose. Furthermore, many nations contributing to such operations based on their strengths or unique capabilities means that no country is unduly burdened and none can be singled out for opprobrium.

Together, these two points suggest that U.S. military forces need to be transformed from their current reliance on heavy, large, concentrated formations to a smaller, more agile and flexible structure that exploits information technology to achieve psychological and, when required, physical dominance of potential adversaries. This course would allow the U.S. to make specialized contributions to multinational endeavors and to remain at the forefront of technological developments.

In fact, multinational involvement in resolving conflicts has been a significant feature of the international scene for more than a decade. United Nations mandated peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian support, and observer missions total 45 through the end of 1997. Thirty-two of these were initiated during the last decade. As of December 31, 1997, 15 are still in existence manned by 14,879 troops, military observers, and police drawn from 38 countries (The U.S. contribution is 644 personnel.)

This chart portrays the number of UN missions at the end of each year since 1989.

The following table provides key information on the 15 U.N. peacekeeping operations still active at the end of 1997. (Operations that began and ended within the calendar year are not included in the totals.)

Current Peacekeeping Operations

Mission Name and Nation(s)	Acronym	Starting Date
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	MONUA	July 1997
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	MINURSO	April 1991
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	UNMOGIP	January 1949
United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	UNMOT	December 1994
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	UNMIBH	December 1995
United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka--Croatia	UNMOP	January 1996
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium--Croatia	UNTAES	January 1996
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	UNFICYP	March 1964
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force-- Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	UNPREDEP	March 1995
United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	MINUGUA	January 1997
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	UNOMIG	August 1993
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force--Golan Heights	UNDOF	June 1974
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	UNIKOM	April 1991
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	UNIFIL	March 1978
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization--Middle East	UNTSO	June 1948

Of course, the most effective way to decrease the number of armed conflicts in the world is to prevent violence from starting. To this end, the Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict which was released in December 1997 sought to identify the causes of violence (both between and within states), structural (security, economic, and justice issues) and operational strategies to prevent violence, and the responsibilities of nations and international organizations in preventing and mitigating violence.

Of particular interest is the distinction made in the study between preventive defense and preventive diplomacy. The former, an approach articulated by the Clinton Administration, proposes that by engaging allies and former enemies on common problems the U.S. will be able to lead them away from the traditional cycle of antagonism that makes conflict more likely. The Marshall Plan was an early example of such U.S. leadership, while the Partnership For Peace and NATO expansion are the Administration's modern version of the same idea. (Of course, as currently conceived, NATO expansion will leave out the most significant former adversary--Russia.) In the Asian theater, the dialogue with and assistance to North Korea by South Korea and the first U.S.-People's Republic of China Consultative talks at the Pentagon fill the same role.

Preventive diplomacy is a much wider concept. As defined by the Carnegie Commission, preventive diplomacy consists of efforts--through bilateral, multilateral, and unofficial channels--to pressure, cajole, arbitrate, mediate, or lend "good offices" to encourage dialogue and facilitate a nonviolent resolution of a crisis. While preventive defense is a more ad hoc response to evolving conditions, preventive diplomacy lends itself to the establishment of more regular channels between international organizations and skilled mediators who can respond to warning signs of impending breakdowns in collective security, economic, and political-legal structures.

Regardless of the best foresight, the most effective structural machinery, and the best will, the world will never be able to eliminate all conflict. Like nuclear weapons, however, "zero" can be the goal toward which nations and international organizations devote sufficient resources--human and monetary--in a bid to minimize the conditions which contribute to wars and to mitigate more quickly the effects of wars that do occur.

Never again should the world stand by and let 500,000 men, women, and children be slaughtered in three months.

Never again should non-combatants be swept up in a war and 250,000 "disappear."

Never again should anyone believe that deadly conflict is inevitable.

For over 40 years I have waged war as a member of the United States Navy and, as Director of the Center for Defense Information, fought for a sane, sensible, and strong military establishment to protect the peace won by the sacrifices of literally millions of American men and women. It seems quite appropriate, therefore, that this--the last Defense Monitor to be published during my watch as CDI's Director--addresses the state of conflict in the world as well as the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations.

The world has gone through many cycles of war and peace since I first donned a uniform in 1942. Too often the hopes of millions for a lasting peace have been crushed by the brutality of wars unleashed for personal power, revenge for ancient wrongs, or for narrow ideologies. The cost of these conflicts in terms of lives lost, lives and talent foreshortened, economic and social development stunted, is incalculable.

As much as we might lament the past, it is the past. We must act decisively while the world enjoys this rather unique period in which there are no major competing military nations or blocs to secure the future from war and the threat of war. We cannot know how long this period of relative and improving peace will last; what we do know is that without strong international mechanisms supported by the majority of nations, we risk returning to the past sometime in the new century.

The choice--to act or to foreswear our values and our heritage--is ours. As a wise if anonymous sage once observed, "On the Plains of Hesitation bleach the bones of countless millions who, at the Dawn of Victory, sat down to wait, and waiting--died."