• The Senate is voting this spring on whether to approve the addition of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Clinton Administration is rushing the vote so that the accession of the new nations coincides with the Alliance's 50^th anniversary in 1999.

• There has been virtually no public debate and little media coverage of the issue. Polls indicate the American public knows little, if anything, about the details of the proposal.

• Nobody knows how many countries will be admitted in the end, and what the costs of this operation will be. Estimates for just the first three countries alone range from $1.5 billion to $70 billion, and another 24 countries of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) may be eligible for admission.

• NATO expansion does not solve main security threats to the United States today, such as Russia's vast nuclear arsenal or proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. On the contrary, it jeopardizes our cooperation with the one country which is crucial for solving these problems: Russia.

• Expansion of an outmoded military alliance which excludes Russia threatens to recreate dividing lines in Europe which were erased with much effort at the end of the Cold War.

NATO Expansion: Full Speed Ahead -- But Where To?

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Despite feel-good proclamations of "embracing our partners" and "extending democracy to Central Europe," NATO expansion essentially represents an extension of the U.S. military protection to three new nations in Central Europe. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have been selected in the first round. But as expansion has gone forward, there has been little, if any attempt to examine the continuing need for such a Cold War military alliance or what its new purpose might be in the current and foreseeable international security environment.

The expansion of the NATO military alliance has serious implications for all parties involved: the United States, our current allies in NATO, the prospective members in Central and Eastern Europe, and Russia. Before the Senate makes a decision, the public should understand and accept not only the political, economic, and military risks involved in the Administration's plan but also the probable high financial costs.

Compared to the diplomatic and military aspects of NATO expansion, the increased monetary costs to the U.S. taxpayer pale into relative insignificance. But because financial costs will be much more apparent early, and since the very limited Senate debate will undoubtedly focus on this point, it will be discussed first.

Why does the expansion of NATO cost money? The militaries of the potential members are largely equipped with old Soviet-era weapons that will have to be replaced. Proponents of NATO membership in the former Warsaw Pact countries know they must have equipment that is compatible with the communication, navigation, and defense systems used by NATO nations if they are to be fully integrated partners. But achieving this level of interoperability requires the purchase of costly Western-manufactured weapons and support equipment.

One of the few points on which most current and potential NATO members agree is that the new allies should bear the largest portion of accession costs. The money, after all, will be spent mostly in these newly-admitted states to upgrade their infrastructure and weapons. What is still unclear, however, is how much modernization is required in the potential new members' militaries and whether and how much of the money required for these changes will be made available from current NATO members individually and from the Alliance as an entity. Answers to these questions will loom large in any judgment as to whether the new allies become true assets to the Alliance or a drain on its resources. Without credible military preparations, such as airbase infrastructure improvement in new member states, NATO security guarantees to the new allies will essentially be hollow. In turn, this will undermine the credibility of the United States and other NATO members.

The potential new members loudly pronounce their willingness to pay, but in reality they have few resources to do so. All are undergoing a transition from centrally planned economies to the market system. Their wealth is growing but not without wild fluctuations that make sound planning difficult. A recent crisis in the Czech Republic, for example, forced economists to revise their forecasts for the growth of the gross domestic product from a 4 percent year-to-year increase to slightly more than 1.5 percent.

NATO's own methodology for dividing the shared costs reveals the Alliance's lack of faith that the potential future allies will contribute significantly to the Alliance's finances. NATO uses a formula for setting each country's individual contributions to common funds, which depends partly on each nation's ability to pay. NATO agreed that the new members should contribute about $72 million a year, slightly over 4 percent of the common budget. At the same time, the new members will receive on average $150 million a year from the same funds, thus consuming twice as much as they are expected to contribute.

In December 1997, NATO issued its own estimate of the total 10-year cost of admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the Alliance: $1.5 billion. But evidence indicates that this $1.5 billion will fall well short of covering costs of all the modernization planned for Central and Eastern Europe. Although the details of the estimate are classified (contrary to earlier promises by NATO that it would be "open and scrutinized"), it is known that it covers the costs of infrastructure improvements, such as training and storage facilities, communication lines, and air defense systems. But NATO's own studies document deep deficiencies in these capabilities, so deep as to question the basis of the NATO estimates.

NATO's confidential reports, recently published in Defense News, a military trade publication, clearly portray the Central European military equipment as old or close to obsolete and incapable of joint operations with present NATO members. Other internal documents obtained by CDI cite examples of inadequate language training in the candidate nations and attempts to "window dress" such shortcomings in the race to qualify for membership. Given the candidates' modest means and a low $1.5 billion allocation from the Alliance, it is unclear how these kinds of problems can be solved. The low NATO estimate raises suspicions that it was politically motivated and intended to dispel the fears of lawmakers in national legislatures who worry that NATO expansion will cost the current allies the proverbial arm and leg.

Still another major source of concern are the costs completely left out of NATO's estimate. The most expensive items -- actual weapons -- were excluded from the study. In Poland, modernization plans for the army alone are estimated to cost between $1.5 billion and $11 billion. Such costs are expected to be borne by the aspiring members themselves. The economic realities in the candidate countries, however, do not allow for a radical revamping and upgrading of their arsenals.

Poland is not alone in facing a huge military modernization effort. The Czech Republic announced plans to buy as many as thirty advanced fighter aircraft. One F-16 Falcon, the airplane often cited by the Czechs, costs $21 million; thirty would cost $630 million. The entire Czech defense budget in 1997 was $826 million, of which only a small part was dedicated to new procurement. Most of the military budget went to pay for wages, pensions, food, and clothing. Given these realities, even proceeding gradually, the Czechs would take decades to complete the purchase of these aircraft. By then, the first planes would be so obsolete that they would require more expensive replacements themselves.

Because threats to the Central European region are virtually non-existent now and for the foreseeable future, the current rush to spend hundreds of millions on the military seems fueled by the potential Alliance members' desire to join NATO rather than by any military needs. Central European candidates have convinced themselves that promises of large purchases of Western military equipment will win them the support of NATO members -- a notion happily seconded by U.S., French, and British arms manufacturers. What is ignored, however, is that by joining NATO the new members are, to a certain degree, surrendering their independence to plan and develop their armed forces at their own pace and to meet their own needs. As one Hungarian expert wrote,

"A neutral Hungary would have the responsibility to decide when to start the enhancement of its defense capabilities and at what pace to carry it out. Presumably such a decision would bear in mind the actual international situation and the Hungarian economy's capacity for shouldering the burden of a military buildup....If Hungary enters NATO, Brussels will dictate the nation's military budget. NATO bureaucrats will not be sensitive to Hungary's domestic economic and social conditions."

The gap between NATO requirements and Central European resources can lead to two possible outcomes: either little of the projected reforms and re-equipment of the armed forces will occur due to lack of funds, or an outside source must picks up the tab. The first option would lead to "hollow" and non-interoperable forces in the new NATO member nations, rendering marginal their contribution to NATO's military might. The latter option would shift the bulk of the expansion costs from prospective to current members. The nation paying a substantial portion of the outside assistance will be -- and it already is -- the United States.

The United States has been providing the prospective allies with military aid at the rate of about $370 million a year. In 1997 alone, the Department of Defense supplied close to $65 million worth of used arms, training programs, and direct grants to NATO membership candidates. The State Department added another $40 million through the Warsaw Initiative assistance program for Partnership for Peace nations. Additionally, a $242 million dollar loan was offered to NATO candidates in 1997, an amount expected to nearly double in 1998. Although these are loans and not grants, U.S. military loans have a history of not being repaid.

These dollar figures far surpass the amounts which the new allies are officially set to receive from the Alliance. But this is not the total of the subsidies. The U.S. taxpayers also cover many indirect costs related to the expansion. The United States offers "free" leases of jet aircraft to potential members. While the planes may be "free" to the candidate nations, they were initially paid for by U.S. taxpayers. And weapons given away or leased for free do not generate the funds for the U.S. Treasury, funds which could be used to help pay for the newer, more expensive models the Pentagon is buying. Moreover, the salaries of numerous U.S. government representatives who are, in effect, agents for for Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and other U.S. arms manufacturers, are hidden costs of NATO expansion which are not mentioned in Senate hearings on NATO enlargement.

The amount the other 15 members of NATO will contribute to NATO expansion remains unclear. European allies feel they can ill-afford to increase their military spending. Most are striving to meet the criteria for the European Monetary Union, which place strict limits on national debt and government spending. Moreover, there is little enthusiasm among current NATO allies to pay more for defense at a time when threats to their security have all but disappeared. Therefore, the initial reaction from Europe to U.S. cost-sharing proposals was a stern refusal to spend any additional money for enlargement. The French President vowed to give not a single franc, and the British Ministry of Defence actually announced it expects its contribution to NATO to decrease after new members are admitted. Subsequently, other defense officials have recanted these statements but it is through deeds, not words, that they must demonstrate their willingness to pay. The Europeans have persistently dismissed even the minimal U.S. cost estimates as too high and led the drive that produced NATO's $1.5 billion estimate. Consequently, the Alliance earmarked this sum for a full decade's worth of gradual modernization and integration of the new members' militaries. If the expected shortfall forces the current allies to appropriate more funds, an ugly burden-sharing debate can be expected to ensue.

The Clinton Administration often argues that the expenses of NATO expansion, even if they are in the hundreds of millions of dollars a year, are small compared to the annual U.S. military budget, which currently stands at an $270 billion. But the litmus test for any new spending should not be whether the allocation is affordable but whether it is wise. The fact is that even the relatively low amount of several hundreds of millions of dollars a year could be spent much more productively. Moreover, the billions that the U.S. may eventually spend for NATO has a real potential to decrease, rather than increase, United States military security.

Concern about nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is clearly on the minds of senior U.S. military experts. At a recent Senate hearing, Lt. Gen. Patrick M. Hughes, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, called the spread of the weapons of mass destruction "the greatest direct threat to U.S. interests worldwide." The dangers are obvious: if one of the many nuclear devices in the world falls into the hands of people who do not wish the United States well, the potential for a sneak attack or terrorist action against the U.S. rises significantly. One small -- even a hand- carried -- nuclear device can cause the loss of tens of thousands of lives. Such arms in the hands of a government hostile to the U.S. are more dangerous yet because governments may have a capability to use missiles to deliver larger nuclear devices.

Russia remains a principal source of both the weapons and scientists capable of developing them. This poses a dual problem. One of Russia's weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists and be used for blackmail or actually detonated. Russian scientists hired by regimes hostile to the U.S. could develop nuclear warheads for their employers. It follows that cooperation with Russia to safeguard and eliminate this destructive arsenal should be on the top of America's foreign policy agenda. Yet that seems not to be the case. NATO expansion is being given precedence in the Senate in spite of the fact that the drive to expand the Alliance has direct implications on our efforts to help Russia keep its nuclear arsenal under strict control. As Ambassador Jack Matlock, a former U.S. envoy to the Soviet Union, said at a Senate hearing: "Adding members to NATO will do nothing to protect us from the real threat [of weapons of mass destruction]. It is going to be increasingly difficult to obtain Russian cooperation in securing this material if our actions are interpreted as attempts to exploit Russia's current weakness, as they are by most [Russian] officials...."

Baiting the Bear
For 200 years Russian leaders have regarded with apprehension the broad military avenues of approach stretching like an arrow from the North German Plain straight to Moscow. In that period their fears have been realized twice. In 1812 Napoleon burned Moscow before he was compelled to retreat, and 130 years later Hitler's forces killed 20 million Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians as the Nazis tried to seize Leningrad and Moscow. With this history of devastation from the West, is it any wonder that Russians are unsettled by the prospect that much of this same territory is to fall into the hands of their late 20th century adversary, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

Would Americans be complacent with the prospect of an alliance between Panama and Russia that allowed Russian submarines to be based in the Panama Canal Zone? No, because security policy is built not on good-will declarations of other powers but on their capabilities. Just as no American political leader would countenance a reversal of 180 years of American foreign policy in Panama, so too no responsible Russian politician can concede without protest the expansion of NATO into territory into an alliance that virtually borders on Mother Russia -- yet continues to exclude it.

Another consequence of NATO expansion is decreased diplomatic cooperation with Russia. Changes in this field are more nuanced but potentially more enduring. Russia and the U.S. have a number of different political and security interests, and it is only natural that Washington and Moscow would disagree on some issues of great importance. It is nevertheless crucial to maintain the best relations possible. Russia's influence can significantly aid -- or hamper -- U.S. efforts in many areas of the world. For example, without Moscow's cooperation, the United Nations Security Council will be unable to make decisions. The row over Iraq illustrates the potential for deadlock unless cooperative U.S. - Russian relations are maintained. In 1990-91, Russia's cooperation paved the way for creation of the Gulf War coalition whose actions were endorsed overwhelmingly by the United Nations Security Council. Seven years later, not only does Moscow not consent to U.S. military action against Iraq, it also seems to be intent on preventing any reconstitution of a major anti-Iraq coalition under U.S. leadership. The willingness of the Russians to work with the U.S. will decrease further if its legislature and its people come to believe that Washington is attempting to take advantage of Russia's current diplomatic, economic, and conventional military weakness.

The Clinton Administration, arguing that recent agreements signed with Moscow prove that relations are on the right track, dismisses the significance of the changes in Russia's attitude. NATO did sign the so-called "Founding Act" with the Russian Federation and has set up a joint NATO - Russia Council. But without a precisely specified mandate, and thanks to suspicions harbored by both sides, the Council has so far failed to produce significant results.

A number of important arms reductions treaties signed by Russia and the United States await ratification by the Russian Parliament. Chief among them is the START II Treaty which would reduce the number of nuclear warheads in Russia to 3,500. The Russian Duma is scheduled to vote on START II this year, but NATO expansion may have complicated the task for those in Russia who support the treaty. An insight into the reaction to NATO expansion among Russian political elites was recently offered by Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Russian Parliament:

"It's surprising that even now some people in the West fail to recognize that Russia, like the United States, is not a homogenous political player, devising sophisticated bargaining strategies. Most Russian political actions are the result of tough domestic infighting, and foreign and domestic events can shift internal balances and affect policy decisions. Many of those who have been trying to persuade the United States not to expand NATO are the people who have staked their careers (and probably more than that) on Russia's close and fair cooperation with the United States. They will still advocate ratification of Start 2, but against the continuing clamor over NATO expansion, their voices will be hardly heard."

NATO’s piecemeal approach -- accepting countries one-by-one or in small groups -- could lead to tensions between the countries accepted and those that are deferred. The Alliance is hoping that the desire to enter the Alliance will keep all those not in the first tranche “on good behavior” until their turn comes. Such an incentive is a very unstable basis on which to build a European security structure or to risk future military guarantees by the United States to aid a member state. Once in, a country might be tempted to reassert some dormant claim to territory or ethnic rights.

If this seems to be stretching credulity, consider the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. NATO has no mechanism for preventing one of its members from committing an aggressive act against another nation. A 1954 resolution of the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s decision-making body, calls for punitive measures to be invoked in case an Alliance member violates the United Nations charter. The existence of this 1954 document, however, did not keep Turkey, a NATO member, from invading Cyprus. Neither did it prevent a shooting conflict between Turkey and another NATO member, Greece.

What are the implications for Central European nations? This area also has its share of unresolved, ancient problems, such as the issue of Hungarian minorities in neighboring Romania, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia. The danger here is the same as between Greece and Turkey -- apparently nothing would prevent a country like Hungary from using its newly acquired status as a NATO member to try to settle disputes in its favor by using militarily means or threats. New members will have armed forces at least partially rejuvenated with money from NATO funds and U.S. military assistance. Under one possible scenario, an ethnic minority group seeking autonomy or an elevation of its status might initiate violence. When police or military forces step in to end the fighting and the first “ethnic” casualties occur, the minority group would appeal for help to the “mother country,” which would assert the right and obligation to protect all its nationals no matter in what country they reside. The next step, if “protection” of the minority groups is deemed inadequate, would see the troops of the “mother country,” equipped with newer NATO weapons, cross the border and, with the help of the sympathetic local minority groups, occupy the disputed territory. The ethnic minority then would declare a provisional government consisting of local politicians who set about depriving residents of other ethnic origins of their rights. Eventually, the territory becomes incorporated in the “mother country” proper.

Opinion polls in Central Europe indicate that more people favor joining the European Union (EU) than NATO. The EU offers a link to the West which NATO can never supply: common currency, no borders, barrier-free trade, and a seat in Europe’s decision-making bodies. The European Union is the true vehicle for the integration of all European countries in a symbolic as well as a tangible sense. Because of the complex relations among EU nations, the process of reaching out to Central and Eastern European countries has been slow. But aside from the substantive hurdles on the way to EU membership, another problem has emerged: the Union appears to be giving preferential treatment to countries also considered for NATO membership.

Of the five Central and Eastern European countries identified for early accession to the EU, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are also first-round candidates for NATO membership. Only Slovenia, which barely missed a spot in the top group of NATO candidates, and Estonia, which has recorded remarkable economic growth, are not among countries to be admitted to NATO in 1999. Part of the reason for the convergence in nations entering NATO and the EU is that both use similar criteria such as economic performance and democratic credentials. But there are also clear indications the EU uses NATO membership as a prerequisite for extending its invitation. This approach leaves little hope that countries excluded from NATO expansion might one day join the one organization most essential to European integration -- the European Union.

In evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of NATO membership, care must be taken not to overlook how NATO membership jeopardizes the relations between Central European countries and Russia. Contrary to assessments of many analysts that Russia does not constitute a threat to Central Europe -- not now, not in the foreseeable future -- expansion proponents play up the “Eastern threat” to justify the Alliance’s plan. Pictures of Soviet leaders and not-so-subtle references to Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968, respectively, were used in media campaigns promoting NATO membership. A prominent Czech journalist wrote, “...our country does not face any threat for at least a decade. But our leaders, in their desire to join NATO, scare the public with the “Russian threat” which they use to justify NATO membership.” These attitudes in NATO candidate countries threaten to turn a perceived Russian danger into a real one by creating a hostile atmosphere and fueling Russia’s insecurity.

The geographic distance and seeming irrelevance of these problems are misleading -- the U.S. should be concerned about these developments. After all, NATO expansion means that current NATO nations guarantee the security of their new Central European allies. A local conflict between an Eastern European country and Russia could draw in the United States and provide the spark leading to a larger conflict. The public needs to ask whether such a possibility is in our national security interest.

Conversely, the Central European countries should also be concerned about new obligations. NATO security guarantees work both ways, and new members could become embroiled in the conflicts of the West. A Hungarian expert wrote, “Just as London and Paris might at one point fight for Warsaw or Budapest, the latter two are expected to do the same for the former. This part of the story is cleverly concealed from the Hungarian public. In fact, in view of the recent crises in the Middle East, it is much more likely that Hungarians will be summoned to protect Western oil interests than, for example, the British would be called upon to defend Warsaw or Budapest.”

Moreover, it is questionable whether security guarantees that NATO extends to its members would be equally honored in case Central and Eastern Europeans needed help. The Western community failed to observe its explicit commitments to Czechoslovakia in 1938 and was unable to respond to the anti-communist revolts in Budapest (1956) and Prague (1968). While these events belong to history, President Clinton very recently sought to downplay the importance of NATO’s security guarantees spelled out in the Washington Treaty. Article V states that an attack on one is an attack on all, and in the past it was interpreted as an automatic guarantee of aid to an ally in distress. But in a written response to an enquiry from a group of Senators, the President wrote, “[Article V] does not define what actions constitute ‘an attack’ or prejudge what Alliance decisions might then be made in such circumstances. Member states...are required to exercise individual and collective judgment over this question.” Given their history, the recent statements by Clinton must seem like a deja-vu to most Central Europeans.

The Administration continues to treat NATO expansion as an “inside the Beltway” issue to be kept from the American public. Listening to the arguments employed by the proponents of NATO expansion leaves the impression that this plan is the elixir for all Europe’s ills. Ironically, until fairly recently, the same people now advocating the virtues of expansion opposed the idea. In 1994, the current Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, warned that to expand NATO was to misunderstand the fears of Russia about encirclement. Then-Secretary of State Christopher added that quick expansion would “risk dividing Europe by creating new blocs and unintentionally replicating a bit to the east a line of demarcation that NATO has fought for a long time to erase.”

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The national elections in 1994 and 1996 changed everything. First, the Republican “Contract With America” called for “Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia [to be] invited to become full NATO members.” A Republican-controlled Congress passed a NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act that allocated money for military assistance to Central and Eastern Europe. President Clinton quickly jumped on the expansion bandwagon in order to preempt a migration of Eastern European ethnic votes to the Republican camp. In a speech at Detroit in October 1996, he called for the Alliance to admit the first new members in April 1999 -- the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty which created NATO.

President Clinton’s speech sent the NATO expansion wheels into overdrive. In the following two years, the House of Representatives authorized hundreds of millions of dollars for military assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, on occasion even diverting money from funds earmarked for economic development. The U.S. strong-armed its European allies into an agreement on which countries to admit at a summit in Madrid in 1997, and U.S. and NATO diplomats negotiated with the candidate nations accession agreements that are being submitted to national legislatures for approval.

All these steps were taken with little media and even less public attention. Newspaper coverage remains largely confined to the op-ed pages of a few selected dailies and specialized defense industry magazines. Network television stories about this issue which aired in the last three years could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Despite this nearly complete lack of public scrutiny, expansion proponents now argue that the project has advanced so far that to stop or even slow it for public scrutiny would “send the wrong signal.” According to this logic, any government proposal, no matter how misguided, should be irrevocable as long as it has been tucked away from the public until substantially completed.

The attempt to open up the NATO expansion debate thus takes on political as well as strategic importance. The continuing absence of a nation-wide debate strengthens the hand of lobbying groups whose narrow interests will prevail if unchecked by public scrutiny of the many implications of NATO expansion for the Alliance and the U.S. The Senate should assert its right and responsibility to consider all sides of the issue submitted to it. Unfortunately, Senate hearings so far have been few and heavily stacked in favor of proponents of NATO expansion. Of the fourteen witnesses invited to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 5, 1997, eleven were well known supporters of NATO expansion. Many speakers had been actively lobbying the Senate prior to the hearings on behalf of pro-expansion interest groups.

The Senate consideration of NATO expansion to date has been conducted mostly hastily and without due preparation. Due to the lack of public attention, many Senators remain uninformed about the possible consequences of this plan. With every passing day, the likelihood increases that a decision will be made which will send the United States down a road whose end -- and even its direction -- remains shrouded in the unknown. While one can never completely eliminate uncertainty, the complexity of the expansion issue and the haste in which it has been conducted so far call for a more thorough critical consideration by U.S. citizens and their elected representatives.

Decisions about the mission or even the very existence of institutions such as NATO are being made with little sense of the enormous changes that were precipitated by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Ideally, the governments represented in NATO would have taken a hard look at the organization, considered whether in its current form it could respond to new emerging threats, and identified its new mission and the means of achieving its goals -- if NATO were deemed still useful and relevant in today’s world. However, no one took up the challenge. By default the initiative passed to bureaucrats who found a new raison d’etre to continue NATO expansion. Yet the public still awaits a satisfactory explanation of how the expansion contributes to NATO’s new mission which also has yet to be convincingly articulated. The bureaucrats were happily supported in their quest by politicians who saw in NATO expansion an issue to attract ethnic votes.

Having found a life-line for survival, NATO bureaucrats set about finding something useful for the Alliance to do. The first rough draft of an update of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, its guiding document outlining the threats and goals for NATO, was just submitted to national delegations in January 1998 -- nearly four years after the decision to expand was made. The Strategic Concept is not expected to be adopted until the first round of new members join the Alliance.

Today, the entire process of NATO expansion seems shorn of a long-term strategy and more akin to ad-hoc decision-making. Because de facto international security is barely being considered, the decisions made do not take into account the potential impact of the piecemeal expansion on other nations. Russia’s concerns have been insufficiently addressed, and many Western leaders actually professed surprise when Moscow vehemently opposed it. Subsequent changes in Russia’s position on some issues was then interpreted as “old thinking” or even malign intent and, in a case of classic circular logic, used to “justify” NATO expansion. Such tactics are not new: they have been used many times in the past to “justify” spending on new weapons programs. But it is time now to smash this self-justifying and self-perpetuating methodology, which has cost our country trillions of dollars, and challenge politicians and bureaucrats to speak straight.