• Vice Admiral John J. Shanahan, Director of the Center for Defense Information, recently testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in opposition to NATO expansion.

• Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and recently retired as U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom, recently spoke at a CDI meeting in New York. He addressed a number of important issues, including relations with Russia, NATO enlargement, Bosnia, and the future of the U.S. military

NATO Expansion: An Ill-Conceived Plan

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In 1969, Mr. Chairman, I was in country in Vietnam, engaged in a real war where Americans were fighting for their very lives. In 1970, I was assigned to the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels. Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to imagine the shock, some of which remains with me to this very day, of moving from Vietnam to the never-never land of NATO and mingling with some 3,000 mindless bureaucrats and diplomats whose main mission in life was to avoid taking any position disruptive of a serene lifestyle. Five hundred people could have done their jobs better.

The prevailing attitude of most members of the alliance was that they were safely tucked under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and that the Warsaw Pact was not a major concern. As a result, our allies did not consistently meet their NATO commitments in terms of defense spending. Their pre-positioned war reserves of food, ammunition, fuel, etc. were well below NATO standards. Interoperability was a joke. They were not ready then; they are not ready now; and as we integrate East European militaries into the alliance this condition will worsen, placing greater demands on the U.S. military to shoulder the burden. Even as we speak, our allies are making significant reductions in military spending and in their force structures.

With that background, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure you sense bias on my part. I am here to express my very real concern on the issue of NATO expansion. That concern has to do with the need to maintain our bilateral relations with Russia, which are more important to the long term security and economic interests of the U.S. and the American people and which far outweigh the fuzzy goals of NATO expansion.

We could well be driving Russian foreign policy in a direction decidedly not to our liking. There are many issues out there on which Russian cooperation is essential. I have in mind nuclear weapons stockpile reductions, nuclear nonproliferation, environmental pollution, conventional arms control and sales, access to new oil resources, strategic relationships in the Middle East and the Far East, and the success or failure of a series of treaties, either signed or on the table.

Thus, I oppose NATO expansion on the grounds that we are sacrificing our long term relations with Russia on the altar of an ill-conceived plan to haphazardly expand an outmoded military alliance -- ill-conceived for domestic political purposes, ill-conceived as a legacy for one man, and ill-conceived since we are not clear on why, how, when, and where to expand.

It is haphazard because we don't know how many countries will eventually join, there is no clear definition of NATO's new mission, and no clear idea of the costs.

I hope the Senate in its infinite wisdom will delay the process to allow time for an informed debate on both sides of the Atlantic. As George Kennan observed, "Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold war era." If that be true, and I believe it is, then, Sir, we need to be cautious and proceed with deliberate speed.

Mr. Chairman, let me thank you once again for this opportunity. I will be pleased to answer any questions you or any other members of the committee might have.

Russia: Our Number One Foreign Policy Challenge

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Four weeks ago I returned from London after serving just a little over three years as the U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James. It was a bona fide adventure, I can assure you, although we did get a little homesick. We discovered two things: one, that Great Britain is a foreign country; and secondly, that we're basically Americans. That's a good way to discover it.

I retired from the Navy in 1989. When I was called back to service in 1994 I discovered that a few things had changed in Washington just in the short period of four years. Today in that town a man is presumed innocent until appointed to a post by the President. That was the first hurdle I had to overcome when I returned to, or at least took on diplomatic life....

In Europe we currently face challenges across the board: Bosnia, Russian reform, NATO expansion, environmental policies, modification to the European Union, the Middle East peace process, Turkey, Iraq, trade sanctions, Helms-Burton legislation (a problem we, ourselves, have imposed on Europe), et cetera. These were sort of the stuff of my everyday business.

The fact that we are in lockstep--and I truly mean this--in lockstep with our British colleagues on the bulk of these questions certainly made my burdens a great deal lighter. I departed the Embassy confident that the bond between our two governments and our two peoples has never been closer or healthier. And I say that genuinely, no matter what you might read to the contrary in the press.

That does not mean, however, that we do not have some hard slogging ahead of us. So this afternoon I want to focus not on the day-to-day business but on the long-term environment in Europe, with the emphasis on those words "long-term." In other words, I want to look a few years down the pike at issues which I think will still be with us and which will have a profound impact on our collective and individual well-being--and more importantly, perhaps a profound impact on the lives of our children.

First and foremost, Russia. In my judgment the most enduring challenge facing us in Europe is Russia. Given today's fast-moving climate, there is a tendency, a strongtendency, to concentrate on the headlines of the moment and to neglect fundamentals. With Russia's vast resources and resilient population, it will ultimately sort itself out and return to the front rank of world powers. In turn, it is imperative that we in this country and in the free world bend every effort to encourage Russia's move toward pluralism, political stability, and a free market economy.

In this process we must not overlook the progress that has already been made. In the first place, if you look back over five, ten years of my life, it's incredible what the relationship is today as compared to then and the many steps that we have made already to break down the problems that we were concerned about in Russia. We are currently engaged directly with Moscow on a number of major issues of grave import. For example, START, the test ban, the nonproliferation treaty, the ABM treaty. Land mines are also something that we're trying to work out with Moscow. We deal with them on Iran, Bosnia, China, the Middle East-- a whole host of these issues.

Of course there are limits as to our influence. But it does not make it less important that we try to reshape, or to shape, events in that troubled land and in the process that we retain and not lose the progress that we've already made which is a very definite possibility if we're not statesmanlike and if we're not sensitive to what we're doing.

Put bluntly, the outcome of the events in Russia can directly affect the future of the free world. The epic journey of that great nation is far from over.

Most of my professional life was spent seeking advantage and victory over the Soviet Union. Now we must be just as vigilant and steadfast in exploring ways to help our former foe return to the mainstream of international politics. This, unfortunately, will require us to do a lot of things, to be creative, to be patient and willing to invest some of our own resources, if necessary. No doubt this will be protracted and perhaps an agonizing problem or process. But if the Russian people ultimately return to some form of autocracy, it would be a genuine disaster not only for them but for us as well. In essence, I would judge that Russia is our number one foreign policy challenge, and it would be folly to treat it otherwise.

A related issue is the ongoing transformation of the NATO alliance. The decision to bring in three new members to the coalition closes one act of the drama. But it is by no means the final curtain. Accession documents with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic must be negotiated and ratified by all member parliaments. This means our Congress, as well; always a sign of trouble.

This is not a minor procedural task. Having spent some time in Washington, I can assure you that nothing involving the Congress is minor or predictable, for that matter. This process will very likely spark a spirited dialogue, and that's fine as befits an issue that is of enduring significance.

Expanding the alliance is a solemn commitment and should be only taken after sober reflection and clear-eyed discussion of what it entails. Now I'm not sure how this debate in our Congress will sort out ultimately, but I will tell you that my own instincts lead me to believe that the Administration will ultimately prevail. I say that because the expansion proposal has moved quite a distance. In fact, it's probably moved too far and many people, even who oppose it, would be reluctant to defeat it now. A defeat would provoke a major crisis in the alliance and certainly with a number of our friends--sort of the same situation as the League of Nations.

That doesn't mean it may not be defeated, but I would suggest that the chances are that it will ultimately prevail. And assuming it does, we should understand what that involves. Approval will not solve all the problems. It in it's own way will bring some Herculean tasks. In a sense, the real challenges are yet to come.

The enlargement of NATO is not especially consistent with the first priority which I mentioned, that of influencing the Kremlin. Make no mistake, the Russians harbor deep suspicion of the proposal and no formal agreement is going to defuse that resentment.

When I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I had many hours of talks with my opposite number, Marshal Akhromeyev, who was the chief of the Defense Staff in the Soviet Union. Curiously enough, in a rather odd way he and I became friendly. We had many spirited arguments and dialogues, et cetera, and one did revolve around NATO. He characterized it as "the most offensive alliance in the history of the world."

I took vigorous exception to that, but I tell you this story to point out suspicion of NATO is built into the woof and warp of many Russian leaders. It's not an easy problem to deal with. The only way it can be dealt with is not just in making agreements and a lot of big talk; it will take time, statesmanship of a high order, and performance. And I mean by that to do what we say we're going to do. If we're going to build a new kind of NATO, then we've got to demonstrate it, not just talk about it. Only then will we convince the Kremlin leadership that we are building a new and different type of international organization.

Now, this is not easy. Given the realities of American politics--and there are many people in this country that do not want to move closer to the new Russia -- given these realities, this will be a difficult and protracted task, at best. It would certainly be a tragedy if the expansion of NATO destroyed the prospect of meaningful future cooperation with Moscow. So that's a big problem for our country, one that we should all be seized of. We should all try and appreciate how difficult it will be and we should be determined on the subject.

Similarly, there's another aspect of expansion of NATO which I would have you think about. The goal of integrating new members into the military structures of NATO will be especially challenging. It is imperative that these steps not erode the fundamental cohesion or strength of the current alliance. The process of absorbing new states and their militaries into the fraternity will be a long-term matter. This will not happen easily. It will take not months, but years.

In any event, it must not be abbreviated or depreciated. It must be done right. NATO, by definition, involves not only rewards but obligations as well -- financial, military and political. Once new initiates are admitted, the tendency -- if history is any guide, and we do have a lot of history in this subject -- the tendency will be to neglect the more demanding requirements and to cut corners. This temptation must be resisted if NATO expansion is to genuinely result in a more robust and stable Europe.

If it is to do what we say it's going to do, it will require a multi-pronged effort. For instance, the continuing evolution of the Partnership for Peace is equally important. It must be nourished. It must be made successful.

All of this will take time and, let us be clear, a demanding commitment. No amount of creative accounting -- and we're seeing some creative accounting right now -- should be allowed to obscure the fact that there will be significant costs for the U.S., both financial and political. Even the current members of NATO have, on occasion, been less than enthusiastic about assuming heavy military burdens. It will be essential for the United States and its leading European allies to lead this process, to ensure that it is done right, to ensure that NATO remains viable during this period of dramatic change, to ensure also that we do it in a manner that Russia will not feel threatened and that we do ultimately convince Russia that we mean what we say that we're building an organization for different purposes.

In other words, we're not just requiring U.S. approval when we enter this process, but also serious and determined U.S. participation. If we don't, it will fall short of its goals. It will fall short of its aims. This is a big problem for the next few years.

Similar challenges face the European Union as it grapples with change and expansion. Originally, the E.C., the European Community, was solely designed to encourage and increase economic cooperation. But, like it or not, today the E.U. is performing on a much larger stage. As we press Eastern Europe to move toward pluralism and to reject autocracy, economic stability becomes a vital pillar of the West's long-term strategy. The ability of emerging democracies to fight poverty, drugs, corruption, and environmental malpractices rests, in large part, on their economic health. Just as NATO offers military assurances, the European Union promises fiscal and commercial assurances. These are linkages that are not always understood or appreciated.

In essence, the long-term challenge facing the E.U. is, in my judgment, to manage complex internal transformations while, at the same time, remaining sensitive to how these affect the wider canvas of political change. The U.S. is not a direct participant but, nevertheless, has a profound interest in the E.U.'s relationship to the overall security structure.

In the near term, for example, Turkey is well positioned to serve as a bridge between the West, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Ankara has been a stalwart ally and partner, often at some cost to itself. At the same time, Turkey is seeking eventual E.U. membership with a view to deepening its relationship with Europe. Put simply, Ankara's military contributions to NATO must be matched and underpinned by sound economic growth and trade. Can Europe -- and, parenthetically, the United States -- on the one hand readily accept Ankara's military contributions to NATO and, on the other hand, neglect its desires on the economic side of the balance sheet? This is a serious question, and the answer is not, at this point, obvious. Nevertheless, it affects many nations outside of Europe, including our own.

The current effort in Bosnia manifests the difficulty in generating concerted European action and the crucial role U.S. leadership plays in such situations. In one sense, recent events have been encouraging. NATO, for the first time, is operating outside of the treaty area. Its forces have separated the warring factions and the arbitrary killing has been arrested.

But the Balkan problem also includes a civil side, which is proving to be rather thorny. It is the first genuine test of NATO's changing orientation and, in that sense, is a long-term issue with dramatic implications for the future. Fractured communities, such as we're seeing in the ex-Yugoslavia, do not heal overnight. And the active involvement of the international community remains critical to long-term success in that troubled land. Our ability to stay the course in Bosnia will be a litmus test, I believe, of how successful we will be in building durable structures of peace and prosperity in Europe. You may not like that. It may not make you feel comfortable. But the future character of NATO, Russia, NATO relationships with Russia, the E.U., the U.N., many of our bilateral alliances all have a heavy stake in the Bosnian outcome. In my view, it will be a watershed event in the history of the next fifty years. I sincerely hope the American public understands this reality. I am not so sure we do. And I'm not so sure what the outcome will be as to a long-term effort.

A similar concern requires me to put my admiral's hat back on for a moment. The pressures unleashed by the end of the Cold War are also reshaping our forces. One thing, however, that has not changed is that we must have a viable military, a viable and flexible military, to underwrite successful diplomacy. George Shultz, the former Secretary of State, was fond of saying, "The military furnishes the umbrella underneath which all diplomacy is conducted."

Many assume the end of the Cold War will mean a greatly reduced need for military activities, with a corresponding savings, referred to colloquially as the "peace dividend." While defense expenditures have been drawn down, the need for credible and viable strength has not decreased proportionately. American troops have become involved in a host of new missions and crises. Consider that since President Clinton took office in 1993, U.S. forces have been committed in some fashion, small or large, some 49 times, a considerably higher number than previous periods. At this moment, there are 14 active deployments of American troops abroad, most notably in Bosnia. At the same time, the lack of a single galvanizing threat, such as the Cold War furnished, has led to defense budgets being gradually sliced back.

I'm afraid this is a perennial problem of pluralist societies. It's not unique to our own. Without a prominent enemy or major threat on the horizon, democratic governments over time are prone to hollow out their forces. A key part of successful U.S. foreign policy is the willingness to take action, including military intervention, if dictated. We must be vigilant that our ability to do this is not allowed to atrophy. This is especially important, for example, if we're to succeed in transforming NATO.

Our reliance on all-volunteer forces likewise adds urgency to the task. Young men and women will not choose a military career if our services are not kept attractive and healthy and modern. This is a service, of course, that organizations like yours can perform. You can be a force for education, you can sensitize the American public to the need for this, as to what is going on in the military, where improvements can be made, and where money is being wasted. And I urge you to take that responsibility very, very seriously.

You may feel I'm letting my background overly color my analysis, but my experience in London confirmed for me John F. Kennedy's observation that "diplomacy and defense are not substitutes for one another. Either alone would fail."

Each of the concerns that I have stressed point out the imperative of American leadership. President Clinton recently underlined the importance of U.S. engagement, saying, "Escapism is not available to us. At the end of the Cold War, America is truly the world's indispensable nation."

I believe most Americans generally want Washington to play a leadership role in fashioning a more peaceful, pluralistic, and prosperous globe. Now, I fully realize this is a large order as we strive to build what some people call a "new world order." I heard a wag say, "The only thing we know about the new world order is it's long on new and short on order." I'm afraid there's a great deal of truth in that.

I anticipate that our government's general approach should and will be essentially pragmatic and incremental. We're groping in a very uncertain environment, the fourth time in a century that we've had such a sea change in the international climate. The U.S. may be the world's only superpower, unmatched economically and militarily, but as a people we remain circumspect about asserting this power. We are not eager to be the world's policeman, nor do we desire to be a solitary sentry on the ramparts imposing our vision on both friends and foes.

I suggest that we much prefer to work hand in hand with other nations. While we are unquestionably strong, I believe that our most important single asset is a political willingness to search for creative, innovative and consensual actions geared to the new realities. Supported by positive bilateral relations with allies, these efforts should enable America to develop a deeper partnership with Europe irrespective of national boundaries. This is of prime importance for, as President Clinton made clear during his campaign, "Nowhere are our interests more engaged than in Europe. When Europe is at peace, our security is strengthened. When Europe prospers, so does America."

Our public can, of course, neglect or reject this advice. Certainly the temptation to offload our Cold War burdens is understandable. But to put it bluntly, we do so at our own peril, frankly at the free world's peril. Churchill described it a little differently. He said, "With great power comes great responsibility."....

Please don't conclude from these cautionary notes that I am filled with gloom for the future. I am not. The challenges I outline are formidable, but I'm confident they can be met. We have a track history that suggests this. In fact, we have a pretty good track record in our own lifetimes. Witness American staunchness and perseverance over the long reach of the Cold War. That great American midwestern philosopher, Paul Harvey, gives us a little advice which we could probably all use. He says, "In times like these, it's helpful to remember there have always been times like these."