• On April 29, 1997 CDI's Director, VADM Shanahan, spoke before the National Defense Panel (NDP) established by Congress to review the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

• VADM Shanahan stressed the possibilities and the pitfalls of the QDR process. He also noted the NDP's dual role to critique the QDR and to chart the future direction of national defense.

• The first part of this Monitor is the edited text of VADM Shanahan's presentation. Following this is an adaptation of a June 1997 article (after release of the QDR) for "Veterans' Vision."

CDI and the QDR

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I qualify this statement with the word "could" for two reasons.

First, the QDR is essentially a National Military Strategy Review. It is not...a National Security Strategy Review. It therefore does not look at the very important part played by other instruments of foreign policy--active diplomacy, trade and finance, and foreign aid. Nor does it look at that most fundamental aspect of national security--a strong and growing domestic economy that...should we ever be seriously threatened, will allow us to regenerate the military forces and military hardware necessary to ensure our national survival.

Second, despite repeated statements by Secretary Cohen...and others, all the signs point to the Pentagon's QDR as budget rather than threat and strategy driven. As a practical matter...whatever the QDR and this panel recommend must resonate in the obscure world of the budget. What the American public has seen over the last eight months, however, is the more familiar inter-service battles over roles and missions--and therefore budget shares....

As arcane as the Cold War-era Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is, it has the merit of assessing the threat, determining the forces necessary to neutralize and, if required, defeat the threat. It also estimates the various levels of risk--from zero to low to moderate--that would exist as the force is adjusted to accommodate the realities of manpower availability, the size and condition of the industrial base, and national budget priorities. Unfortunately, the Pentagon now starts with a budget target into which each of the services attempts to shoehorn as many of its programs as possible with insufficient regard for joint battlefield synergism or the actual threats to our national interests....

The military forces of a nation are only one player in preserving national interests, and in a democracy such as ours, the military is not the primary line of defense of those interests when we are at peace. Nonetheless, because some nations will defy international norms, may elect to oppose legitimate U.S. interests by force, or threaten the lives and safety of U.S. and other citizens, we must retain military forces able to respond to realistic threats to our interests.

In February...LtGen Patrick Hughes, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)...listed some of the likely threats to U.S. interests: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, missile proliferation, the growing economic disparity between North and South, increasing resource scarcity, and intra-state conflicts that produce huge refugee flows and humanitarian relief needs.

LtGen Patrick Hughes, Director, DIA
February 6, 1997

Defining our core values and enduring vital national interests is critical to determining the nature and extent of the threats to those values and interests. Our Founding Fathers, in the Preamble to the Constitution, provided a list of values which have served well as general guidelines....

However, nothing is quite that simple, for what politicians might interpret as vital national interests at any given time can be biased by ideology, convictions of the elite, "common wisdom," policy inertia, and the general state of the world....Furthermore, history suggests that a nation which unnecessarily retains larger than needed military forces has a propensity to see every challenge as an assault on its vital interests. Such a posture cannot be sustained in terms of national will and public support, let alone economically. If the power, the will, or the public support for using force is absent, threats to use force become hollow until, in frustration, the military is set a task that involves not vital but distant, less important interests simply to "prove a point."...

Dr. Michael Roskin, "National Security: From Abstraction to Strategy"
Parameters, U.S. Army War College, 1994

Nonetheless, the Pentagon continues...business as usual: permanently stationed forces abroad where the Cold War threat has disappeared; high levels of routine operational deployments; heavy emphasis on maximum readiness for all elements of the active force and selected reserve units; and purchases of expensive equipment unsuited for the scale and types of military interventions in which U.S. forces would most likely be used.

Just how these strategy components would be justified became clear when...[in] March 1996 ...General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the new basis for U.S. military force structure, end strength, infrastructure, and budgets: "Managing the [more uncertain world] has led us to modify our Cold War approach of maintaining a threat-based force, towards a capability-based approach that ensures we protect the balance to handle today's real threats, as well as tomorrow's equally real possibilities."

A "capabilities based approach"...is equivalent to asking for a blank check....This mind set can be used to justify the purchase of every new piece of equipment that emerges from what many refer to as the "Revolution in Military Affairs" or RMA, although...technology is only one part of this revolution....

These considerations only magnify the importance of being more selective in the quantities of new systems the Pentagon procures. The traditional "American way" of attempting to replace every piece of equipment every 20 years simply is no longer affordable. We have the technology to design and redesign, to combine, manipulate, and integrate systems and simulate outcomes without going through long, expensive development cycles. A workable alternative is to build-in growth potential....Incremental modernization would seem an easier and less expensive method of remaining on the cutting edge of technology....

When a major technological evolution appears possible but needs to be tested by bending metal..., the services should be restricted to basic prototyping and the production of the number of new systems required to test battlefield synergism. (A very clear success in this regard was the F-117 stealth fighter.) In this way, we gain the benefits of understanding how new technology affects and is affected by doctrine and tactics....

Given all the foregoing, my instincts, both as a former military commander and as a concerned citizen, tell me we have to completely reevaluate the way we consider future military security.

Why do we still need forces permanently based overseas when there is no enemy in Europe--unless we create one by excluding Russia from a fully integrated Europe--or in Asia, where North Korea is a shadow of the South and where China, though touted by some as our likely future "near peer competitor," lacks a credible and sustainable power projection capability?

Why do we still routinely steam carrier task forces and amphibious ready groups from the U.S., as we did during the Cold War, when there is no security contingency that demands the presence of such a force?

Why do we still rely on 12,500 nuclear warheads as a fundamental element of warfighting strategy when such weapons have no military utility?

[Furthermore]...in the short run savings in the order of one to two billion dollars per year could be realized by returning most of our two European based divisions stateside and, if they are judged to be necessary to the force structure, assigning them to currently underused facilities.

Bringing more troops home from Europe should not be dismissed out of hand. It is not nor should it be interpreted as a prelude to isolationism....After 50 years, Europe should be able to handle most of its problems on its own. If we reject government paternalism at home, why do we insist on U.S. military paternalism abroad?...From a strategic political-military point of view, I believe all that is needed to reassure our European allies that the U.S. remains committed to common security is our ability to reconstitute and reinforce--a global reach capability if and when war threatens again--rather than a permanent global force presence.

Having global reach without global presence is entirely consistent with our national security strategy and is feasible given our highly sophisticated Indications and Warning (I&W) system for tracking and projecting future threats....Our satellites and other technical collection methods, along with human open source and specialized collectors, can acquire sufficient long-range information...to detect traditional nation-state and many sub-state threats. The real need is better analyses--getting the relevant information and piecing it together.

Force structure...should reflect strategy and threat, both in terms of what and what kind of forces are needed to deter current military adventurism and the possible re-emergence of a hostile peer competitor. In this regard, I am particularly disturbed--and believe this Panel should very carefully examine--proposals to retain an artificially broad force structure that is significantly undermanned and under-equipped.

In terms of force attributes, I recommend this Panel consider how to reintroduce mobility and agility into our forces. From the Battle of Actium to the Battle of the Bulge, these two elements have been critical to military success....Winning really means identifying and destroying the enemy's centers of gravity. Depending on the adversary, these centers will vary in importance and kind. What we develop therefore, both in terms of force attributes and equipment, should focus not on substituting for the soldier, the airman, the sailor, the Marine but on enhancing the capability of the warrior....

I suggest two possibilities which...address force structure and the related issue of personnel and operations tempo.

First, we should consider a force size and structure based on the adage, "if you can't see it you can't shoot it." Simply put, our active forces should be sized against predictable threats. This structure would have a sensible "floor," an irreducible minimum number of active force units capable of fighting across the entire conflict spectrum from low to high-intensity warfare. This minimum would be one of each type unit as a "root" on which to graft mobilization and reconstitution forces....

If the active force were targeted against predictable threats, reserve components would be oriented against "unforeseen" contingencies. With the greatly expanded warning time available... the U.S. could rebuild active forces from preexisting cadre and reserve units when these emerging threats raise themselves above the horizon....

Second, the U.S. should take the lead in promoting the formation of a civilian-led "Crisis Intervention Unit" that would be available, on a standby basis and in conjunction with our allies and friends...for rapid response to potential trouble spots. The armed element of such a unit... would be armed sufficiently for self-protection and for the equivalent of constabulary work. Its emphasis, however, would be on nation rebuilding within the context of peacekeeping. Such a unit would relieve the regular military of many current personnel and optempo demands....

What I hope all this suggests to you is that no single national military strategy...can be the final arbiter of the size and composition of our forces. Since strategies, by definition, only apply to the means to defeat a specific threat, perhaps a better alternative to a single strategy would be some form of national emergency response capability. This might include, as the Pentagon's prime planning and programming yardstick, the ability to reconstitute up to a level approximating our Cold War combat capability of the mid-1980's. This capability to reconstitute up to our largest post-World War II levels would be the "sleeping giant" behind our more visible active force, a giant serving to deter as well as to counter emerging opponents.

In summary, the considerations I have outlined...could provide enormous benefits to American society. Among these are:

• A military force capable of fighting today and mobilizing for tomorrow at a lower cost.
• A return to our tradition of melding all the elements of national power--diplomatic, political, economic, social, and military--into a cohesive and synergistic foreign policy.
• More resources devoted to creating sustainable national wealth by, among other measures, transitioning excess military-industrial capacity to civilian production, the real engine of our national strength and security.
• Reduced anxieties in Russia and perhaps in other nations about our large standing force.

"What part of ‘no' don't you understand?" echoed Senator Pat Roberts (R-KA).

The review is "long on commitments and short on resources--in this regard, it truly looks like deja vu all over again," declared Representative Floyd Spence (R-SC).

These were a few reactions on the Hill as details of the Pentagon's long-awaited (and low- expectation) QDR emerged during the final days before its official release....

Six years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many in Congress, academia, and foreign policy think tanks have had their worst fears realized. Instead of a military whose mind and efforts are focused on the challenges of the 21st century, the Pentagon...is still fixated on Cold War era strategy, forces, structure, and budgets.

In the strictest sense, under terms of the QDR legislation, this failure to force a clean about face must be placed at the feet of Congress. But in the broader picture, the military and the vast U.S. military industry must bear partial responsibility for perpetuating the status quo in the face of the greatest nonviolent change in power relationships the world has ever seen....

Driving the QDR was congressional frustration with the Clinton Administration's relatively steady-state spending on defense, especially for near-term readiness and quality-of-life improvements. This frustration was stoked when key legislators such as Senators McCain, Lieberman, Coates, and Representative Spence suddenly realized that the balanced budget drive would further hamstring congressional efforts to force the Administration to increase its military budget request as well as Congress' prerogatives to add money.

The conundrum was how to shift money within the Pentagon's steady-state $250,000,000,000 budget without incurring "asymmetrical responses" (Pentagonese for unexpected courses of action by opponents unable to meet U.S. power head-on) from those who advocated priorities other than buying billions of dollars of "new toys," as one critic put it.

This was a very real threat, although not one to our military forces which already have technological superiority. The threat was to the reelection of those from districts and states with big defense industries. In short, the issue wasn't modernization; it was money and jobs.

In assessing QDR "winners" and "losers," it's important to remember that this review comes at a time when even the Pentagon admits that there is "no major power threatening the United States before 2010, and potential threats after that are very uncertain."

With this 13 year (or more) window, taxpayers had a right to expect serious steps away from spending for weapons designed to defeat non-existent Soviet weapons and towards weapons that enhance the warriors' capabilities against the more likely threats associated with peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. It didn't happen.

The QDR talks about changing threats and a "new" military strategy of "shaping, responding, and preparing."...To "shape" the international environment the U.S. will continue to forward deploy 100,000 troops in Europe and the Far East and maintain the Cold War patterns of lengthy, routine deployments of Navy and Marine Corps units. Reductions in personnel are proposed, but most will be in the civilian workforce.

To "respond to the full spectrum of threats," the U.S. will continue to prepare for two Major Theater Wars (what the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) called "Major Regional Contingencies" or MRCs)....The QDR [also] says U.S. forces also must be prepared for less intense combat operations such as assisting with humanitarian relief or peacekeeping. But there was little change in the proposed force structure.

To "prepare now for the threats and dangers of tomorrow" the Pentagon will pursue the "Revolution in Military Affairs" by aggressively pursuing high-tech innovations (e.g., information warfare, precision munitions, and missile defense)....

If it taught no other lesson to mainstream military establishments, 20^th century warfare demonstrated that failure to develop and properly integrate technology applicable to the more likely security threats guarantees defeat in battle. But in applying this lesson, generals, admirals, and politicians frequently forget the key phrase, "technology applicable to the threats."...

It seems this is the QDR's fate....Russia is not the threat. Its 1997 defense budget dropped to $14.5 billion. Defense procurement fell 39 percent between 1995-1996 and is still at historically low levels. The decline for key weapons was even greater: 59 percent in shipbuilding, 42 percent in aircraft and in the rocket/space sector, and 41 percent in ammunition and special chemicals.

Yet the Pentagon has not canceled any high-tech weapons designed for the Cold War. The QDR does reduce total quantities of big weapons systems, particularly in the $350 billion tactical aircraft program. But the Army's RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter program remains on course as does the Marines' V-22 Osprey, although the total buy is reduced. Even with reductions in quantities, experience dictates that program costs will likely increase, not decrease, because purchases will be stretched over more years and contractors will charge more per plane.

Finally, the QDR also calls for adding $2 billion to the National Missile Defense program despite the Secretary of Defense's acknowledgment that "even with additional funds, NMD will remain a program of high schedule and technical risk."

QDR Recommended Major Weapons Procurement Changes
	Programmed Buy/Maximum Production	New Quantities/Maximum Production Under the QDR
F-22 Raptor	438 (48 per year by 2002)= four wings	339 (36 per year by 2004) = three wings
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet	1,000 (48 per year by 2000 and 60 per year by 2006)	548 (up to 785) (48 per year by 2002)
JSF	2,978 (194 per year by 2010) USAF 2,036 USN 300 USMC 642	2,852 (194 per year by 2012) USAF 1,763 USN 480 USMC 609
MV-22 Osprey	425	360 (30 per year by 2004)
Joint STARS	19	13 (NATO buys other six)
TOTAL Anticipated Savings: TACAIR=$30B + $3B from MV-22

The QDR legislation established an independent panel of defense experts--the National Defense Panel (NDP)--to evaluate the QDR and to take a longer-term look at strategy, forces, and force structure. The NDP's evaluation, issued with the QDR, tepidly called the Pentagon's effort "an important step down the evolutionary path" to a new 21st century military.

But the NDP detailed serious reservations. While saying that the QDR strategy "provides a much richer view of the challenges" across the warfighting spectrum, it noted an "insufficient connectivity between strategy on the one hand, and force structure, operational concepts, and procurement decisions on the other." A glaring example of this disconnect is the QDR's call for strategic and tactical global information superiority and the proposed reduction in the JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System) program from 19 to 13 aircraft.

The NDP also questioned the validity of the analytical wargames the Pentagon used to re-justify the classic force-on-force, two nearly-simultaneous theater wars scenario of the BUR. The panel noted that the models employed were "believed to have significant shortcomings" ten years ago, adding that changes in warfare since then made the models "less relevant today." Even the more recent "Dynamic Commitment" series only looked at force availability, not actual warfighting.

But the most telling criticism by the NDP goes to the heart of congressional and Pentagon plans to spend more money to "modernize the force." While applauding initiatives to reduce excess infrastructure, close unneeded bases, cut headquarters and support staff, and reform acquisition, the NDP bluntly told the Pentagon and Congress that modernization plans have "more budget risk than is acknowledged" because they "rest on several key assumptions" that may never materialize"

• two more base closing rounds;
• infrastructure savings in the face of anticipated major congressional resistance;
• reserve component cuts despite intense opposition from state governors;
• significant additional efficiencies from acquisition reforms; and
• defense budgets at a steady $250 billion even with the balanced budget drive and other demands on the nation's pocketbook.

The biggest winner, according to the Wall Street Journal, is the military-industrial complex. As noted earlier, the QDR canceled no major weapons systems. Nor was there any acknowledgment in the QDR that the U.S. fuels many of our ostensible national security threats by selling our top line weapons abroad where we have little effective control over the technology.

Industry's "win" also is a win for politicians. Since no weapons were canceled, defense contractors and vendors will remain generous with PAC money and employee-voters will be inclined to reelect those who "protect" defense jobs--even though nondefense jobs routinely enhance the economic well-being of workers and their communities.

The Pentagon wins because it kept the peace. No service was gored; all shared the "pain" -- although Senator John McCain (R-AZ) discounts this because "Not a whole lot of tough choices have been made." In fact, Congress is now only beginning to realize that the Pentagon neatly threw back the ball (and potential blame) by producing a strategy, force structure, and modernization plan that cannot succeed unless Congress closes bases and relaxes restrictions on transferring depot maintenance and other nonwarfighting jobs from DoD civilians to private enterprise.

The losers? Taxpayers, of course. Stretched weapons buys cost more. Representative Skelton, who opposes the proposed personnel cuts, suggests that for only $9 billion more a year for the next four or five years, end strength could be maintained at today's levels. Congress' refusal to reduce our nuclear arsenal to START II levels (a move the NDP endorses even though Russia has not yet ratified the treaty) will cost $64 million in 1998 with costs escalating thereafter.

If defense were not so vital, this "first step" could aptly be caricatured as firmly setting the Pentagon on the path to the 20th century--when the rest of the world is moving into the 21st.

We will see another QDR in four years. By then our "threats" will have mutated further. Maybe Pentagon generals and admirals will give more heed to the bright colonels and captains whose careers transcend the Cold War era. Perhaps even politicians will be wiser and more concerned with national priorities instead of local pork.

It's unlikely. Come 2001, look for "deja vu all over again."