Volume XXVI, Number 2 March 1997

The Quadrennial Defense Review

A Sense of Deja Vu

• Starting in 1997, the Department of Defense is required to conduct a review every four years of military strategy, force structure, modernization, and infrastructure.

• Since the end of the Cold War, two similar reviews have been conducted, but they were faulty because they were still based on the underlying assumptions of the Cold War.

• Congress seemed to take a major step to improve the credibility of the new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) by establishing an independent review board, the National Defense Panel. However, the criteria for appointing panel members suggest it could easily become little more than a rubber stamp for the Pentagon.

• Another potential problem is the use of Cold War era special studies to "save time" in assembling data for the QDR. These studies embody Cold War assumptions and thinking.

• To accomplish the intent of Congress and to ensure the integrity of the QDR, a separate panel of distinguished Americans familiar with defense issues but not long-time members of the military-industrial-political establishment should review Pentagon data and conclusions and make a separate set of recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

On September 23, 1996, President Clinton
signed the Department of Defense Fiscal Year1997 (FY1997) Authorization Act, Public Law 104-201. This law contains a subsection entitled "Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996" establishing a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process to examine Department of Defense strategy, force structure, modernization, and infrastructure.

This new mandate is the result of frustrations within Congress about the slow pace of Pentagon reform and policy changes in light of the momentous events of the last 7 years. While there have been many commissions and panels examining virtually every aspect of Defense Department operations, substantive changes directed toward reshaping and redefining the U.S. military establishment for the 21st century have been few. The Pentagon has continued to use the same fundamental assumptions to develop and justify force levels and spending requests that worked for them during the Cold War.

In the space of 25 months, without a shot fired in anger, America's military security requirements were turned inside out. Gone was the 45-year threat

of a massive Soviet/Warsaw Pact blitzkrieg across a divided Europe. Gone were the Soviet nuclear missiles stationed in Europe. Pledged to be gone were the nuclear arsenals inherited from the former Soviet Union by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. In short, having lost its only significant military competitor, at the end of 1991 the U.S. possessed the world's most powerful military force yet had no worthy adversary to justify it.

The Initial Response

The Pentagon's response to these momentous changes was hesitant, contradictory, and in the end, typical. At first there was no response; the old containment strategy and supporting force structures and budgets remained in place. When change did come, it was slow and reluctant. In some quarters of Congress and military industry, any change was actively opposed.

Compare the following with the historical events of 1989-1992.

In an April 8, 1991, interview, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said,

The Center for Defense Information believes
that strong social, economic, political, and military components and a healthy environment contribute equally to the nation's security. CDI opposes excessive expenditures for weapons and policies that increase the danger of war.





		©1997 Center for Defense Information — Washington, DC I.S.S.N. # 0195-6450 Volume XXVI, Number 2 March 1997
The Quadrennial Defense Review A Sense of Deja Vu • Starting in 1997, the Department of Defense is required to conduct a review every four years of military strategy, force structure, modernization, and infrastructure. • Since the end of the Cold War, two similar reviews have been conducted, but they were faulty because they were still based on the underlying assumptions of the Cold War. • Congress seemed to take a major step to improve the credibility of the new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) by establishing an independent review board, the National Defense Panel. However, the criteria for appointing panel members suggest it could easily become little more than a rubber stamp for the Pentagon. • Another potential problem is the use of Cold War era special studies to "save time" in assembling data for the QDR. These studies embody Cold War assumptions and thinking. • To accomplish the intent of Congress and to ensure the integrity of the QDR, a separate panel of distinguished Americans familiar with defense issues but not long-time members of the military-industrial-political establishment should review Pentagon data and conclusions and make a separate set of recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
		On September 23, 1996, President Clinton signed the Department of Defense Fiscal Year1997 (FY1997) Authorization Act, Public Law 104-201. This law contains a subsection entitled "Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996" establishing a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process to examine Department of Defense strategy, force structure, modernization, and infrastructure. This new mandate is the result of frustrations within Congress about the slow pace of Pentagon reform and policy changes in light of the momentous events of the last 7 years. While there have been many commissions and panels examining virtually every aspect of Defense Department operations, substantive changes directed toward reshaping and redefining the U.S. military establishment for the 21st century have been few. The Pentagon has continued to use the same fundamental assumptions to develop and justify force levels and spending requests that worked for them during the Cold War. In the space of 25 months, without a shot fired in anger, America's military security requirements were turned inside out. Gone was the 45-year threat	of a massive Soviet/Warsaw Pact blitzkrieg across a divided Europe. Gone were the Soviet nuclear missiles stationed in Europe. Pledged to be gone were the nuclear arsenals inherited from the former Soviet Union by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. In short, having lost its only significant military competitor, at the end of 1991 the U.S. possessed the world's most powerful military force yet had no worthy adversary to justify it. The Initial Response The Pentagon's response to these momentous changes was hesitant, contradictory, and in the end, typical. At first there was no response; the old containment strategy and supporting force structures and budgets remained in place. When change did come, it was slow and reluctant. In some quarters of Congress and military industry, any change was actively opposed. Compare the following with the historical events of 1989-1992. In an April 8, 1991, interview, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said,
The Center for Defense Information believes that strong social, economic, political, and military components and a healthy environment contribute equally to the nation's security. CDI opposes excessive expenditures for weapons and policies that increase the danger of war.


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