Rear Admiral Gene LaRocque (USN, Ret.)
Pres., Center for Defense Information
HOST:
Lt. General Norman E. Ehlert (USMC, Ret.)
Director, Center for Defense Information
DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH:
David T. Johnson
DIRECTOR of TELEVISION:
Mark Sugg
SENIOR PRODUCER & NARRATOR:
Ira Shorr
PRODUCERS:
Marguerite Arnold
Glenn Baker
Daniel Sagalyn
Stephen Sapienza
PRINCIPAL ANALYST & SCRIPTWRITER:
David Johnson
SEGMENT PRODUCER:
Stephen Sapienza
VIDEO GRAPHICS:
Adam Luther
ORIGINATION:
Washington, D.C.
PROGRAM NO.:
812
INITIAL BROADCAST:
4 December 1994
CONDITION OF USE: Credit "AMERICA'S DEFENSE MONITOR"
(Center for Defense Information).
(C) Copyright 1994, Center for Defense Information. All Rights Reserved.
Videotapes also available.
ABE BRUMBERG
Former Editor, Problems of Communism
SUSAN EISENHOWER
Center for Post-Soviet Studies
GREGORY GUROFF
President's US-Soviet Exchange Initiative (1986-92)
ROALD SAGDEEV
Director, East-West Center for Space Studies
RUSSIA'S TIME OF TROUBLES
WILLIAM PERRY, Secretary of State (before Senate Armed Services Committee, February 2, 1994): "No national security issue is more important to us and to our children than a stable government in Russia dedicated to democracy."
SUSAN EISENHOWER: The last couple of years has managed to do what the communists were never able to do, which was to create genuine anti-American, anti-Western feeling.
NARRATOR: Even as an ally, Russia remains a paradox to most Americans. What lies behind "Russia's Time of Troubles?"
["AMERICA'S DEFENSE MONITOR" program introduction.]
GEN NORMAN E. EHLERT (USMC, Ret.): Welcome to "AMERICA'S DEFENSE MONITOR".
The Soviet Union used to be our adversary. In fact, during almost all of my military career, the Russians were our enemy. The Cold War, however, is now over and a new Russia is emerging. Americans have many contradictory impressions of just what is going on.
Today's program provides some background in depth and some insights into this new Russia. We hope you enjoy it.
NARRATOR: The Russian people and their leaders have faced daunting problems in adapting to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the challenge of building new economic and political institutions. The United States has sought to promote the development of democracy and free markets in Russia by giving strong support to President Boris Yeltsin and pushing for rapid economic change and privatization of the economy. The United States has also given priority to helping Russia control and dismantle its huge nuclear weapons complex.
When President Yeltsin came to Washington in September, the emphasis was on progress in Russia and expanded cooperation.
President BILL CLINTON (White House, September 27, 1994): "The Russian-American relationship is at last remarkably a normal one, full of real accomplishments and genuine promise."
NARRATOR: At that moment, the future of Russia and US-Russian relations was looking good. The Clinton administration's claim that Russia is its number one foreign policy success seemed to ring true.
A few days after the September meeting, US officials responsible for aid programs for Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union reported to Congress, claiming great progress for the ambitious US goals and justifying the support for President Yeltsin.
TOM DINE, Assistant Administrator, US Agency for International Development (before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4 October 1994): "Our efforts focus on making fundamental structural changes in both the political and economic spheres. Such changes makes systemic transformation possible and sustainable, and ultimately irreversible.
"We deal with those who want to make changes. We deal directly -- and I'd like to think in some depth -- with those government officials and non-governmental officials who want to reform the societies that they now find themselves in, who want to end the Stalinist, communist period and want to get into the market economy-democratic capitalism society.
"Now there are conflicts within these governments, and we're partners with them as they battle within their bureaucratic politics."
THOMAS SIMONS, Coordinator of US Assistance to the Newly Independent States, Department of State (before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4 October 1994): "Mr. Chairman, these programs are working. We are observing substantial and promising progress in a number of countries, including the largest country, Russia, and in a number of sectors. The success stories are rolling in."
NARRATOR: Ambassador Simons was asked about reports that officials in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union complain that they have no input into the planning and implementation of US aid programs.
Amb. SIMONS (same hearing as above): "The criticism is partly misplaced and is partly a fact of life. This is a program which is managed from Washington. We regularly consult with officials at the highest levels about the major priorities of the program: privatization, private sector development, trade and investment, democracy initiatives, exchanges. They accept those priorities, but not everyone can be satisfied."
NARRATOR: Only a week after this hearing, the optimism of the September Washington summit was overtaken by the plunge in the value of the ruble on Tuesday, October 11. Claims of political stability and economic progress now had a hollow ring.
Ms. EISENHOWER: Actually, what we're got is a kind of photo opportunity friendship.
NARRATOR: Susan Eisenhower is founder of the Center for Post-Soviet Studies and a leading American expert on Russia. She and her husband, the eminent Russian space scientist, Roald Sagdeev, maintain homes in both Washington and Moscow. Susan Eisenhower is the granddaughter of President Dwight Eisenhower.
Ms. EISENHOWER: Where the two presidents have their arms around each other and patting each other on the back, and then when it gets down to the crunch, they defer any talk of difficult matters for some other time. I think the last summit between Clinton and Yeltsin was a tremendous disappointment because there are some very big issues out there, and it was much more convenient for both of them to be scoring points with their own domestic constituencies.
NARRATOR: For some analysts the fact that the fall of the ruble came so soon after the summit meeting in Washington casts doubt on how well Americans and their government understand developments in Russia.
Ms. EISENHOWER: I think it's remarkable actually that we spent trillions of dollars defending ourselves against the Soviet Union, and then the minute the Cold War was declared over, everybody packed their bags and went home. If that region in the world was so important then, you'd think that it deserves better coverage than it gets now. I think the coverage has been inadequate, I think it's been very one-sided. And I think it has been actually detrimental to the formation of good policy.
NARRATOR: Abe Brumberg was for two decades editor of the US Government's journal, Problems of Communism. He is one of the country's most experienced Russia watchers.
Do you think that the American policymakers are in touch with the realities in Russia?
ABE BRUMBERG: Well, my general impression is that they have invested so much faith and hope and reliance in Yeltsin as the only answer to Russia's troubles and so much faith in his advisers and the policies they recommended to him that they are not adequately aware of the chaos and the difficulties that reign over Russia today. And I think lots of people may be misled by the surface glitter of life, especially in Moscow, not to realize that behind this there lurk very deep and profound troubles in medicine, in life expectancy, in public health, in food consumption, you name it.
Ms. EISENHOWER: The quality of life has deteriorated substantially. Life must be perfectly frightening for a huge percentage of the population. And, you know, the overall policy has created an absolute collapse of the industrial structure of Russia.
Sure, the shop shelves are full, full of foreign goods. My Russian colleagues and friends say they go into shops and can find nothing produced in Russia anymore. In the last six months, industrial production dropped 28 percent.
NARRATOR: Gregory Guroff was for many years an expert on the Soviet Union in the United States Information Agency. For six years, under Presidents Reagan and Bush, he was coordinator of the President's US-Soviet Exchange Initiative.
GREG GUROFF: What concerns me are, one, the long term seeds of a kind of anti-Americanism that has been generated, in part, by Russia's condition and, in part, by our own attitudes some- times of arrogance toward Russians.
Keep in mind, which I don't think has been discussed very much here as to the impact of privatization, and that is that the whole social safety network of Russia was tied to the industries. So, your health care, your polyclinic, your day care, all of your extracurricular activities, housing, almost everything was tied to the plant you worked in. When you privatize the plant, all of a sudden, all of those support systems disappear. Now who picks them up? Who pays for it?
NARRATOR: The distinguished Russian scientist, Dr. Roald Sagdeev, is worried about the survival of the scientific, educational and cultural communities in Russia. But he sees an even larger problem.
ROALD SAGDEEV: Oh, I think what's happening in Russia, in my view, despite of all the rhetoric about success of market reforms, social transformation of Russian society is taking a very difficult and painful shape. There is tremendous stratification in society.
INTERVIEWER: Between the rich and the poor?
Dr. SAGDEEV: Between rich and poor. Middle class, virtually disappeared. And essentially supporting this type of transition with a very narrow layer of people becoming rich, mostly using corruption, criminal tactics. A lot of these people are former party apparatchiks. Supporting this class, we are planting a time bomb, a time bomb of indignation among the masses. And stability of this regime, if it would continue this particular way, peculiar way, which is much more outrageous than it was here during the robber baron time.
Ms. EISENHOWER: What has been created is a very deformed kind of creature. It's not really a market. This whole privatization thing, too. Fifty percent of the privatized assets are in the hands of Russian mafia circles. I mean, the corruption is terrible. Corruption reaches to the highest level of the Russian government.
NARRATOR: For Susan Eisenhower, the good intentions of American advisers to help Russia may not be enough to ensure success and prevent mistakes.
Ms. EISENHOWER: Many of the people who are offering technical advice in Russia don't know the first thing about the way that society operates.
INTERVIEWER: These are American consultants?
Ms. EISENHOWER: American consultants. They've worked on projects in Egypt, they've worked on projects in Latin America, and now they're being assigned to go over and work on Russia, like one economy is interchangeable with another. The truth of the matter is that this is a very, very different kind of society.
We sent our technical advisers over there who went over and treated the Russians like a bunch of nobodies who didn't know how to do anything with their environment, with their society, with their economy. We took the sort of attitude that, you know, if you're so smart, why did your system collapse?
NARRATOR: US financial support to Russia and the other newly independent states since 1991 totals about $4 billion, including about $1 billion for military-related programs, such as the dismantling of nuclear weapons. Additional assistance has come from the International Monetary Fund and other international agencies.
According to Susan Eisenhower, much of the so-called aid to Russia has actually been paid to American consultants and American companies.
Ms. EISENHOWER: I hate to be so blunt about this, but quite frankly, a lot of the aid that was going to that part of the world was really kind of a handout to the American consulting community. When you look at the vast sums of money coming out of the federal government, many of these huge grants went to profit-making companies in Washington to go over and, you know, teach the Russians all sorts of technical tricks.
NARRATOR: Some experts question whether President Boris Yeltsin is now really the most effective leader to help move Russia in the right direction.
Mr. BRUMBERG: Well, President Yeltsin is really continuing his -- how shall I put it? -- his work as a communist party official. He has been shaped, as have many politicians in Russia, by his experience in the communist party, which wasn't merely the experience of a low grade apparatchik, but of a fairly important member of the ruling elite. He is a man who has autocratic tendencies, who doesn't like disagreement, who will have his own way no matter what, who will be bent on portraying his critics as enemies, which is an old Soviet tradition.
NARRATOR: According to Abe Brumberg, President Yeltsin's "autocratic tendencies" contributed substantially to the most traumatic event in recent Russian history: The dispute between Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament concerning a new constitution, which climaxed in violence in October 1993.
Mr. BRUMBERG: Yeltsin had no interest in convincing parlia-ment. He didn't send people to parliament or try to call. An American president, if he wants to see a policy put through, will get on the phone, talk to this senator, talk to that, he will have people over for lunch, for breakfast, you know. That whole mechanism of coming to a compromise is simply foreign to Yeltsin. He was going to have it his own way.
NARRATOR: Susan Eisenhower finds fault with American news coverage of the conflict between Yeltsin and the Parliament.
Ms. EISENHOWER: The news media persisted in saying that it was a Soviet-era parliament that was in this dispute with this democratically elected Boris Yeltsin, failing, of course, to say that Boris Yeltsin was also a Soviet-era Russian president. And by failing to make the distinctions absolutely clear on both sides, they created a natural tendency for everyone in this country to automatically side with Yeltsin.
Now the Yeltsin people were very smart about this. They knew if they labeled all of their opposition as neo-fascists and communists, that this would ding all sorts of little dingers in the West and suddenly everybody would say, oh, my goodness, you know, the choice is clear. But obviously the situation was considerably more complicated.
NARRATOR: Boris Yeltsin was elected president of Russia in June 1991, before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Fall of 1993, Yeltsin promised to hold new presidential elections in June 1994, but then changed his mind, and the election is now scheduled for June 1996.
President Yeltsin has been accumulating power since he abolished the old parliament in September 1993. The new parliament, elected in December 1993, although it can voice criticism, has very limited powers under the new constitution. The Russian White House, the building that used to be the home of the parliament and the focus of democratic resistance in August 1991, and violence in October 1993, is now occupied by Yeltsin administration officials.
According to reports, Boris Yeltsin's personal presidential administration has grown to enormous size, totally some 40,000 people. The main television and radio stations are under government control. President Yeltsin, after having difficulty persuading resistant Defense Ministry officials to attack the parliament building in 1993, has now brought under his personal command elite military units in the Moscow area.
Most of Russia's regional governors, 78 out of 87, are not elected, but rather appointed by Yeltsin. The president rules primarily through decrees, edicts and directives.
In 1993, Yeltsin dismissed members of a constitutional court that had attempted to limit his authority.
Mr. GUROFF: Why should one expect a man in his sixties, who has been a party boss most of his life, to want to foster democratic institutions? He's done an enormous amount of good, but he still is a transitional figure. He's much happier ruling by decree than in negotiating with the parliament. He wrote a constitution which was designed to minimize any impact the parliament might have on any kind of policy. And, at the same time, there's been very little effort to create a real judiciary.
NARRATOR: In view of the fact that Russia has yet to undergo a peaceful democratic transition of presidential power, we may recall President Clinton's remarks when announcing the US intervention in Haiti in support of President Aristide.
President CLINTON (Press Conference, 18 September 1994): "When you start a democracy, the most important election is the second election."
NARRATOR: The instability and polarization of Russian politics has been in large part a consequence of the economic policies, sometimes labeled "shock therapy," pursued by the Yeltsin government. Advisers from the United States and the International Monetary Fund helped to shape these policies. Aid from the US and the IMF was tied to the implementation of stringent economic measures.
Government price controls were freed before there was any real competition in the economy to keep prices down. Inflation skyrocketed and savings, salaries and pensions became almost worthless. Government-funded social programs were cut back before any alternatives were in place.
A new scheme for organizing society was imposed from the top on an unprepared population. As a result, Russia is experiencing a severe economic depression and considerable social disruption.
Mr. GUROFF: The coining of the phrase "shock therapy" was perhaps one of the most unfortunate linguistic errors of policy one could imagine. Russians who understood the term began to think of themselves as laboratory animals for some Western economists. So, I think the term itself is bad.
I think what's clear is that most Russian economists now looking at the situation, and those particularly around Chernomyrdyn, have no doubt that the movement to a decentralized economy with more private involvement is inevitable and ought to be moved toward and perhaps more slowly than some Western economists would like. But I think they also believe that the role of the state in the economy is going to be much greater than would be considered desirable by American economists or Western economists. In that, I think you need to look more -- if you're looking for models -- much more towards some of the European economies.
Mr. BRUMBERG: Let's not buy this line that Yeltsin has tried to spread the goal. Those who are opposed to him are against the market economy. That's poppycock. They certainly do believe in a market economy, but they have different priorities, different attitudes.
NARRATOR: It was to be expected that in an emerging democracy undergoing severe economic dislocation that political differences would grow. Many Russian leaders who stood with Yeltsin to defend democracy in 1991 subsequently fell out with him because of disagreements over the pace of economic reform. These include Yeltsin's handpicked former vice president, Alexander Rutskoi, and the man Yeltsin designated as speaker of the Russian Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov. These men were among Yeltsin's main allies in August 1991, but by October 1993 they were under bombardment in the Russian Parliament building and taken at gunpoint into prison.
Many other former colleagues of Yeltsin and prominent human rights activists in the Soviet era have become political opponents of the Russian president. These include the Nobel Prize-winning author Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Oleg Rumyanstev, once celebrated in the United States as the Jeffersonian author of a new democratic constitution for Russia.
While some observers argue that even with his faults there is no alternative to Yeltsin, others disagree.
Mr. GUROFF: I find it preposterous that in a country of 170 million people, there's only one person who could be counted on to lead the country. Leaders arise when need comes.
Mr. BRUMBERG: Historical circumstances produce their leaders unexpectedly. And people used to say exactly the same thing about Gorbachev; there's nobody like Gorbachev, he's the only -- The very same people who now criticize Gorbachev mercilessly were the ones who three years ago could not think of any other solution, any other alternative to Gorbachev then.
Ms. EISENHOWER: In actual fact, I think there are some very decent, intelligent, responsible and, frankly, more engaged people on the scene today than the president himself.
NARRATOR: In 1994, American politics was characterized by voter discontent with government. Incumbent politicians were on the defensive all year and many were voted out of office in November. The problems that Americans face, however, whether it's crime in the streets or economic strain, pale in significance when compared with the day to day problems facing Russian voters. Russian voters have much more reason to be angry with their government. American policymakers and other Americans trying to understand Russia would do well to follow some advice that President Eisenhower gave to his granddaughter.
Ms. EISENHOWER: I grew up with my grandfather. He lived quite close to where my parents did and I spent a lot of time with him after he left the White House. And we used to have a lot of big dinner table conversations on all kinds of topics. And almost every time -- it was almost like a intellectual discipline -- he say, "And how do you think it looks to the other guy?" And then we'd have to go through this little process, 'Well, if it were me, I'd feel this, this and this way.' And I've always carried that discipline with me.
We have to again put ourselves in their position. What would we find intolerable? We would find it intolerable if Russia told us what we ought to be doing on a whole host of levels, particularly with respect to our internal situation. Imagine if Yeltsin got up every five minutes and said that he hopes that the Democrats don't win the mid-term elections. Everyone would be absolutely outraged. 'It's none of your business,' we'd say.
NARRATOR: With all its problems, Abe Brumberg remains optimistic about Russia's future. He believes a new Russia has emerged.
Mr. BRUMBERG: Russia is a different country. And one of the reasons Russia is a different country is because of Gorbachev, who brought in an entirely different political climate into the country, who is impossible now -- Well, it's highly unlikely, let's put it this way, for a dictator to take over Russia. People are not afraid anymore. This was the singular weapon that Stalin wielded: Fear. He didn't have to exercise it. He didn't have to shoot people. It was merely there all the time; people were afraid.
Even under Brezhnev, people were afraid. Even in the first year or two under Gorbachev, they were afraid, they weren't sure whether this is really so. Ah, yes, we've been promised all these things before. That has disappeared to a remarkable extent. To put this genie back into the bottle would be I think extremely difficult.
DOD Secretary PERRY (before Senate Armed Services Committee, February 2, 1994):
"No national security issue is more important to us and to our children than a stable government in Russia dedicated to democracy."
NARRATOR: Secretary of Defense William Perry reminds us of the American stake in Russia's future. Russia, even in its weakened condition, is a major world power. While the United States cannot ensure Russia's success in achieving a stable government dedicated to democracy, we can be supportive and understanding of their extraordinarily demanding task. The United States can help Russians work out their own solutions to their problems.
Ms. EISENHOWER: In the final analysis, Russians are going to have to help themselves. We can allow them to develop a system that works for their culture.
GEN EHLERT: As you can see, the emerging Russia is considerably different from the Soviet Union of the Cold War era. The Russian people face several challenges in the years ahead. Our sensitivity and understanding of these challenges is vital to their success.
We hope that today's program allows you to be better informed on this most important country.
Thank you for watching. For "AMERICA'S DEFENSE MONITOR," I'm Norm Ehlert.
[End of broadcast.]
CONDITION OF USE: Credit "AMERICA'S DEFENSE MONITOR"
(Center for Defense Information).
(C) Copyright 1994. Center for Defense Information. All Rights Reserved.
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