Admiral Gene LaRocque (USN, Ret.), Pres., Center for Defense Information
HOST:
Admiral John Shanahan (USN, Ret.), Director, Center for Defense Information
DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH:
David T. Johnson
DIRECTOR of TELEVISION:
Mark Sugg
PRODUCERS:
Glenn Baker
Stephen Sapienza
PRINCIPAL ANALYST & SCRIPTWRITER:
Stephen Sapienza
SEGMENT PRODUCER:
Stephen Sapienza
NARRATOR:
Kathryn R. Schultz
VIDEO GRAPHICS:
Adam Luther
ORIGINATION:
Washington, D.C.
PROGRAM NO.:
1106
INITIAL BROADCAST:
19 October 1997
CONDITION OF USE:
Credit "AMERICA'S DEFENSE MONITOR" (Center for Defense Information).
JOHN DONNELLY
Defense Week
IVAN ELAND
Director, Defense Policy Studies, CATO Institute
NORMAN POLMAR
Columnist, Proceedings, US Naval Institute, author, "The Ships and Aircraft of the US Fleet"
KAY VAN DER HORST
Submarine Issues Analyst
with additional comments from:
DICK CHENEY
former Secretary of Defense in testimony before the Senate Budget Committee
Senator DALE BUMPERS
(D-AR), from an interview by "AMERICA'S DEFENSE MONITOR"
(Program begins)
NARRATOR: It's called the New Attack Submarines. It's possibly the single most controversial topic to surface between Congress and the Navy in recent years.
At issue is a plan to buy 30 new nuclear attack submarines at a cost of $67 billion. The Navy says it needs the new subs to modernize its fleet. Two shipyards say they need the construction of the new subs to keep their companies afloat. And critics want to torpedo the plan which they allege is ill-conceived and could end up wasting billions of taxpayers' dollars.
At stake is the shape of the US submarine force for the 21st Century. Will the US Navy sink $67 billion under the sea?
["AMERICA'S DEFENSE MONITOR" program introduction.]
ADM JOHN SHANAHAN (USN, Ret.): I'm Vice Admiral Jack Shanahan, director of the Center for Defense Information.
Most Americans probably have never heard of the New Attack Submarine. It is a new submarine the Navy wants to build that will eventually replace its current fleet of attack boats. Why are we building it? What will it do? How much will it cost? Do we need it? Stay tuned to find out the answers to these questions.
NARRATOR: It's called the New Attack Submarine program, a plan to build 30 new nuclear attack subs -- subs designed to attack other subs -- for the US Navy. The total cost of buying the 30 submarines in the coming decades could be as much as $65- to $70 billion. Congress has already given the Navy a $3 billion down payment to begin the submarine program. However, to date, the new attack submarine, or new SSN, exists only in virtual reality -- in the computers of submarine designers, on the pages of Navy literature, and on the Internet.
The New Attack Submarine is planned as a supplement to the Navy's most recent class of attack submarines called the SSN-21, or the Seawolf. It's supposed to be smaller and have many of the same features as the Seawolf, but avoid the political and budgetary depth charges that rocked the Seawolf program.
OFFICER: "Executive Officer, set the watch."
EXECUTIVE OFFICER: "Aye, aye, sir. LCDR Ivy, set the watch."
LCDR IVY: "Aye, aye, sir."
NARRATOR: With that command, the Navy took delivery of its newest attack submarine in July of 1997. Named the USS Seawolf, the Navy hails it as the fastest, quietest, most heavily armed nuclear attack submarine in the world.
ADM JAY JOHNSON (July '97 ceremony):
"This submarine and her crew are the latest inheritors of the proud traditions of our naval service. Those traditions tie us to the greatness of our Navy's past and prepare us for the greatness of our Navy future."
NARRATOR: Only months earlier, the Navy tested the Seawolf in the open sea.
CREW MEMBER: "Dive. Submerge the ship to 1-6-0 feet."
CREW MEMBER: "Dive. Dive."
NARRATOR: Not surprisingly, the sailors who ran the $2.8 billion sub through its paces gave the Seawolf high marks.
SAILOR: "We're taking a look at a ship that has a tremendous amount of fire power."
SAILOR: "It's a high-tech piece of equipment. It's the most advanced submarine built yet."
NARRATOR: The Navy hopes that by enthusiastically promoting the Seawolf, it will increase support in Congress for funding the Navy's next sub, the New Attack Submarine.
SAILOR: "It's been a long time coming. Everyone's really excited about that, waiting to go out there and actually do battle, so to speak, and see what we do against another submarine."
NARRATOR: But despite all the high-tech weapons and sensors, just who the Seawolf will do battle against is one question that the Navy is hard-pressed to answer. Not long ago, the answer to that question was much simpler.
JOHN DONNELLY: The Seawolf submarine was developed in the early eighties. The original objective was to buy 30 of them.
NARRATOR: John Donnelly covers submarine issues for the trade publication Defense Week.
Mr. DONNELLY: The Seawolf submarine was the follow-on to the Los Angeles Class 688 submarine. It was also very much of a Cold War-style submarine designed to fight the Soviet Navy in the deep blue sea.
NARRATOR: During the Cold War, American and Soviet attack submarines vied for control of the world's oceans as they prowled the depths hunting for ballistic missile submarines and each other. With submarine production at high levels, both the Soviet Union and the United States sank hundreds of billions of dollars into their submarine programs in a relentless competition to build ever-quieter and more capable submarines.
But with the end of the Cold War, the underwater hide-and-seek games came to an end. With the Soviet Union in decline, the Pentagon found it difficult to justify building the SSN-21 Seawolf submarine and other Cold War era weapons.
DICK CHENEY, then-Secretary of Defense (before Senate Budget Committee):
"The SSN-21 would be nice. Again, our problem is just sheer cost. Where am I going to come up with the savings that everybody would like to come up with? And we identified these programs, and the SSN-21 specifically, because the thing that was driving that construction program was our anticipation of improved Soviet submarine capabilities."
NARRATOR: In 1992, President George Bush decided to torpedo the remaining 29 Seawolf subs after building just one submarine.
Mr. DONNELLY: The reasons were twofold: First, the Soviet Union had gone south. Secondly, the cost of the Seawolf was
heading north.
NARRATOR: But despite its cancellation, the Seawolf program would resurface. The Pentagon claimed stopping all Seawolf production until sometime in the future could cripple the Electric Boat Shipyard in Groton, Connecticut. That would disperse thousands of engineers and welders who specialize in sub building, costing the taxpayers billions of dollars to regenerate the capability to build subs if needed in the future.
Citing the need to preserve the "submarine industrial base," Congress decided to build a second Seawolf sub.
Mr. DONNELLY: In 1993, when the Clinton administration had arrived in Washington, they conducted a so-called "Bottom-Up Review" of Pentagon priorities. And one of the things that review determined was that the US should go ahead and build that third Seawolf submarine. So, we'd already had two; they said go ahead and build a third.
NARRATOR: Although the Pentagon could not justify additional Seawolf subs on military grounds, it argued that the third Seawolf was necessary to keep Electric Boat in business until the New Attack Submarine program would begin in 1998.
JOHN DALTON, Secretary of the Navy:
"And the third Seawolf, which we need, will be the bridge that preserves this industry to build a more affordable literal warfare oriented New Attack Submarine."
Mr. DONNELLY: Now between the Congress' decision to reverse Bush's move to stop Seawolf #2 and the Clinton administration's decision to go ahead and build the third one, we're starting to see the emergence of a national policy to not let submarine makers sink anymore than we let submarines sink.
NARRATOR: The first Seawolf has now been delivered to the Navy. By the time the third Seawolf is delivered in 2002, the total cost to the taxpayer for preserving the "submarine industrial base" will be $13.8 billion.
The Navy hopes that its New Attack Submarine will avoid the controversies that beset the Seawolf, but the program may already be headed for turbulent waters.
NORMAN POLMAR: Today, the New Attack Submarine program, the NSSN, is undoubtedly the most controversial new ship program in the Navy.
NARRATOR: Defense analyst Norman Polmar is a regular columnist for the US Naval Institute journal Proceedings, as well as the author of numerous books, including "The Ships and Aircraft of the US Fleet."
Mr. POLMAR: There's very little question we're going to build more aircraft carriers. The question is what size, not even how many. We're going to continue to build surface combatants. The question is not what kind, because we have several good designs available, but how many. With the New Attack Sub, there's a question of what we want to build, what the missions will be for that submarine.
NARRATOR: Just as some critics question the need for the Cold War era Seawolf, the rationale for building the New Attack Submarine is also under scrutiny.
Ivan Eland is the director of defense policy studies with the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C.
IVAN ELAND: I think the threat is dramatically diminished. Of course, after the Cold War, the Russians aren't making too many submarine deployments, an occasional one here and there. They're not producing submarines at a high rate at all. And so, I don't see any threat that would justify a new submarine.
NARRATOR: According to a worldwide naval market forecast, the number of new subs being built is declining and the United States will build the majority of new subs in the future.
KAY VAN DER HORST: It is a tremendously expensive undertaking to maintain a nuclear submarine fleet.
NARRATOR: Kay Van Der Horst is a private researcher who has followed submarine issues for over a decade.
Mr. VAN DER HORST: I think the situation has changed significantly. We look today at over 600 submarines operated by 40-something countries, and it's kind of questionable who operates these subs and how they operate it and how effective they are.
NARRATOR: To drum up support for building new and improved US submarines, a slick annual report produced by the Office of Naval Intelligence is used as an unabashed lobbying tool by the Navy, lawmakers and submarine manufacturers. The most recent report, Worldwide Submarine Challenges, uses colorful charts, graphs and photos to create the impression that the threat posed to the United States by foreign submarines is more significant than at anytime during the Cold War. The report suggests that there is a military necessity for the Seawolf and New Attack Submarine because of a perceived mismatch between Russian and US submarines, especially in the area known as "quieting."
Mr. VAN DER HORST: Their technology might be in that area quite advanced, but I doubt that the operational capability will be significantly enhanced to the level that they will be building eight, nine, ten, twenty new submarines. There's just not the funds there to make that happen, not possible.
NARRATOR: Even though the Russians spend significantly less on their military than they did in the past, they continue to place emphasis on submarine research and design.
Mr. POLMAR: The momentum, the emphasis they built up in submarine design and construction during the Cold War, some of that momentum remains.
NARRATOR: Although no one can be completely sure how good the Russian sub designs really are, US subs continue to have a qualitative edge over the Russian subs.
Mr. ELAND: You have to look at the total submarine. Our ability to hear the Russian ships is much greater than their ability to hear ours. So, you have to look at it in a total picture. They focus on the quieting issue. And it is an important issue, but it's not the only issue. We have better weapons, we have much better processing and sensors than the Russians have.
Mr. VAN DER HORST: We see a more reduced threat from the former Soviet Union for a variety of issues. We see reduced operational capability, reduced funding. Basically, the submarine Northern Fleet, for example, is in rapid -- decay is maybe the wrong word, but basically the structure is falling apart to the extent that we see reduced deployment and people haven't been paid for eight, nine months. And it is rather questionable to which extent the Russian Navy is out there posing the old type Cold War threat.
NARRATOR: In addition to the Russian challenge, the Office of Naval Intelligence report points to the sale of subs, like this Russian-built Kilo Class submarine, to countries like Iran and China as another potential "area of concern" to the US Fleet.
Mr. POLMAR: The Russians are willing to sell almost anything, almost anything in their current economic situation. The fact that they produce advanced diesel electric submarines makes it a natural that they'll sell them on the world market.
Mr. VAN DER HORST: If I look at currently over 600 submarines in operation worldwide, operated by 42 countries, you always have to question are these countries actually capable of operating the sub. To have a sub is one thing, but to operate it is another thing. We have to look at what type of technology do these countries have, and on the other side, how capable are these countries to maintain infrastructure and maintain the true training that makes a sub so efficient.
NARRATOR: In a sense, it is the unrestricted sale of submarines to foreign countries that threatens the stability of the world's sea lanes.
Mr. VAN DER HORST: I think there has to be something done about conventional submarine proliferation, and the answer is not to build bigger, faster, and deeper-diving submarines, but a combined effort of advanced research, methodological research, adapt your production to the international developments, the production cycles in other countries, but at the same time do your best to curtail sales to countries, in general, in terms that could be potentially unfriendly.
NARRATOR: Another justification for building the New Attack Submarine is the shift in US naval strategy.
Mr. POLMAR: During the Cold War, US nuclear submarines' ballistic missile and torpedo attack had key roles, probably more important than any other single type of ship. In the post-Cold War period, I don't think we yet know how we're going to use attack submarines.
NARRATOR: The Navy's blueprint for operations in the 21st Century is called "Forward From the Sea..."
NAVY Video:
"Our objectives are from the sea to change over from our Cold War scenarios, where we're always watching the Soviet Union, to projecting ourselves into small areas, such as the Persian Gulf, to protect different countries from aggression."
NARRATOR: The shift in strategy has the Navy requesting the smaller size New Attack Submarines to operate in shallower waters.
Mr. DONNELLY: The New Attack Submarine program has as its objective to be as capable as the Seawolf in important ways, especially post-Cold War ways -- the special operations, the eavesdropping, the land-attack-strike mission.
Mr. ELAND: These new missions, they did those in the Cold War, they just didn't emphasize the fact that they were doing it, they emphasized the Russian threat.
NARRATOR: But pressure to build the New Attack Submarine has less to do with addressing a specific military threat than it does with keeping the companies that build submarines in business.
At the center of the New Attack Submarine controversy is the Navy's plan to build the new sub at two separate facilities, the Newport News Shipyard in Norfolk, Virginia, and Electric Boat Shipyard in Groton, Connecticut. Realizing that Electric Boat would not have another submarine to build after the third Seawolf, the Navy sought to award it the contract to build all 30 New Attack Submarines.
Mr. DONNELLY: In 1995, the Navy position on the New Attack Submarine was to have Electric Boat produce the first couple of submarines. Electric Boat was still in a tough position vis a vis Newport News because Newport News had its aircraft business. The Navy also said there's not enough submarine production to justify having two different sub makers do this, so it'll cost less to do it. And besides, we can compete later.
NARRATOR: But the prospect of $67 billion going to the competition set off alarm bells at Newport News Shipbuilding, which also builds submarines.
Mr. DONNELLY: Congress was not very happy with that position. In particular, the Virginia lawmakers stood up and were outraged. The Virginia lawmakers are very well represented on the national security committees and they successfully argued that to give Electric Boat the first couple submarines would give them a leg up that Newport News would not be able to overcome starting from cold, starting from scratch.
NARRATOR: Congress crafted a plan whereby the two contractors would alternate building the first four subs. After that, the two shipyards would compete for the remaining 26 submarine contracts. But this arrangement was not to last.
Mr. DONNELLY: The two submarine makers came to Capitol Hill with a proposal that was quite stunning. And that was that even though they had spent the last couple decades competing to build the nation's attack subs, now they would, in fact, work together jointly to do it. Fundamentally, they argued that there was not enough submarine business to justify continuing their competition.
The Navy agreed. The Navy said, 'Congress, this is consistent with your intent to keep two submarine manufacturers and designers alive and working. It also will save money in the near term.
NARRATOR: The Navy will spend about $13.8 billion on the first four submarines through 2001. But critics are already attacking the "teaming" arrangement. They argue "teaming" will destroy innovative design and competition between the yards.
Mr. POLMAR: The key question is do we want the yards to team and destroy that design competition, that technical competition, or do we want them to go their separate way, with direction from the Navy, of course, and each develop separate designs? I think that's the crux of the issue.
NARRATOR: The Navy says its "teaming" arrangement will keep costs down and produce submarines that are equal to or better than the Seawolf submarines. But some critics believe the "teaming" arrangement may have the opposite effect.
Mr. POLMAR: I think what we're going to see is in the next couple of years the cost of the New Attack Sub will go up so steeply that coupled with its reduced capabilities compared to Seawolf or, to some degree, even the Los Angeles Class, we're going to see three or four of those submarines built, and then the class just stopped and a reevaluation then.
NARRATOR: Congress, the Defense Department and the Navy agree that the Navy needs a New Attack Submarine that is as capable as the Seawolf, but more affordable.
Mr. DONNELLY: Right now, the New Attack Submarine plan is to build approximately 30 boats. The estimated cost is about $67 billion. That's the Navy's official estimate. They say that the price tag will be $1.65 billion per boat. That's starting with the fifth boat, and that's the traditional measure, number five and on.
NARRATOR: However, a string of reports have surfaced raising concerns over the new subs' cost. A December 1996 report by the General Accounting Office found that the new New Attack Submarine program is not likely to meet its objective of producing a submarine that's more affordable than the Seawolf.
The report found that the Seawolf's average price tag was originally estimated at $1.8 billion per copy. The New Attack Submarine's average price tag was originally $1.5 billion per copy. However, based on the Navy's 30-sub, two shipbuilder program, the average price tag would increase to $1.8 billion per copy.
The GAO report went on to say that there is potential for other cost increases due to technological challenges.
Mr. DONNELLY: One of the reasons that it is being eyed so keenly is because the system is even more complex than the one that caused so many problems with the Seawolf. Specifically, 15 different sub systems, everything that's electronic that doesn't propel the sub, from navigation to communications are all going to be integrated into a single system. This has never been done before and they're doing it on an extremely tight schedule, by 2000. It is being watched very carefully as a source of problems.
NARRATOR: The GAO also criticized the Navy for, in some cases, not knowing what technologies they want to include on the new sub.
Mr. DONNELLY: Another example that's being watched very carefully is the Navy's own testers have shown that the external communications system -- there isn't a requirements document for that right now, so they're not even sure what they're going to build. The Navy responds that, in fact, this is basically a paperwork issue. But the GAO critics say, well, if you don't know what you're going to build and you're in a hurry, that could cause some serious schedule and cost risk. So, in other words, if past is prologue, we're in trouble in terms of cost.
NARRATOR: While the Navy disputes the findings of the GAO, even its own analysts agree that splitting the New Attack Submarine contract between Newport News and Electric Boat shipyards will add $3 billion to the overall cost of the program.
Mr. ELAND: I think it could get more expensive and then they would have a problem. Because the main reason for canceling the Seawolf and producing the New Attack Submarine was because they felt they couldn't afford the Seawolf and they wanted to have a certain number of ships. So, if the sub gets more expensive, they're going to have to give up the idea that they're going to have 30 of these and not to build less or else they're going to have design yet another new submarine.
NARRATOR: Still another controversy has to do with the Navy's plan to retire Los Angeles Class submarines before the end of their service life in order to pay for the New Attack Submarine.
Senator DALE BUMPERS (D-AK): Take the case of the Los Angeles Class submarine. That submarine is built for a 30-year life. They're going to be discarding that submarine after 10, 15, 20 years. We're going to be losing anywhere from 10 to 20 years of life left in those submarines in order to build the Seawolf and the New Attack Submarine. And to start building new ones right now to replace it is nonsense.
NARRATOR: But there are less costly alternatives to the approach the Navy has chosen to maintain its attack submarine fleet.
Mr. ELAND: The Russians are still designing submarines, but they're not producing them at great numbers. And so, I think you do have a kind of a hiatus in the threat where you might be able to keep the R & D program going, and then not produce as many, or perhaps none.
NARRATOR: Another possible alternative is to overhaul and extend the service life of the Los Angeles Class subs. Modern attack submarines, like the USS Tucson, are the backbone of the current American submarine fleet.
Mr. ELAND: The improved LA Class, 688 class submarines, much like the USS Tucson, are regarded in the sub community as the most capable submarines in the world and they'll continue to be, certainly in the near and medium-term.
NARRATOR: One shipbuilder stated that the service life of a 688-I Los Angeles Class sub could be extended for an additional 10 to 20 years.
Mr. VAN DER HORST: Let's maintain and refit our existing 688-Is and rethink what will the threat be in the next two years, but also in the next 10 years, and see where the Russians are going with their development and their capability to develop and sustain the development.
NARRATOR: Still another alternative to the current New Attack Submarine program would be to delay production. In February of 1994, the secretary of defense testified that the Pentagon has no need to build new submarines until after the turn of the century.
Mr. ELAND: I do think the submarine is a powerful naval weapon and I think one of the advantages of it is its invulnerability, but at this point we just don't need the submarines.
NARRATOR: The United States may face a new threat in the future which will mean
building new attack submarines. But right now it is uncertain when we will need them, what
kind we will need and for what mission. Perhaps the submarine community in the United States
has time to plot a new course for the future, one that seeks to avoid repeating the costly mistakes
of the past.
ADM SHANAHAN: Three Seawolf submarines cost you and me $13.8 billion. They were built not because of the military threat, but to save a sub maker from going under during peacetime. No other country will have the means to challenge our submarine fleet for at least the next two decades and beyond. We need to take a closer look at the current plan to build 30 new attack boats and ask if this submarine is justified or are we trying to keep two shipyards with yet another expensive jobs program.
For "AMERICA'S DEFENSE MONITOR," I am Jack Shanahan.
[End of broadcast.]
(C) Copyright 1997, Center for Defense Information.
All Rights Reserved.
Videotapes also available.