CDI Interviewer: Well, welcome, Mr. Renner.

RENNER: Thank you.

CDI: How would you assess the state of the environment around the world at the turn of the century? And could you identify the major environmental threats to human security?

RENNER: Well, we certainly arrived at a point where environmental awareness, the realization that environmental issues confront us in -- in a major way, is probably higher than it has ever been in many places around the world. At the same time, we have really not made near;y enough headway in turning around some of the -- the trends that are clearly not sustainable. When we look at -- at things such as the fossil fuel consumption, burning off the fossil fuels, which leads to -- climate change, air pollution, acid rain; when we look at consumption of -- of water and other non-renewable resources, there are many trends that are not going in the right direction. And so, much remains to be done.

CDI: When you think about human security and these environmental trends, can you point to a -- a couple of those trends that would impact human security most directly?

RENNER: Well, clearly the issue of climate change is -- is one that no country, no community, no -- no individual can really escape. It is -- In essence, it will be, in essence, a global phenomenon, although of course going from region to region, you will find different ways in which global -- global climate change impacts on -- on agriculture, on the ability of human settlements, habitats to -- to -- to go, to survive. But it is an issue that affects everybody.

Beyond that, there are -- there are more issues that are more regionally and locally focussed. And I think some critical ones involve water scarcity and the issue of -- of crop lands, how well we maintain our soils, our productive soils, what we do to forestall soil erosion and other trends that will more and more present a problem in terms of being able to grow sufficient amounts of food.

CDI: Are there any specific things that the most developed countries should be doing to help the least developed countries who do not have perhaps the infrastructure to deal with these problems? You know, what could -- You know, what could these countries -- what could the most developed countries be doing to help these underdeveloped countries who may be facing some of these regional issues?

RENNER: There are a number -- There are a number of things that can be done. Again, let me go to climate change as the first one. But clearly it is the old industrial countries, the Western countries that have, of course, for at least a century been -- been burning fossil fuels on a very large scale, so that the cumulative effects of that fossil fuel burning accounts for a very, very large share of the atmospheric changes that -- that, in turn, then help to trigger climatic change.

So, while it is, in a sense, a responsibility to now on our part reduce the fossil fuel use, bring that down to much lower levels, use -- use alternative, renewable fuels, push energy efficiency much, much stronger than we have so far. That's -- That's one thing that I think is very obvious and makes a lot of sense. It makes sense certainly in our own terms of what we would like to see within our own societies and economies.

But beyond that, in -- in terms of more directly addressing what developing countries may need and may require, it's clear that a lot of these countries are extremely poor, are -- are burdened by large -- by -- by heavy debt load, foreign debt load. So, there are a number -- a number of things that can be done, again, as is now being discussed more and more, to lighten the debt load to allow these countries to invest the resources that they do have in areas that will allow them to -- to pursue development in sustainable ways, but also to share much more actively, pro-actively the kinds of forward-looking technologies that will help us make more headway with regard to energy efficiency, water efficiency and, in general, retaining the natural capital on which we all depend.

CDI: Turning to human security, I wonder if you can just give me a -- a quick definition of human security as you see it?

RENNER: Human security, really the idea is that we need to get a -- move away from the idea that our security, our well-being, as a society is -- is threatened primarily by some foreign invader that stands ready to cross the border if we let down our guard. I think that's -- that's, of course, the old idea that, to a certain extent, during the Cold War and, of course, it was also very prominent even before the Cold War.

But it's very clear that many conflicts now are taking place within a -- a given country's borders and not so much between different countries. And these kinds of conflicts go very much to the root of what human security is talking about, the social, economic and environmental conditions that affect how -- how well people live, what their -- what their future prospects are, whether they see a sense that they can actually move ahead, have jobs, have an income, have a future, in a sense, or whether they need to struggle to retain jobs to have enough wherewithal to feed their own families, to have the land that they need to grow food, to basically have the kinds of natural resources on which we all depend to -- to -- to carry on and to -- and to survive.

So, human security really is a function of how well do we guard the social fabric within society, how well do we guard the -- the natural resources that we depend on. And on those two counts, I think we are not doing all that well.

CDI: Very good. You recently wrote an article that proposes a possible way to end war in the 21st Century. Could you quickly explain a few of the key changes that have to occur to make that happen?

RENNER: I think that one of the key changes, clearly, are that we need to pay much more attention to as -- as we go on with a global economy that draws in individual national economies, regional economies, we need to be much more careful about how we distribute the benefits of that economy or that we have greater equality in terms of income and the results of what this economy provides than we -- than we do so far.

It seems that up to this point the -- both the benefits and the burdens of the global economy are being distributed in a very, very uneven manner. And that, of course, leads to, on the one hand, extreme -- extreme wealth, on one hand, extreme poverty, on the other hand. And that inevitably with countries and -- and beyond borders does lead to a certain resentments, to social discontent that can be a source of conflicts.

So, we need to be much more on the guard with regard to -- how we deal with what the economy provides us. We have to be very careful that we do not go on consuming the resources at such a level that we destroy the natural environment. We have to boost the -- the efficiency with which we use energy, water, forests and other natural resources. And these are things that can be done. There -- There are many -- there are technologies, there are ways to -- to do this much more intelligently than we have so far.

But aside from these kinds of issues, I think we also need to realize that there is an interplay between conflicts that may be generated within society because of these discontents, inequities and so on and, on the other hand, the -- the very easy availability of weapons. Because if there is discontent, if there are grievances that go on unaddressed, it is more than likely that people at some point will resort to violence in order to -- to rectify a situation that they see as unjust, where they -- where they face a situation that they cannot bear going on, and on, and on with. So, if we do address the social, economic, environmental issues that confront us, but do nothing about weapons availability, I think we really do have a job.

CDI: Can you -- Can you point to a couple of environmental trends, in particular, that could lead to armed conflicts sometime in the near future. I'm thinking of, for instance, the conflict, which wasn't necessarily an armed conflict between Canada and Spain and Portugal, in which the -- the Canadian navy confiscated a -- the fishing vessels. Also, water conflicts. Can you maybe explain or elucidate those two please?

RENNER: Certainly, fisheries is a good example for this type of environmentally-induced conflict or as some prefer to say in a much shorter way, an environmental conflict. I think what's different about fisheries from other similar cases is that if you have an actual skirmish among rival fisher -- fishers' vessels, obviously there is very few people involved. It's far removed from everybody. It's on the high seas where nobody really sees much what's happening. And in that sense, it's a very different story than if you have conflicts that's over resources that are -- taking place on land, such as water.

And water conflicts are happening as we are speaking all over the globe. Not so much between countries, but within them. You have -- In various portions of Mexico, of India, of Brazil and other countries, you have local or regional clashes over how do we distribute the water resources. Who -- Who gets to count how much? How -- Who gets to use water for irrigation and other purposes? And these are issues that need to be addressed much more forthrightly than we have managed so far. Clearly, we cannot wait until the large scale kinds of water conflicts are played out. We cannot wait until large -- large scale water conflicts are played out that actually do involve different countries.

Take the Middle East, for example, where the water resources are in dispute between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Once it comes to the level where -- where central governments are involved, it is much more likely than violent conflict will -- will break out and we'll have very severe consequences. So, I think we should already take some lessons from the much smaller scale, very limited kind of skirmishes that we see happening in many places. (Pause in tape or taping?)

MARK SUGG: Is any -- Is anybody out there thinking about, you know, that kind of a framework for international conflict, where -- where wealthy countries with the wherewithal go down to Brazil and go into Indonesia and enforce, you know, a certain level of treaties or --

RENNER: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Well, you know, it's been talked about, but I think most people seem to think that that is a much less likely scenario. I think what -- what it leads to more is sort of, you know, international acrimonious relations on the diplomatic stage primarily, sort of the public relations - slash - diplomatic stage. But really, yes. I mean, you talk about how did we implement Kyoto, the Kyoto Protocol about, you know, reducing CO2 and -- I mean, the Senate is on record saying --

CDI: That's right.

RENNER: -- we won't do anything until the developing countries come on board, you know. Why should they get a free ride?

(Often all three simultaneously through this part.)

CDI: Yeah.

RENNER: Which I think is a fallacious argument the way it's been made, but -- and that leads more to a blocking --

SUGG: Is anyone saying we'll force them on board?

CDI: I'm sorry?

SUGG: Is anyone saying we'll force them on board, by military force, if necessary?

RENNER: No, not really, I don't think. I mean, I don't think -- I -- It may not be that one or the other person --

SUGG: Mm-hmm.

RENNER: -- may say that -- I mean, may make that kind of a statement, although I -- I would be hard-pressed to --

SUGG: Okay.

RENNER: -- know where -- where I would find that.

CDI: In science fiction.

RENNER: It's more that it leads to -- And I think that's the real problem. It leads more to a mutual blocking of any sensible action. You know, where they say, "No, I'm not going to move until you move," and the other side says, "Well, you make the first move."

(Chitchat.)

SUGG: And one other follow-up question would be, what are the consequences for the United States if we don't do anything? In other words, will we have an increase in skin cancers? Will we be forced to, you know, go to war for resources? I mean, what are the practical day-to-day consequences that people will face if we don't -- if we're not pro-active on these issues?

(Chitchat.)

CDI: What should the US do to take a leading role in resolving some of the issues you've outlined here?

RENNER: Well, as one of the -- the major users of resources worldwide or the major user of resources, I -- I think it is incumbent on the United States and the other industrial countries, as well, of course, to lead the way away from the very resource-intensive kind of developments that we have really put out to the rest of the world and said, "This is the way to do it." We have to show that it is quite possible without the kind of social and economic pain that some -- that some employ, that it is possible to go down a route with much greater energy efficiency, much greater materials efficiency.

And what that means really is producing goods and services without relying so much on extracting oil, cutting down trees, extracting other kinds of resources, doing it much more intelligently with much less material input. But we really can do this because the technologies are out there. It is a matter of going ahead and demonstrating that there is, in a sense, the political will or the will of society to go down a different route or down a different development path.

Because as long as the rich countries have some wherewithal and some latitude in the way in which they -- which they travel along the -- the technological path, as long as we don't do it, poorer countries that are hard-pressed to, in a sense, sort of get up to the level that we are accustomed to will have every reason to say, "Why should we be the first ones to do this? You showed the way. You were the ones who led the way into this dilemma, you show the way out. And if you show the way out, we are more than willing to follow."

CDI: What are the implications for the United States if it should not take this leading role in solving some of these issues?

RENNER: I think that we'll see that we cannot preach to others, urge them to do things that we are not prepared to do ourselves, in the first place. What that really translated -- translates into, if there are certain measures that we would like to see others to do, whether that relates to -- to energy use, climate policy, water use policy, or any other item that's -- that's on the agenda, it is -- it is very unlikely that others will then take the lead if it is clear that we are not prepared to take some sensible steps.

So, you have -- a net effect really is that we have a blockage of progress internationally. And that, of course, is the thing that we cannot really afford to -- to have going on for a very long time. Because we now still do have the time to make changes in our intensive resource consumption, to get off the environmentally destructive path that we are on. But if we -- if we lose another few decades, the same task will be much, much harder.

So, it will, in a sense, come back to us and at some point when we have leadership, political leadership in place that is more educated about the challenges that we're facing, more willing to take action, that leadership will be much harder pressed to do the kinds of things that are already out there now as options. So, that's the first cost.

I think another cost is if -- if we are not prepared to lead the way and show that energy, materials, water efficiency and other measures are possible, then we're also blocking the way. We are not, in a sense, allowing the kinds of developments to go forward that other nations may, a little bit down the road, benefit from. So, it is more likely that these nations will much faster run into resource roadblocks or environmental roadblocks, as it were, that they will run into greater water scarcity, they will face greater environmental degradation as a result.

So, I think it is only intelligent to go ahead and be more forthcoming in terms of sharing the best available technologies that we do have and are -- that are on the drawing board at this point, to share those in a very active manner with others around the world and, in a sense, head-off the kinds of problems that are quite predictable now and that do not have to come to pass.

CDI: Can you envision a scenario in which the United States would have to use military power to solve some of these regional conflicts and issues that we're just not taking a leading role in heading off these resource blockages, as -- as you refer to them?

RENNER: It may seem as though that is one of the likely consequences, although I am personally less convinced that that is all that likely to happen, for the following reason. We are, in effect, not so much facing resource shortages as was envisioned particularly during the 1970s. What we're facing much more is the problems that arise once you actually exploit these resources, once you actually burn off the oil, natural gas and coal and put carbon emissions into the atmosphere.

Now you cannot really force a country to reverse its carbon emissions by military force. What you would have to do is literally take over the whole country and its economy and totally restructure the economy. You cannot do that by military means. What is much more likely is that you -- that you by good example, in the first place, engage in cooperative policies, in negotiations to see how in a joint manner these kinds of problems can be resolved, how we all can find solutions to the climate change problem, to water scarcity problems and other -- and other such issues.

CDI: Excellent.

(Chitchat.)

SUGG: Do you want to comment on anything else?

RENNER: I think I pretty much --

(Chitchat, describes program.)

RENNER: I mean, the issue is not -- and if you -- you want to go into that. I mean, I haven't -- I haven't looked at the details of that, to be honest. But it basically comes down to questions, well, how can you be sure if a country signs on to the -- to the Kyoto Protocol that they actually live up to their commitment. And what it really comes down to and -- and I think that is an encouraging answer, actually, is that, you know, it's not just a matter of, you know, government A, B and C signing on and then, well, gee, we have to sort of wait and see what happens, but rather than you rely on NGO's on the spot really to do the sort of -- the kind of monitoring job.

SUGG: (Inaudible.)

RENNER: You know, we have coming out of the Copenhagen Summit, 1995, the social summit, probably by now thousands of NGO's, I would imagine, that in their own country, home country, they basically monitor what their own government is doing --

SUGG: Uh-huh.

RENNER: -- and being very loud in most cases, you know, where they see governments falling short -- and, unfortunately, governments are falling short, by and large -- and saying, "Look, this is what you signed-on to," you know. "You are doing this much and you're this much short." And that's I think the only way that this can ever work because you cannot have a central institution of whatever kind to do the kind of, you know, policing as it were, really.

You know, you have to rely on on-the-ground monitors that engage in a give and take, basically, you know, back home and then, of course, rely this kind of information internationally to have a reasonable chance of saying, "Well," you know, "are we getting there?" You know, "Are we doing the kinds of things that at least on paper we have signed-on to and that we can expect to happen?" That I think is the only way and it's -- it's -- in a way, it's a hopeful way because, you know, it involves a lot of actors. It opens up the whole -- the whole discussion, the whole process and it doesn't hinge on, you know, the environment ministry of whatever country, you know, doing one or the other thing or failing to do it, which doesn't leave you with that many options in the end.

CDI: So, Bradley would say that human security is perhaps going to depend -- international human security is going to depend more on NGO's than it will on traditional forms of government and sovereignty.

RENNER: I -- I definitely think so. And really -- really it is in a sense the logical extension of the concept of human security because really the idea partly is to say, well, if we don't rely on military forces to guard the borders, if that's not the primary concern, then what -- what else counts if -- if the social, economic, environmental issue are much more in -- at the forefront -- (gap in tape?)

CDI: Could you summarize for us what -- what would be the -- the costs financially of taking a leadership role -- the United States, one of the most developed countries in the world, taking a leadership role in assuring human security for the entire world?

RENNER: It is interesting to note that we -- that we -- we are told that some of the options that have been offered up in term of addressing climate change and related challenges, the kinds of challenges that make up the -- the -- the human security concept, that those are basically unaffordable, that they would wreck the economy and that they are generally a bad idea. And I think that is -- that is really the wrong -- the wrong conclusion to draw. If we -- If we take a serious detailed look, we find that taking the lead -- taking leadership in these issues, in these areas is considerably cheaper than the kinds of weapons that we now routinely and without asking any questions spend on military security.

If we -- If we accept the -- the idea that the primary challenge to security now does not stem from foreign armies waiting to invade but rather from social, economic and environmental challenges, the -- the issue of social fabric, conserving the natural environment and so on, when we look at the kinds of programs, efforts and responses that we can -- that we can undertake in response to these kinds of challenges, we find that it may well be possible to spend a fraction of the -- of the world military spending, perhaps on the order of $200 billion a year or so, and we'd be well on the way then to resolving a lot of these issues or certainly turning around the -- the kinds of very upsetting trends that we are now witnessing.

CDI: Perfect. That was perfect.

SUGG: Thanks.

(End of interview.)