INTERVIEWER: To start with, call you tell me what CBD Comm is and what your responsibilities are as commander of CBD Comm.

GENERAL FRIEL: First let me start by describing the organization that, that I'm part of and, and my responsibilities. I'm the commander of the Chemical Biological Defense Command, which is a, an Army organization as part of the, the Army's materiel command, responsible primarily for providing the, the materiel and, and, and resources for, for DOD's NBC defense posture and equipping United States forces for defending against chemical biological agents. In addition, my command also manages the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile at eight chemical weapons storage sites (inaudible) which we, we are also providing chemical stockpile emergency preparedness program, which is preparing the local emergency responders to assist us if we have a chemical accident at those chemical storage sites.

Specifically my, my responsibility also includes the, the tasks provided under the Nunn-Lu--Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, which requires us, requires DOD to assist the federal government and state and local authorities in preparing America for a, a domestic attack, specifically using what is termed weapons of mass destruction, or nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In, in that role I'm the, the program manager for the Army executing DOD's responsibilities.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. If you could say, what kind of threat do you think chemical biological weapons pose for the U.S. public, to the civilian population?

GENERAL FRIEL: The, the threat posed to, to United States, specifically United States homeland, for the, the so-called weapons of mass destructions or primarily chemical and biological agents, is much, is much higher today than it, than it has been in history for a couple of important reasons. So first of all the, during the Cold War when we had the, the large bipolar world, East and West, the United States focused primarily on the, on the massive threat which was, was Soviet, Soviet-led forces, primarily in the, in the western European theater of operations.

And the homeland felt relatively safe for, for several reasons. Primarily the, the small nation-state and terrorist-sponsored organizations did not pose a real threat to the world community at that time period. And the second component of it is since the demise of the Soviet Union much of the technology which was developed during the Cold War has found its way into the hands of potential nation-states who would threaten the United States.

And second, it's now available to terrorist organizations. The technology has proliferated across the world. It's relatively available for those who want to pay and use it.

Second major component of that change in the threat is that the United States is no longer challenged as a superpower. And the lessons that have been learned in the last ten years, especially in Desert Storm when the United States was capable of, of using its mass conventional forces against Saddam Hussein, we, we basically are not challenged and do not have a world competitor today in the conventional realm.

So if any nation-state or any terrorist organization would choose to attack the United States anywhere in the world, it would use what we term as the asymmetrical threat. It would bring basically to their battle and to their planning efforts a, a threat that would be real to the United States. The conventional threat is not real. And so the only way they could threaten the United States would be with an asymmetrical threat.

Second, we have now become what we call a power projection force. The United States forces are primarily now stationed in the United States, not overseas. And without forward deployment, to rapidly respond to any international incident or, or threat that would require the deployment of U.S. forces would require that we deploy those forces from the United States. A lesson not lost on potential enemies is the fact that we had six months during Desert Storm to build our forces up, to move them into the theater and prepare them to conduct the war which we did against Saddam Hussein.

Two components of that bear watching. First, we have to be able to deploy those forces into the theater. And they could stop that deployment by threatening the U.S. forces, either where we were going or from where we were coming, for example, at one of the large installations or military bases in the United States. And the second component of that is U.S. will. If you threaten the American public and their cities and the infrastructure in the United States with a, with an asymmetrical threat, it would get at the will of the United States to deploy. So if a threat was building and the potential enemy would, would threaten the United States with the use of one of those weapons, it could, in fact, attack the political and the military will of the United States to deploy those forces.

So it is a real threat. It's a viable threat. It's, it's much higher today than it ever has been in the past for the two reasons: ready availability of the technology, and second, it's now part of the, of the asymmetrical threat faced by the United States in potential hot spots around the world.

INTERVIEWER: What is CBD Comm currently doing to enhance domestic preparedness against a possible chemical and biological attack?

GENERAL FRIEL: In addition to our role of preparing U.S. forces against that asymmetrical threat which I just described, my organization, the CBD Comm, is also chartered by, by the Department of Defense to lead the role mandated by public law that the so-called Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, which requires that DOD take a lead responsibility in preparing United States cities and the infrastructure, both at state, local, and federal level, to respond to a chemical or biological attack.

In doing so, we've developed what we call a four-pillar program in that we've focused the first pillar primarily on training the first responders in American cities, the largest 120 cities, to be able to cope with a, a chemical or biological attack in their cities, as they currently do with other major catastrophes or, or disasters that would befall them, for example, large fires, earthquakes, floods. We've added to their, we're adding to their capability in, as a first responder to cope with a chemical or biological attack.

The second pillar is providing testing and, and assistance to look at better ways of using the equipment that's currently available to most first responders in America. The training program focuses primarily on (inaudible) the differences between what they currently are trained to do and what the city should be capable of doing in handling a chemical and biological attack. So we're not retraining the emergency responders, but only adding to their current knowledge and capabilities.

In that realm, the equipment that's currently available to a city's first responders----hazmat, fire departments, law enforcement officials, and emergency medical personnel----can, in fact, be used if it's properly, if it's properly applied or used. And what we want to do is to train most of the city first responders to be able to use the existing equipment, rather than having to buy new. So we have a testing program that's looking at the array of equipment that's currently available to America's first responders.

The third pillar is what we call a help and assist pillar in that, in that we've established a national hotline system so that any first responder in America, be it a battalion fire chief, local law enforcement official, a 911 operator, could call a, a centrally managed 1-800, 1-800 number that is an emergency hotline number that will link together the federal response capability to provide advice and assistance and also alert the national response capabilities so that they could respond and assist the cities and local officials.

And the fourth one is to enhance and build on the emergency response capability that exists in DOD today and make that availability capable of responding immediately and, and properly to assist a state and, and local officials in coping with the, the disasters, both the crisis response, which is preventing the, the effects of a potential terrorist threat, and consequence management, which is dealing with the after effects and the results of having one of those effects.

So we basically have four major components to the program. I have a program manager that's leading each of those pillars--

INTERVIEWER: Um hmm.

GENERAL FRIEL: --across the country, at both the state, city, and, and federal level.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. If there a chemical or a biological attack, take me through the response scenario quickly, briefly, from local involvement from the first responders until when the federal agencies--

GENERAL FRIEL: There are, there are two important considerations when, when we're discussing chemical and biological attacks. First of all, the chemical attacks, chemical attacks are not the same as bio attacks in that, and, and not all chemical attacks are the same. Some chemical attacks, such as we saw in Tokyo, use a, a rapid-reacting toxic chemical that will affect the people, people immediately so that the results of a potential use of a, by a terrorist organization of a chemical agent would be relatively quickly known.

Second, that type of an attack also calls, requires very rapid response in order to save large numbers of lives and prevent it from, from spreading across a city. And so if you want to minimize the impact it has and also save the people who've been exposed, it requires extremely rapid response. The focus of our training in the cities is to, is to train the, the existing emergency response system, the first responders, to be able to do that on their own without, without advice and assistance from, from outside.

And so the focus of the training program is primarily on assisting a city to cope with the disasters they would have to cope with on their own very, very rapidly.

Other chemical agents have delayed effects and, and are more persistent. By persistent, it means they, they last longer. They stay there much longer.

And so normally those that are fast-acting that kill very rapidly are also those that are nonpersistent and rapidly dissipate and, and so after a few hours would have minimal effect upon a city that would require detail, decontamination, and cleanup. And, and larger and potentially large areas that become contaminated would have to be restricted and, and controlled.

A biological agent, on the other hand, may, may in fact be designed to inflict casualties that may not occur for several days. A good example of the dilemma is the, is the federal dilemma that we had after the Legionnaire's Disease attack in, in Philadelphia many years ago in that people were getting sick and it took many days for the medical community in America to figure out where it was coming from and what it was. And so in a biological scenario the, the attack may occur, and unless the terrorist announces that an attack has taken place the first indication that we have been attacked may be when we have casualties begin showing up at our hospitals many days later all across the country. Because if it was a convention people may have gone home. If it was in a city, people going through airport, may be all over the world. And so a, a biological attack poses a totally different threat scenario and, and different requirement.

A chemical attack requires rapid and immediate response. A biological attack, if you know that it's occurred, may also require rapid response but for different reasons. What you're trying to do is prevent personnel from being exposed, and second, to identify all those that have been so that you can move them to medical facilities and then begin the, the therapeutic treatment that would prevent them from becoming severe casualties.

And so each scenario could be and, and would be different, based upon the type of agent, the intent of the terrorists, and also the emergency response capability of the organizations to prepare. In those that have long-term effects or, or effects that take hours to days to occur, some assistance can be provided by the federal government. But for those that require immediate response, the first responders in our cities and local communities would be those that would bear the brunt and responsibility for saving the lives.

Now that was a very long answer to a, to, to what seems to be a simple question. But I think it's important that America know that, that there is no one simple response scenario--

INTERVIEWER: Um hmm.

GENERAL FRIEL: --to the potential use of, of these agents.

And when we talk about nuclear or radiological hazards, the, the, the threat scenario also poses different hazards and different requirements as well. And there are teams in the Department of Energy that could respond and assist in a radiological incident as well.

INTERVIEWER: A lot of different federal agencies have been on rapid response teams. With so many different rapid response teams, are you concerned that this would create logistical difficulties or duplicity of responsibilities?

GENERAL FRIEL: No. I don't think America can have too much emergency response capability, whether it be at the federal or, or, or local level in that each of the federal agencies brings a, a technical capability to America that I think should be leveraged.

For example, the Public Health Service is responsible for basically the public health of America and should be the lead federal agency responsible for building the infrastructure, both in, in terms of facilities and trained personnel, that would sustain and maintain an emergency response capability across America, be it trained physicians, EMTs, emergency rescue squads, and hospital staffs that are, that are trained and equipped for long-term therapy.

For example, even though an individual has been exposed to a chemical agent and you may survive because you've been given properly, proper emergency care by, by a hazmat team or, or a, an emergency response medical official, you normally will arrive at a hospital and require long-term therapy or health care. And so hospitals across the country could be overloaded very quickly with large numbers of casualties that aren't necessarily in immediate danger of dying but will require long-term therapy to sur--to basically to return 'em back to normal, whether it be a chemical or a biological agent.

And so the Public Health Service has a responsibility for, for focusing in, in that realm. In addition, they're, they are planning to, to, to train and equip metropolitan medical strike teams that would be somewhat like a SWAT team, except they're a medical team that would assist--

INTERVIEWER: Um hmm.

GENERAL FRIEL: --both first responders and hospitals in coping with the, with the, the casualties that would have resulted from one of these attacks.

Department of, of Energy brings a very special capability in, in responding to nuclear accidents in the, in the form of their nuclear emergency search team, which has been in existence for many years. As a result of the U.S. effort in, in both our power plants industries and, and in, in, in the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in this country, we've maintained that nuclear response capability. It exists today and would respond to a city to assist 'em.

The Department of Defense brings unique capabilities as well and an emergency response capability for chemical and biological weapons, because for many years after World War I the United States was involved in both the research and development and building those weapons, and in, in developing the capability of defend against them for our armed forces. That capability exists today in emergency response forces that are in resident my command. There're also numerous units across both the Army and Marine Corps that have the capability to, to respond and provide assistance to a city in the consequences of long-term cleanup and, and, and management of the, of the process of returning a city to normal.

I have a special team that's been designed primarily to assist the FBI and, and other agencies in responding to a crisis, the threat of the use of those agents so that we could prevent it from becoming a reality in a city, and then also advise and assist local and state officials and the rest of the federal government in how to cope with the aftermath, once one would occur.

So I don't see that, that, that we can have too much of a capability that's been, that's been built up in each of, of the respective federal agencies. There is, there's nothing wrong with having some duplication, but they would certainly be something wrong with a void. And so I don't see duplication as being bad.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Can you briefly explain the train trainer aspect of the DPP, and what is the background of the federal trainers?

GENERAL FRIEL: The, the, the, the primary focus, or the, one of the major pillars of the domestic preparedness program is the, is the training of 120 cities. And it's based upon the principal of, of training the trainer and that it would be impossible for, for example, for us to spend the time to train all the emergency responders in New York City. There's potentially 25 to 50,000, depending upon how you, you measure the size of the metropolitan area, emergency responders.

And so our focus has been primarily in the, in the 120 cities as we've initially be--as we've begun the training in the past year to focus on training those people who currently train emergency responders in the cities. For example, EMTs and, and fire rescue squad emergency medical personnel are normally trained by the, the central or largest hospital. And so emergency room physicians are normally responsible for training those individuals, and they have a training system to do that and certify them. So what we want to do is train the emergency room physicians that are responsible for training those medical, emergency medical personnel.

In terms of fire fighters, and hazmat, and law enforcement, they also have academies and, and training institutions established at the state and local level. And larger cities have their own, own academies and, and training institutions.

We want the trainers that are currently doing the training of America's first responders to continue to do the training for chemical and biological as well. So we want to add to their training curriculum and to their, the, the institutional ability of those institutions and individuals the knowledge and capability to train individuals in their cities and states on the differences between what they currently do today and what they would need to do in the, in the case of a chemical biological attack.

The trainers that we use to do that is a cadre of not only trained experts in DOD and the medical community that have the knowledge and, and, and experience to be able to, to impart, impact and, and provide the training to the cities. We also have trained over the past year-and-a-half experts from the emergency response community across America individuals with 20 to 30 years of experience as a hazmat or a fireman or a law enforcement official. They've been, they've been exposed to the training now for a year-and-a-half and are expert trainers so that when we go to the city we don't have a standard training package that goes to every city.

We have a standard core curriculum, or basic training objectives, that we want to ensure that the trainee, the, the training includes for the city. But the first thing we want to do is to understand how the city responds. So if the city's primary focus upon command and control and management of an incident site happens to be a senior law enforcement official----a captain, or a, a police commissioner or chief----then we want to train the command and control process to the law enforcement community in that city because that's the ones would do it. If it's, if it's a battalion fire chief or a senior fire official that would normally be the incident commander, then we want to train to use the fire response system as the command and control or incident command system.

And so we will bring to the, to that respective city a, a, a training package that is tailored, designed just to train that specific city on the way they currently operate. And we'll bring with us experts, both military and civilian, and also National Guard and reserve officials that, that also may have dual, dual capability of both training the DOD's role. And they may in fact in their own right be emergency responders. And they maybe a, a, a fireman or a law enforcement official in their state, so they bring that capability from both realms or, or from both sides of the fence.

The bottom line basically is this. We take a, a, a team of, of experts in both the chemical and biological threat emergency response and treatment casualties, and we will include cadre on our training teams that, that, that are resident and experts in their own right in, in emergency response because they are, in fact, emergency responders. And so our team basically is a joint team.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Of the cities that you've done so far, I think it's been what? Twenty-three, something like that?

GENERAL FRIEL: We've, under the current pro--the training the trainer concept we're in excess of 20. But we've, we've also done special training in some other cities for special events, such as the Olympics, or the Summit of Eight, and some of the other ones. So we're nearing 25 cities that we've trained.

INTERVIEWER: Of your, just generally speaking, experience, has the DPP been implemented to your satisfaction? And have the local communities, at the end of the training program, gotten everything that they needed to get out of it, gotten all the equipment that they needed? And how will you, are you gonna have a role in ensuring that they maintain preparedness once you finish the program?

GENERAL FRIEL: Of the, of the cities that we've trained in--

INTERVIEWER: Um hmm.

GENERAL FRIEL: --in the past year, actually all the cities that we've trained and visited, I'm very satisfied that, that the training program has the right focus and that, and the cities are, in fact, embracing both the process that we're using for the training and are able and capable of using what we bring.

First, let me describe what we take to the city. We have eight, basically eight basic courses that we provide to the city that starts with what we call a senior officials workshop in which the mayor and his cabinet, several weeks prior to us actually doing the training of his, of his trainers, will be, will be given an overview of the training program and an understanding of the dilemma that a mayor and his cabinet would have in case one of these attacks would occur in his city and some of the principles that he would need to use in order to manage and cope with those incidents. So that he now understands what he needs to do in, in terms of preparing his city for the training.

And then when we take the training to the city, we've taken, as I mentioned earlier, a designed training program that fits a city and the way it responds. In addition, we take what we call a training package, which is not only the literature that's required by all the trainers, we provide both the student and an instructor set of materials that he can, he or she can use and to, and to conduct the training. And we conduct the training for the city on both those sets of materials. So when we leave they have a guide and all the materials they would need to conduct that training.

In addition, we provide what we call a training set of equipment, which is all the equipment that the city would need to conduct the training, the hands-on training. So that special detection equipment and personal protective equipment, masks and clothing, etc., we provide about $300,000 for each city for a special set of equipment that they can use in training. That equipment can also be used as part of their emergency response capability.

But to answer the question of whether or not the cities are adequately equipped, the answer is no. What we are doing basically is leaving the city now educated, with an understanding of what it needs to do in order to equip itself. But my charter and mandate is not, does not require me to equip the cities. That would be an impossible task.

Every city is unique and different. If you go to California, where there are large number of brush fires and, and large threats of mudslides and, and rains, that, that state has equipped its communities so that its fire departments are extremely care--capable. They're well-equipped, large numbers of, large amounts of emergency rescue equipment for fires and, and, and, and earthquakes and other natural disasters. And so it, it is a well-equipped, you'll find those cities are well-equipped in the fire department arena.

If you go to large industrial cities on the East that have large chemical industries, or other industrial processes that have hazardous material threats, you'll find those cities extremely well-equipped with hazardous material types of handling equipment.

And so every city is different and unique. They all don't use the same type of equipment. They use the same basic type of equipment, and most of it is purchased using standards that are developed by the, by the institutes in America that are responsible for overseeing them to ensure that both federal law and, and safety is, is assured.

And so we're, we are not proposing that, that we take on responsibility of equipping the cities, but educating the cities so they, they can equip themselves. I personally believe that as time goes by that, that, that the federal government will have to assist the cities, and the way they can do that is providing grants to the states so that each of the, each of the states and their, and their cities can then develop its, its own requirements, and then purchase the equipment that will be needed, augment what they currently have.

But one of the primary things we like to do is, is to teach a city that most of what they have is usable in responding to a chemical or biological attack. For example, decontaminating a, a large area in the city that, that would have been contaminated with a chemical agent can be done using their fire trucks, especially if they have large airports because they have foam trucks. Simply by mixing bleach, using bleach and other commonly-found decontaminants that are readily available in the city, the fire departments can, in fact, do the decontamination themselves, without buying special decontamination equipment.

And so the answer is, is a better educated city and state emergency response system, I think, can make smart buying decisions when it comes to purchasing the equipment they need. And there is a need for additional equipment.

The, in fact, I, I think it's what, what I call the best of all worlds and the worst of all worlds. What we've basically done is, is, is a process of educating America's senior leadership, whether it be at the federal level, state, or even at the city level. We've created an expectation and, and the, and in many cases an acute sense of a, of an awareness of, of the dilemma that the threat poses for the cities.

Many of the cities I've going to, for example, I've found that, that, that we begin, for example, about six months out with a city visit in which we discuss the program and the fact that we're going to come to train. And we arrange, as I said earlier, training of the city officials with what we call a senior officials workshop all the way to the end. After we complete the training we conduct what we call a tabletop exercise and, where we bring all the, the state, the regional, and the city emergency response planners to the table, along with senior members of the federal response community, and we actually work a scenario through the city.

I've found that the cities are extremely well prepared when we arrive to begin that discussion. They've thought through their vulnerabilities, they've done an analysis of, of where terrorists could potentially use those agents, and what it would do to their city.

And so, as I said earlier, it's the best of all worlds and the worst of all worlds. We've raised the expectations of America's cities, and simultaneously the leadership in DOD and the rest of the federal government is now well-attuned to the potential threat that, that, or the potential asymmetrical threat that, that this country now faces and what it could do to our, both our political will and our, and our military capability to play our forces in the interest of the United States.

And, and so, having said all that, it's raised both the, the awareness of the threat throughout DOD and all of its forces, at the senior levels all the way to the, to the operating level, and a, and a thirst and a demand for education among our DOD components, additional support for our, our developmental programs that will bring special equipment to DOD forces, and both DOD and Congressional support for funding to do that. So the result of the DP program is that, is that we're not only doing more R&D, more research, we're also better equipping, I think, our forces as a result of it. So it's, it's having a synergistic effect on DOD, as well as, I think, the rest of the country.

So I see it, I see it as a, as not a drain. It's, in fact I think it's a, it's having a, an important impact on the, on the specialized DOD community that's responsible for CB(?) defense, both by organization as well as the medical community that's responsible for, for those aspects of, of treating casualties and assisting the communities.

INTERVIEWER: Last question. If you (inaudible) national domestic preparedness, where do you see room for improvements?

GENERAL FRIEL: I, I think the, the, the current program is, it is focused properly on the, on the 120 cities but I believe that, that we can improve the domestic preparedness program by, by making sure that we, that we coordinate and bring the synergy from the other federal agencies, as I mentioned earlier, that, that bring a special capability to, to assist the states, cities, and the federal government in a, into our emergency response capability.

The, the focus on the 120 cities is only the beginning process. There are, I think, two major components to ensure that we sustain and maintain what we have begun as time goes by. As, as many may not be aware but once the 120 cities are, are, are trained, then DOD's lead role and responsibility for training those cities basically goes away, and we're not planning to continue beyond that. What we will do is plan to assist the other federal agencies that are responsible for emergency response----FEMA, the Department of Energy, the Public Health Service, and others----in their role and responsibility for institutionalizing the program.

I think what we need to do is, is, is revert from what I call the push method which is curr--we're now pushing this training to the cities, although it's, they're not resisting it. In fact, they're welcoming it. But, but we need to get to the, to these, to the state in which the institutions of America who are responsible for training emergency responses across our country have basically imbedded it in their current program. So that when a doctor graduates from a university, a medical school, and receives his, his degree, he's been trained in the fundamentals of chemical and biological defense; and that if he becomes a emergency room physician, part of his accreditation and certification process will require that he have this training. And it will be provided in the institutions that normally do that.

So that a firefighter who goes through the, a state or a national institute to receive special firefighting training, when he gets his certificate to become a senior firefighter or a, a trainer, he also has received the same chemical and biological defense emergency response training. Law enforcement officials will do it, as well. And our medical institutions across America will begin training those who operate emergency rooms. And, and, and support EMTs and fire rescue teams will have that imbedded in their training.

So we need to institutionalize so that it, it, rather than us pushing it to the cities, it will be pulled because they will desire it. In order to be certified in three or four years from now I would hope that individuals would have, would have been required to take this training to be, to receive the certification. That's the first piece.

The second thing, and I think it needs to, to occur to sustain the training, is a, is a national system to maintain the awareness and provide the training outside the 120 cities, to sustain it beyond the 120 cities. And we're beginning to do that now by inviting the states and other emergency responsible officials----public health officials at the state level, emergency response agencies, and the regional agencies, federal and state----to also attend our training programs, to begin to learn how we're managing the training within the cities today. So that the states can now take over the training, using national guard resources, their fire and emergency rescue training academies, their police academies. Also use the training, use these resources to continue to train the cities and small towns that, that are not currently on the, on the list of 120.

And so that three to five years from now we have also provided, not only to the institutions responsible for certifying emergency responders but also the agencies responsible for managing it, the wherewithal and the capability to, to do it for their own, their, their own states and the, and the other cities.

And finally, that a national training of the federal response capability needs to continue and in something that will, that will maintain the validity of the training program, which is a series of exercise programs, I think, are needed, both at federal, state, and local level, that would continue beyond our, our, our training and, in the, of the 120 cities that will ensure that we continue to hone, improve the research and development into, into new techniques, procedures, and, and better equipment for our cities, and, and also give the states something that they can use to measure how well they're being trained.