Admiral EUGENE CARROLL, Jr.: Welcome to "AMERICA'S DEFENSE MONITOR."

Today, 163 nations are signatories of a very important agreement, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For 24 years, this agreement has helped prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. In 1995, the signatories must decide whether to continue the treaty or to let it expire. Our program today explores the issues which will determine the outcome and the importance of this decision to all of us.

NARRATOR: On July 1st, 1968, 61 representatives of nations from around the world gathered at the United Nations in an attempt to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle. Before leaving, they had signed an historic landmark accord: the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. For the first time in history, many nations took a public vow of nuclear chastity, giving up their right for a period of 25 years to possess nuclear weapons.

Under the NPT Treaty, nations were prohibited from developing, acquiring or maintaining nuclear weapons. There was one exception: Those nations that already had nuclear weapons were permitted to keep them, at least for the time being.

In exchange for the right to keep their nuclear weapons, the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France and China agreed to share the peaceful benefits of nuclear power with the nations that did not have nuclear weapons. Perhaps most importantly, the nuclear weapons states agreed to pursue a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing and "the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery."

The sharing of nuclear technology and the pledge to work toward eliminating nuclear weapons have proved to be the most controversial aspects of the treaty.

The NPT Treaty went into effect in 1970 and will expire in 1995. Unlike other arms control treaties which last forever, the NPT Treaty only has a 25-year lifespan. It can only be made permanent by a majority vote of its signatories. If no agreement is reached, the treaty will die at the tender age of 25.

The upcoming NPT "extension conference" offers an opportunity to take stock of global non-proliferation efforts and to determine what can be done in the post-Cold War world to further reduce the danger posed by nuclear weapons.

Much has changed since 1968 when the NPT Treaty was first signed. The world was in the throes of the Cold War and the threat of a possible nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union hung over the globe. Today, nuclear proliferation has replaced communism as the United States' foremost enemy.

Consider North Korea. We've made a villain of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and threatened his country with annihilation over its suspected nuclear weapons program.

President BILL CLINTON (Korean DMZ, 11 July '93):

"It is pointless for them to try to develop nuclear weapons because if they ever used them, it would be the end of their country."

NARRATOR: The fear-mongering over North Korea is a classic case of the elephant being scared by the mouse. The United States has 17,000 nuclear weapons and is the number one military power in the world. North Korea, on the other hand, might have one or two nuclear weapons.

Certainly, the world must work towards stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. However, we must be careful that the threat of nuclear proliferation is not inflated to justify high levels of military spending or Cold War weapons.

Ambassador THOMAS GRAHAM, Jr.: It's the principal national security threat that exists, as far as the United States is concerned, in the world today.

NARRATOR: Thomas Graham will head the US delegation to the review conference in New York. Ambassador Graham has been assigned the daunting task of convincing other signatories that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is still worthwhile and should be permanently extended.

Ambassador GRAHAM: We consider it a very, very important treaty. And, as a result, we want to make it a permanent part of the international security system. And that means its indefinite extension, and that is what this country is trying to achieve, the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

NARRATOR: At the NPT extension conference, treaty members

have three options: They can do nothing and kill the treaty. They can extend the NPT for a fixed period of time. Or, they can extend it indefinitely and make it a permanent treaty.

The nuclear weapons states are lobbying for the permanent extension of the NPT, so that no other nations will join their exclusive nuclear club. Many nations that do not have nuclear weapons, however, favor extending the treaty only for a short period of time, so as to keep pressure on the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their NPT obligations, including the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Miguel Marin-Bosch is the distinguished Mexican ambassador to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Ambassador Marin-Bosch chairs the international negotiations for a complete ban on nuclear testing.

Ambassador MIGUEL MARIN-BOSCH: There are still the haves and the have nots. And are we closer to a more equitable situation? No. So, therefore, until we get to that point, I think we should continue to have a limited extension of the treaty.

NARRATOR: Is this a one-time opportunity to extend the treaty?

Ambassador GRAHAM: A ten-year extension runs out in 10 years. It would be very, very difficult to extend it beyond there because of all the parliamentary actions that would be required. This is a one-time opportunity to make this treaty a permanent part of the international security establishment and it's in the interests of all the parties to make that decision.

Ambassador MARIN-BOSCH: I think it's up to the parties. They're all sovereign states; they can decide what they want at the NPT review conference. They could say this treaty is extended for another 25 years, and then we will have another discussion like the one we're having now to see whether it's extended indefinitely, or another fixed period, or periods, as the treaty says.

TOM CLEMENTS: Well, it's actually a good thing if there's a fixed period and you go back and review it to see what progress has been made towards actual non-proliferation and towards the nuclear weapons states getting rid of their nuclear weapons.

NARRATOR: Tom Clements is with the Greenpeace International Plutonium Campaign and a respected authority on nuclear techno-logy. Mr. Clements maintains that if the NPT is indefinitely extended, the nations without nuclear weapons will lose any leverage that they might have to persuade the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligation to ban nuclear testing and to eliminate their nuclear weapons.

MR. CLEMENTS: Now is the time to have a better treaty discussed, and that's why we don't want to see this one extended. We want to see a better Non-Proliferation Treaty come into being.

JOSEPH CIRINCIONE: It's risky at this conference to try and amend the treaty and make changes. We think in terms of improving the non-proliferation regime.

NARRATOR: Joe Cirincione is the executive director of the Campaign to Extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This coalition of 18 organizations committed to arms control wants the NPT treaty to be made permanent. In order for this to happen, Cirincione believes that the nuclear weapons states need to take a number of steps to wind down the arms race.

Mr. CIRINCIONE: The main purpose of our campaign, in addition to extending the treaty, is to convince those nuclear weapons states to make that progress, to go the extra mile to conclude a comprehensive test ban, to cut off production of nuclear weapons materials, to adopt declarations saying that they won't be the first to use nuclear weapons, and to ratify and implement the nuclear reduction treaties they've agreed to. If the nuclear weapons states do these things, then we'll have a successful conference.

NARRATOR: If the nuclear weapons states do not go that extra mile, it is uncertain that the NPT treaty will survive. If the NPT is not made a permanent treaty and is only extended for one, five, or even ten years, Joe Cirincione believes that more countries may seek "the bomb."

Mr. CIRINCIONE: If a nation believes that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is doomed, well, then it has to hedge its bets and continue its research or even enter into a nuclear weapons program itself for its own security.

Ambassador MARIN-BOSCH: But why hasn't there been a rush for weapons now as the treaty is beginning to end? That is to say, a rush between 1990 and 1995. Why hasn't there been a rush? I think the treaty has worked well and it will work well if it's ten years, or 15 years extension, or 30 years extension.

NARRATOR: More than 30 years ago, President Kennedy predicted that within a decade we could live in "a world in which 15, or 20, or 25 nations may have nuclear weapons." Fortunately, Kennedy's dark predictions have not come true. The same countries that admittedly possess nuclear weapons today had them in 1968: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Soviet Union. The former republics of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have inherited the Soviet arsenal.

Thomas Graham attributes the success of keeping the nuclear club small to the NPT treaty.

Ambassador GRAHAM: In the 1960s, it was an act of national pride, of great national achievement for a country to acquire nuclear weapons. In the 1970s and thereafter, it was something that no one wanted to do. That if a country was thinking about it, they'd want to do it undercover and not tell anyone. An international norm was established against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional states. And why did that happen? It happened because of the entry into force of the NPT in 1970. I think it has been an enormously successful treaty. The world that we live in would be far, far more dangerous if it wasn't for the existence of this treaty.

Mr. CIRINCIONE: Yugoslavia almost had a nuclear weapons program and was stopped, in large measure, because of treaties, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Think of where we would be if Yugoslavia had built a dozen nuclear weapons that were now under the control of the factions in that sad country. That would be a disaster for the world.

NARRATOR: The Non-Proliferation Treaty, however, has not been entirely successful. Israel, India and Pakistan all have nuclear weapons programs and may already possess nuclear weapons. Interestingly, none of these three countries has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Convincing them to sign is one of Thomas Graham's goals.

Ambassador GRAHAM: Moving further toward universality; that's one area that improvement can be sought. The treaty, as I said, currently has some 163 parties. There's roughly 184, 185 members of the United Nations, so we're getting close to universality, but we still have a ways to go.

NARRATOR: But just because a nation signs the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not guarantee that it will not seek nuclear weapons. Both North Korea and Iraq signed the treaty, but still sought nuclear weapons. The NPT, however, does give participating nations some enforcement authority.

Mr. CIRINCIONE: The only reason we have any hook at all over North Korea is because of the treaty. If they were not signatories to the treaty, there'd be nothing whatsoever from stopping them from continuing their program. There wouldn't be international sanctions. There wouldn't be a debate over inspections. They'd be free to go their -- whatever route they chose.

NARRATOR: Commercial nuclear power is often the back door through which nations go to get the bomb. Today, there are more than 420 electrical-generating nuclear power plants in 29 countries. Fifty-four additional countries have nuclear research reactors.

Every nation that has a nuclear reactor potentially has the raw materials -- uranium and plutonium -- to make nuclear weapons.

MR. CLEMENTS: It's which countries have the nuclear weapons capability and have the ability to make the components. That number has grown dramatically and that's really where we need to focus, is the technological capability, not the actual weapons.

NARRATOR: There is a growing momentum for a ban on the production of these nuclear, or fissile, materials.

MR. CLEMENTS: We certainly feel there should be a ban on all fissile materials. There should be no separation, no reprocessing to separate plutonium or highly enriched uranium, because these are the most dangerous materials, the central part of nuclear weapons. And if a country gets a hold of these materials and has the technological capability, they can build a nuclear weapon.

NARRATOR: The Clinton administration has proposed a cutoff of fissile material production for military uses. A ban on the production of nuclear materials for military purposes would not, however, affect electrical-generating nuclear reactors, research reactors, or the reactors that power warships and submarines.

How did so many nations get the nuclear materials which could be used to make nuclear weapons? They obtained them from the United States, Britain, France, China, and the former Soviet Union.

Why did these nations share such sensitive materials and technology? Because the Non-Proliferation Treaty requires the sharing of nuclear technology for so-called peaceful purposes, such as electrical generation.

The NPT treaty only prohibits the military use of this technology, not the technology itself.

MR. CLEMENTS: Well, there's nothing under the treaty right now that really stops a country from acquiring nuclear weapons because they can get the nuclear technology. It's blessed by the treaty, so it's really only the political will of the various countries that's stopping countries from getting nuclear weapons; it's not the actual treaty itself.

Ambassador GRAHAM: I certainly don't believe that Green-peace is correct. There are procedures to ensure that material from such facilities cannot be diverted into weapons programs. If the treaty rules are observed, these facilities can be certified as peaceful and not contributing to a weapons program.

NARRATOR: The job of verifying that nuclear energy is not used for military purposes is the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA. The IAEA was created in 1957 to facilitate the sharing of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Today, this UN-affiliated agency has two seemingly contradictory tasks. It still has its original job of promoting nuclear energy generation and arranging the transfer of nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes.

At the same time, the IAEA serves as the IRS of the nuclear weapons world. It is the policing arm of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All non-nuclear states that have signed the NPT are required to submit to a program of audits and onsite inspections, collectively referred to as "safeguards."

HANS BLIX: So, you might say it's a little like an accountant in a bank system. That the states are obliged to give us all the records of the acquisitions and the uses of the nuclear fuel for their reactors or research reactors and we verify that. We check that there are no lacuna or no inconsis-tencies; if we find any, that they are cleared up, fortunately. And then we also, as it were, go into the bank vaults. We send the inspectors there to see that nuclear material actually is there and in the places which are declared.

NARRATOR: Hans Blix has served as director-general of the IAEA since 1981.

Mr. BLIX: If we, through the information we have, we are suspecting a particular place somewhere, then we can ask for explanations. And if the explanations are unsatisfactory, then I as director-general can demand that they accept a special inspection.

NARRATOR: Mr. Blix did request a special inspection of several North Korean nuclear reactors and other buildings. Months went by before IAEA inspectors were allowed to visit selected sites. Although North Korean President Kim Il Sung has denied that his country has a nuclear weapons program, IAEA inspectors have still not been allowed to conduct special inspections of all the suspected nuclear sites.

The IAEA has a huge mandate, but only a small staff and budget. With a staff of 2000 people, including 200 inspectors, and a budget of about $180 million, the IAEA safeguards 98 percent of all nuclear activities in more than 160 nations. The IAEA needs more money and more inspectors to better fulfill its dual mandate of promoting nuclear technology, while verifying that the technology and materials are not diverted to make nuclear weapons.

Dividing the IAEA into two separate agencies would increase the agency's effectiveness and alleviate its conflict of interests, according to Tom Clements.

MR. CLEMENTS: The International Atomic Energy Agency is allowed to police the proliferation of nuclear weapons at the same time they're promoting technologies that could be applied to nuclear weapons development. There should be a policing agency, and that might be the IAEA, but there should be an energy agency of the United Nations, not just a nuclear agency. So, there need to be two different bodies here, not just one.

NARRATOR: Another option is to change the IAEA's charter, so that it can go wherever and whenever it desires in all of the NPT signatory countries, including the nuclear weapons states. The United States and the other nuclear weapons nations are not now subject to IAEA inspections. This inequity is a bone of contention to many of the non-nuclear nations.

Ambassador MARIN-BOSCH: It was seen as discriminatory in the 60s when the NPT was put into place. But we thought that since they would be moving toward nuclear disarmament, they would eventually have all of their civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards. Unfortunately, we have not achieved that, we are far from that. Therefore, it continues and it's even more discrimina-tory today than it was then. Obviously, what the international community needs is for everyone, including the nuclear weapons states, to have all of their facilities, civilian or military, under international safeguards.

NARRATOR: It's not just the verification system that is viewed as inequitable. Ambassador Marin-Bosch doesn't believe that the United States and others have lived up to their end of the NPT bargain. After all, Article VI of the treaty does require that those countries with nuclear weapons eventually get rid of them.

Ambassador MARIN-BOSCH: Non-nuclear weapons states have, more or less, lived up to their bargain of the treaty; it's the other side that has not.

Ambassador GRAHAM: With respect to nuclear disarmament, perhaps 20 years ago there might have been something to that argument. But particularly the events of the last five, or six, or seven years I think definitely established that the Article VI obligations of the nuclear weapons states have been met.

NARRATOR: During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union each spent more than $1 trillion on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. At the height of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union collectively had at their disposal more than 60,000 nuclear weapons. Today, the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union are cutting back their nuclear arsenals.

However, these plans under the START I and START II treaties will take a decade to complete and still will leave the United States and Russia collectively with about 18,000 nuclear weapons. The explosive force of this remaining arsenal is equal to roughly 200,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs, a force capable of destroying life on the planet as we know it.

Ambassador MARIN-BOSCH: START is the beginning of the implementation of Article VI, as far as the two principal nuclear weapons states are concerned. But once you've had the full imple-mentation of START I and II in the beginning of the next century, you will still have more nuclear weapons in place than you had in 1968 when the treaty was signed.

MR. CLEMENTS: The whole problem is the nuclear weapons states are demonstrating by their action of trying to protect their nuclear weapons stockpiles that this is a legitimate military way to protect your sovereignty and it's going to take exceptional leadership on the part of the nuclear weapons states to say, "no," nuclear weapons are not the way to go. But right now, they're fighting to protect their nuclear weapons, and that's got to change before this treaty's going to succeed.

Ambassador GRAHAM: We look forward to further discussions with the Russians about a START III and maybe even beyond that. And at some point, all the nuclear weapons states, undoubtedly, will want to discuss these questions.

NARRATOR: While the possibility of START III negotiations is a good sign, the NPT commits signatories to rid their national arsenals of nuclear weapons completely.

Ambassador MARIN-BOSCH: Anything short of the elimination of nuclear weapons, not tomorrow, not the next day, but down the road, any divergence, deviation from that road is going to cause great -- is going to upset many countries in the world, including many European countries, who went into the NPT having foregone their own nuclear option, thinking that the nuclear weapons states were going to eventually become nuclear-free zones.

Ambassador GRAHAM: As a long term objective, it certainly is something that our country does subscribe to, but it may be a long time before we are able to achieve that objective.

NARRATOR: The NPT also demands that nuclear explosive testing be stopped forever.

Ambassador MARIN-BOSCH: The comprehensive test ban, since the 1950s, is the symbol that the powers that be are ready to move to the reversal of the nuclear arms race.

NARRATOR: Under the leadership of President Clinton, the United States is observing a nuclear testing moratorium. The United States last tested in September 1992. Only China has tested a nuclear weapon since.

A complete ban on testing is being negotiated at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Ambassador Marin-Bosch, who chairs these talks, told members of the

Washington-based Campaign for the Non-Proliferation Treaty that there will likely be a basic agreement in place before the NPT review conference.

Ambassador MARIN-BOSCH: When you have the United States and the Russians pushing for something, it's very difficult to stop it.

NARRATOR: Achieving a comprehensive test ban is a good start, but it's not an end in itself.

Ambassador MARIN-BOSCH: It's what Prime Minister Trudeau used to call "the suffocation of the arms race," and I think that that's an important -- You're not solving all the problems, but at least you're beginning to go in the right direction. And if you stop producing nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-grade material, you're beginning to comply with the treaty. If you stop testing nuclear weapons, you begin to comply with the treaty. And if you assure others who don't have weapons that you're not going to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, you're beginning to comply with the treaty.

Mr. CIRINCIONE: They've got to lock these agreements up now. They've got to get a comprehensive test ban this year, a cutoff of fissile materials this year, in order to have a successful Non-Proliferation Treaty conference in April '95. It's doable, it's in hand, they've just got to execute it.

NARRATOR: Twenty-five years ago, the United States and other the nuclear weapons states agreed to pursue the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The reasons to turn back the clock on the nuclear arms race are more compelling now than ever. We have the opportunity to close the book on the nuclear weapons age. If we are fortunate, the final chapter may be written in April of 1995.

Admiral CARROLL: As you can see, the decision concerning the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is not a simple one. The fact is, the treaty's terribly unbalanced. The nuclear powers get all the benefits; the non-nuclear states accept all the restraints. If the big five want to extend the treaty, they're going to have to make some changes. The first one is to adopt a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and then to go on with real progress toward nuclear disarmament, as they have promised in the treaty. If the have nots can live without nuclear weapons, the nuclear states are going to have to learn to live without them also.

Until the next time, for "AMERICA'S DEFENSE MONITOR," I'm Eugene Carroll.

[End of broadcast.]