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Show Transcript Humanitarian Tasks for the Military
Produced February 13, 1994
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NARRATOR: These are United States soldiers building a road. These are United States soldiers
giving medical care. And these are United States soldiers building a school. They've all traveled to
Central America to practice what the Pentagon says are their military skills.
General GEORGE JOULWAN,
Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command (in "Total Force at Work in Southern Command"):
"The reserve component gets excellent training. He trains to his mission-essential task list and he
trains in an environment that is different than anything you can find in the United States."
Colonel CHARLES DUNLAP: Don't kid yourself in saying it's training. You can say anything is
training. But don't kid your-self in saying that you are helping the military mission by doing that.
Admiral GENE LaROCQUE: Welcome once again to "AMERICA'S DEFENSE
MONITOR."
Our military forces are famous around the world for their ability to destroy targets. They do it
with precision-guided missiles, or conventional weapons, or nuclear weapons. They're the best in
the world; no question about that. Recently though they put more emphasis on their ability to
construct things and questions have arisen as to whether construction is really the role for our
military in the future. Our program is about that subject.
General CARL MUNDY, Jr., Commandant, US Marine Corps (before Senate Armed Services
Committee, 19 May 1993):
"Our tempo of operations isn't slackening in the new world disorder. If anything, it's quickening."
General MERRILL McPEAK, Chief of Staff, US Air Force (before Defense Subcommittee of
Senate Appropriations Committee, 28 April 1993):
"There's lots of business around for the Air Force to do. We're very busy."
NARRATOR: Today's top military officials report that they're busier than ever before. The once-feared Soviet military, with its hundreds of ships, tens of thousands of tanks, and millions of
troops, which were once at the center of US military planning is now in total shambles. But the
Pentagon's top brass says United States forces are still on the go.
General RONALD FOGLEMAN, Commander-in-Chief, US Transporta- tion Command
(before Senate Armed Services Committee, 22 April 1993):
"Despite the end of the cold war, the men and women of the United States Transportation
Command and our components -- the Military Traffic Management Command, the Military Sealift
Command and the Air Mobility Command -- have continued operating at a very high tempo."
NARRATOR: And just what are US military forces doing?
In part, they're providing disaster assistance to foreign peoples in need of help. Over the past
years, airmen have been busy delivering medical supplies, food and other items to the former
Soviet Union.
In Bosnia, heroic pilots risk anti-aircraft fire to deliver food, clothing, blankets and other supplies.
In Somalia, US forces did everything from flying in urgently needed food and building bridges in
remote villages to providing dental care to Somalis on the beaches of the Indian Ocean.
In Niger, US forces delivered seeds and dispensed medical treatment.
After a devastating cyclone struck Bangladesh, US military forces ferried food, clothing and other
supplies to inaccessible victims, and provided medical help.
Over the past nine years, the Pentagon has delivered more than 10,000 tons of emergency relief
supplies to more than 100 countries.
In addition to responding to natural and manmade disasters, the Pentagon has also been busy
providing another kind of assistance to foreign countries. It's called "civic action," or sometimes
"civic assistance," or "nation assistance."
Nation assistance is when the US military, in non-emergency situations, sends soldiers to build
roads and bridges, schools and medical clinics, as well as other facilities. Sometimes soldiers give
inoculations or provide other kinds of medical or veterinary care.
Between 1988 and 1992 over 75 countries received such assistance from the US military. From
1991 to 1993, over 63,000 active duty and reservists traveled just to Latin America to conduct
civil assistance.
Pentagon officials like doing these activities because, they say, these missions provide valuable
training opportunities for US soldiers.
General JOULWAN: "The reserve component gets excellent training. He trains to his mission-essential task list and he trains in an environment that is different than anything you can find in the
United States."
NARRATOR: But how valuable is this training? According to a report presented to the US
Congress by the General Accounting Office, or GAO, the training was of dubious value.
FRANK CONAHAN: In our current work, we found that all too often the value of the training
being received by individual soldiers was questionable.
NARRATOR: Frank Conahan is the experienced director of GAO's National Security and
International Affairs Division.
Mr. CONAHAN: We ran into a medic in one of the countries that we visited and said that he
felt that he could get much better training in the emergency room of his local hospital back home
than he got from dispensing shots to the villagers in the area where we visited with him.
NARRATOR: US military officials associated with these civic action programs reject the GAO's
report.
Colonel JOHN COPE (Ret.): I am a little concerned about it. My concern is that it really
doesn't strike me as being terribly well-informed.
NARRATOR: Colonel John Cope was the deputy chief of staff at Southern Command, the
United States Headquarters for all American military forces which operate in Central and South
America. Today, he's a knowledgeable senior fellow at the National Defense University. He is
convinced that civic actions provide realistic training for US soldiers.
Colonel COPE: To physically have to leave your home station, leave everything behind that you
can't just go back if you forgot, you've got to -- it's got to be very thorough. And so, you rarely
get these kinds of training opportunities in these overseas deployments to provide that.
NARRATOR: Other observers are skeptical.
Colonel DUNLAP: Don't kid yourself in saying it's training. You can say anything is training.
But don't kid yourself in saying that you are helping the military mission by doing that.
NARRATOR: Colonel Charles Dunlap is the thoughtful author of The Origins of the American
Military Coup of 2012 and The Last American Warrior: Non-Traditional Missions and the
Decline of the US Armed Forces. Colonel Dunlap's views expressed on this program are his own
and do not necessarily represent the policies of the Defense Department.
Colonel DUNLAP: Well, the missions do provide a type of training and they do have some
training benefit. But when you look at training, you need to determine whether this is the most
efficient and effective way of accomplishing that training. Do we really need to send a unit from
Pennsylvania to South America to teach them how to pack up their equipment? I would suggest
not.
NARRATOR: Senior military officials stress the benefits military units receive working as teams
to achieve cohesion. Soldiers in videotapes produced by the military and provided to
"AMERICA'S DEFENSE MONITOR" say they benefit from the training they get during civic
actions.
From Department of Defense Video:
"The troops get really good training on these type of deployments because you use every type of
skill that you have, plus some that some that you never knew that you had, using expedient
methods to get things done."
NARRATOR: But are they getting the right kind of training? Colonel Dunlap thinks not. He
believes that effective training requires the integration of support forces, like these construc-tion
engineers, with the combat forces, the soldiers who actually do the fighting during wartime.
Colonel DUNLAP: In war and in combat, the hard task is not the medical people doing their
discreet task -- in other words, giving the shot or the engineers building the road -- the hard task
is to integrate those support functions with the actual combat unit that they're supposed to be
supporting. When these units constantly train in isolation from the combat unit that they're
supposed to be supporting, their overall effectiveness, in my mind, is undermined.
NARRATOR: In addition, the General Accounting Office found that the opportunity for soldiers
to improve their occupational skills during civic action was limited. And that some soldiers were
assigned tasks for which they had no experience at all.
Mr. CONAHAN: We talked with a sergeant who was supervising construction in one of the
countries that we visited and he said flat out, he says, "I just don't know construction techniques,"
and he inferred that he shouldn't be called upon to do it.
NARRATOR: As a result, a number of construction projects were not carried out very
successfully, according to the GAO.
Mr. CONAHAN: When you ask people do to things that they're not trained to do, they're likely
not going to do them right, and we found cases where that was the case. For example, in Panama,
a unit replaced a roof on a hospital clinic. They essentially slanted the roof in the wrong direction;
they slanted it inward rather than outward. And the person in charge of that clinic was enraged
when the person found that during the rainy season, the clinic got flooded. Rightfully so. Well, the
people just simply weren't trained to do that the right way.
NARRATOR: Colonel Cope reminded us that one of the reasons the military does civic actions
is to give US troops an opportu-nity to practice such things as construction techniques. Colonel
Cope thinks the problems the GAO found are isolated instances and that GAO evaluators did not
do a thorough investigation.
Colonel COPE: When you're taking from a very limited sample and making very broad general
conclusions about just whether or not a program is very effective, I just don't think that you can
reach the conclusion that they do from the size of the sample that they've got.
NARRATOR: Nevertheless, GAO evaluators found problems at every location they visited.
Do civic actions help developing countries economically and politically over the long term?
JOY OLSON: If a humanitarian aid program goes out and vaccinates children, it has a positive
effect in terms of the children that are vaccinated. I'm not saying that that's not a good thing to
happen; children need to be vaccinated.
NARRATOR: Joy Olson is the astute director of the Central American Working Group, a
nonprofit group which coordinates the activities of 45 organizations focussing on Central
American issues. She agrees that civic actions in Latin America may provide short term benefits,
but doubts they are beneficial in the long run.
Ms. OLSON: For long term development, what you need to see are the civilian infrastructures
developed to the point where not just this year's children get vaccinated, but next year's children,
and the year after that. You continually have children who need to be vaccinated. So, you need to
develop the civilian infrastructures that can respond on a continuing basis to the problems that
exist.
NARRATOR: US military officials say their programs are specifically designed to teach the
citizens of the host nation new skills.
General CARL STINER, Commander-in-chief, US Special Operations Command (before
Senate Armed Services Committee, 21 April 1993):
"In Cameroon in FY-91, a small reserve civil affairs team of five doctors and four nurses
conducted a medical training mission with the Cameroonian military... The skills given to the
Cameroonians enabled them to inoculate an additional 170,000, military people after the SOF
team left, and set up a system of record keeping that could be promulgated throughout that
country."
NARRATOR: Some experts think the US military ought to concentrate on its mission of
defending America from external dangers and allow civilian government agencies or private
organi-zations which are specifically assigned to provide foreign assistance to do their job.
Colonel DUNLAP: We need to let those non-military agencies of government do their job. Let
the State Department do their job. Let the Peace Corps do their job. Let the Agency for
International Development do their job. And let the military do its job of being prepared to fight
the wars should the occasion arise.
NARRATOR: Civic action supporters say there is enough work to go around and that their
activities complement other non-military development efforts.
Colonel COPE: The DoD is not trying to compete with the Agency for International
Development.
NARRATOR: Others emphasize that America's whole approach to foreign assistance should
focus on helping developing countries initiate projects they can sustain and manage themselves.
JOHN SWENSON: I think US development assistance ought to encourage smaller scale
development down at the community-based level.
NARRATOR: John Swenson is the thoughtful associate execu- tive director of Migration and
Refugee Services, a department within the US Catholic Conference.
Mr. SWENSON: Local communities getting together to define and try to meet their own needs
are given support and nurture through selective funding, but where they can establish coopera-tives, small enterprises, these sorts of things, which will assist them to take more control over
their own lives than they're currently able to do.
INTERVIEWER: And the role of the US military?
Mr. SWENSON: I don't see a role for the US military in long term development.
NARRATOR: One problem of using military forces for nation assistance, Colonel Dunlap
suggests, is that it sets a bad example by encouraging developing nations to look to their military
for promoting economic and social growth.
Colonel DUNLAP: In many of these less developed and Third World countries, the military has
been the source of oppression. And by bringing more military people in, we validate the concept
that the military is the thing that gets things done. So, once again, the people are impressed or
imprinted with the idea that the military is in charge and is the only way to get things done.
NARRATOR: Colonel Cope told us that in some countries, the military already plays a large
role in building their nation's economy. And that US civic assistance provides American military
personnel the opportunity to teach their foreign counterparts to respect human rights and the
democratic process and civilian control.
Joy Olson believes US policy ought to use civilian means to encourage the growth of private
businesses in developing countries.
Ms. OLSON: If you're talking about the long term stability of democracy and peace, you have to
have civilian institutions that have the capacity to be able to build roads, maintain roads. You need
the domestic infrastructure and something that isn't the military infrastructure. If the military is
given -- it has all of these capabilities and is the only entity within the country that does, then you
end up depending on the military to do things that I think within a democratic society should be
carried out by the civilians.
NARRATOR: A number of development experts we spoke to wondered if using the military to
provide foreign assistance was cost effective.
Mr. SWENSON: Military forces, and I think particularly the American military forces, travel
with a very long logistical tail. I question whether it's really cost effective to provide humanitarian
assistance directly using the armed forces, since it's so very expensive for the military to deploy.
NARRATOR: Others believe the costs are small, since the US must spend money on training
anyway and that the only additional costs of providing civic assistance are the incidental costs of
material, such as the wood used to build the schools and fuel consumed by road-building
equipment.
Colonel COPE: This is not something that is going to generate a lot of new units or a lot of
fancy equipment. We're using existing capabilities and low-tech items to perform these particular
missions. It's a case of, I think, good husbandship of your resources in peacetime and getting the
most out of something that is there, and there is a training benefit when you use your particular
capabilities.
NARRATOR: According to the Defense Department, the Pentagon spent about $21 million on
civic action between 1988 and 1992. Yet these figures don't tell the whole story, according to the
General Accounting Office.
Mr. CONAHAN: The two principal costs, the personnel costs associated with the troops that
actually carry out these projects are not included and the costs of deploying these troops to the
overseas locations are not included. And when you think, for example, that some 50,000 troops
were deployed just to Latin America since the 1980s, you can see that we're talking about massive
numbers of troops and you're talking about pretty high costs.
NARRATOR: The GAO's first recommendation in their report was that "the Secretary of
Defense develop a cost-effective method for providing Congress with a more reasonable estimate
of the costs incurred in providing humanitarian assistance."
Some observers are concerned that these civic action activities will be used as an excuse to keep
military forces America does not need for legitimate defense needs.
Colonel DUNLAP: I will predict to you, if it hasn't occurred already, that these non-traditional
missions will be justified, will be used to justify the existence of these support organizations.
NARRATOR: General Stiner, the commander-in-chief of Special Operation Forces, or SOF, just
this past year testified before Congress that operations and maintenance, or O and M, had to be
provided so that his troops could continue to do civic actions.
General STINER (21 April 1993, before Senate Armed Services Committee):
"If SOF are going to continue to contribute to US national security, as it should, four things are
essential. First, we need sufficient O and M funds to ensure training readiness."
NARRATOR: And that additional personnel had to added in order to keep up with all the
activity.
General STINER (at same hearing):
"SOF must have an adequate force structure. Increasing demands for SOF may require small
increases in SOF size if we're going to continue to provide the support required of us by the
administration and the regional CINCs. The most important man-power shortage currently faced
by SOF is being addressed by the formation of a second active civil affairs battalion."
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