GILL: Today, when China looks out and looks at threat possibilities, it's over water to China's east which is very different from the situation in the past which have been mostly land-based threats or problems coming from China's internal borders and the West. This means that in the future, should China decide to use force, is entering into a wholly new battle space, a wholly new environment in which it needs to effectively operate its armed forces. The questions arise ­­-- how effective can it be? What sort of experience does China have in these sorts of operations? Very little is the answer. And that, then, raises questions about how problematic is it, really, that China may use force in the future in this sort of unknown environment that it faces.

SPARROUGH: It hasn't held them back on Mischief Reef in the Spratleys. I mean, here again, it's over water.

GILL: Well, over water, no opposition and we're not talking about, you know, a major military operation of any kind such as what they did in Korea or versus Vietnam or even the skirmishes with the Soviet Union in the 1960s. So, those are small operations in comparison. The kinds of things they may face, like a Taiwan contingency, having to confront the American military presence or deal with the Japanese at some level in the future.

SPARROUGH: Overall, there are those in the United States that look at China as the new threat, that they are after world power, they want to remove the United States from Asia and diminish American hegemony. In your judgment, do you see China as a contender for world power with the United States?

GILL: I think that we make a very big mistake when we attribute to China the kinds of ideological and global domination aims which we saw in the case of the Soviet Union, for example. This is not the kind of threat that we're facing with China. I believe that for reasons of its own internal purposes as well as the realities of its military capabilities over the foreseeable several decades, our threat from China is largely going to involve its hope to extend its sphere of influence some 200, 300 miles off of its coasts to exert itself across its eastern seaboard and into the ocean in a way that protects its economic center of gravity which is its eastern seaboard, the cities there, pushes American power projection capabilities farther away so that they're not potentially threatening, not to China's core ­ center ­ economic center of gravity, regains Taiwan which is a core national security goal, keeps Japan at bay and I think, also, over time, brings Korea, the Korean peninsula into its traditional, geo-strategic sphere of influence.

So, we can definitely foresee that our forward presence in the region, our troops in Korea, our desire likely to keep Korea within a friendly sphere of our influence, our commitments to Taiwan ­ political and military ­ and, of course, our alliance relationship with Japan will begin to knock up against Chinese aspirations. This is a regional problem by and large. It does confront fundamental interests which we now have in this country about our presence in East Asia. And in that sense is a threat to the United States. But I don't see this as a global problem. It's largely going to be friction and potentially, confrontation at the regional level.

...(an)other question is, well, what ­­-- what is the Taiwan Relations Act and what commitment do we have ­ um ­ to this? So, there's a lot of nuance that isn't clear. And I think given the mission of your center, you know, this is one of the major areas in the next ten years, we may well go to war.

SPARROUGH: Yeah.

GILL:You know, American men and women may die in the Taiwan Straight. And so I think the public needs to be informed about what those commitments are.

This is an area where the language is ­ has to be very precise and to be exact.

SPARROUGH: Yeah.

GILL: Because ­ because I think there are a lot of misperceptions, but ­

SPARROUGH: Take with gr ­­-- I think, with grave concern, right and we must maintain the capacity to ­­--

GILL: Provide for the defense of Taiwan, I guess, [inaudible].

SPARROUGH: Yeah.

GILL: - critical language is.

The Taiwan Relations Act which was passed during the Carter Administration in response to the normalization of relations between the United States and China was intended to bolster our commitments ­­-- political and military ­­-- to Taiwan so that it would not enter into or be coerced into agreements with China that it didn't want to have. In that Taiwan relations act, in the event of a unilateral action by China which threatens Taiwan, the President, in consultation with Congress, would view this as a grave concern and the United States would then be obligated by our national law to provide for the defense of Taiwan. Provide for the defense of Taiwan doesn't clearly state the nature, precise nature, of what that commitment means. Does it mean intervention? Does it mean putting American lives in harms way? Does it mean resupply of our spare parts, weapons and other forms of defense to Taiwan? It's not clear and I think depends very much on the ­­-- on the context.

SPARROUGH: Good.

BERRY: I had one question. Does the ratio of troops - China outnumbers them by so much. Does that make - pay into anything? Because when I talk to a lot of people, they say, well, China, you know, outnumbers them by so much that ­

GILL: Uh huh.

BERRY: ­­-- and I think the general populace believes that that plays a role.

GILL: Sure. One reason why a strictly military solution is unlikely to ­ to be one that we want to see is because of the sheer geo-demographic enormity of China, I think, ultimately weighs in its favor over time, to bring about a solution on its terms. Just its military forces along which number some 2 1/2 million men, largest standing army in the world, itself, I think, presents a kind of quantitative superiority that China could bring to bear if it chose to on a ­ on a military solution to the problem.

Now, we shouldn't be deluded just by the numbers, though. Because, of course, it's a question of somehow getting those numbers over 90 miles of open water and delivering the kind of punch which is going to be needed to bring the military solution to Tai ­ to China's ­ to China's hoped for aim. So, while the numbers are important at the moment and probably for the next five, ten years or so, it's ­­-- China has a lot of problems in bringing those numbers quantitative superiority together in a qualitative way that can reach a military solution.

BERRY: Good.