MR. SPARROUGH: Okay. How do you perceive the national priorities of China, and in what basic order?

MR. BANDOW: I think Beijing has a couple of very important priorities that its following today.

One is economic development. It's still a relatively poor country, it wants to join the ranks of the industrialized states.

I think a second is a more nationalistic one. In a broad sense, assertion of diplomacy, of military, to become essentially a great regional power, to really overturn a century of Western domination.

SPARROUGH: How would you, in looking at Taiwan, how would you estimate their national priorities? Or is that, or is national priority the right word? Taiwanese priorities?

BANDOW: I think Taiwan clearly has priorities, and they're effectively national in the sense that, Taiwan, even if it's not officially a separate nation, clearly has a separate identity and acts separately.

I think Taiwan in some ways mirror China's, one of which is to maintain economic development, which has been incredibly successful. You know, Taiwan is one of the wealthiest countries on earth.

And the second, I think, is to basically protect its separate identity, and part of that is trying to assert itself in the international realm, as at least if not a formal separate nation, as some sort of a separate, you know, thing, a state or what have you.

In membership in UN organizations, that sort of thing.

SPARROUGH: From Taiwan's point of view, does this mean a rejection of eventual reunification with the mainland?

BANDOW: Well you know, if you look at polls, you find that the majority of Taiwanese today, actually see themselves as being separate from China.

So I think in the long term, most Taiwanese would like to actually have an independent state. Now I think that many of them might be willing to accept ultimate reunification of a democratic, capitalistic China.

But I suspect the goal, certainly the goal of President Chen, of his vice president, of many Taiwanese who voted for them, is that long term, they really have no interest in reunification with China.

And this, I think, sets the potential for a conflict with China.

SPARROUGH: Let's, let's explore that potential conflict. How, how can Beijing develop a strategy to prevent formal independence?

BANDOW: Now today, Beijing is relying primarily on threats to try to convince Taiwan not to move towards independence, mixed with some, you know, modest inducements.

The notion that, you know, we can have two different systems, that we are willing to accept, you know, some sort of differences within, you know, between a Taiwan and a China in terms of the political system, the economic system.

But there aren't an awful lot of inducements that China can offer. China's problem is that, you know, its main weapon is a stick--

Which is a threat of war, and you know, why should Taiwan want to reunify with the country that's much more backward, much poorer, you know, is much more authoritarian--

Frankly, China doesn't have an awful lot to offer Taiwan, and that's, I think, the problem between the two countries.

SPARROUGH: But it does have a stick, that you mentioned. How can it use that stick?

BANDOW: Well so far, you know, China's been attempting to use its military stick through threats; that is, talking about, you know, a declaration of independence would mean war--

You know, this is a critical issue on their part, you know, the missile tests back four years ago, the buildup of missiles and missile bases along the coast.

And I think all of those things are basically an attempt by China to waive its stick without actually using it, you know, at the moment.

You also look at the, the relatively slow, but still the buildup in Chinese military forces. I think you're seeing that in terms of forces that would be useful in a potential conflict with Taiwan.

SPARROUGH: Can you envision how that conflict would unfold? How would it begin?

BANDOW: Well it's really hard to say. It certainly looks today, you know, that a conflict between China and Taiwan would probably begin, certainly with a Taiwanese declaration of independence.

That would be the most obvious trigger. The question, though, is you have China in its white paper suggested the failure to negotiate seriously, might also be a trigger.

And in that, I suspect, would be much more triggered by domestic events in Beijing; that is, potential leadership struggle, you know, nationalistic pressures, things of that nature that might then simply declare Taiwan as, you know, basically transgressed to this other condition.

SPARROUGH: There is a strong probability that the United States would get involved under the Taiwan Relations Act. If there was an unprovoked attack by the mainland on Taiwan.

Do you envision the US policy actually carrying through on supporting Taiwan in the face of an unprovoked attack?

BANDOW: Well, the US has no formal treaty obligation with Taiwan to get involved in a military conflict, but basically the promises of this administration are pretty strong--

The promises of the Congress; I mean, if you look at the desires of the Congress, the passage in the House of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, there's obvious congressional support for tighter military ties with Taiwan.

I suspect that a president, given these kinds of pressures, given the commitments of this, the Clinton administration, would find it difficult to stay out of a conflict, and that worries me.

And I don't think the Chinese recognize the pressures an administration would find itself in, but there's a real potential here, of the Chinese not taking American threats seriously, and of American presidents, and Congresses, actually being very serious about those threats.

SPARROUGH: Would that then create a threat from China to the United States, using limited ICBM capability they have now?

BANDOW: Well the most serious concern about a potential conflict with China is that obviously, China is not Serbia; that China is a serious country, with ICBMs, with a nuclear capacity.

Now, a few years ago, a Chinese general warned Chas Freeman, a China analyst, that really, the US would not be willing to risk Los Angeles for Taipei.

There was an implicit threat there of China to go nuclear. I don?t think that a rational Beijing leadership would want to go nuclear, but unfortunately, sometimes nationalism causes otherwise rational people to do utterly irrational things.

I'm worried that, you know, the potential of mistake, you know, escalation out of anger, and you know, what have you, that we could see it go nuclear. It shouldn't, but one could imagine that they're at the very least perhaps striking at Japan, striking at American allies in the region if we use their bases.

There are a lot of potential dangers of a conflict.

SPARROUGH: Doesn't that lead to the conclusion that the United States should warn Taipei not to declare formal independence?

That it could provoke a conflict that would get out of control?

BANDOW: You know, the potential of an out of control conflict really, I think it should impress upon Washington the importance of clarity in its position.

I'm concerned about the Clinton administration's policy of kind of strategic ambiguity, where it hasn't formally promised to defend Taiwan, so I?m not sure the Chinese take its promises seriously.

But it's, you know, the implicit promise to defend Taiwan, I think encourages Taiwan potentially to be more irresponsible.

The US really should make it very clear to Taiwan that, you know, Taiwan's future depends on Taiwan, not the United States, and it shouldn?t take the United States, you know, intervention for granted.

It certainly shouldn't be out there planning on declaring independence, and expecting American support in the event of a conflict.

SPARROUGH: The Chinese have charged that US arms sales to Taipei has the effect of pushing Taipei towards independence, if they feel that they can defend themselves.

Why not declare independence? Plus, they may believe that the United States will back them. Are these arms sales, therefore, counterproductive?

BANDOW: I think the problem with arms sales to Taiwan is that if you don't sell them enough to really defend themselves, you may very well encourage them to do something irresponsible.

And I think the Chinese probably have a fair criticism in that they're concerned that to the extent you convince Taiwan it can defend itself, it may be more willing to declare independence.

My view is it would be far better for the US to say it won't get involved in a conflict, let's sell Taiwan the arms that it desires, and tell Taiwan it really is up to you.

You have to make the call. If you want to declare independence, don't expect our help, but we'll sell you arms to defend yourselves. But realize, this is a momentous decision, and you really don't want a conflict, you want to be very careful here.

SPARROUGH: Does that include US arms sales that could be classified as offensive, like the Aegis destroyers, or even missiles?

BANDOW: I'd be willing to sell the Taiwanese most anything that they wanted, telling them they need to make the call on their own defense--

But I would couple that with a very strong warning they should not expect us to get involved in a military conflict.

It's not clear to me the Aegis necessarily is cost-effective for them. It's an expensive weapon, you know, the Navy today is fairly dilapidated, there are a lot of naval vessels that probably need to, that perhaps should come before the Aegis.

Whether or not they have the personnel in the short term to handle the Aegis, all of these are, I think, important issues.

But I'd leave those pretty much up to Taiwan. But I would do a coupling. I would say you can buy what you want, but boy, don?t expect us to come into any conflict.

SPARROUGH: What would be the consequences, for Beijing, if in fact this came to an armed conflict with Taipei?

BANDOW: Part of it I think depends on the time frame in terms of consequences for China. You know, a war between China and Taiwan today, I think Taiwan would win.

Certainly Taiwan has the capability to fend off any invasion. China really doesn't have a blue water navy capability.

You know, you run into other issues, of disrupting the Taiwanese economy with missile tests, the question of attempted blockade, potentially seizing a couple of offshore islands--

And some of these things that might be hard for Taiwan to prevent, though it's not clear they would gain Beijing very much.

It would gain it a lot of international condemnation without actually achieving control over Taiwan.

Over the longer term, the concern is that China may very well be able to build up their military sufficient to overcome Taiwan.

And that's why I think that arms sales to Taiwan are important. You want to make sure that China never has the certainty they can win a war.

You always want to have that sense of uncertainty, that it would be a very dicey deal.

SPARROUGH: Let's go back to the first question. You mentioned that the national priority of economic development. No question about it.

Wouldn't a conflict with Taiwan endanger that in terms of its integration with the global economy? And direct investment?

BANDOW: Well, the Chinese attempt to use military force against Taiwan would have enormous international consequences, particularly impact on the economy, I think, in terms of trying to trade with the rest of the world, its integration of international economy--

You know, things which today appear to be important goals of the administration in Beijing. The problem is, you know, we don't know exactly how the leadership struggle is going to come out--

You know, President Jiang will soon be passing from the scene, we don't know really the relative authority of the military within the structure.

So I'm very nervous that there are probably elements within China willing to sacrifice economic development for nationalistic purposes.

And I wouldn't underestimate the nationalistic importance of Taiwan. I've even been contacted by, you know, Chinese who are particularly supportive of Beijing, Chinese who live outside of China--

Who care passionately about Taiwan, and view it as kind of a culmination of a century-long process of breaking domination by the West.

And that might cause some otherwise rational people to say, forget economic development; we'll take the risk.

SPARROUGH: Terrific. Have I not asked you an important question I should have?

BANDOW: I guess, you know, are you interested in exploring at all to the extent that China is a potential threat to the US?

That is the way some on the right are making them a demon. I mean that I?m skeptical of, so if you want to talk about that--

SPARROUGH: Yeah. You hinted at that when I mentioned the US backstopping Taiwan.

BANDOW: I'm happy to confront that directly.

SPARROUGH: Okay. Let me just ask you; in your judgment, is China an expansionist power?

BANDOW: So far, I think China, you know, looks like its assertive rather than aggressive.

And I don't think that's unreasonable; China is really moving beyond decades of, frankly, oppression by Japan and by Western countries, a whole, you know, period of the empire and the early republic, and Western concessions and what have you.

So the fact that China wants a bigger role in East Asia shouldn't be viewed as inherently threatening to the US. What the US should do is try to help channel China's development in a more peaceful direction.

We ultimately want a democratic and capitalist China, that's more likely to come if we trade with China, and it's more likely to come if we don?t treat them like an enemy.

I'm concerned about some people who want to treat them as an enemy, then we're more likely to make them into one. You know, we need to be watchful in a way, we need to, you know, watch where they go--

Recognize we can't be certain, but there's no reason to expect today they will become an enemy. There are a lot of areas where we can cooperate, economic integration into the international economy should help.

So let's treat China as a potential friend, but with some wariness on the side, some skepticism.