LOTTMAN: Let's talk about the recent flight tests—the one in October and the one just a week or so ago. I just want to put those into perspective. What have we learned from this? Where do they put us in the grand scheme of missile defense?

COLLINA: Judging on the basis of the first two intercept tests, we're very early, in a very immature program, which will not be ready for a deployment decision this summer. The first test hit its target, but it did it in a very roundabout way, that to most observers is a mystery as to whether you classify that test as really a success or not. Because although it hit its target, it only found that target with the help of a decoy balloon, that you would not expect to have there in the real world—or if you did, that balloon wouldn't be set up that way. So that test gives you no confidence that you can do this system well in a real-world test. The second test just flat-out missed, so, you know, that will be classified as a non-hit.

So basically you've got one miss and one test that's very suspicious, or at least not well-understood. And that's not a basis on which you make a deployment decision, clearly.

LOTTMAN: My personal view on this is that, the very limited system that's being talked about, eventually they'll figure it out. They'll finesse and finagle the treaties, to the extent that they have to, they'll get it to work with reasonable reliability, and most likely 3 or 4 or 5 years down the road, they will begin putting up this system. First of all, do you agree with that prognosis?

COLLINA: Well, I think it's true that eventually they'll figure out how to do hit-to-kill reliably. I think given enough time and money, the Pentagon will perfect hit-to-kill. The problem is that's not the realistic threat, is hit-to-kill on the test range. The realistic threat is countermeasures or a responsive threat, that is, let's say, North Korea, who launches not just one warhead at us, but a warhead with decoys and various things to confuse our defense. That's the kind of thing that it's not being tested against, and until you test against that, you simply won't know whether the system will work.

LOTTMAN: Is that a realistic threat? If you look at threats to the US homeland, where do ICBMs fit into that spectrum?

COLLINA: Oh. Well, they're not very likely. I would say, you know, if you compare an ICBM threat to a terrorist attack, or attack by a boat, a warhead on a boat, or in an airplane or something like that, I would say the long-range missile threat is not very high up there. It's more difficult to do for an attacking nation, it's not as reliable for an attacking nation, and we know clearly who did it.

As opposed to—let's say you put something in an airplane and fly it over the coast. We may not know who did that. But if you launch a long-range missile, let's say an ICBM, from your territory, we will know right away who launched that attack.

So there are a number of reasons to be skeptical about whether this is the threat that's the most important one. But be that as it may, it is an emerging threat, and therefore the issue has come up about what we should do about it, understandably. But to us the real question is not whether that's a threat, but whether this system, the National Missile Defense System as proposed, would be effective against that threat. And our answer is no.

LOTTMAN: Expand on that a little bit. When they put up the system they're talking about now, we'll be safer to a degree, but how much safer exactly? Or does this open the door to new dangers?

COLLINA: Well, if we put up a system that doesn't work, we're not any safer. So, that's the first place to start. And if you look at what is the realistic threat coming from a country, again, like North Korea, we have to assume that if North Korea can put up a long-range missile, and put a weapon of mass destruction on it, like a nuclear warhead, they can also do countermeasures. Balloon decoys, submunitions, things of that nature. In fact, the intelligence community here in the United States states that, indeed, any nation that can put up a missile like that can also do countermeasures. So we have to assume that's part of the threat, and therefore we have to test the system against that kind of threat. And that's not being done.

LOTTMAN: So—the system is fielded, the ground-based interceptors, and concerns start to emerge about just that—about countermeasures, about how it may not be up to the task. What steps do you foresee being taken to address that? Will they start looking at alternative approaches to the threat in general, or just add more bells and whistles to a missile defense system?

COLLINA: One concern is, once you spend $20 to $50 billion dollars putting up a system, and when people realize that it's not going to be effective, against even the most basic threats out there, the call will be to improve the system. And go to space-based interceptors, or boost-phase interceptors, or things that dramatically increase the scale of the system or really do worry Russia about their retaliatory capability—which is really the heart of this for Russia. They're worried that this is not the end of the story on our system, but just the beginning. The first phase.

LOTTMAN: The concept of deterrence seems to be important to all the nuclear powers, and it's really based on the axiom that offense will always overwhelm defense, when it comes to missile attacks.

COLLINA: Certainly in this case it's much easier for the offense than the defense. And the reason is the defense has to be fielded first. And the offense can respond to that defense, that particular defense, before it attacks. So we put up our defense, everyone knows what it's going to be. And then an attacker can sit back and say, OK, what are the sensors going to be, what is the interceptor going to be able to do? And then, plan your attack accordingly so you can do the countermeasures, things that I've been talking about, or you can simply go around the defense, or underneath it. So the defense always has a harder job.

And particularly in this case, there's a real cost disadvantage to the defense. Because we'll be spending some numerous millions of dollars on each interceptor missile, where an attacker has to put up a 25 cent balloon as a target, that we would have to shoot at. So the cost advantage there, to the offense, is astronomical.

LOTTMAN: Say we do have a limited but reliable system up there. Ius it economically feasible for a potential threat countries to keep escalating along with us. You mentioned the 25 cent balloon, but at least in theory, we could have at least that level of discrimination in the hit-to-kill system. I guess we don't exactly have that now…

COLLINA: But see, in theory, you won't. In theory, well, here's an example. Let's say you've got 50 balloons up there. These are mylar balloons, the kind of thing you might buy in a supermarket, for a birthday party. And you've got one warhead amongst those fifty balloons. These balloons are such that radar can't see through them, the infrared sensor can't discriminate which one's got the warhead and which one doesn't, you've got to shoot them all.

LOTTMAN: The missile threat as it's described—a rogue state, an unauthorized launch, or an accidental launch—is there any alternative for how to deal with that, other than fielding an interceptor system?

COLLINA: Let's hope so. Putting up a system that doesn't work is no alternative. So there better be something else to do. Yes, and we have a system.

First of all there's nuclear deterrence. I mean, this nation spends trillions of dollars maintaining a nuclear strike force. And the point of that strike force is to say to any other nation, “if you strike us, we will strike you back.” And we say that quite credibly. So that's the first answer is that deterrence can be used in that fashion.

Second is diplomacy. We're working with North Korea to stop its missile development program. We should keep doing that kind of thing. Working with Russia, through the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties to reduce their nuclear forces that would otherwise be aimed at us. These are very successful, proven programs, and we need to pursue them more vigorously.

LOTTMAN: I referred to another person I interviewed as viewing this system as an entree to more advanced weapons in space, offensive capability, potentially. You mentioned space-based lasers and interceptors, which is something they are actually working on. Is that a legitimate concern? We have these satellites, we have to keep them safe, but at the same time, there's this desire to really control access to space. What are we getting ourselves into here?

COLLINA: Well, it's a legitimate concern, that the Russians, for example, might fear that we'll move on from a ground-based defense to a space-based defense. It's not preordained, it's not unavoidable, but it's a legitimate concern.

SPARROUGH: Don't you think it's more legitimate issue for the government to be worried about someone just bringing in low-grade uranium or something here, versus launching something from further away? I think the average person is more worried about something like Oklahoma City that about being shot at by some other country.

LOTTMAN: Are we overlooking potential real-world threats?

COLLINA: In the context of National Missile Defense, the only threat the system can respond to is a long-range missile threat. So that's really the threat we're talking about here. But certainly, people can look at the system and say, given the likelihood of that threat, which isn't very likely, compared to the other ways of delivering a weapon of mass destruction to the United States, then maybe we don't need this system. If a nation that wants to do us harm can smuggle a bomb in, can do it by truck, by plane, by boat, which this system has no capability against, then is the system for us?

The reason there's so much emphasis on NMD is that that's the one thing that people think we can do. That the one threat that people think we can counter, is the missile threat. But in fact, there is no silver bullet, and that's really what we're trying to say. That the answer to these threats is difficult, and it's complicated, and it's messy, and that it's not clean, yet the proponents of missile defense would like to say, here's the silver bullet that's going to solve all of your problems. Unfortunately, it's just not true.

LOTTMAN: The Missile Defense Act passed in both houses with unbelievable majorities. In UCS' lobby visits, and I assume you're going in there to urge restraint in missile defense deployment, what sort of feedback do you get from Members of Congress? To the extent that they engage you and respond to the issues you guys bring up, how would you characterize that response?

COLLINA: Well, this is a question that's tough to answer because we haven't done a lot of that since the recent test failure. But since there have been a lot of editorials calling for delay of deployment this summer I would say previous to that, most politicians, particularly Democrats, were just fearful of this issue, and didn't want to take it on, because they thought the politics was simply against them. But I think that's changing. I think they were concerned that because of the perception that the threat was there, that anyone who opposed the system would be seen as unpatriotic and anti-defense, and no politician wants to be seen like that.

But now, that more information's coming about about the systems not working, that it's simply not ready, you can sort of take cover under the technologies being immature, as a reason to go slow. And I think that's a place where more politicians will feel safer, now, in the context of one failed test and one simply not-understood test, to say that we should not be moving too fast on this program.

LOTTMAN: Are you noticing evidence of that, that people are softening their stance…

COLLINA: Well, we've had two Republicans now come out—Senators—calling for delay. Smith of Oregon, and Hagel oif Nebraska. So in a sense you've got Republicans coming out ahead of Democrats, calling for delay. And my expectation is that some Democrats will see that as a sign that it's safe for them to say the same thing.

LOTTMAN: You may disagree, but it seems realistically that the choices right now would be either, delay, or cancel. Because if they really have to make this decision at the date that they set, it doesn't seem likely that they would decide in favor of putting up this system….

COLLINA: I don't know why you would say that. There's a presidential election going on. Al Gore is in trouble, and he needs the defense vote. Facts will not matter. It will be the height of irresponsibility to politicize a decision that really should be a technical one. And the technology says this system ain't ready to go. The technology is not ready for prime-time. But politics is a different animal.

LOTTMAN: And when it is ready to go—if hit-to-kill becomes reasonably reliable—at that point, is there really gonna be anyone that says, it's still a bad idea?

COLLINA: There's always a need for political cover, for positions that are easily spun by the opposition as irresponsible, as anti-defense, as anti-patriotic. That's just the way the political system is. But I would disagree that it's a foregone conclusion that there will be a way to prove whether the system is really effective.