LUCK: I think there's always been a pioneer spirit. I mean, people came to the United States and first to the colonies, to get away from their problems in Europe. They wanted to start a new world, they wanted to be a little bit apart, and they wanted to pick and choose on their own volition, when they would become involved, when they would not become involved. So Americans have always been a little bit resistant to government, and quite resistant to the calls of governments from other parts of the world, saying come help us in this problem, or come help us in that problem. Americans by and large seem to want to pick and choose. They want to do things because of their own volition; not because someone is saying it's a legal obligation, or it's your responsibility, or because you're part of some kind of international institution that you have to intervene. They really seem to like to pick and choose. It doesn't mean that America has a fundamental isolationist history, because I think the United States has always been involved in foreign affairs. Even back in the 19th century, which many people thought of as being basically isolationism. But again, because we were apart, with two large oceans, from the rest of the world, we really have the option that other countries didn't have, of picking and choosing about when we would get involved, and on what terms.

BAKER: And what is meant by the phrase "American Exceptionalism?"

LUCK: Well, exceptionalism seems to be very much a part of our character. We like to believe that our ideas, our norms, our beliefs, our values, are just a little special; that perhaps the rest of the world ought to be learning from us-- That we don't necessarily have to learn from them. And now I think you have that notion of American values being exceptional, have an additional layer with American power being exceptional. When you are both in terms of your military and economic and political power, unsurpassed in the world, and you think you have a set of political beliefs that have particular value for the rest of the world-- Then you're bound to think you're rather special. And I think in some ways, the US just doesn't fit into international institutions so well anymore-- Both because we think our values are special, and because we think, because of our power, everyone should listen to us all the time.

BAKER: Based on that, we're constantly hearing we're the lone remaining superpower, dominant economically, our system's the best in the world, and we believe that we seek, benignly seek to make the world better by exporting our values. With all that going for us, I mean, why should the US bother to trouble itself with global institutions?

LUCK: Well, I think what some Americans don't see is that we have power around the world in part because we have allies around the world. And in part, because we have other countries that we're cooperate in ventures that the US is interested in. We've built our economy largely, at least in recent decades, as an export economy. We're dependent on other countries to buy our goods. We have in fact been very fortunate to draw talent from around the world, to American universities and research institutions-- Much of our scientific advancement is really because we are part of the world; not because we're separate from the rest of the world. And I think we have to recognize that as an open society, we have to care that international law, international institutions, really hold sway, rather than simply the power and the might that might be important in the jungle, for example. We're really, we are a law and order society, our values thrive in an open kind of a world; therefore, we have to care about whether other countries are relatively open, and whether they're totalitarian. We have to care about whether they respect human rights or not, because if our values are based on the rights of the individual, and yet the rest of world ignores that kind of approach, has a very different kind of view, that could be very threatening. I think what is paradoxical is that now that communism is basically dead, now that we have won the Cold War, it is a chance for our ideas to triumph. In fact, they seem to be in many parts of the world, both in terms of democratic ideals, and in terms of capitalist, open economies. But at that very moment, when we should be triumphant in many ways, many Americans seem to be pulling away from the world. Just at the time when we ought to be declaring victory, and recognizing that we have to work with the others in order to maintain that kind of status-- In order to maintain those kinds of values.

BAKER: You're jumping right into my next question, which is good. Arthur Schlesinger has suggested that isolationism is America's natural state, and that only direct threats to our national security divert us from that. With the Cold War now a decade past, do you think that this helps explain the current mood?

LUCK: Well, I don't think Americans are fundamentally isolationist. I think, in terms of policy, the US tends to be more unilateralist than isolationist. We very often have more faith in our own power, and our won ability to decide when to use that power, than making joint decisions with other member states, in the UN, or even sometimes even in NATO. We really like to have our own way very often, but that doesn't mean that we're fundamentally withdrawing from the world; it just means that we want to reshape the world under our own design, and in our own time. I think one of the things that we are seeing now, that is happening, is that Americans are recognizing that there is a global economy, that they have much in common with people in other countries-- And there are all kinds of non-governmental ties that are trans-border, where people think nothing of hopping on a plane and going to other parts of the world, or when their computers, and the Internet, instantaneously corresponding with people with similar interests, all over the world. So we have these sort of trans-national phenomena going, whether it's in business or education, or in terms of our particular interests, whether it be religious or moral interests, or hobbies, or whatever, people tend to see these as global phenomena. On the other hand, that doesn't mean that that immediately translates into government to government programs. In terms, for example, of foreign aid, American official development assistance is by far the lowest of any of the developed countries. And yet, we have a lot of private channels of giving, that is voluntary giving, whether it's through churches or religious institutions, or whether it's through various kinds of humanitarian and human rights organizations. So Americans I think do recognize that they're part of the fabric of the world, and they do recognize that in many ways, the world is becoming smaller, but that doesn't mean they're necessarily comfortable with inter-governmental institutions-- Because whether or not one thinks Americans are isolationist, there's really no question that Americans are more skeptical of government than those people in most parts of the world. Because we value our individual independence, and we value that sort of pioneer spirit of going out and creating and shaping and being entrepreneurial, on our own. We don't by and large expect the government to do that for us. So, we have I think a dual attitude, well, on a private basis, on a personal basis, and on an individual basis, I think most Americans, not all, but most, really are quite comfortable with the world, and want to be part of the world. But when they start looking at inter-governmental institutions, then they become suspicious. They're a little bit suspicious of their own government, and they're quite suspicious, for example, at the UN, when you get 188 governments together. They're quite happy to go to a convention of nongovernmental organizations, that have people from all over the world, but they're a little skeptical when the governments get together-- Because somehow they might work to somehow limit individual liberties, or limit the values that we cherish in this country.

BAKER: Last year, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger raised a lot of hackles when he said there was a new isolationism afoot, particularly citing the Congress. And at the time, the rejection of the test ban treaty. Do you, do you agree with that? I mean, do you, do you think there is a, a renewed spirit of isolationism in this country?

LUCK: I think there has been a rise of a feeling of being both exceptional and of wanting to pursue unilateral options. And I think there is a rise of those people, particularly among conservatives, who are very skeptical of international institutions, and international agreements. But I don't think that constitutes isolationism. One, I don't think it's a majority of the people. Every poll shows that the majority of Americans are in fact quite internationalist. It's a minority who are fundamentally isolationist, and a fairly small minority. But I think because we don't have a direct threat from the Soviet Union, we're not engaged in a global Cold War, those who basically were internationalists for strategic reasons-- Because they felt for our international security we had to in fact be engaged with the rest of the world. Some of those people have pulled back a little bit. And I think what we see with the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and some of the other rejection of international norms and agreements right now, in part, I think, it's a conservative backlash to the fact that multilateral enterprises-- Those involve many countries, and people from many parts of the world, are in fact becoming so strong, and are multiplying. We are, in fact, in most ways, I would say we're in a multilateral era. We're in an era of internationalism. So for those who are very antagonistic towards internationalism, very suspicious of it, they are now redoubling their efforts to block treaties, block organizations, withhold dues from the UN-- Doing all kinds of things, which don't create anything, which don't do anything very positive, but it's a little like, you know, trying to stop the Titanic in a rowboat. You know, you just, they're furiously trying to stop it by, by just paddling as hard as you can, but the momentum is really with the Titanic, it's with internationalism. And so what I think we're seeing is almost a panic attack among conservatives in this country, who say, you know, stop the world, I want to get off. It's because internationalism is so strong, not because it's so weak. And that I think is paradoxical. So what we're seeing is a very noisy minority, and they're particularly influential in the US Senate, and particularly because Jesse Helms has these views and happens to be chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So I think it gives the option that somehow Americans are becoming isolationist, or that our policy is going off the rails, when in fact, it's a blocking minority that's trying to stop what they see as the inevitable flow towards a much more international system-- Where in many ways, our sovereignty has to be compromised. Whether it's on a question of environment, or trade or security, fighting terrorism, disease, you name it, all of these things cross borders. And our borders are inevitably very porous. Ideas, people, goods, capital, flow around the world at an amazing rate, and you just can't control that from any single capital. So different countries have to work together, it's just the nature of the world, and for those who are uncomfortable with this, they shout and they scream, and they block legislation, and they kill treaties-- But the handwriting is on the wall, this is a time of change, and the change is not towards isolationism; the time is towards internationalism. So I think what we're seeing now is really a blocking function. We're not seeing a sign of the future in this country.

BAKER: Do you, can you respond in particular to any of those treaties? I mean, there is the concern that American sovereignty will continually be given up. How do you feel about responding, say, to the international criminal court, something that had widespread support around the world, to stop war crimes and crimes against humanity-- The US kind of out of step with the rest of the world, blocked it, out of a concern that many felt was unjustified. Do you have a take on that?

LUCK: Well, I think that many issues on which there's a move towards international law, which the majority of Americans accept, and in fact welcome, that are being blocked, particularly in the US Senate these days. A small one, but an important one is the Rights of the Child convention. Here, only the US and Somalia have failed to ratify that convention. And Somalia, of course, has no working government. So the only real government in the world that's blocking it is the United States, despite the fact that Americans support UNICEF, the UN Children's Fund, very avidly. And despite the fact that the child rights movement is very strong in this country. And there's nothing in that convention that should be harmful at all to American values, or to American sovereignty. But somehow, a small minority in the US Senate sees this as some kind of an assault on the American family unit, and it's nothing of that sort. On a larger political basis, we have now that the blockage of the international criminal court. Here, the US is not alone; there's China, Israel, a number of other states, that do have serious reservations. And this is not really completed yet, it's still in processes. But at their own convention back in the summer of 1998, the US was certainly the, taking the lead in trying to slow down the process. And I think the idea of an international criminal court that would make national leaders responsible for crimes of genocide, for some of the massive violations of human rights that we see going on in different parts of the world, is very much needed. I think most Americans recognize this. I do get a little bit worried, though, if the legal process internationally moves much quicker than the process here at home domestically, that in fact there would be a dangerous gap there-- And that again and again, the US is not able to be a party to a treaty which in fact, in many cases, the US helps to negotiate, because there's going to be a blockage in the Senate. And I would urge many of the nongovernmental organizations, and many of the people concerned with the values represented by an international criminal court, or some of these other conventions, to work as hard in the US Senate as they do in going to international conventions and pushing international norms. Because I think our problem now is not so much that we have insufficient numbers or quality of norms; but we have insufficient implementation. And if you don't have the US solidly behind these, if the US Senate has not ratified many of these conventions, then the US is not able to take part in them. And that inevitably weakens the implementation and divides the international community. And the US is simply too important to be left on the sidelines. So I urge groups to work as hard in Washington as they would for example, in Rome, on the international criminal court.

BAKER: I want to look at the UN here. The US helped found the United Nations, but to listen to the current debate, the UN is an incompetent, bureaucratic waste of money, that works against our interests, infringes on our sovereignty. But to put it, as I think you did in your book, what happened to turn US-UN relations on their head?

LUCK: Well, the US has had a long history of ambivalence towards international institutions, starting with the League of Nations in 1919, 1920, when it was not accepted by the US Senate, even though it had been a project, a pet passion, in fact, of President Woodrow Wilson. And then that turned around with the World War II, and people said my God, if we had a League of Nations, maybe we could have prevented this war. So there's an upsurge of public and political support for creating a new and stronger international institution. So when the UN was created in 1945, it was on a wave of popularity in the United States. But I think many people thought that the organization would consistently reflect American policy preferences, as well as American values. And of course, when you got many developing countries in the UN, when you had to contend with a Soviet veto during the years of the Cold War, then when you had Communist China enter the UN-- Clearly, there were a lot of states who saw things differently than the US, and therefore, we didn't always get our way. And what we really ran into problems, really in a serious way, I think, in recent years, when you, again, as we had in Woodrow Wilson's day, when you had a Democrat in the White House, and a Republican majority in the Congress. And where we had Jesse Helms saying no to the UN in recent years, in the early years, we had Henry Cabot Lodge. And it was almost like an American domestic political play, that was somehow being carried out on a world stage. So Congress started withholding more and more money, for the UN, and we built very large arrearages. And I think one of the reasons it fell apart in an international sense, was that with the end of the Cold War, I think some Americans, maybe even subconsciously, felt less of a stake in the maintenance of the UN. Because they felt a little less worried about our own security, and were not so clear that the UN work in peacekeeping, and conflict resolution around the world, was serving American national interests. And we certainly ran into problems in Mogadishu, back in 1993, when the American Rangers were killed there. Even though they were under a US command, not a UN command, people immediately blamed the UN for this. And even President Clinton blamed the UN, even though he was in command of the forces. So the UN became something of a scapegoat. And I think what the problem has been throughout this time, was that the UN symbolized to many people in this country, the possibilities of a world government. To those who really wanted a world government, the UN and before that, the League, were very pale shadows. They're simply a collection of governments, trying to work cooperatively on a few issues when they could. It had no power, really, to control member states, or to tell them what to do. So that people who really wanted a world government were disappointed. On the other side, those who were skeptical of government to begin with, and very much feared a distant and inaccessible world government, felt that the UN was just like the camel's nose under the tent-- That pretty soon, step by step, we were going to have a world government out of this little UN. So they opposed it, I think, largely for symbolic reasons. For what it might become, rather than what it was. And on top of that, very few Americans know, really hardly anything about the UN, or how it works. And what they hear tends to be an odd mixtures of one one hand, sort of an idealistic idea of international peace and cooperation, and on the other end, sort of somehow a black threat to American sovereignty and American way of life. And of course, the UN is neither one; it's an organization that struggles to find 188 member states to work together.

BAKER: I'm going to interrupt here, and just let you go back and, that last, and do the last thing you did again. Seeing how the two different sides see it, I just don't want to use the phrase "a black threat."

LUCK: Yeah, that's fair enough, yeah.

BAKER: But go through how the two different sides see it, as a threat. Take it again.

LUCK: Well one of the real problems with the UN is that Americans tend to see it in symbolic terms. On the one hand, those who really would like a stronger set of international institutions, and maybe one day a world government, complain that the organization is too weak-- That it can't tell member states what to do. On the other hand, Americans are very skeptical of government, and particularly fear the idea of a world government, see in the UN a symbol of something that someday could begin to tell member states what to do. That's something that they fear. So on the one hand, one group of Americans are disappointed the UN hasn't grown into the kind of institution that they'd like to see, really strong and effective-- And the other group of Americans are worried precisely that the UN might become strong and effective. So the organization is really caught in between the two. And very few Americans really know what the organization does, and it's not very good at advertising itself, and largely they hear what American officials say about it, which is often to blame the organization for our own mistakes. So what they really are seeing is something of a caricature of what the UN really is. And so we have a debate about symbols. We have an argument between the extreme right and the extreme left, and most Americans are left in the middle, completely befuddled, and not really knowing what the facts of the case are.

BAKER: What responsibility does the Clinton administration take for the state of the US-UN relationship?

LUCK: Well, I think you have to hold every president accountable in terms of US foreign policy. The president can't always blame the Congress for all of the ills of the world, and for problems that he's having getting American foreign policy implemented. And so while I would first place the blame on a very recalcitrant and Republican-led Congress, at the same time, I think President Clinton at the early days, along with at that point Madeleine Albright at the UN, spoke about assertive multilateralism-- Talked about the UN having standby forces, and putting down brushfire wars in one part of the world or another. They talked as if multilateralism and the UN was going to be a centerpiece of the Clinton administration foreign policy. And then when push came to shove, and some things didn't go well, as in Mogadishu, then the administration ran from support of the UN. And early on, I believe it was in late 1994, the president signed a bill which would unilaterally reduce American assessments for peacekeeping. And that, of course, is something that has to be negotiated among all the member states. Each member state can't decide on its own what it's going to pay. And this was a bill that the president complained about, but he did sign it; he didn't bother to veto it. And that was a bad sign, and I think people and Congress recognized that the administration was not going to stand up for the principles that it had enunciated at the beginning of its first term. And so I would fault the administration for raising expectations, somewhat falsely, and then not sticking to it, not backing the organization. Because there's always going to be a recalcitrant group in Congress. There are always going to be some who look inward, who tend to be isolationist in Congress. And it's always required presidential leadership to overcome that, and remind people that we have international commitments, we have international responsibilities-- And most importantly, we have international interests. What happens in the rest of the world does matter for America. But it's the president who has to see that; it's the president who has to conduct foreign policy, and he has to convince both the American public and the US Congress to support him in this kind of initiative.

BAKER: Do you have a prescription for getting us out of the current impasse? I mean, very generally, how do we get beyond this point where we've got the US with the arrearage-- I know there's legislation to pay the past dues, it's not clear whether the member countries are going to accept that and everything's going to be tidy or not. How do we get back on track, to an improved relationship with the UN that's to everyone's benefit?

LUCK: Well, to repair the damage that's been done with the UN is going to take time, and it's not going to be easy. It's not just a question of paying American arrears, although that's very important-- But it's really a question of what is the US role in the organization. And I think we have to ask ourselves what kind of a UN do we want? What do we want to get out of the organization, what are we willing to put into the organization? Because if it's only going to be a place where occasionally we see it as an option in foreign policy, where occasionally we see the necessity of trying to get other countries on board-- But we want the organization to stay away from any problems that we're involved in, where we want to keep the organization on a very short political and financial leash, where we are going to look for a smaller and smaller assessment for the US, so we pay less-- That's not going to be a very promising future for the organization. On the other hand, I think the other member states, the other 187 in the UN, have to come to grips with what kind of a US do they want? Are they going to be willing to have the kind of unsurpassed power that the US has outside of the organization, also reflected inside of the organization. So I would call for a new domestic compact, where there's a dialogue between conservatives and liberals, between Republicans and Democrat, between the administration and Congress, about how we want to handle this institution, and what we're willing to put into it. And on the other hand, I would urge the other member states to start building a new international compact, a new set of relationships, which take into account the fact that the US in indeed not just like every other country. The US is more powerful, and the US has enormous value, not only in terms of money and manpower and soldiers to bring to the organization, but in terms of ideas. The UN was in many ways, a US creation, and now the question is how to renew that kind of spirit, both in the US in terms of our, the way we look at the rest of the world, and in terms of other countries, how they look at the US. Can we work out a new set of relationships. If we can on both sides, then I think there could be a promising future. Otherwise, I think we're going to see a lot of organizations popping up here, there and everywhere, that are not related to the UN. And the UN is going to be in decline, even though multilateral institutions as a whole may be in the ascendancy.

BAKER: This is my last question. Last month there was a somewhat extraordinary spectacle, of Senator Helms himself, one of the UN's most severe critics, speaking at the Security Council-- With ambassadors responding to him rather pointedly. What did you make of his appearance there, and do you think it represents a turning point?

LUCK: I was very pleased to see that Senator Helms and five other senators were willing to come up to New York, spend a couple of days, enter a real dialogue with other delegates from other countries-- And to engage the UN more directly. It's easy to throw pot shots at the UN from a distance, but to get more of a personal relationship, to explain to other member countries what his concerns were, Senator Helms, and the other members of the committee, I think was very healthy. Many of us for years have urged senators to come up, and I think one has to give Ambassador Holbrooke a lot of credit for helping to engage them and actually move them up to the UN. And then they held a hearing in New York, the first time, apparently, that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held a formal hearing outside of Washington. That, too, I think was a good sign. Certainly in the short run, the music is more pleasant, there's less insults going back and forth, Senator Helms is seen with a UN cap on his head, he had his whole family photographed with the secretary general-- But on the other hand, it's not so clear that in the long term, this is going to last. Nothing fundamentally has changed at the UN, and nothing fundamentally has changed in Washington. At least there's more of a dialogue and more openness, but there are fundamental questions that have to be dealt with, and so far have not been. And there's a very dangerous precedent, because this time maybe the US got away with these massive withholdings, and maybe they forced some changes in the organization, although I would argue rather small changes. But that may be a precedent for other countries. The last two years, the Japanese diet has raised the question of withholding Japanese money to the UN. And now, the Japanese contribution in regular terms, in terms of the regular budget to the UN, is almost as large as the US. That if they don't get their seat on the Security Council that they want, maybe they won't pay their dues. And many other countries may take the same kind of attitude. We also may have future Congresses, maybe Senator Helms is happy for the moment, but maybe two years down the road, he won't be. Maybe someone else will head the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a few years, and maybe he or she will want to have other withholdings for other reasons. So I think we might have started on a very slippery slope here, where other countries start withholding funds, where other Congresses in the future start withholding funds for other reasons-- And in fact, the whole idea of a responsible, predictable income for the UN is going to disappear.

BAKER: Other people I've talked to besides yourself and Steve, is Lee Hamilton at the Wilson Centre, and Bob Keegan down here at the Carnegie Endowment, (inaudible) counterpoint. It should be an interesting, it's not really a dialogue, it's just, you know, since you're not talking with them, but different perspectives. Our program is narration and pictures, and then we use experts to come in and kind of round it out and give perspective, and take away the onus of saying some of the things from us, to have them say it. And (inaudible) seem to do that every day.