KAGAN: There has been a significant element, especially among Republicans in Congress, that have turned away from internationalism, don't think we should be involved in many hot spots around the world, and they have played a substantial role in Congress.

On the question of CTBT, however, which was the specific question that Berger was responding to, I think he's wrong to think that the CTBT defeat was due to the forces of isolationism. There were many, many Republican senators who voted against that treaty, who are not in any way isolationists. You have people like Chuck Hagel, John McCain, George W. Bush, opposed it, all these people are confirmed internationalists. They thought, and they believed, that the CTBT was not in the best interests of the United States, and there's a difference. And I think that was really a political ploy more than anything else on Berger's part, to try to label everyone who had been involved in defeating CTBT as isolationists. And Berger retracted it pretty quickly. I mean, the administration backed away from that simplistic calculation, almost immediately.

BAKER: You took care of one of my other questions. My next question, so I'll skip over it, was about the, well, let me follow up on it. I mean it was specifically about the rejection of the test ban treaty. What do you make of the treaty's rejection?

KAGAN: Well, I thought that those who rejected it, the vast majority of those in the Senate who rejected it, did so—

BAKER: Let me interrupt again, you can say "test ban treaty", or something, rather than "it."

KAGAN: Oh, okay, right. Those who voted against the test ban treaty in the Senate, the vast majority of Republicans who did so, their motivation was concern for the well-being of the US nuclear arsenal. Their concern was that the treaty would not in fact bind other nations, and particularly rogue nations, that they would not abide by the treaty. And that this was just treaties for its own sake. They thought that ultimately it was a strategic error, not that they were opposed to the idea of a treaty, they were opposed to this treaty.

BAKER: What about, the US has also opposed several other significant multilateral treaties, from land mines to the establishment of an international criminal court, to deal with war crimes. Does US refusal to join these treaties, that enjoy widespread international support, reflect a growing isolationism?

KAGAN: Well, I think it's fair to say that part of the opposition in Congress, particularly in the Republican Party, particularly among conservatives, to all these different treaties and agreements, is neo-isolationist, in the sense that they just don't like the idea of international agreements. But I don't think that those forces alone could defeat these agreements, or could prevent the United States from engaging in them.

What, what has kept the United States from engaging in them ultimately is a much broader consensus that these particular treaties are not good for the United States, and I think it has something to do with people's perception of the unique role that the United States has to play in the world. It's fine for any number of 120 or 140 countries to sign up to treaties that a) mostly don't apply to them, and b) which they themselves do not play the role that the United States plays in the world.

The United States has a unique role in maintaining international stability, partly, and in fact heavily, by its military strength. And so fears about whether American soldiers could be indicted for war crimes in the international criminal court, fears that a land mine convention might limit American capabilities to defend against an attack, say, on the Korean Peninsula. I think these played the critical part in the defeat of those agreements, or the refusal of the United States to engage in them.

And I think in some respects, the Clinton administration itself is to blame. The CTBT, for instance, the test ban treaty, was not the best treaty that could have been negotiated, and I think if you talk to members of the Clinton administration off the record, they'll even admit that they didn't get the best possible treaty.

And in the case of land mines, well, you know, that was, that was very much a product of NGOs, a product of private organizations that had rallied the international community. It was not something that even the Clinton administration itself had been a spark for. And so it's not that surprising to me that ultimately, the US government would wind up opposing it.

BAKER: Moving on to the UN, Senator Helms recently spoke at the United Nations, and laid down a rather harsh appraisal of its performance. And even the possibility of US withdrawal, if there wasn't a turnaround. Is the United Nations a lost cause?

KAGAN: Well that's a pretty broad question, but I'll, let me address the narrower question of Helms' statement. I think Senator Helms is wrong if he believes that the United States is ever going to withdraw from the UN. I do not think that reflects the majority opinion of Americans. I can't imagine the Senate or the Congress voting to withdraw from the UN; that's a non-starter.

The UN is such a symbol in the eyes of many Americans, even today, of efforts to improve the international situation. Americans still remember that the UN itself is a creation very much of the United States— That the declarations and charters of the UN were written virtually by the United States. And so there isn't that kind of broad hostility to the UN that Senator Helms seemed to suggest in that comment.

On the other hand, even though he went to the UN and made strong statements attacking the UN, I think a lot of people thought that that visit to New York, and that meeting, was constructive. I think Richard Holbrooke, the UN Ambassador, believes that just having Jesse Helms come to the UN was a victory, in a way. If Jesse Helms can come and address the UN, then what American politician can't, then what Republican can say we shouldn't even be talking to the UN. And the truth is, in his own way, and I think that Secretary of State Albright has recognized this, and I think that Richard Holbrooke has recognized this— In his own way, Helms has actually played something of a constructive role. I mean, he holds down the far right scale of the political spectrum in the United States, and his position has not been simply let's just get out of the UN, let's never pay our dues— He's actually tried to find some way to reach a compromise between the views of many Americans and where the UN is right now.

BAKER: In today's media-saturated environment, US policymakers are increasingly reluctant to use US force, because of the risk of casualties, and the backlash against it. If the US doesn't want to be global cop, doesn't it need a stronger, well-funded UN?

KAGAN: Well, I have to reject one of your premises. The notion that the United States has been unwilling to use force, in the post Cold War period, seems to be belied by what have been six, seven or eight significant interventions around the world, since the end of the Cold War. Bush went into Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Clinton went into Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti. If anything, the United States has been intervening more frequently in the post Cold War world than it did during the Cold War.

On the other hand, you're absolutely right that there is this tremendous reluctance to suffer casualties. I think the fear of the Clinton administration of a public backlash against casualties has been misplaced. I don't accept the notion that Americans are unwilling to accept casualties, I think they are willing to accept casualties, if they understand what the purpose is, and that purpose does not have to be strictly security— I think they're willing to accept casualties, even on so-called humanitarian missions.

So I think that's, that's a mistake, to think that we just, the United States is not in that game anymore. Now, there is reluctance to be a global cop, there's a lot of debate over each intervention, and so the question does arise, should the United Nations have its own force. I guess I'm undecided about that. I'm very skeptical that it'll ever happen. I think at the end of the day, it really is going to be up to the great powers, particularly the United States, to carry the bulk of these interventions.

I can't see a UN force, if it ever came into being, doing more than mopping up, and sort of getting a handoff, after a significant intervention by a great power. I don't think it's realistic to think that the UN, that an armed force of the UN can ever replace the United States and the other great powers.

BAKER: You mean, so the Kosovo model as being a model, what happened in Kosovo, or what's happening, as a model for the future, you think?

KAGAN: Well, it may not be a good model, because, you know, in my own view, I think that the United States in recent years has been too quick to hand off the problem once it's engaged in the initial intervention. I think the United States was too quick to get out of Haiti, it's been too quick to try to withdraw its forces in Kosovo, and even recently, the commander of NATO forces has been talking about putting more troops in Kosovo.

So I don't know when your show's coming out, but anyway, you know, our big mistake has been to try to hand things off too quickly. And I suppose that if there were a UN force, that really was robust and knew its business, that that might do a better job of keeping the peace in a place like Kosovo, after the United States and NATO has withdrawn, than is currently the case. Certainly what we see now is a very ineffectual UN effort, both on the military side and on the civilian side.

BAKER: I think Richard Holbrooke has cited Kosovo, and a few other places, as kind of a last make-or-break opportunity for the UN, to show what it can or can't do. And he's looked forward at East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Congo, which represents a scale of conflict and land mass and people that dwarf all those others. Do you see the United States as willing to pick up the slack in any of those situations that may not appear to have national security interests written on them?

KAGAN: Well, you know, you can never tell what the United States is going to do, frankly. No one would have guessed that we would have gone into Somalia when we did, that there were no strategic interests at stake there, nor were any, there was no claim that there were strategic interests at stake there.

At least one of the Republican presidential candidates has spoken of, seems to agree with President Clinton that we should have gone into Rwanda to prevent the genocide there. If you talk about Sierra Leone now, I don't think the United States is likely to get involved in Sierra Leone, but I wouldn't rule it out, because the more people learn about what's going on there, there can be pressure building. We're not going to see it in an election year. I don't foresee any major US interventions in places like that before November, but I wouldn't rule it out in the first year of the next presidency.

BAKER: Congress has demanded reform at the UN, and, including a reduction in the US dues, or the percentage of dues as a condition for paying back almost a billion dollars in back dues. Do you think that's an appropriate stand to take?

KAGAN: Well, I don't think even Secretary General Koffi Annan would deny that reform is necessary, and he has agreed that reform is necessary, and I think it's fair to say that if the US were not to some extent holding its contributions, holding them hostage to reform, that you wouldn't be getting any kind of reform. I know that our UN ambassador, Richard Holbrooke himself is committed to trying to push through these reforms, and I think it's just the fact that the US can use its own resources as leverage in trying to do that.

BAKER: Do you think other countries should also have the right to withhold dues until the UN meets its specific demands for reform?

KAGAN: Well obviously they have the right to do that. I mean, there's no, I don't see where they don't have a right to do that. I don't know how much it would matter— The US really is the big fish at the UN, and I think our leverage is probably more significant than any other country's leverage. We do make a substantial contribution to the UN, and a lot of that money is wasted on bureaucracy. And I don't think, if this were a domestic program, there would be pressure for reform. I don't see why it should necessarily be any different at the UN. At the end of the day, though, I do think the United States should pay its dues and it should maintain its commitment to the UN, because I think ultimately it's in our interest to do so. But in the meantime, I don't see why the United States can't try to press for reform.

BAKER: What reform, maybe I'm getting far afield, I know, but what reforms—

KAGAN: You're also getting far into the area that I am less and less knowledgeable about.

BAKER: Okay, my next question is are there specific reforms that you would recommend for the UN?

KAGAN: Yeah, you just sailed right off my place.

BAKER: Okay, we'll skip over it. Getting back to Berger, one of his, he cited a number of indicators of this so-called new isolationism. And again, I'll quote him here. The notion that burden-sharing is a one-way street. He says "Proponents of the new isolationism will not pay America's part of the cost of UN peacekeeping missions, or even uphold peace agreements we helped forge." "Congress has cut our request for peacekeeping by more than half; this is dangerous. If we don't support the institutions and arrangements through which other countries share the responsibilities of leadership, we will bear them alone." That's a long-winded set-up, but how do you respond to that statement by him?

KAGAN: Well, I think on that point he's right. I think that Congress has been niggardly in, in expending funds, not just on UN peacekeeping—oh, you can't use that word anymore.

BAKER: You know, it's a perfectly good word, but there's a whole debate about it.

KAGAN: (inaudible) in the English language, but (inaudible). I've got a better word. I think Berger's absolutely right. I think that Congress has been very parsimonious when it comes to spending American dollars, not just on UN peacekeeping, but on foreign aid, and on the military, on the US defense budget. And that's a big mistake, and I do think it's a reflection of a neo-isolationist sentiment in the United States.

BAKER: So you think that military spending, the levels of military spending are an indicator of neo-isolationism? Because they're not high enough?

KAGAN: Well, yeah, I mean, I think that even though the Republican Congress frequently talks about wanting to spend more in defense, I think that's a good debating point when it comes to running against Democrats, and the Clinton administration in particular. In fact, they have not really fought for increases in the defense budget. In fact, some of their budgets are lower than Clinton's budget, and the reason is, I think, that at the end of the day, they, so many of them don't think it matters very much anymore— So many of them do not want the United States to be intervening abroad, and don't want to spend the money to be able to afford that. And so it's hardly surprising that they're also short-changing the US contribution to UN peacekeeping, because they're just fundamentally opposed to all these kinds of interventions.

BAKER: Another of Berger's tenets is "We can't be a great country without a great adversary." And for the role of New Enemy Number One, they've nominated China. Do you think the United States is prone, as he says, to seeking out new enemies. And in this case, is China truly being nominated as our next enemy?

KAGAN: No, this is really where Berger sort of flies off the tracks, as far as I'm concerned. He wants to paint those people who are concerned about the rising threat of China as isolationists, and he wants to suggest that somehow, the old Cold Warriors are in search of a new Cold War. But that is, that's not true.

There are people who are concerned about the role that the United States plays in the world, the importance of the United States remaining the dominant power in East Asia, as well as in Europe and the Middle East— But in East Asia, China has a clear goal of becoming the dominant power itself and removing the United States. And I think that it's foolhardy and incorrect to suggest the people who are concerned about a rising China are somehow isolationists or irrationally looking for an enemy.

Berger here is just trying to defend his own policy of trading with China, no matter what they do, of trying to declare China a strategic partner. It was really a defensive statement on his part, I thought.

BAKER: You may have responded to this one, but let me just run it by you anyway. I know you've responded to it, but Congress has cut funding for foreign assistance and diplomacy as well, and also demoted three agencies that were instruments of foreign policy, ACTA, AID and USIA, into subdivisions at State. Were these prudent moves, or signs of America turning away from the world?

KAGAN: Well, in the case of funding American foreign assistance, and American diplomacy overseas, it is a mistake, and it is a sign that many Members of Congress, particularly in the Republican Party, do want to withdraw the United States and lower its role in the world.

When it comes to the reorganization of those various bureaucracies, USIA, AID and ACTA, I'm not so sure that was a mistake. I don't quite know whether USIA ought to have the role in the post Cold War period that it had in the Cold War period— And myself, I'm not so sure the USIA played in the Cold War period. I worked at USIA, and have some understanding of what contribution it made, which is not negligible, but I don't think the reorganization is that damaging. And ACTA, I don't think is any great loss. AID is another problem, and no one knows how to fix AID, and I don't know that this reorganization is going to fix it, either.

BAKER: Moving along, critics charge that nothing better reflects a growing attitude of fortress America than the push to develop a national missile defense, formerly known as Star Wars. Do you agree with that assessment?

KAGAN: Well, the funny thing is, I think a lot of the people who support a national missile defense think that what it will accomplish is to build a fortress America, where we don't have to worry about what's going on in Iraq, and Iran, and North Korea because we'll have the shield— We won't have to intervene as much abroad because we'll have the shield. It'll give us safety and we can just go back to within our borders. I think that's wrong, in fact.

My view is that for the United States to maintain the world role that it has played over the past 50 years, it must have a national missile defense. Our entire strategy—a national missile defense and a theater missile defense. I mean, our entire grand strategy, if you will, rests on the ability to project force overseas— Rests on our ability to deter and punish aggressors in various regions of the world. Those aggressors, those regimes in coming years are going to be armed with weapons of mass destruction, and the missiles to deliver them. If we are vulnerable to those missiles, our willingness to play the role that we've played over the past 50 years, our willingness to go, to send forces overseas, to fight Saddam Hussein, to defend South Korea, is going to be reduced. Any American president is going to have to think twice before doing so.

So therefore, I think that a missile defense is actually central to a US global role, and if we do not have a missile defense, we will in fact head in a more isolationist direction. And this is where I think people in the Clinton administration and the sort of liberal view of missile defense is wrong. Liberal internationalists don't seem to understand that we are not going to be an internationalist nation if we don't have some kind of protection against missiles.

KAGAN: When Franklin Roosevelt created the United Nations, he had the veto in the Security Council, and that essentially solved that problem. You're always going to have to balance the American people's strong sense of sovereignty and national self-determination, against their equally strong desire to do well in the world, to be a force for good in the world. Both of those things exist, and it's very important that you find the balance between them.

And I think when you look at things like the international criminal court, the land mines treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, I think the Clinton administration failed on just about every one of those counts. They didn't do a good job, especially on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, of bringing Congress in early, of working with the Senate early in the negotiation of the process. They didn't do any effort to sell the American people on the importance of the treaty until after it was defeated. The big speeches about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by President Clinton and by Sandy Berger came after the defeat, not before the defeat. And so I think maybe they had to relearn the lessons of the Versailles Treaty after all.

BAKER: Is there anything else you'd like to add? That's good, I like the last thing you added there.