ADMIRAL CHANDLER: When I started out on the trip, I really wasn't sure what to expect. I had not obviously had an opportunity to visit Cuba before, so this was going to be something entirely new to me. It's not a repeat visit, or a return visit.

My impressions, therefore, were decidedly favorable. Favorable in the sense that the apparent well being of many of the people whom I saw on the streets, walking in the streets. The availability of entrepreneurial restaurants, or paradores.

I was surprised by much of the infrastructure that is being improved, such as the hotels, and they weren't just superficial improvements. They seemed to me to be well-planned and well-executed. Restorations of old buildings, and what have you, obviously much of the misfortune and misery of the people, which I had expected to see, was indeed there.

So my expectations in that regard were fulfilled, but unexpected was the overall wellbeing of many of the people, and additionally, I would say I was impressed by what I would describe as high morale among people that I encountered informally. I don't mean our hosts, so much as service personnel in hotels and restaurants, or even vendors in the streets buying postcards, and that sort of thing. And another impression I came away with was truly surprising to me, the friendliness of the Cuban people toward an American, toward a North American. Once they knew we were from the States, rather than being any sort of antipathy, or grinding an ax about the blockade, or anything, it was instead an obviously sincere and visceral positive reaction about the States.

BAKER: You mentioned dealing with people in the service economy there, where dollars are changing hands left and right. Do you see an impact from the influx of U.S. dollars on Cuban society, and do you see this causing problems for a socialist society that has the notion of equality established there?

ADM. CHANDLER: It's hard for me to assess the economic impact of the influx of U.S. dollars on the Cuban economy, a) because I'm not an economist, and b) because I'm a first time visitor to Cuba in the post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, having said that, it doesn't seem to me to be unprecedented for a communist country, or a reformed communist country, to be adopting untraditional concepts in the marketplace.

So yes, I think it's alien to strict communist doctrine, but on the other hand, I'm not surprised to see that under the terrible circumstances that the Cuban economy is undergoing, with the loss of Soviet support, it's not surprising for me to see that they're exercising some innovative procedures in order to bring in hard currency, and what have you. I wasn't surprised by that.

BAKER: The next one I had was about the changes in the Cuban military. I'm not sure if that was one you wanted to address, how the Cuban military has changed. That's not your bailiwick.

ADM. CHANDLER: It's the first time I've seen them, so-

BAKER: Do you think Cuba in any way poses a security threat to the United States?

ADM. CHANDLER: It has been my, it was my understanding before I ever left on the trip, from having had briefings, and having read unclassified reports and literature on the Cuban military, it was my understanding before I went on the trip, that I was going to see a military that in no way presents a strategic or operational threat to the United States or to the U.S. armed forces.

No, I don't think the Cuban military presents a real substantive military threat to the United States. I think there's always the potential for, there's always some risk of the Cuban military acting in a way antithetical to our U.S. security interests, and more in a passive sense. In other words, perhaps the Cuban military's failure to get involved with narco-trafficking, or the Cuban military's failure to stem illegal immigration. In that sense, obviously, the Cuban military presents a potential risk to our interests. But in a strictly military sense, I don't think they're a realistic threat. I think they're, I got the distinct impression that the Cuban military considers its mission as purely defensive.

BAKER: I had a few questions in the middle, specifically on the economic role played by the Cuban military. Would you rather I not get into that?

ADM. CHANDLER: Well, try one.

BAKER: Generally what were your thoughts on the military playing an economic role in running enterprises, running tourism businesses, that kind of thing?

ADM. CHANDLER: I was not surprised to learn that the Cuban military has become involved in non-military, economic activity. I've seen other countries in the region, countries in South America, where the military is either directly or indirectly involved in fisheries, and mining, and that sort of thing. Or even where countries where the military budget is directly fed by the profits of industry. So when a relationship between industries and the military, I don't think is unprecedented. And in the case of the nature of the relationship that we saw in Cuba on this trip, I think made sense to me.

When one looks at our own U.S. businesses and industries, I think there's a widespread recognition of the value that retired military officers bring to private enterprise, or to private industry. And that value is largely in terms of principles that, as active duty military officers, govern the way we plan and execute military operations. But those principles, principles such as the unity of effort, and the principle of the objective; keeping your eye on the target. And principles of leadership, caring for the people underneath you, and respect going down and up the chain of command. Those sorts of fundamental principles that a successful military officer obviously masters and lives by, I think are directly applicable to private industry. So to me it makes sense that the Cuban military would be tapped in this manner.

BAKER: Do you see any irony in the military of a communist country employing these capitalist style business management practices? And with one of its primary missions today being the transference of these Western-style management techniques to the civilian sector?

ADM. CHANDLER: No, I don't see any irony in the application of these techniques and principles to private industry. I think that the U.S. Navy, for example, for several years, looked long and hard, and studied intensely the principles of Deming and, you know, Total Quality Management, or Total Quality Leadership in the Navy. Again, taking some of these management techniques and principles that have been so successful, and in modern automobile industries, for example, and seeing how they can be transferred over to the way we run the military. So likewise, I don't see any irony in those being transferred back in a country like Cuba, where the leaders retire and then apply their skills in these entrepreneurial businesses that we saw.

BAKER: You had the opportunity to meet with quite a few of the Cuban military officers. What was your impression of their professionalism, and personal integrity?

ADM. CHANDLER: Our visit was short, but in the one week we were there, we certainly did meet several middle-grade, senior military officers of the Cuban armed forces. My impression was a)that they were very at ease in meeting with us, that they were very forthright, candid, and I felt, unguarded, perhaps I'm wrong, but I felt unguarded in responding to our questions, our many questions. They gave good answers without hesitation, they seeemed, again, I was impressed by the warmth of their receiving us, and the warmth extended to us and the hospitality during all the events that we had.

I also sensed that there's a high level of professionalism and integrity, and by integrity, I mean the obvious loyalty up the chain of command to Fidel Castro. I never sensed, nor was I surprised not to witness, any lapse in that, in all of our conversations, it seemed to be, at the very least, great respect, if not downright adoration of the commander-in-chief. So I think in a sense, that speaks well for the integrity of those military officers, during a very difficult time, when they're downsizing, to use our term, is so significant. A 50 percent, roughly, reduction in their armed forces. Much of their heavy equipment, ships and what have you, out of commission or put into a mothball status. A time when morale could be very low, I never sensed that it was. On the contrary, I sensed they were highly professional, and showed tremendous loyalty up the chain of command, respect for the leadership in Cuba.

BAKER: In the past, Cuban officials have consistently blamed the U.S. trade embargo, and blockade, as they call it, as the primary culprit for their economic woes. Did you hear much of htat argu9ment this time, on this trip?

ADM. CHANDLER: I never heard anyone say to me, or overhear them say to anybody else, that the U.S. blockade was the cause, the root cause of that problem, their problems. I sensed that it truly is the loss of the support from the Soviet Union that is the real culprit. We saw ample evidence around town, and in signs and banners, I beleive, trying to convince the Cuban populace that it's the U.S. blockade that is making life miserable for them. But over and over, I heard from all different sectors that I came in touch with, that they realized the difficult time this special period that they're enduring is because of the loss of Soviet aid. No one ever said to me personally, or criticized U.S. policy.

BAKER: You had a fairly long meeting with the president, Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro. What was your personal impression of Fidel?

ADM. CHANDLER: We did have a long meeting with Fidel Castro, nine or ten hours straight. Indefatigable is the first term I would have to have used to describe him. He was very much in the transmit mode during the, virtually all of that long, long meeting. He seems to, it seems to me that he very much enjoys the role of senior statesman, of the communist leader who has survived all communist leaders. It seems to me that Fidel Castro is proud of his accomplishments, however much his state represents in my view a failed communist state.

Nevertheless, I think that he delights in recounting the many examples of his successses and enjoys, if I may say, living in the past, that he enjoys recounting old sea stories, to use a naval term. I was impressed at his gentlemanly behavior, or stance vis a vis these us-U.S. representatives on the other side of the table, through that whole evening. There were ample opportunities for him to take some shots at us, or at our policies, and even though they were frequently implied, he was very much a gentleman; never put any of us on the spot, or tried to get us to criticize U.S. policy or acknowledge U.S. policy as being a problem for him.

I was impressed as one who was not a fluent Spanish linguist, I was impressed by his beautiful Spanish. It is very, very easy for me, as a novice in the language, very easy for me to follow most of what he was saying. Throughout that long evening, he just kept up a very direct and clearly articulated language. I was impressed by his command of the atteention of the Cubans around him. Again, they very patiently sat through the whole evening that we enjoyed. For them, it must have been very routine, but it was anohter example, I think, of how he commands their loyalty. He seemed to have a staff, both his interpreter and his administrative staff, and his senior military advisors, all of them seemed very much to be rallying around Fidel Castro. Very much in control, I think.

BAKER: Throughout Latin America, in fact, even more broadly, in the developing world, many people veiw Fidel Castro as some kind of a hero. Even some of the conservative, more conservative governments in Latin America have a begrudging respect for him. What do you think that is?

ADM. CHANDLER: I recall, in some of my past assignments, where I had colleagues who were senior Latin American military officers. I distinctly recall in the mid to late eighties, some of these senior Latin American military officers, who are anything but communist, very decidedly anti-communist, having a really ambivalent attitude toward Fidel Castro. Because on the one hand, they deeply resented and feared his interventionist policies in Central America, and in South America.

But on the other hand, I think that he is, was, and continues to be widely, if somewhat begrudgingly, respected by many of them, as somebody to whose credit it is that he has stood up to the North Americans, to us. And I think that he commands some widespread admiration in the region, simply for that, whether it's a David and Goliath relationship that all of us tend to respect the underdog, or love the underdog; whatever it is, I'm not quite sure. Except that it is a, there's a real ambivalence, I think. On the one hand, his communist doctrine is anathema; on the other hand, his ability and his stick-to-it-ive-ness, and his tireless resistance of what he perceives as the Yankee aggressor to the North, I think is begrudgingly respected.

BAKER: Are there, and this may be getting into policy, but are there areas of cooperation with Cuba that you think would benefit the United States? Is that something you've-?

ADM. CHANDLER: During our discussions, or during our audience with Castro, he seemed repeatedly to come back to the theme of counter-narcotics, and illegal immigration. And seemed repeatedly to suggest that these were areas where the United States and Cuba could and should be cooperating, because we share, Castro would say we share common objectives. I think that he made the point very eloquently that in Colombia, and in the United States' attempt to assist Colombia in their time of terrible trial, and internal instability, that there is a common objective on the part of the Cuban government, as Castro articulated it to us, and the United States objective. Castro would say that we share a common objective, and that is to see Colombia be successful in reestablishing control of their country and restoring stability to Colombia. I think that Castro sees this as an area where he would say that the United States and Cuba could both pursue that common objective, and do so in a coopeerative manner.

BAKER: Is there anything else you'd like to add?

ADM. CHANDLER: No.

BAKER: Thank you very much.