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Show Transcript Lessons of Kosovo: Where is the United Nations?
Produced September 5, 1999
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| NARRATOR: Kosovo, 1999. Major General WILLIAM NASH (USA, Ret.): This was an operation designed to stop the killing and brutality towards a group of people and to establish the international principle that the treatment of a nation's citizens is a matter of concern for all nations. NARRATOR: History will record it as the war in which one side -- NATO -- suffered no combat deaths during 78 days of aerial assaults. History may also note it as the first sustained combat in Europe since World War II. It was an offensive operation by an alliance whose founding credo was purely defensive. JAVIER SOLANA, NATO Secretary General, April 12, 1999: "NATO is united. We have justice and right on our side, and we will prevail." NARRATOR: The primary justification for this war was a determination by NATO not to allow the wholesale deportations and slaughter of a people simply because of their ethnic origin or religious beliefs. President WILLIAM CLINTON (April 15, 1999): "We cannot simply watch as hundreds of thousands of people are brutalized, murdered, raped, forced from their homes, their families" (inaudible) "all in the name of ethnic pride and purity." NARRATOR: What history may not record is the role played by the United Nations both before and after NATO's air assaults against Yugoslavia. Since there is an increased likelihood that the U.N. will be given the task of reconstructing other shattered societies in the future, its role in Kosovo should be told. President CLINTON (February 26, 1999): "Kosovo is, after all, where the violence in the former Yugoslavia began over a decade ago, when they lost the autonomy guaranteed under Yugoslav law. We have a clear national interest in ensuring that Kosovo is where this trouble ends." NARRATOR: The origin of the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo lies in the extreme nationalism encouraged by Slobodan Milosevic, originally president of Serbia and later of all Yugoslavia. The unrestrained exhilaration that swept Eastern European nations and the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 also took hold in Yugoslavia. One after another of its provinces -- Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia -- declared their independence from the Serb-dominated Yugoslav federation. Milosevic, however, was determined not to stand idly by and watch Yugoslavia disintegrate. He unleashed the full power of the federal Yugoslav army and supported Serb paramilitary units in a doomed effort to keep control. Fighting was particularly brutal in Croatia and Bosnia, where local Serb populations fought to remain a part of Yugoslavia. Thousands died -- Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Civilians suffered the most. When the US-sponsored Dayton Accords of 1995 ended the fighting in Bosnia, Milosevic turned his attention to the rebellious province of Kosovo, whose population of some-two million was overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian. In 1989, Milosevic had summarily revoked the political and cultural autonomy previously enjoyed by the Albanians. The Yugoslav authorities refused to allow the Albanian majority their own university or local administration, to use their own language, or to practice their customs. In short, Kosovo Albanians lost total control of their destiny. WILLIAM MAYNES: I think that what we have to do is look at the core concern, which is their security to define their own fate. NARRATOR: William Maynes is president of the Washington, D.C.-based Eurasia Foundation. MR. MAYNES: The controversy in each case revolves around the issue of whether one group is going to be able to determine the character of the government and the society for an entire piece of territory. And, people fight over that. NARRATOR: Albanians attempted to preserve their culture through an unofficially elected Albanian administration in Kosovo. It eventually turned into an armed uprising, which Serb officials in Belgrade met with force. By 1998, Kosovo was in a virtual state of rebellion. NARRATOR: Kosovo had been seen as a potential arena of conflict long before 1998. In 1992, Yugoslavia agreed to allow the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- commonly called the OSCE -- to establish a mission in Kosovo to monitor human rights and promote ethnic tolerance. But the Yugoslav authorities kicked the mission out less than a year after it arrived, prompting the UN Security Council to take up the Kosovo issue in 1993. Citing the value of preventive diplomacy in controlling violence, the Security Council called on Yugoslavia to renew the OSCE agreement, but to no avail. The major powers had been preoccupied with Bosnia until 1998 when the violence in Kosovo intensified sharply, raising fears that Kosovo could undermine the fragile peace in Bosnia. The UN, the OSCE and other multinational groups tried to rein-in both Milosevic's forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA. That was also to no avail. Events had already spiraled out of control The KLA was increasing its hit and run attacks on Yugoslav military and police forces. Serbian retaliation was swift and indiscriminate. Between March 1998 and the following March, some 2000 Kosovars, both Albanian and Serb, were killed. When Milosevic failed to respond to the various diplomatic initiatives, the UN Security Council demanded that Milosevic remove his special police units from Kosovo and allow humanitarian organizations access to the province. The demand was summarily rejected. MG NASH: We continue to establish a self-fulfilling prophecy with respect to the UN. NARRATOR: Retired Major General William Nash is director of Civil Military Programs at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. MG NASH: We under-resource the UN, we don't pay our bills, we denigrate their performance, and then at the last minute, call upon them to accomplish very difficult tasks. And then we sit back and wonder why the UN doesn't accomplish what we expect of it. NARRATOR: By September, 1998, conditions in Kosovo had deteriorated sharply. More than 225,000 people had been displaced by Yugoslav security forces, including 50,000 who had no shelter or other basic necessities. Refugees were flooding into Albania, Bosnia and other European nations. HUMANITARIAN WORKER: "But there were so many kids like her. All the kids found their parents. It seems to me that she got lost and then after a short time, we found the parents." NARRATOR: Richard Holbrooke, US negotiator and now the US Ambassador to the UN, reached an agreement with Milosevic that would permit surveillance flights over Kosovo by NATO aircraft. Milosevic also agreed to allow 2000 unarmed peacekeepers to monitor compliance with UN resolutions. But like other promises made by Milosevic, these agreements also fell apart. The breaking point for the West came on January 15, 1999, when 45 ethnic Albanians from the village of Racak were killed. Ambassador WILLIAM WALKER, OSCE Mission Leader: "Unfortunately, I do not have the words describe my personal revulsion or that of all who were with me at the site of what can only be described an unspeakable atrocity." (January 1999) NARRATOR: The Racak massacre led to the February-March 1999 conference at Rambouillet, France, at which Yugoslav representatives again rejected the West's proposal to end the violence. Some called the proposal an ultimatum since NATO forces would have been free to go anywhere in Serbia. RICHARD BECKER: You have to turn the country over to us is what the Rambouillet Accord says to Yugoslavia. You have to give us full access. You have to pay all the costs for our occupation of your country. I think that beyond any doubt, no country, no sovereign government could have signed such an accord and remained in power. NARRATOR: Furthermore, it was deemed a virtual certainty that within three years Kosovo would demand its independence from Serbia. MR. MAYNES: I don't think we could have saved the authorities in Kosovo in terms of their earlier ambition, but I think we could have limited the amount of the suffering, we could have stabilized the ceasefire lines. NARRATOR: With the Rambouillet conference dead, the United States and NATO had to act or lose face. So, on March 24th, NATO began the bombing that would last for 78 days. As attention focuses on efforts to reconstruct Kosovo and perhaps the rest of Yugoslavia, one significant question remains unasked: Did the international community, particularly the UN, exhaust every avenue that might have settled the Kosovo crisis peacefully? This question is critical for the future of international intervention in the affairs of sovereign nations. Nations, such as China and Russia, with unhappy and rebellious ethnic minorities don't want the question raised because they fear the answer might involve intervention in what they consider their internal affairs. William Maynes sees a possible solution not in changing the rules of intervention, but in convincing governments that personal freedoms invariably make nations stronger. MR. MAYNES: The fight is not over whether one person can live in a certain area. It is over whether a government that has the majority is going to use that majority to impose, let's say, a single religion or a single language. NARRATOR: Although the UN failed to rein-in Milosevic and had no part in NATO's air war, it still has the greatest legitimacy in most nations, including America, to carry out the task of rebuilding war-torn societies like Kosovo. STEVEN KULL: The American public has, overall, quite a positive feeling about the United Nations. NARRATOR: Steven Kull is the director of the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes, a nonpartisan polling organization that tracks what Americans think about international affairs. MR. KULL: They see the United Nations as the key institution to play this organizing role in the world and, thus, they would like to see the UN actually become stronger. More than 80 percent of the public would like to see the UN stronger than it currently is. NARRATOR: But there are differences among Security Council members, each with veto power, on how much reliance should be placed on the United Nations. Kosovo is a case in point. MR. KULL: I think most Americans understand that the problem with the UN and Kosovo was that Russia and China were not comfortable with the operation or opposed to the operation. And that made Americans uncomfortable. Eighty percent said that they were uncomfortable with the fact that we did not have a UN Security Council mandate for the operation. NARRATOR: General Nash sees another problem with the rebuilding effort. MG NASH: Almost at the time the air war came to completion, the decision was made to put the United Nations in charge of the overall implementation of the resulting situation. And I think what we had by this change of who was the lead agency for the conduct of the operation -- I think we see now that it's caused everybody to be behind the power curve. NARRATOR: NATO, which is charged with enforcing the peace in Kosovo, had trouble getting its forces into Kosovo after the war. But its mission is much simpler than the role given the UN, which is to reconstruct Kosovo and rebuild its institutions. Wisely, this mandate has been subdivided and experts from different organizations will be used to assist the UN. More than 30 nations will contribute 50,000 peacekeepers to provide basic security in Kosovo. US participation, scheduled to be about 7000 soldiers, is a figure Americans see as reasonable, says Steven Kull. MR. KULL: That's a proportion that they feel comfortable with for sure and there's quite strong support for contributing those troops to the peacekeeping operation. NARRATOR: But while the American public may be comfortable with US military participation in the security mission, the Pentagon and some members of Congress are not. Senator JACK REED (D-RI): "The biggest concern I have is the formation of a UN police force. They have a terrible track record." (Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, July 20, 1999.) NARRATOR: In July 1999, Senator Jack Reed criticized the slowness of the UN in fielding a viable police force. Senator REED (at same hearing): "Their whole approach is asking for volunteers around the world. So, they get sometimes high-quality police officers, sometimes low quality. They have no unit cohesion. They take individual volunteers. That force has to form itself before it becomes effective." NARRATOR: General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed. GEN HENRY SHELTON: "It's critical that we get a police force in and that we get this justice system established in order to provide a safe and secure environment and to build upon for the long term." (before Senate Armed Services Committee, July 20, 1999.) NARRATOR: While appreciating the Pentagon's desire to be rid of public safety duties, William Maynes thinks this will not happen soon. MR. MAYNES: When we have a breakdown in law and order in this country, a total breakdown, we do not ask the police to reestablish order, we call in the National Guard. And that's what happens in any country. Now what you have in Kosovo is a breakdown in law and order, a total breakdown. NARRATOR: Keeping the peace in Kosovo while rebuilding a judicial system free of corruption and bias is critical, but it is only one of the many non-military activities that must be done. The UN mission in Kosovo, in addition to coordinating the overall effort, is responsible for restoring order. It must also set up a system of public services, such as health care and telecommunications, while putting the international police force and judiciary in place. UNICEF is already rebuilding schools destroyed in the war. FLAKA SURROJ, UNICEF, Kosovo: "This example in the back would be one of the schools that would require up to six or eight months of construction. So, probably these kinds of schools may be finished by the next school year. But in the meantime, we still have to find a solution for the children for this year. DAFINA HOXNA, 13-year old girl returning to school (Through translator): "I am very happy because I am back with my friends and we are all safe. I never believed we'd be together again so soon. NARRATOR: The OSCE has the job of building institutions that will support an up and running democratic system. This means a system that fosters respect for human rights and promotes the emergence of an independent, unbiased media that is allowed to freely inform and educate the public. OSCE efforts are designed to lead to free and open multi-ethnic elections. The OSCE also has the job of training a police force drawn from local citizens that is tolerant and objective, a very tall order in a region where so much blood has been spilled and where there is a long history of intolerance. The humanitarian component is being administered by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Getting the returning refugees settled is the most difficult of all tasks and becomes more urgent as the harsh Balkan winter gets closer. Shelter, food, clean water and medical assistance must be in place by winter to meet the needs of the entire population of Albanians, Serbs, and other minorities. Over 90 non-governmental organizations, along with the World Health Organization and the World Food Program, are contributing to this massive effort. As with public security, NATO is trying to distance itself as rapidly as possible from humanitarian issues. WILLIAM COHEN, U.S. Secretary of Defense: "The NATO forces should not have as a mission the reconstruction of homes or the provision of electricity or other types of necessities. The situation of the more we do, the less incentive there is for the UN to come in and assume that burden." (before Senate Armed Services Committee, July 20, 1999.) NARRATOR: The European Union is leading the effort to fulfill the UN mandate to provide more permanent electric, water and sanitation facilities, as well as a host of lesser necessities. Its success depends on the response of donor nations and international financial institutions and making sure the resources of the European Union are devoted to the highest priority concerns, one of which is assisting in the reunification of families. NARRATOR: In many ways, what the UN is doing is unprecedented and highly complex. MG NASH: As you put these elements all working together, you need to realize that the military forces can create a secure atmosphere, they can create an absence of organized military conflict. But it takes political, economic and social actions in a wide variety of fronts in order to achieve a lasting peace. NARRATOR: While there are some doubts about the UN's ability to act quickly, some Americans seem willing to give the UN expanded powers that would allow it to react more swiftly when peacekeeping or humanitarian missions are needed. One proposal, opposed by many politicians, is to allow the UN to tax certain transactions, such as international arms sales, with the proceeds to be used to pay for the many missions associated with rescuing failed states. MR. KULL: The idea of the UN having its own power to tax -- to tax oil sales or arms sales -- these ideas get strong majority support. NARRATOR: In addition to funding limitations, UN peacekeeping forces have often been handcuffed by severe limitations on their authority to act. In Somalia in 1993, eighteen American troops died in an attempt to capture a Somali warlord. Some critics argue that the debacle was a result of the narrow mandate given the UN forces in Somalia, which was so narrow and so uncoordinated with the American forces, they weren't authorized to come to the Rangers' aid as the fateful battle raged. Sometimes the mandate given UN peacekeepers is so limited they don't even have the firepower to defend themselves, let alone disarm the warring factions. Oftentimes, other forces are called in to assist UN forces. The Pentagon refers to such instances, where US forces have to take action above and beyond their mission, as "mission creep." NATO forces in Kosovo are intent on making sure their efforts are closely coordinated in order to avoid the kind of disaster that occurred in Somalia, especially in operations where public security is involved. Troops from several nations, including Russia, are charged with keeping the peace in five designated sectors of Kosovo. Even so, NATO nations are intent on closely coordinating their work and keeping in close contact, so that in case of an outbreak of hostilities, adequate firepower will be available to deal with it. There are no military forces assigned to the UN in Kosovo, but a lightly armed international police force of 3100 men will be at its disposal. It took two months after the bombing ended in Kosovo to assemble the first 500 members of the international police force. Hopefully, assembling of the international police force will not be plagued by further delays. William Maynes sees the delay as the logical result of opposition -- chiefly from the US -- to UN standby forces. MR. MAYNES: We have been the country that has been primarily opposed to the idea of standby forces, both military and police. Unless you have those in place, it is impossible for the UN to move with the dispatch that the Pentagon would like. NARRATOR: The ultimate success in rebuilding Kosovo will depend in large measure on how successful the international security forces are in getting weapons out of private hands and in controlling violence and crime. NARRATOR: There is a lot riding on whether the Kosovo experiment succeeds or fails. And it is an experiment, because nothing like it has ever been tried before by such an array of multinational organizations. Whether a democracy and a market economy can be established in a province so ethnically divided remains to be seen. The results for good or bad will not only set the tone for Kosovo and Serbia, but the entire Balkans region. Thirty nations recently signed an agreement at Sarajevo designed to provide a framework for the kind of cooperation that could lift the whole area out of its chronic cycles of poverty and violence. Kosovo is an opportunity for the UN to gain badly need experience in how to deal with similar situations in the future, but its success will hinge largely on the support it gets from the international community. It is imperative, if the UN is to succeed, that it not yield to the temptation to withdraw prematurely. MG NASH: People want to know what the end state in Kosovo is. I would say to you that end state is democracy. And building a democracy in a country is a long-term process. And it takes a lot of actors, and it takes a lot of education, and most of all, it takes responsible citizens that are interested and committed to the destiny of their country in such a manner that respects the individual and respects the collective society. NARRATOR: It is a monumental tragedy that at the end of the 20th Century the region that spawned the First World War is still gripped by uncompromising ethnic divisions, hatred and violence. The world must not compound the tragedy by abandoning it once again.
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