MR. BAKER: Your book is called Mis-Reading the Public. How have policymakers mis-read the public on the issue of military casualties?

MR. KULL: American policymakers have an exaggerated idea of the extent to which the American public reacts to American casualties, American troop casualties. There is an assumption, a widespread assumption, that, if there are any fatalities in the course of a peace keeping operation, that the American public will want the U.S. to simply pull the troops out. And, there is a perception that this happened in Somalia and that this would have happened in Kosovo or that it could have happened in Bosnia. And, the polling shows that that's not the case. The American public didn't respond that way in Somalia and it is very unlikely that they would have responded that way in Bosnia or Kosovo.

BAKER: Under what conditions will the public tolerate U.S. war casualties?

KULL: The, the critical question in the public's mind is whether or not the operation succeeds. If the operation doesn't succeed, obviously they're going to feel bad about getting involved and losing those American lives. If the operation does succeed in fulfilling an important objective like stopping ethnic cleansing, then they say that they will accept a, even a significant number of casualties in the course of the operation.

BAKER: Have you seen any significant difference between members of Congress and members of military leaders on this perception issue?

KULL: This perception seems to be strong on both the military and in Congress. It doesn't seem to be as strong in the executive branch. But, the executive branch responds to Congress.

BAKER: Let's look at the case of Somalia. It's, as you said, often cited as a case where the public's lack of stomach for casualties led for an immediate decision to withdraw. In reality, was it public reaction that led to our withdrawal from Somalia?

KULL: Well, there were two polls taken the evening after the news reports that showed the bodies being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. And, in one case, thirty-seven percent said they wanted U.S. troops to be pulled out right away, and another case forty-three percent. Now, that's not an insignificant number, but it is clearly not a majority. In fact, the majority said that they wanted to respond by beefing up forces, by bringing in more forces. There was a feeling that we need to get out eventually, but that was already in place before the fatalities. So, in fact, there really wasn't a major change in attitudes about the Somalia operation as a result of the fatalities. Maybe that's -- I think that's a key point, so let me, I left something out, so let me try that one again.

BAKER: Okay.

KULL: In October, 1993, in the evening immediately after the news reports that showed the bodies being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, there were two polls taken. In one case, thirty-seven percent, and in the other, forty-three percent said that they wanted the U.S. to withdraw immediately. And, in the subsequent days, there were further polls taken, and it was never a majority calling for immediate withdrawal. There was a majority saying that they wanted to bring in more troops to beef up U.S. forces, and there was also sentiment for going after Hadid.

BAKER: So, what you're saying is that the public sentiment was almost the opposite of the sentiment that was portrayed by elites, that the public had had enough and was ready, that was it, let's cut and run?

KULL: There was a very strong minority, and apparently a very vocal minority who was opposed to being there and wanted to get out and had a very strong reaction to the fatalities. And, that, apparently, that minority made a bigger impact on Congress, and Congress responded accordingly, as though the dominant perception in Congress and in the media was that this was a majority position, just based on, on its volume, the volume of that voice. So, it's not that the public was clamoring for some intensified response. But, when presented a sense of options, that's, that's the one they thought made the most sense at the time.

BAKER: One reaction to Somalia was a growing reluctance to commit U.S. ground troops to humanitarian missions that might result in casualties. Does the public really oppose such missions, or are policymakers again out of touch with the American people?

KULL: The question of whether to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations has been asked repeatedly over the last years. And, it's, in almost every case, a substantial majority say that the U.S. should contribute troops to peacekeeping operations, even just days after the deaths in Mogadishu, seventy-one percent said that they thought the U.S. should contribute troops. The response to specific operations varies depending upon a number of variables. It's very important to the public, that it's a multi-lead, clearly a multi-lateral operation, that the U.S. contribute, is contributing its fair share, that the operation is likely to succeed. So, there can be variation. And, at times, you don't have a majority in favor of a specific operation. But, as a broader principle, the majority says, yes, the U.S. should contribute to this kind of thing.

BAKER: Despite, even in the face of casualties?

KULL: Even when it's presented that -- the Americans are aware that contributing troops to peacekeeping operations does involve risks and when the U.S. went into Kosovo, the majority thought that there were going to be fatalities in Kosovo. The median estimate was in the ten to twenty-four fatalities range. That's what they expected. But, nonetheless, the support was there for going on. So, it's not that the public has some kind of unrealistic idea that there are no risks involved in these kinds of operations. They think there are such risks and, nonetheless, they feel that it's, in many cases, it is very important. And, when they see genocide occurring, they see it as one of those cases where it is essential to take some risk of that kind.

BAKER: You did a rather revealing poll on Bosnia and U.S. deaths and NATO peacekeeping efforts there. Can you encapsulate for us what that poll showed?

KULL: One of the strongest pieces of evidence that the public is ready to support operations even if there are casualties was a poll that we did where we asked, do you think that there have been fatalities in the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia due to hostile fire? And, I, a significant majority said that they thought there had been fatalities in the operation in Bosnia, even though, in fact, there have been none. We then asked, well, how many fatalities do you think there have been? And, the median estimate was in the twenty to twenty-five range over the previous year. And, nonetheless, you had a substantial majority supporting you U.S. participation in that operation. And, support for the operation was not heavily influenced by the perceived number of fatalities. What did determine the support for the operation was whether they perceived the operation as succeeding or not. That is the critical question in people's mind. If they don't think it's succeeding, they want to pull out. If they think it is succeeding, then they support it, even if they think, even if they think there are or if there are fatalities.

BAKER: What is the definition of success here? Is there something to do with how well the administration communicates goals and message on intervention?

KULL: I think those would probably contribute, could help. It's more the outcome, whether they perceive that some critical value is being filled, such as stopping ethnic cleansing. And, we have asked, we have asked whether, if in the course of the operation there are a significant number of fatalities in the hundreds, we've even tried in the thousands, and said, but the operation succeeds in stopping ethnic cleansing. Would you then feel that the U.S. did the right thing in going into the operation in the first place. And, a significant majority, about sixty percent, usually say that, yes, we would have done the right thing if the operation succeeded, even in the face of that number of fatalities.

BAKER: In the thousands?

KULL: Even in the thousands.

BAKER: The use of ground forces was essentially pulled off the table, or at least hedged quite a bit very early in the Kosovo campaign, largely because of the perceived public intolerance for casualties. The way I wrote this question was, is this a correct reading of the public? Uh, I guess I'll ask that again?

KULL: Well, the American public is not eager to put US troops at risk, and if there's a way to do it without putting the troops at risk, they're certainly going to support that. They're going to prefer that option. In the case for Kosovo, they actually thought that it was going to be necessary to go in with ground troops. They were pessimistic about the idea that the operation would succeed just with air power alone. Were they ready to do that at that point? The polls showed that if you asked them, do you want to do it now, they said, no. Well, what if NATO says it's the only way to do it? Then they said, then sixty percent or more would say, yeah, okay, if NATO says it's the only way to do it, let's go ahead and do it. MR. BAKER: Are policymakers unnecessarily handcuffing the military by ruling ground troops out?

KULL: The, yes, the short answer is, yes. It is not, it is an option for U.S. policymakers to use ground troops in an operation like Kosovo. The public does not reject that as an option. They think it is a, it should be on the table. In fact, about sixty percent thought said that they thought it was a mistake to take it off the table, to make the statement that we will not use ground troops.

BAKER: Fear of losing pilots lead to the decision to conduct high altitude missions, putting civilians on the ground on greater risk. Was this decision in synch with the polling, or would the polling indicate a nuance like that?

KULL: A plurality was in support of the idea of not flying low. A bare plurality, but a plurality nonetheless. There, again, there is significant concern for the lives of American pilots. However, if the American pilots were given the option of choosing whether or not to fly low, this is the choice that they would make so that they would decide whether to put their lives at risk, then a significant majority said that they would support kind of thing.

BAKER: I'm going to ask you something about television. I'm not sure if it's --

KULL: I'm, you might want to elaborate. I think this point about volunteering is really critical.

BAKER: Okay. On the --

KULL: As a general principle.

BAKER: Generally, it doesn't work, the military doesn't allow people --

KULL: Okay, so you don't want me to --

BAKER: No, no, I want you to say it. I'm just wondering, the military doesn't allow its pilots to voluntarily do anything, you know, so --

KULL: Right. Well, it's an issue, and, I mean, it has been proposed, the idea of earmarking forces and, it's, the Europeans do it.

BAKER: Can you tell me more about this notion of troops voluntarily putting themselves in harm's way?

KULL: The American public would really like to see U.S. troops have the option of choosing to volunteer for peacekeeping operations. If troops have that as an option, then support for contributing troops goes above eighty percent. It's a critical factor. There's a majority without it, but if the troops have the option to opt out, then you get an overwhelming majority saying that they're supportive.

BAKER: In other words, on an individual by individual basis, a soldier can say, no, I'm not going to go to this mission?

KULL: We've tested it in a number of ways. One is to do it on a mission by mission basis. Another is to set up special units that, set up units that specialize in peacekeeping operations. And, all those ideas are very popular among the public.

BAKER: Uh, I wanted to ask a question about --

KULL: There, there is a feeling that U.S. troops, U.S. soldiers, by enlisting, have made a commitment to defend the United States proper. And, there is some uncertainty about whether they have made the commitment to peace keeping kinds of operations and, if they, thus, if they're given the option to make that commitment in this particular case, or as a general principle, then the public does feel more comfortable with committing troops to those kinds of operations.

BAKER: Is this a distinction that's arisen with the professional, all-volunteer force, that we have now, as opposed to the draft dates? Despite the fact that it's an all volunteer force, this is still a concern on the part of the public. They don't perceive that the commitment to enlist means that the soldier has necessarily made that commitment to risk his life for that, for other purposes, such as humanitarian operations.

So, the public has a very strict, sort of isolationist notion of what the military role is, strictly to defend the United States territory proper?

KULL: No, no. No, the American public does believe that the U.S. should be involved in peace keeping operations. There is, there are some, there is some discomfort with the idea of putting U.S. troops at risk, given that there's some ambiguity about the nature of the commitment that the soldiers have made by enlisting. There, they would like to see the soldiers volunteer. And, if they volunteer, then there's strong support for the U.S. participating in those kinds of operations. There's still support even without it. But, if there was, if this, if this ambiguity was clarified, then support would become very strong, which goes to show that the public actually supports generally U.S. participation in peacekeeping fairly strongly in principle.

BAKER: Have you done any polling among military leaders or of the Congress or policy elites on how they feel about this sort of case by case selective volunteerism?

KULL: No, I have not.

BAKER: Let me move on to the question. I'm not sure whether it's up your alley or not. But, with CNN and satellites and live location broadcasting, has television fundamentally changed the equation between war and tolerance for casualties?

KULL: Well, television can go both ways. On one hand, they see atrocities being committed in living color, and that mobilizes strong feelings in the direction of wanting to intervene. Also, the potential of seeing Americans' bodies on television being dragged through the streets as it occurred in Mogadishu, that, also produced a strong emotional response. However, the public is not as emotional as is assumed. They may have these feelings, but that doesn't really change their fundamental attitudes as much as policymakers tend to assume. I can add one thing to it that I think we didn't cover earlier that I think is very important. We posed a number of hypothetical scenarios, where we asked our respondents to imagine that in Kosovo or Bosnia or Rwanda or Haiti, that there was a battle and a number of Americans were killed, sometimes ten, sometimes fifty, in some pitched battle. And, then we asked them, imagine that you saw their dead bodies on television. And, then we said, under these circumstances, how do you think you would react? What do you think you would want to do? And, in every case, never more than one out of four said that they would want to withdraw. In every case, the majority expressed a desire to take some more assertive response by either striking back or beefing up our forces so that the next time around, we would be able to respond more effectively.

BAKER: Interesting. __ might be different if, have you done polls on that, I guess you did, in Mogadishu, where it was right after, so that they had a specific image fresh in mind?

KULL: Well, yes, we did. There were polls. We did a poll about ten days later and we didn't ask that specific question, the hypothetical one obviously in that case. But, I mean, uh, well, in the case of Somalia, they were asked immediately after and the response was approximately forty percent said that they did want to withdraw -- which is a bit higher than the numbers that said that they would want to withdraw in the hypothetical scenario. But, still, a minority.

BAKER: Military leaders are now expressing concern that the bar has been raised, by fighting a war with zero U.S. combat casualties, and that political pressures for zero casualties will now loom over every mission. Do your findings support this concern?

KULL: Well, the American public went into the situation in Kosovo with the assumption that there would be some fatalities. And, they were obviously glad that there, that there weren't. Does this mean that they now have the assumption that there will be no fatalities or casualties in the future? There's no evidence to that effect. The American public is fairly realistic about these issues.

BAKER: To what do you attribute the gap between the elites and the public?

KULL: The American Congress is very responsive to people who call, who write, who attend town hall meetings. They pay a lot of attention to these things. And, people who get upset about fatalities are more likely to call and write. People who are watching an operation unfold and perceive what's going on as okay are not as likely to call and write and say, hey, you know, things are running good. That's fine. So, this vocal public creates an image in the mind of policymakers that this, these people that they hear from are representative, when, in fact, it's clearly not the case.

BAKER: That's all I have on the casualty phobia notion. Are there any other points, any other points to be made about that? [Background talking.]

KULL: Well, there was majority support, a plurality resisted the idea of flying low. Not a big plurality, but a plurality. So, it's, uh, I can add one thing to that about the flying low. Uh, although a plurality was opposed to the idea of the, of the American bombers flying low or using the Apache helicopters for that kind of purpose, if the operation was succeeding in stopping the ethnic cleansing, a modest majority said that they would then support continuing the operation. So, if the U.S. had gone ahead and it was succeeding, a majority would have backed it, even though the public would have refrained from saying, yes, let's go ahead and do that. This is actually a general pattern, that the public is somewhat reticent to come forward and say go ahead, be more aggressive, take more risks. So, policymakers are not likely to suffer for being too cautious. But, if they go ahead and it is effective, then the public will, the majority will tend to back them.

BAKER: Americans love a winner.

KULL: That's right. Who doesn't. I have some limited information on the subject.

BAKER: Yeah, why don't we do something about, you know, we've talked only about U.S. military casualties, but another goal of the new way of fighting war is to limit non-combatant casualties on the ground even in the enemy country.

KULL: Well, from one point of view, that's not what happened, that we need to make sure our combatants were not hurt, we actually probably increased the number of, number of non-combatant casualties. In the, over the course of the weeks of the Kosovo operation, there was, in the later few weeks, a softening of support for the air war. And, it does appear that that was related to discomfort with the number of civilian casualties that were occurring. Among those who were most concerned about the civilian casualties, the drop in support was the most marked.

BAKER: The war, just one more thing, the Kosovo war seemed to be locked in this steady state of very little progress as the air campaign continued and continued into about day sixty or so, and suddenly, following an offensive by the KLA that seemed to flush out the Serbian forces, that they couldn't hunker down, suddenly there was this breakthrough and things seemed to pick up and resolve much more quickly there. Was there, do you think, a sense among the public, if that change hadn't occurred and if it had continued for two, three, four more weeks, with no apparent, you know, change in status in the war, Milosovic's agreement to cave, do you think the public would have turned on this campaign?

KULL: I don't think that, it's hard to say. There are a lot of ways that, a lot of ways the operation could have gone. It would depend to some extent on how it was framed in the media. If it was framed that this is going nowhere and it will not go anywhere and it is clearly a failure and no matter what we do, it's not going to produce an effect, if that perception jelled, then support for the operation would have dropped. If there was a feeling that, well, it's, it just needs a bit more time, but it's likely to succeed, then support would have sustained itself. More likely, probably the most likely scenario, if it had reached this kind of stasis with the air war is that support for a ground intervention would have increased, particularly if reports of atrocities continued to filter out. Because, that really was the source of support for the operation, was the perception of atrocities being committed. Because, ultimately, the public did think that it was going to be necessary to use ground troops.

BAKER: And, we sort of sensed policymakers coming around to that position as well and kind of testing the waters of the public.

KULL: But, leaders would have had to clearly say that this is necessary, that we've tried every kind of diplomatic approach and they have not succeeded and this is our only option left, to either walk away from this situation or to go forward with ground troops. And, if it had been clearly formulated in that way, a significant majority says that they would have supported it.

BAKER: A lot of terms like quagmire and Vietnam were brought, you know, referenced to fairly early in the campaign, largely from retired military people. Was that sentiment that this was another Vietnam type bottomless quagmire, was that shared by the public?

KULL: Clearly, there's nervousness whenever the U.S. gets involved in some kind of operation like this, that we're going to get bogged down, that there will be failure, or it will just drag on with casualties and no clear result. Yeah, that's a concern. Was it an overriding concern, was it a driving concern, was it a fundamental thing shaping attitudes? No. Much more significant was the analogy of dealing with Hitler and the idea that you need to deal with an aggressor who's conducting genocide and that you need to stop him before it gets too far, that we didn't intervene soon enough with Hitler. And, that's a lesson that's been coded in people's mind and that was one that came into play in this particular case, more than the fear of repeating the experience that we had in Vietnam.

BAKER: Increasingly, the world's been focused on war crimes, and there's an international criminal court being set up with the notion of prosecuting war criminals for crimes against humanity. Is there public support for U.S. troops to be involved in this very risky activity of going after war criminals?

KULL: Yeah, the public is surprisingly unambiguous in their support for going after war criminals. In Bosnia, we posed that question and, over seventy percent said they did support the U.S. going, U.S. troops going after the war, indicted war criminals. Even when it was spelled out that this would put US troops at risk. In regard to Kosovo, one of the frustrations about the ultimate outcome is that Milosovic is still in power and a strong majority said that a goal of the operation should be to remove Milosovic from power. And, the fact that he's still there has left some dis-satisfied taste in the public's mind.

BAKER: Is that compounded by the Iraq experience where many people said Saddam Hussein should have been taken from power as well?

KULL: Yes. Yes.

BAKER: So, are the American people just, you know, blood thirsty? I'm not sure how to put it but --

KULL: No, the public is not happy with the idea of the U.S. playing the role of world policeman. They're very clear about that. They only want to participate in these kinds of operations if other countries do, too. They would prefer that these operations occur as part of the United Nations mandate. If that isn't possible, then, NATO is okay as a second best. But, any kind of idea that the U.S. would intervene unilaterally or even with just a few allies joining in, as in some kind of ad hoc coalition, you get a clear majority opposition. It's always ___ to be multi-lateral. Yeah, but you asked another question, though, Gulf War --

BAKER: Going after leaders?

KULL: Oh, whether or not, whether or not the public would support a large scale offensive going into Serbia in the face of, you know, major opposition from other countries and so on, that, that's, I think, that's doubtful. But, that's still the goal that they had in their mind, that they would like to have seen fulfilled.

BAKER: We kind of moved into the second area I wanted to move into anyway, UN peacekeeping. According to your polls, how do most Americans feel about the United Nations in and its role in the world?

KULL: The American public has, overall, quite a positive feeling about the United Nations, for a number of reasons. One, that they see it as being a means to promote peace and that's a very positive value in their mind, clearly. And, it's also that they see it as a way for the U.S. to move away from its role as the world policeman, as the dominant world power, as the world's hegemon, maintaining order in the world. The American public does not want the U.S. to dis-engage from the world, but it is tired of the U.S. playing the role that it perceives that it has been playing, which is this excessively, the dominant player. And, that leads them to support working through the United Nations. They see the United Nations as the key institution to play this organizing role in the world, and, thus, they would like to see the UN actually become stronger. More than eighty percent of the public would like to see the UN stronger than it currently is.

BAKER: In the wake of what happened with Kosovo, where we see that the UN is essentially viewed as toothless or was end-run by NATO to justify intervention in Kosovo, is there a perception among the public that the UN is week and doesn't really have a mandate to take these kinds of actions?

KULL: I think most Americans understand that the problem with the UN and Kosovo was that Russia and China were not comfortable with the operation, or were opposed to the operation. And, that made Americans uncomfortable. Eighty percent said that they were uncomfortable with the fact that we did have a UN Security Council mandate for the operation. Nonetheless, a majority felt that, in this case, the imperative of intervening in the case of genocide was a stronger imperative than the imperative to have a UN Security Council mandate.

BAKER: Do you think now, following what happened in Kosovo where the UN wouldn't have, you know, there would have been UN support, there may be cases in the future where, similarly, a member of the Security Council would veto an action, and, in the wake of that, do you think public support for UN peacekeeping missions will erode?

KULL: No. The preference for peacekeeping operations from the public's point of view is for it to happen within the UN framework. Uh, the more multi-lateral the better, from the point of view of the public. And, if it's not possible in specific cases like Kosovo, then, okay, we'll take the second best, which is NATO. But, we won't support acting unilaterally.

BAKER: And, what is public sentiment about putting American troops under a foreign commander in UN missions?

KULL: That's a subtle question. When he question is asked straight up, how do you feel about putting US troops under a foreign UN commander, the public divides. A slight majority says it's okay, but it's basically a divided response. Then, if you ask, well, what if the US has contributed a minority of the troops? Would you then feel okay about it? And, then, in that case, over seventy percent say it would be okay. So, what we see going on here is that the public assumes that the US is always going to be contributing the lion's share of the troops. Therefore, it makes sense for the US to be in command. But, if it's spelled out that the US would be contributing a minority, then they see that as acceptable.

BAKER: Uh, are there other areas of --

KULL: Overall, there's a tendency on the part of the American public to overestimate the portion of U.S. troops in peacekeeping operations. There's a, generally they tend to assume about half of the troops in peacekeeping operations are American, when, in fact, that's never been the case. And, when asked how they would feel about contributing a quarter of the troops, a strong majority says that's acceptable.

BAKER: Did you probe that at all with regard to this NATO intervention in Kosovo, because there the U.S. was the main contributor of troops, weapons, etcetera. I'm just wondering --

KULL: Right. And, they would not like that. That they, to the extent that they're aware of it, they don't like it. Enough in that case to say that, well, we don't want to do it? Probably not. And, then, when given the current peacekeeping operation where we're contributing seven out of the fifty or so thousand, that's a proportion that they feel comfortable with for sure, and there's quite strong support for contributing those troops to the peacekeeping operation there.

BAKER: ____ perception of U.S. dominance -- [inaudible] -- in control of NATO.

KULL: I'm not --

BAKER: -- in peacekeeping operations, there is a question whether you're going to be under a foreign military officer or ___ Pakistan --

KULL: Right.

BAKER: -- but, with NATO, you're pretty sure that it's going to be a U.S. commander.

KULL: Yeah, it's not an overriding concern on the part of -- the idea that the American public is very absorbed by the idea of who, what's the nationality of the commander of an operation is really overblown. The majority of the Americans are not absorbed by this issue.

BAKER: We've seen a number of situations in recent years where aggressive peacekeeping, if that's not an oxymoron, might be seen as increasingly worthwhile tool to preclude genocide. Many people say --

KULL: What's the term?

BAKER: Aggressive peacekeeping. Like, putting forces in there to prevent a genocide or some kind of persecution in a country. Is there support from the American public of more peacekeeping, peace making missions to keep combatants apart in a preventive way, as long as the U.S. way is proportional?

KULL: As a general principle, Americans do support the idea of aggressive peacekeeping or peace making in specific instances. With regard to specific operations, they're going to take it on a case by case basis. Do they think this one is going to work? Are there humanitarian values here that are compelling or is there potential for significant civilian suffering if we do not do this? Are other countries going to contribute their fair share? Is this clearly a multi-lateral operation? Those are all factors that will come in the nexus and will effect whether or not the public support's that specific operation.

BAKER: One critique of the --

KULL: Another factor that will affect support for specific operations is whether the President and Congress are seen together. If they are, I mean, we've tested for this, if the President and Congress are aligned, then in almost every case, you will see majority support. If they're out of kilter, then it's much harder.

BAKER: With regard to UN interventions that involve U.S. troops, is there a race element in terms of geography, whereby we see humanitarian mission supported in Kosovo, but Rwanda, no one intervened; Sierra Leone has had a long war with no intervention. Does the American public track with that? Do they say, you know, Africa is a morass, forget it? Or, is there something racial about that?

KULL: The evidence shows that that is not the case, that the American public does not make distinctions based on this continent over that continent. It's not that they feel much more compelled to intervene in Europe than, say, Africa. There was majority support for intervention in Rwanda. And, there was overwhelming support for intervention in Somalia, stronger than there was for Bosnia at that time, and subsequently, and, when asked in principle, how do you feel about intervening to prevent ethnic cleansing in Europe or Asia or Africa, support in those three cases is basically the same.

BAKER: I don't have anything else.

KULL: I should say a little bit more, though. You asked about Sierra Leone. Now, if you have a situation like Sierra Leone, where, when you have a situation like Sierra Leone, where the American public doesn't know much about the situation, it's going to be hard to generate a lot of support. But, if the media starts giving information, or leaders start calling attention to it, it's possible to generate that support. As it was in Somalia and Rwanda.

BAKER: Not too many people knew where Kosovo was until six months ago.

KULL: Right, uh huh.

BAKER: Uh, this an area that I've focused on a lot --

KULL: Let me say one more thing about the -- in generating support among the public and, even moreso, the policy community, there are many factors that contribute to that support. Humanitarian concern is key. Also, concerns about maintaining NATO as an alliance is another. And, when you have both of those concerns working together, it's easier to create a consensus than if you just have the humanitarian. Within the public, the humanitarian is very strong and concern about maintaining NATO as an alliance or maintaining the U.S. position vis a vis NATO, those are very secondary concerns. But, they contribute a little bit. So, if you have both of them together, you may be more likely to get together a majority in favor. So, when you're dealing with the situation in Europe, there are more sources of potential support than there may be in Africa. But, in principle, the public doesn't say, you know, Europe's more important to us than Africa.

BAKER: I think a lot of people have a general perception the public is being quite isolationist and not being particularly interested in humanitarian missions abroad. You seem to paint a different, more engaged public. Is that correct?

KULL: We don't see an overwhelming majority of Americans supporting humanitarian operations abroad, but you do see a significant majority who say, approximately two-thirds say that the United States has an obligation to intervene when ethnic cleansing or genocide humanitarian atrocities are being committed. Two thirds said that we had an obligation with regard to Kosovo. So, there's a strong underlying support for U.S. participation in these kinds of missions. When you get down to specific instances, then other factors come into the picture, is it going to work, are we ___ our share, all those affect their attitude about specific cases. But, in a general way, the public is supportive of the U.S. participating in these kinds of operations, even when they do not have a direct effect on the U.S. national interests. And, poll questions that spell that out, poll questions that make the case that we should not intervene in Bosnia or Kosovo or Rwanda because it's far from the U.S. and we have no interest there, therefore, we shouldn't risk the lives of American troops in these kinds of operations, those arguments do not get majority support, even though they touch all the hot buttons. The majority rejects the idea that we should only be involved in operations that are connected directly to a narrow concept of the U.S. national interest.

BAKER: That's all I have. Thank you, Steve.

KULL: Okay. One thing on the UN, I don't know, few things, actually on the UN.

BAKER: Okay. I'm doing that for someone else for a show, so if you could just volunteer some information. Okay.

KULL: There is some concern about the effectiveness at the UN. At times, the UN's rating in terms of whether or not it's doing a good job or a bad job has slipped, particularly when the UN was in Bosnia. There was a perception that it was not doing a good job there, that it was too passive. So, there could be ups and downs in support for the UN's performance. But, in principle, support for participation in the UN and for the existence and continued existence and even strengthening of the UN is very strong and persistent. Now, it's also very interesting, the American public is ready to support the expansion of the UN in a variety of ways that are quite surprising, I think, to many members of the Washington policymaking community. For example, the idea of having a standing UN peacekeeping force made up of individuals who volunteered independently to be part of this force. So, it would be independent of any nation. Then it gets more than two thirds support. The idea of the UN having its own power to tax, to tax oil sales or arms sales, these ideas get strong majority support. There's an idea that the public is uncomfortable with the UN gaining this power, that it's going to take away U.S. national sovereignty and become a kind of world government. This is not a concern with the majority of Americans. There is a very vocal minority that is very strongly concerned about this, and they call and they write to members of Congress. They really make their voice heard. But, they're not representative. They're really not a large ____ of the public even. Very small minority.

BAKER: Okay. Is there another point?

KULL: I was just thinking. Because, I know there's something about the future of the UN. Overall, the American public thinks that, in the future, the UN will probably become a bigger factor, a more important factor. That the world is becoming more interconnected, more interdependent. And, that the UN is going to have a greater role to play in coordinating national activities so that we don't run into conflicts setting up principles for nations to have greater commerce and so on. This is, this, from the point of view of the American public, this is where things are going, it's natural, and that's something that they're comfortable with.

BAKER: One specific thing. As far as I last heard, the US still has an enormous back debt in UN dues. How does public support go in terms of paying that off?

KULL: Right. Uh, a majority of Americans feels that the U.S. should pay its dues and should pay its dues in full, should pay its back dues. There are some parts of the public that feel the U.S. has been paying more than its fair share, but when it's explained to them how this was, how the formula was arrived at, what the U.S. does pay and why, a strong majority says that that's fine, that's a fair share. So, it's, uh, but there is some sentiment out there that maybe we've been paying more than our share. Nonetheless, a majority feels that we should pay our dues in full. There is a significant minority that is concerned about this issue of international -- there is a portion of the public that is concerned about the question of abortion and our support for organizations that are involved with abortion. And, but, a fairly strong majority feels that it is inappropriate to attach this condition that we do not -- a fairly strong majority feel that this condition for paying our dues related to abortion is inappropriate. They do not want this amendment added to the bill to pay UN dues. Even if they have some support for the concern there.

BAKER: Can I just ask one more. You mentioned, with regard to Kosovo, that the public understood that China and Russia were going to somehow or could possibly in the Security Council block --

KULL: Uh huh. Uh huh.

BAKER: -- but, did you probe that any further and try to find out whether the U.S. should have cooperated more with the UN at different times during the crisis? __ go back?

KULL: No, no. All we did, we just, we did ask, though, you know, should we not proceed because we don't have security council approval? Should we go ahead -- it bothers me and therefore we shouldn't, it bothers me but we should anyhow, it doesn't bother me. And, only a small minority said it doesn't bother me. And, the largest portion said it bothers me but I think we should go ahead. Anything else on dues. Oh yeah, overall, the American public has the belief the UN is something considerably bigger than it is and that the amount of money that we spend on the UN is considerably greater than it is. When Americans find out how much it is, as a portion of the budget, most respond by going, gee, that's not very much at all. And, on average, they substantially increase it. They think we should overall be spending more money on the United Nations, that it's something that deserves more support than we're currently giving it.

BAKER: Hmm, interesting.

KULL: There's a widespread perception in Washington that the public perceives the UN as being this bureaucracy that's pervaded with waste, fraud, and abuse, and that that's a reason that they don't really want to support the UN or don't want to pay UN dues. Well, there is some concern about that. We asked, how much of the money that goes to the UN is lost to waste, fraud, and abuse? What's your, what's your estimate? And, the median estimate was thirty percent, thirty percent of the money was lost. And, that's a substantial amount of money. And, we wondered, well, maybe there's just this general concern about public institutions, so we said, well, how much of the money that goes to the U.S. government is lost to waste, fraud, and abuse? And, the median estimate in that case was forty percent. So, clearly, there is some concern about it, but it is not an overriding concern. And, it is not that the UN is perceived as specifically bad in this regard.

BAKER: It's all bureaucratic ______.

KULL: There's also some sympathy for the idea of withholding dues for a while as part of putting some pressure on the UN to improve its financial practices. That, most will say, we should pay our dues.

BAKER: We have been withholding them for a while.

KULL: Yeah.

BAKER: We'll divide between the elites and what they think the public thinks and what the public really thinks. How, why are they so out of touch?

KULL: According to what they say in, for example, after the deaths in Somalia in October of 1993, they received a deluge, they were deluged by --

BAKER: Can you start over again. Say, rather than they, say who, who is.

KULL: Members of Congress say that, after the deaths in Somalia in October of 1993, that the Congressional offices were deluged by calls and letters expressing outrage at the situation. They assumed that this was representative of the general population. Polls show clearly that it was not. But, it does appear that the people who get upset about these issues are more likely to take action to call and write, to, and they have stronger feelings about the issue. And, this has created an incorrect perception of the American public, as a whole. The majority are obviously concerned about these fatalities. And, whenever there are fatalities, it does make the public pay closer attention, it makes them ask harder questions, is this really working, is this really necessary, is this doing any good. But, if they believe that it is, that it is working and that it is doing good, that the goals are worthwhile and that they can be fulfilled, then the public says, okay, we're willing to accept some fatalities in support of those goals. Now, let me say one more thing, though, about that, because, no -- if, studies of public attitudes in regard to the Korean war, in regard to the Vietnam war, show that, over time, if there are fatalities and fatalities, week after week, week after week, at a certain point, the public will start saying, is this doing any good? Are we getting anywhere? And, if they perceive that it's not the case, then support will begin to drop. They're not, they won't take it forever. There is a point where the support will drop, and tell it can turn into real majority opposition. The public is very attuned to the question of fatalities. It's, it's, it matters a lot to them. They're by no means cavalier about the lives of American soldiers. But, they do believe that U.S. soldiers have made a choice to put their lives at risk and that there are goals for which it is appropriate to put U.S. troops lives at risk. And, if they perceive that it is going in a meaningful direction, they can sustain support, even in the face of those, in the face of those deaths. I know I'm repeating myself, I know you probably want -- [both talking at one time].

BAKER: Admiral Shanahan of the -- the whole notion of individual --

KULL: During the operation in Kosovo, when the three servicemen were captured, this got a lot of public attention, the support for the operation did not go down. In fact, it even went up slightly. It's unlikely that was due to the servicemen being captured, but it clearly did not go down. I think it's more likely that Americans respond to those events by getting angry than by getting a kind of fearful response of wanting to withdraw. Maybe you want me to say, ___ sixty percent for the operation, and it did not go down.

BAKER: Could you restate that --

KULL: Yeah, sure. During the Kosovo operation, when the three servicemen were captured, this did not have a negative effect on the support for the operation. Support for the operation was about sixty percent, and it actually even went up a little bit shortly after they were capture. I doubt that that was due to the fact that they were captured, but it's possible that it made the public more angry about the kinds of things that the Serbs were doing. It did not produce a response of, oh, here we go, now it begins, let's get out.