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Transcript Lessons of Kosovo:
The Limits of Air Power
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Col. Carl Bernard
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NARRATOR: On March 24th, 1999, the NATO alliance
began a bombing campaign against the regime of Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic. NATO hoped to stop the Serbian armed forces'
brutal attacks on ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo.
After 78 days of NATO airstrikes, Milosevic agreed to pull his
forces out of Kosovo, and to allow displaced ethnic Albanians
to return to their homes.
The conflict in Kosovo was portrayed as a victory for air power.
But NATO warplanes inflicted surprisingly little damage on Milosevic's
armed forces, and the Serb military remained virtually intact.
NATO bombs and missiles failed to prevent the murder and abuse
of ethnic Albanians at the hands of Serb forces. And unexploded
NATO bombs continue to menace both civilians and NATO peacekeepers.
In this chapter of "The Lessons of Kosovo," we'll explore
the limits of air power.
TITLE SEQUENCE
....Television for changing times NARRATOR: In 1992, war erupted in the former Yugoslavia. The
fighting raged for 3-1/2 years in Bosnia and Croatia, leaving
250,000 dead, and two million people forced from their homes.
The United States and its allies held Serbian president Slobodan
Milosevic responsible for most of the carnage. In an attempt
to extend Serbian control over the former Yugoslavia, Serb forces
loyal to Milosevic systematically brutalized Muslims and Croats
in Bosnia and Croatia.
WILLIAM COHEN: "Mr. Chairman, responsibility for the disintegration
of the former Yugoslavia and for this decade of barbarous atrocities
rests largely with one man: Slobodan Milosevic."
NARRATOR: In the Fall of 1998, reports surfaced that Serb military
units were attacking ethnic Albanian villages in the Serbian province
of Kosovo. The NATO alliance determined that it would not stand
idle and allow a repeat of the Bosnian tragedy. NATO resolved
to stop Milosevic from carrying out the "ethnic cleansing"
of Kosovo.
When diplomatic efforts stalled, and the violence in Kosovo intensified,
NATO decided to strike. Operation Allied Force had begun.
CG - March 24th, 1999
PRESIDENT CLINTON: "My fellow Americans, today our Armed Forces
joined our NATO allies in air strikes against Serbian forces responsible
for the brutality in Kosovo.... Our mission is clear: to deter
an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo
and, if necessary, to seriously damage the Serbian military's
capacity to harm the people of Kosovo. In short, if President
Milosevic will not make peace, we will limit his ability to make
war."
NARRATOR: While NATO's member nations were unanimous in their
desire to stop Milosevic, there were differences within the alliance
over exactly how NATO's military power should be used against
his regime. NATO's newest member countries - Hungary, the Czech
Republic, and Poland - were fearful of the consequences of a long,
destructive war in their neighborhood. And the entire alliance
was wary of a potential backlash from Russia, Serbia's closest
ally.
NEWMAN: "Do you say, "you know, well, it's for humanitarian
purposes, and therefore it's not worth fighting for? " I doubt
that that's the right answer. Do you say that it's for humanitarian
purposes so we're going to go all out as if, you know, we were
being attacked in our own back yard? That doesn't really seem
like the right answer."
NARRATOR: Richard J. Newman is a military correspondent for US
News and World Report.
NEWMAN: "How do you begin a war like this with a level of intensity
that can be decisive, and still hold together a number of nations
with divergent views about, frankly, whether NATO should be going
to war with this place in the first place?"
NARRATOR: NATO decided to fight a limited war, attacking only
carefully selected and approved targets in Serbia and Kosovo.
NATO used the most accurate bombs and missiles in the American
arsenal, fired from aircraft flying at a minimum of 15,000 feet,
or from nearby Navy cruisers and destroyers.
From the beginning
of the operation, the use of NATO ground troops in Kosovo was
ruled out. NATO's plan to rely exclusively on air power in Operation
Allied Force came under immediate criticism.
NEWMAN: "From the outset, senior people in the Pentagon.... said
in their advice to senior leaders in the White House, "We
don't think we can stop ethnic cleansing with air power alone..."
So there was always this friction between what the political
people wanted done and what the military people felt they could
accomplish.
NARRATOR: The dazzling speed, futuristic technology, and destructive
power of today's combat aircraft give them an aura of invincibility. But there is a
widespread tendency to overestimate their effectiveness
in combat.
BERNARD: "The movies were such a powerful influence. Everyone
saw these marvelous photographs of airplanes sweeping in, shooting
up the bad guys, and then going off while the music was playing.
And so there was a myth of aircraft that had caught the American
imagination. And those of us who were soldiers believed in this
as well. And we believed in this until we had to learn differently."
NARRATOR: Carl Bernard is a retired Army Colonel and a veteran
of the Korea and Viet Nam wars. Col. Bernard claims to have been
attacked from the air more times than any living American soldier.
More often than not, these attacks were from American aircraft.
BERNARD: "The first thing we Americans learned about American
aircraft, while they might be lost and shooting at you, they didn't
hit you. And that's the big secret. They don't hit you...."
NARRATOR: According to Col. Bernard, airplanes can be useful
tools in combat. But he says an attack from the air can be easily
escaped by well-prepared infantry units operating in familiar
territory.
BERNARD: "The futility of aircraft trying to attack a ground element
is well known. And every military school teaches you how to protect
yourself.... Now, can they hit a building? Sure. Can they hit
a bridge? Yeah. Can they beat a fighting element? No.
That's not proven at all."
LINK: "I think part of the problem with the early phases of the
NATO campaign was a lack of a clear military objective achievable
by air power."
NARRATOR: Charles Link is a retired Air Force Major General,
who today serves as president of the Air Force Memorial Foundation.
A strong advocate of air power, even General Link doubted NATO's
ability to stop ethnic cleansing with bombs and missiles.
LINK: "You may remember that in the opening days of this conflict,
I would suggest that somewhere in the neighborhood of 95% of all
of the expert military commentary predicted a failure."
NARRATOR: NATO's ruling out of the use of ground forces in Kosovo,
and President Clinton's decision to reveal that information to
the public, fueled the dismay and pessimism of military leaders.
LINK: "The problem was to announce that we weren't going to use
ground forces."
NEWMAN: "Well, I mean, just about every military or tactical expert
you'll talk to will say that's foolish - to begin a war by saying we're only gonna commit
so much to it. It just makes no sense."
LINK: "I think that was an extraordinarily foolish thing to do.
It was the equivalent of saying 'Milosevic, we're going
to attack you militarily, but we want to assure you that our commitment
is rather tentative,' ... although he knew he was playing
a much superior player, those bungled first moves put him in a
frame of mind that he might be able to hold out for at least a
draw, and maybe a win."
NARRATOR: President Milosevic almost certainly would have questioned
whether ethnic cleansing in Kosovo could possibly be worth the
immense damage Serbia would suffer in an all-out war with NATO.
But as many had feared, Milosevic found that surviving a muted
campaign of NATO airstrikes would be a far lesser challenge.
BERNARD: "These marvelous weapons, that reach and see everything,
doesn't defeat the ingenuity of someone dedicated to staying alive
and understanding how to fight."
Title: OBJECTIVE 1: STOP ETHNIC CLEANSING
NARRATOR: Operation Allied Force got off to a rocky start. In
the first month of the air campaign, nearly half of NATO airplanes'
combat missions were canceled due to bad weather. And uncertainty
lingered within the NATO alliance over how to strike effectively
at Milosevic's regime.
NEWMAN: "The air planners developed a list with something like
2000 targets on it, and ran it up the chain of command through
NATO and up through the political side of NATO, and were given
back a list with 200 or so targets on it, saying these are the
ones you're allowed to strike."
NARRATOR: NATO gambled that a few strikes on targets within Serbia
would force Milosevic to pull his troops out of Kosovo.
LINK: "I think the real objectives were to fight Milosevic into
folding early. And I think those were the expectations. And
I think those expectations permeated the entire 19-nation military
alliance."
NARRATOR: But the airstrikes did not deter Milosevic, whose popularity
among the Serb people had grown stronger since the bombings began.
LINK: "In terms of satisfying the expectations... I think military
force failed. Because it did not bring Milosevic to an early
capitulation."
NARRATOR: While NATO hesitated, Milosevic sprang into action,
creating a nightmare for both the NATO alliance and Kosovo's ethnic
Albanians.
During the first month of airstrikes, Serb forces in Kosovo grew
from about 30,000 soldiers to 47,000. Meanwhile, aggression against
ethnic Albanians accelerated. By the end of April, virtually
all of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians had been forced from their homes.
Without troops on the ground, NATO could not establish safe havens
for refugees within Kosovo. Those forced to flee were vulnerable
to both atrocities at the hands
of Serb forces, and accidental bombing attacks from NATO's warplanes.
And even those refugees who escaped safely entered neighboring
countries which were ill-prepared to receive them.
By mid-May, Milosevic and the Serb armed forces had swept through
Kosovo, and in the process had saddled southern Europe with a
monumental refugee crisis. NATO's bombs and missiles had failed
to stop the forced exodus of ethnic Albanians.
BERNARD: "If our objectives were protecting the people, causing
the Serbians to withdraw, to behave more humanly towards... their
ethnic minorities... we simply had totally misjudged what air
power could do."
Title - OBJECTIVE 2: ATTACK SERB MILITARY
NARRATOR: With Kosovo's ethnic Albanians forced out of Serbian
territory, NATO war planners found themselves with a freer hand
to pursue their second objective: to attack the Serb armed forces,
and to degrade the Serbian regime's military capability.
Over the last three weeks of the war, NATO intensified its bombing
campaign against a new list of targets in Kosovo and Serbia, including
water and power plants. Belgrade, the Serbian capitol, went dark.
At the same time, Milosevic's Russian allies began pressing him
to yield control of Kosovo to the NATO alliance.
COHEN: "As NATO intensified its bombing campaign and diplomatic
initiatives, Milosevic realized that he had to capitulate or risk
suffering irreparable damage to his regime, his military, and
his power.
NARRATOR: On June 10th, Milosevic agreed
to pull his forces out of Kosovo, and to allow ethnic Albanians
to return to their homes. NATO's leaders credited the bombing
campaign with forcing the Serbs' retreat.
SHELTON: "The air campaign accomplished the stated military objectives,
as well as the political objectives of the U.S. and the NATO alliance.
NARRATOR: As the air war drew to a close, NATO studied its own
video footage, aerial and satellite photographs, and put together
a picture of a stunning victory for air power. NATO claimed to
have destroyed more than 120 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, and
200 armored personnel carriers. NATO also claimed to have caused
between five and ten thousand Serb military casualties.
But NATO peacekeepers observing and counting the Serb forces withdrawing
from Kosovo spotted a disturbing trend. Light infantry, artillery,
and armored units, which made up the vast majority of Serb forces
in Kosovo, had been virtually immune to NATO attacks.
BERNARD: "The forces they put in came out in the same number,
and they looked as though they hadn't been beat up on for 78 days.
They hadn't been damaged."
NARRATOR: NATO observers reported that Serb forces appeared to
be orderly and in good spirits, with nearly all of their vehicles,
equipment and personnel intact. Since then, NATO has dramatically
scaled back its estimate of the damage done to Serb forces.
After 78 days and 11,000 strike missions, in which 20,000 bombs
and missiles were delivered, NATO may have destroyed or damaged
fewer than 20 Serb tanks, along with 'a few dozen' artillery pieces
and armored personnel carriers.
NEWMAN: "So now people think that NATO airplanes didn't destroy
nearly as many tanks, artillery pieces, and armored personnel
carriers, and other types of heavy equipment like that, as they
once thought. And the difference, they think, can be accounted
for by decoys."
NARRATOR: NATO's decision to avoid using ground troops in Kosovo
allowed Serb forces to use a variety of techniques to divert and
deceive NATO war planners. One such method was to build crude
silhouettes of military vehicles, bridges, and even roads, which
look like the real thing in satellite photos and radar images.
NATO pilots repeatedly bombed these decoys, believing each time
that they had destroyed a military target.
NEWMAN: "If you drive around Kosovo now, you see these things.
I mean they are oddities, curiosity pieces just sitting out in
a field. You'll be driving down the road and see what looks like
a toy tank from up close. But from the air, it just has the outline
of a tank."
NARRATOR: Serb forces were also able to deceive NATO's heat-seeking
radars and missiles by placing large drums of liquid in the sunlight.
After dark, as the liquid gave off its stored heat, it would
divert missiles and radar away from nearby Serb troops and equipment.
Another tactic used by the Serbs was to place damaged
vehicles or equipment out in the open. Bombing the same pieces
of equipment over and over again accounts for part of NATO's inaccurate
estimates of Serb losses.
NATO's early estimate of Serb casualties was also grossly
inflated. Rather than five or ten thousand, NATO peacekeepers
now estimate that less than 1,000 Serbs were killed in combat.
It is widely believed that the figure would have been even lower
had NATO not coordinated its attacks in the final weeks of the
campaign with the Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA.
The KLA, a guerrilla army of ethnic Albanian militants, is dedicated
to Kosovo's independence from Serbia. The majority of Serb casualties
in the air war are believed to have resulted from two American
B-52 bomber attacks on Serb units which had been driven into the
open by KLA troops.
NEWMAN: "And in the end, in order to really do some damage to
these people, it required, it did require ground force. It just
wasn't a NATO or U.S. ground force, it was the KLA fighters that
were forcing the Serbs to come out in the open...."
NARRATOR: Ruling out the use of NATO ground forces in Kosovo
is now viewed by many as a grave tactical error. It allowed the
Serbs to enlarge their forces, adapt their tactics, and all but
complete the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo.
Charles Link argues
that, perhaps worst of all, ruling out ground forces in Kosovo
allowed Milosevic to think he could win.
LINK: "To me, that was the fundamental problem. If you have
all of the American expert testimony, public testimony, that this
is probably not going to work, it probably induces an enemy that
thinks there's a chance of a successful holdout, to hold out longer."
NARRATOR: In many ways, Milosevic's tactics were successful
in the Kosovo war. He held the world's most potent military force
at bay while his own forces swept through Kosovo, brutalizing
his enemies. When his forces withdrew from Kosovo, they did so
at near full strength.
Thus far, Milosevic has escaped any serious punishment for his
aggression in Kosovo. And while the KLA has agreed to disarm,
Milosevic has not.
Title: AFTERMATH
NARRATOR: A perilous legacy remains from the air campaign. Both
NATO peacekeepers and the people of Kosovo face the daily danger
of 11,000 unexploded bomblets from American cluster bombs. Since
the end of the air war, bomblets have killed or maimed more than
80 civilians and peacekeepers in Kosovo and Serbia.
The NATO alliance will also have to deal with the political fallout
from the numerous accidental bombings which marred the air war.
In Kosovo, NATO missiles struck a number of refugee convoys mistaken
for Serb military units.
SHEA: "We made a mistake, regret loss of life, etc."
NARRATOR:
In Serbia, some attacks aimed at military or government targets
instead destroyed houses, hospitals, and other unintended targets.
NATO bombs destroyed or damaged eight foreign embassies in Belgrade
[China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Hungary, Switzerland, Spain,
Sweden], including a deadly attack on the Chinese embassy. As
many civilians were killed in the air war as Serbian troops.
LINK: "Of course the political objective would have been very pleased
if you could have just picked off Serbs in Kosovo with air power,
but that's not yet within our capability."
NARRATOR: NATO's political leaders described such unintended
destruction, known as "collateral damage," as an aberration
which can somehow be corrected. But even advocates of air power
suggest that such losses may simply be inevitable amid the chaos
of war.
LINK: "I think most airmen by this time have figured out that
collateral damage is something you can't control."
COHEN: "War remains a dangerous and uncertain business. Technology
and precision guidance have not eliminated the fog of war."
Title: LESSONS OF KOSOVO
NARRATOR: As the fog of war lifts from Kosovo, there are important
lessons to be learned. Firstly, the threatened or actual use
of air power will not necessarily bring about a quick and decisive
victory.
Secondly, sustained air attacks will almost certainly
claim the lives of innocent civilians.
And finally, that technology
developed to fight World War III is of limited use in humanitarian
operations.
But the hard lessons of Kosovo could be obscured by one headline-grabbing
statistic: in the Kosovo conflict, NATO forces did not suffer
a single casualty in combat.
NEWMAN: "It's a paradoxical thing, because of course, it's very,
it's a good thing that there were no casualties. But clearly
it establishes an expectation that you can have bloodless war,
that the American people don't have to worry... because the Pentagon
can just go off and drop some bombs and get foreign leaders to
bend to their will."
NARRATOR: Coming to grips with the limits of air power is vital
to both political and military planners as they set strategy for
any future military ventures. Otherwise the NATO alliance, the
Pentagon, Congress, the White House, and the American people all
risk falling under the same illusions: that superior military
technology can overcome poor decision-making; that a just cause
and a modern arsenal can allow us to overlook the harsh realities
of armed conflict; or that the decision to go to war can ever
be taken lightly, without the commitment to do what it takes to
win.
BERNARD: "The Koreans we were fighting then didn't give up because
they'd been shot at by airplanes. Nor did the Vietnamese, and
obviously, the Serbian army didn't either. And I don't think
anyone else will. The way they prepared and took care of themselves,
the way they looked when they left, said a great deal about how
effective our air power was and whether we should do it again.
FADE OUT.
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