JOHNSON: The war in Yugoslavia has become a sort of central feature of U.S./Russia relations. What's your kind of overall reading of its impact?

McFAUL: Well, I think the war demonstrates yet again how the United States and Russia see international affairs through fundamentally different lenses. I actually believe that the United States and the NATO alliance intervened in the war in Kosovo for humanitarian reasons, for what I would call to defend human rights, for what we call in academia, liberalism as opposed to realism. Whereas the Russians see the world through the prism of realism, they see it in many ways as a 19th Century balance of power politics, and what's good for your enemy is bad for you. The world is a zero-sum kind of world, and therefore, they look at Kosovo as being yet another defeat, another definition of their weakness, a representation of their weakness.

And so it's no surprise to me that now at the end of the war, the NATO alliance thinks that they are vindicated in affirming their commitment to defending human rights, and the Russians see it as a setback, and as a further evidence of the battle between the East and the West.

JOHNSON: So Russians are sort of not bringing to it this sort of moralistic sensibility, what are they bringing to it, in terms of how they think that their interests are being threatened, or that their national interest is at risk in what the U.S. and NATO have been doing?

McFAUL: I think it depends on who you ask in Russia. That is to say that there is not a unified set of foreign policy interests to which all Russians ascribe to. That is, there are different coalitions, different personalities that have very different views on what Russian national interests are abroad, and even in Kosovo.

If you look at the evolution of the policy, it began in a very vehement, anti-Western kind of stripe. It was dominated by what I would call the anti-Western ideologues, those then gave way to what I would call the anti-pragmatists, dominated by Prime Minister Primakov, who also saw that it was not in their interests to cooperate with the West. They wanted to use Kosovo to divide the West, but yet they also understood Russian's weakness, and were not going to do something stupid, that would not serve Russia's long term strategic interest from their view.

It then changed again, when Mr. Chernomyrdin came onto the scene. Mr. Chernomyrdin, in my view, is a pro-Western pragmatist, who sees cooperation with the West as something that is in Russia's national interest, and therefore he wanted to broker a settlement to keep the push towards integration of Russia into Europe on board.

Today, after the Russian troop movement into Kosovo, I think you see the rise of another coalition, the military, that was not happy with Mr. Chernomyrdin's definition of Russian national I interests. And, when they had the opportunity to do so, they tried to undermine it, and put it back on their terms.

JOHNSON: Russians, at least from the American point of view, did seem to basically play a constructive role in bringing about an end to the violence. And, kind of raised the profile of Russia here. As you look at the world, and situations on the borders of Russia, or Russia itself, are there other potential conflicts where a kind of cooperative mode might be productive?

McFAUL: I think there are, I think cooperation over the conflict, for instance, could be very useful, if the Russians and the western alliance could cooperate there. I think Russian cooperation in Georgia could be very useful.

And more generally, Russia has a lot of relationships with countries that the West has conflicts with, and therefore, to have a cooperative relationship, on Iran, on Iraq, on Korea, could be very useful, both for Russia and for the West.

The problem is, of course, is that not everyone in Russia agrees, and if those forces take hold, then it means that they would like to see an antagonistic relationship. So the very same places that could be seen as points of opportunity for cooperation could become flash points for genuine conflict between the West and Russia.

JOHNSON: As you look at the political season that is coming up in Russia, in the aftermath of the war in Yugoslavia, and NATO expansion, and whatever else are some of these difficulties, what kind of impact do you think we're going to see in Russian politics, you know, over the next year?

McFAUL: Well I think it's safe to say that all the viable candidates in Russia today are more anti-Western than Mr. Yeltsin. He's a strange character, Mr. Yeltsin. He makes a lot of erratic decisions, he's difficult to predict, but I think it's been true over the last decade that when push comes to shove, the Clinton Administration always thought, and still does think, that they can make the phone call to Boris, and to get the deal done.

And that happened on Kosovo, it happened on NATO expansion, it happened on a lot of issues over the decade. I'm not so optimistic that they'll be able to do that with the next president of Russia. Now, ironically, that might be a very positive thing, because it might take the personality out of it, it might take the volatility out of it, you might have a more coherent foreign policy under a new president of Russia.

But it will definitely complicate things, and it might make the West and the Clinton Administration, or the next administration, I guess we should say, to deal with the Russians on a more pragmatic basis, and not necessarily through such an ideological way that we've had in the 1990's.

JOHNSON: Just recently the Russian military have come up on the radar screen here. Some people might feel that the Russian military, having traditionally been very passive, are now kind of getting more engaged in politics. What's your reading about some sort of emerging prominence of the military in politics in Russia?

McFAUL: Well, I do think the Russian incursion into Kosovo with apparently not the direction sanction most certainly of the foreign ministry, and even Yeltsin's role is somewhat ambiguous. My guess is that he gave some general orders, and then the military interpreted those in a specific way.

But I think that's a dangerous precedent. I think we've worried about it for a long time. We all thought it would be coming, and now it's here; that is, that the military is acting more independently, following its own set of interests as it defines it, and it's especially scary when it happens abroad, but I think over the long run it'll be even more scary if it happens domestically within Russia.

I think it's too early to say that this is now the trajectory that Russia is on. This might just be a blip on the screen. And historically, even in the Soviet period, and in the pre-Soviet period, the Russian military does not have a tradition of intervening domestically in politics. I hope that will be the case in the post-Yeltsin era as well.

JOHNSON: The United Sates has had a number of sort of cooperative programs in arms control and in military areas, some of which have been at least temporarily disrupted and, will be returned. Your appraisal of sort of how things have been working in this area, perhaps what some new steps might be that would perhaps help to rebuild some of the fractured, lack of confidence. What can be done in this sort of traditional area of arms control issues?

McFAUL: In the traditional area of arms control, I'm not very optimistic about the future. In fact, we may be seeing the end of arms control as we know it, and we might just have unilateral policies that each side will pursue, and then they will coordinate them, but not try to negotiate them.

And by the way, that may not be such a bad model for the future, given where we're in the relationship and the levels that we're talking about. However, I think it's a time now to kind of think about non-traditional ways of cooperating with the Russians, and to reinvigorate those programs.

I'm convinced, in my dealings with Russia, and my dealings with Russians, that the best way to get cooperation with somebody is to deal with them on a personal basis, on a one-on-one basis, on a professional basis.

And I would like to see more of that, military to military cooperation, DMA to congressional exchanges, exchanges of staff, exchanges of youth, exchanges of everything. Because when you have that kind of engagement, and a personal relationship with somebody, it's much harder to walk away from it, it's much harder to be defiant.

And I've noticed this on a personal basis with some of my most militantly anti-Western friends, that it's easy to say something generically on television. It's much more difficult to say it face to face, when you're talking to me, a real live American. And I think the more we can do of that kind of interaction at the personal level, the better off both countries will be.

JOHNSON: So even with the rise of anti-Western sentiment, there's still a large constituency, even among the same people that may be anti-Western, that they're still having a capacity for cooperation, and looking to the United States?

McFAUL: I believe so. For the simple fact that I think most Russian elites, and even the anti-Western hard-liners, even the communist party believe that they need some form of integration with the West, to get ahead in the world. And they look at the laggards in the international community of states, and those are those that have been left out of the international system.

Now having said that, I think there's a real debate within Russia, after you've made that one first move, whether you want to integrate with Europe, or whether you want to have cooperation with the Untied States. To me, that will be a big debate in Russia, and I would not be surprised to see a greater focus on European integration, and less focus on cooperation with the United States.

JOHNSON: It's clear that there is a spectrum of Russian views, and not a singular Russian view of any subject. But, insofar as we may want to make a generalization, when Russians look at the Untied States today, having lived through the Yeltsin era, and sort of the era of euphoria, and then some disillusionment, when, what do they want from the United States today, both in terms of maybe sort of concrete benefits, but also in terms of what kind of attitude would they like the United States to have towards their country?

McFAUL: Well, if you're talking about the Moscow elite, I think it's one word, and that's "respect." They feel like they have been dragged through the 1990's as a crumbling superpower, as a country in disarray, and they would like to be treated with more respect as an international player.

The problem, of course, is not so much internationally how they react, but you get your house in order in home first, and then you will be given respect. This latest crisis in Kosovo, by the way, is a great example of that.

On the one hand, the Russian troops going into Pristina without authorization, to most Russians I've talked to, they are euphoric about it. They have put their thumb in the eyes of NATO, they have shown that they can still do things, and that they don't have to just listen to NATO commands.

But then when you think about the long term implications of that, what does it say to the rest of the world? It says that Russia is not a partner we can trust, that we are still in an antagonistic relationship with them, and it does this kind of long term damage.

So, I think respect is the number one thing that they want, but to gain that respect, they also have to be responsible for their actions. And that's where the tension lies. If you ask a common Russian person, what do they want from the West, I don't think respect is a big part of it. I think it is a chance to live a better like, and have the West remain true on its commitments to help to promote that.

There is now a lot of distrust in Russia, if you look at public opinion polls, where they no longer believe that that is the case. That they think that the Clinton Administration and the United States really had a sinister plan all along to destroy Russia. And we have to do something, I think, to show that that was not the case.

JOHNSON: What are some of the things that we could do that would be helpful in that regard?

McFAUL: Well, given the state of the relationship, and the lack of resources, and sort of the burnout on Russia that you have here in Washington, I don't think a massive Marshall Plan is in order. I don't think anybody will support that anymore; there just isn't the domestic support for it.

I think, perhaps on a smaller level, however, one might just have to remain true to one's normative statements that we make about things like democracy, about human rights, about these kind of things, and not be wishy washy in the name of supporting one individual or set of interests.

And to return to Russia a sense that we are a country committed to these principles, and to act accordingly, irrespective of what side it might be on in political lines domestically within Russia. I think if we did that, we would begin to restore America's reputation in Russia.

JOHNSON: American policy in Russia had been very much focused on Boris Yeltsin, this sort of major historical figure. How, do you have any sense of how history is going to look upon him, or how would we sort of encapsulate his role in the past ten years and what legacy it leaves?

McFAUL: I think it depends a lot on what happens in the next ten years. Like many legacies, after all. Yeltsin is on the cusp of being a hero of Russia, or a real failed leader, and it really matters on what happens in the next ten years. If in ten years' time, Russia is a stable democracy, and a country on the road to economic prosperity, I mean growth - I don't, call it capitalism, call it socialism, whatever it's called - but if there's real growth, economic growth in the country, then I think we'll look back and we'll say, "it all began with President Yeltsin. "

It was a rocky start. He made some very big important, critical mistakes, that he can't run away from, but, he was the one that started Russia on this new trajectory.

However, it's difficult to see that road today, and if Russia continues to stumble along, to have more economic problems, to have greater ethnic conflict throughout the Russian Federation over the next decade, then Russia will remember their first president, elected president, as the one who got them off on to the wrong path, and will be seen as a real, rather tragic figure.

JOHNSON: I've heard you mention that one of the changes that has occurred recently is that young people, who used to be considered to be very pro-Western have somehow, at least a significant portion of them, have kind of revised their views of the United States. How would you sort of state that at this point?

McFAUL: Well, I think right now in the wake of Kosovo, we have lost their confidence. These were always, the young people of Russia always banked on as being our allies, our fifth column in Russia, and once they came to power, then, you know, our interests would be better served. I don't think -- that assumption I think was flawed all along -- I think it's now seriously challenged in the wake of Kosovo, and we have to do something to regain their -- loyalty is the wrong word - to regain their commitment to values that we have.

I don't think it's a lost cause, but I don't think we can just assume that they're going to be on our side down the road. And you're back to the old debate about Russia's place in the world. Is Russia a European counter, is Russia something different? And quite frankly, I think we've done a lot in the last decade to try to signal to Russia that "you're not a European power," that "you're not part of Europe," that "we want to keep you out of Europe." And I think for us to have any chance of bringing Russia back in, we need to make different signals to say that fundamentally, Russia is a European power, and is part of the West, and should be part of the West. And it's those young people that are going to decide that.

JOHNSON: Do you see anything else coming down the pike here? We've had this war in Yugoslavia, which kind of really was a substantial setback in U.S./Russian relations, maybe in some ways a temporary setback. Is there anything else, you know, it comes on top of NATO expansion, which was really a major irritation? Is there anything else that's coming down the pike here that could keep this negative trend going, or can we anticipate that we'll get through this, and then we'll get back in a closer relationship?

McFAUL: Well, there are lots of things that will keep us in this negative status quo. NATO expansion as an issue has not gone away. In many ways, it has been accelerated with the Balkans war, because you have a new set of countries now in the Balkans that, de facto, are already protectorates of NATO, and those on the border, countries like Bulgaria, now want to be members of NATO in a much faster sequence than we had originally anticipated. So that issue will continue to be a problem.

I see the same kinds of problems when it comes to arms control issues, and ballistic missile defense issues. These are going to be things that we just don't see eye to eye on, and are going to continue along and be tensions in the relationship.

However, the thing that I'm worried the most about are issues of nuclear proliferation, and that is an issue that Russia can concretely threaten the interests of the West, and the United States. Under a different administration that's not so wedded to operation with the West, you might see that happen in Moscow. After the next presidential election.

And if that happens, that is the kind of issue that could really put us back into a confrontational relationship. And the reason for that is not so much what the Russians might do which might be an incremental step towards a more confrontational relationship, but what the reaction here in the West would be to, say, evidence that Russia is accelerating its nuclear cooperation with Iran.

And that's the kind of issues, those kind of proliferation issues, are the, I think are the real flash points of the relationship in the coming decade.

JOHNSON: There's the case of Iran. There's some other things that they could do as examples of this?

McFAUL: Iraq would be another, to just defy the sanctions. Listen, if you no longer believe that you have any chance at getting IMF money, you no longer believe that the West is serious about bringing you in, what's the easiest and fastest way to make money out there, hard currency? It's that kind of relationship with Iraq and Iran. And Russia, if it gets desperate, will be tempted to look to those markets.

JOHNSON: In the case of China, the U.S. has had a huge sort of economic relationship, a lot of business contacts which really haven't been present so much in Russia. Is there potential there that somehow has not been taken advantage of, for a much larger amount of trade, a much larger amount of American investment, so that we sort of got that underpinning of a substantial economic interest in Russia's fate?

McFAUL: Well, I think that is the key distinction. If you look at our Russia policy and our China policy, is to look at what domestic groups in the United States have an interests in the relationship, and what's striking on the Russia side is they just don't have any friends in this town.

Now that's a real problem, and so they get beat up on these issues a lot worse than China, even though China in many ways is a bigger, is a bigger problem for us on a lot of these issues. And I think you're right that foreign direct investment would change that in a big way, the problem of course is that for that to happen, things in Russia have to change, and we can only affect those on the margins.

However, I'm optimistic that that will happen. Russia's just simply too big a market for American investors to walk away from. You've had a - after the August 1998 financial crisis - of course, you've had a big letdown, a lot of the kind of speculative investors have left, but those that have long term investment strategies are still in Russia, and they see it's just too big a market to walk away from. And so, over time, I'm more optimistic that you'll have that kind of engagement. And therefore a change in American policy towards Russia.

JOHNSON: As we get into the election season, and Americans are sort of observing this and thinking about the end of Yeltsin, and the vast unpredictability of this, are you sort of optimistic about the post-Yeltsin era? Because I'm suspecting too many Americans are just going to be very fearful that some horrible thing is going to happen. And what's your sort of overall feeling about this?

McFAUL: Well, I'm cautiously optimistic, for the simple fact that Russia has in place a process for choosing its leaders that is an electoral process, and that's the best check on stupid, nasty leaders.

I firmly believe that, and they're precariously in place in Russia - let's have no illusions about that - they're not institutionalized, there could be a threat to them, but in the upcoming future, I don't see a real threat to elections.

I don't see anybody strong enough, quite frankly, to exercise a kind of authoritarian rule in Russia, and therefore that makes me optimistic that the people in Russia will have some control over its leaders, very marginal, elections are a very imperfect way of controlling one's leadership, but it's a start, and it's a beginning, and it allows for other kinds of controls.

And so over the long term I am optimistic that because Russia has those institutions in place, it has a chance for the future. And I mean both democratic, but also economic future. If you look at the region, the post-communist region, there is a striking and very strong correlation between those countries that are democracies, and those countries that have economic growth.

Our original assumption at the beginning of these post-communist transition was exactly the opposite, and in many ways I think this was maybe the greatest failure of American foreign policy in the 1990's, because we believed that we needed a strong executive, we needed an authoritarian, some would argue we needed an authoritarian leader in Russia to smash into place economic reform.

That model has proven not to work in the post-communist world, to the surprise of many, including myself. And the democracies are much better at it, and so Russia has a fledgling democracy, and they have a chance at actually then economic growth down the road.

JOHNSON: And public attitudes are committed to democratic values and elections? If you would sort of state that, is not my question. So the public is part of this picture, and they're a hopeful factor in some ways that you're going to describe.

McFAUL: The public, I'm most optimistic, I'm always most optimistic when the public has something to say about the policies, rather than the elite, and in Russia, it's very clear to me that if you look at opinion polls, that the Russian public is committed to what I would call "liberal democratic values."

They don't like those words, by the way, but when you ask them specifically about things that would fall into those categories, they're firmly in support of them. The one thing that does make me nervous and scared for Russia's future is the lack of commitment to fight for those principles.

When you ask people "are you for an independent free press?" an overwhelming majority says "yes, I am." When you ask another question, "are you willing to fight an authoritarian regime, and to protest against an authoritarian regime which might take away those rights?" then the numbers come way down. And that's a scary situation, because that means that there's the possibility that somebody could step in and would meet little resistance.

JOHNSON: How does the sort of money picture figure in? Show me the money?

McFAUL: Most people describe the Russian relationship with the IMF and the West as being dependent on the IMF, and therefore we have this lever that we can use to get their cooperation on Kosovo.

I actually see it the exact opposite, that is the IMF is as much dependent on Russia as Russia is on the IMF, because Russia is too big to fail, that IMF cannot afford Russia to fail, and the Russians have figured that out. And so they know that when push comes to shove, that we do not have that kind of leverage over them, and that really, the relationship is in the other way.

Now, that may be an overstatement, and I think it's important that the IMF remains involved to try to wield the kind of leverage that it has in other countries, but I think it's an overstatement to think that we can dictate terms to Russia, simply because we lend them this money.

And finally, let's not forget that these levels of money are not that significant in the grand scheme of things in Russia. So, I think we tend to overestimate the power we have over reform in Russia, and it doesn't matter if Anatoly is the person, or Mr. Primakov; whether it's a communist, a nationalist, or a liberal, they're all sort of in the same boat. They're all trying to turn this giant thing around one way or the other. They have very few powers to do so, and the IMF, in the interaction with those people, also has very few powers to do so.