JOHNSON: What are the important things that we should know about the Russian military today?

HERSPRING: The important things, I would say, first of all, the situation within the military is catastrophic. Institutional cohesion is gone to such a degree that I don't think you can even talk about the Russian military anymore; we'd have to talk about Russian militaries. The, I mean, examples of, their food is so bad, they've gone to two meals a day. They eat primarily vegetables, some cases of dog food has been given to them. I guess the best comment that I heard was a Russian saying that potatoes are better guarded than nuclear weapons, because the situation is so bad.

It is in a situation where the military is simply not combat-capable. There are some units that could be used for military purposes, but by and large, it has gone to the point where Marshall Sergeyev has said that they will not get any new weapons until the Year 2005.

They have not had any weapons for years in most areas, division level exercises have not taken place. Everything is by simulation. One could just go, discipline has collapsed, drugs are a major problem, alcohol is becoming a major problem. Medical facilities are nonexistent. Their budget, they're getting very, even though they increased their budget, they're lucky to get forty or fifty percent of what in fact they're promised by the legislature. Tax collection simply doesn't happen. So, I would say from one end to the other, the situation is just absolutely catastrophic.

JOHNSON: Is this good for the United States? We used to look at them as the enemy, and now they're very weak.

HERSPRING:I don't think the collapse of the Russian military is to the American benefit. A case of hungry soldiers running around the country looting, with a country full of nuclear weapons, is frankly one scenario that scares me, one that I think is not totally impossible, and I think that American security is integrally linked to Russian security.

We cannot ignore what's happening, the consequences for us, the consequences for Europe, the consequences for the rest of the world, would be too serious if the situation is allowed to get worse, to the point where you have a total collapse.

JOHNSON: What has the U.S. been doing with regard to conditions in the Russian military and their nuclear weapons? We've had some programs...

HERSPRING: We've had programs for dealing with the Russians that aim at helping them get rid of chemical weapons, get rid of some nuclear weapons, that sort of thing. We've had in the past, exchange programs with them, most of those are, or at least the exchange parts are on hold because of the Kosovo experience.

JOHNSON: And the U.S. military's experience in their cooperation. Has it been a positive experience?

HERSPRING: I think it certainly has been a positive experience. The U.S. military certainly had a very positive experience in dealing with Russians. Russian military work much better dealing with other militaries than they do with their own citizens. They tend to be very professional. My son-in-law just came back from Bosnia, worked with Russians in Bosnia, found them to be very professional and easy to work with.

My experience in dealing with Russians is that they're extremely good at what they do. They know how to do it, they simply don't have the wherewithal to do it. Pilots are being forced to go into ground forces, because they go through four years of school and never get a chance to fly an airplane. Because there's no gas to fly.

And when it comes to things like peacekeeping, Russians are very good at that; they know what to do, and they know how to do it; they simply don't have the wherewithal to do it.

JOHNSON: The Russian peacekeeping role in Kosovo, then, should be something that will work out?

HERSPRING: I think the Russian role in Kosovo will work out. I'm a little concerned about the way they assigned sections and left the Russians sort of dangling. I don't think that sends a good message to Moscow.

But if there is a political decision to make positive use of the Russian peacekeepers, I think the Russian peacekeepers will do whatever they're told to do, and they certainly are capable professionally.

Now, whether, what the political decision will be in Moscow, whether they're told to sort of do this, but side with the Serbs, that's a political decision; that's not something that will be a military decision.

JOHNSON:When the controversy over Kosovo sort of subsides and the military contacts are re-established, what are some suggestions you may have for improving or expanding on what's been happening so far?

HERSPRING: I would argue that once Kosovo is behind us, and Kosovo is not forever, that we try and pick up on the contacts we've had in the past with the Russians. Military to military exchanges are important.

I've watched Russian military officers come and study in this country, it helps them understand much better the complexities and the nuances of how we do things here.

I would argue that we should go, think in the area of joint peacekeeping operations, maybe set up a peacekeeping academy under NATO auspices, where Russians and Americans and others will work together.

In the meantime, I think that the really serious and urgent need is to follow up on the suggestion that has been made for providing them with food, the ubiquitous MRE's, blankets, medical assistance, that kind of thing, which I think our military can provide.

The argument has been raised that this will not work, because some colonel will take it and pocket all the money. There are enough former military officers who have done on the on-site inspection agency who know corruption a-la-Russki as well as the Russians know it. And I think that's a problem that can be handled.

I don't think that's an insurmountable one, but I think it's an urgent need, and I can still remember being a young diplomat in the Soviet Union, and being told by Russians of how much they'd like Spam, or they remember Jeeps, or "villies," things of that nature. My attitude toward the Russian military is it's far better to provide an open hand than a mailed fist.

One has to remember that the British Empire collapsed over a period of 25, 30 years. The Russian Empire collapsed in a year. A lot of these people are very resentful. A lot of these people feel like that they've been, their world has collapsed and we're taking advantage of it.

We may be turned down, and probably will be turned down by some, but let's go ahead and make the offer again. But let us be the ones who are providing, or offering to provide, the assistance that they desperately need, without political strings attached, because it's in our own national security interest. It's money spent that would otherwise have to be spent on weapons systems to counter Russians when we start having the situation of Russian soldiers running loose around the country.

We already have them in mafias; we already have them in other areas that they've moved into which are not in our interest, and so for that, just for national security reasons, I think we should be proactive rather than reactive.

JOHNSON: The different perspectives that the two countries brought to the war in Yugoslavia obviously led to different policies and different preferences. How would you describe the essential sort of motivating factors of Russia as it had to react to the NATO war there?

HERSPRING:I am one of the - when looking at Russian reactio - I'm one of those who say that I don't think that the slavophilism is really the major reason. Yes, they shared religion, yes, they share a historical background. The Russians were deeply resentful, not because so much because the Serbs were Slavs, but because in the beginning the Russians were excluded. And it's a case of inferiority complex, it's a case of a country that lost its power, that couldn't do anything.

For example, the Russians talked about sending six ships from Sebastopol into the Adriatic. My feeling is, having been on some of those ships, that if they had sent them there, we would have probably had to rescue them. And that creates a deep feeling of impotence on the part of Russian military officers, a feeling that the world's against them, and we happen, from their perspective, we look like we are trying to take advantage of them.

Which is why I believe we have to, we need to take advantage of an opening now that we will have to try and say no, we're not trying to take advantage of you; we're trying to reach out and help, and slowly change perceptions, because I remain convinced that the most important, the most important attitude in international relations is perceptions.

And if we can change the attitudes of a lot of Russian military officers not to the point where they love us, or even like us, but that they understand that we have tried to be of assistance, I think that will pay benefits for the next 20 or 30 years. Because Russia's down now, but Russia's not down forever.

Russia may, the situation may even get worse, but at some point, the Russians and the Russian military will be back. And the question will be then, where are they, what do they think, do they look upon us as a country that kicked them when they were down, or look upon us as a country that tried to help them when they were down? I would much prefer the latter than the former.

JOHNSON:Why did the Clinton Administration draw the Russians into a permanent role in the war?

HERSPRING: I think that most of the credit for that goes to Strobe Talbott. I think that most have realized, people like him realize what's at stake, and they realize how the Russians, how left out they felt, by the way they were being treated. I think it was a very wise move, I think we can now look back and say that there would not have been an agreement without Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin, and Chernomyrdin, his shuttle diplomacy was absolutely critical in this, because Milosevic for a long time was trying to play the Russian card, and once he realized that Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin were simply not going to put up with it, I think that was more critical in turning him around than I think a lot of the bombing was, because it was the final realization that the Russians were not going to continue to support them, and in fact the Russians really had no way to do anything. But I think by getting the Russians involved, giving them the feeling in the civilian world that we care about them, and that they are a valuable partner, I think that was absolutely critical, and I think that the credit for that probably goes to Strobe Talbott, who spent hours and hours working on this. This is somebody who understands Russia, and understands the Russian mentality.

JOHNSON: Is this something that can be done again? In looking around the world, are there other crises, or potential crises, where sort of enhanced cooperation between these two countries, or their friends, could pay off?

HERSPRING: I think there are, I think there are a lot of places around the world where we can find the Russians useful in terms of cooperation. I can't think of the incident right now, if we took something like East Timur, or something like that. First of all, we'd have to have political agreement, but more importantly, we'd have to understand that the Russians don't have what the military will call "the tail" to do anything. I mean, as for the ROC5A's, where we had the exercise at Fort Reilly, Peacekeeper '95, we sent the planes over, we paid for the gas, we flew them back here, we provided the buses from Wichita to bring them up to Fort Reilly. That's the situation they're in. But even having said that they're in that kind of a situation, I think that the mere fact that we want them to be involved is going to have a very positive effect. They probably won't play a major role; maybe they'll just have a small company one place or something else, but yes, I think it can. It's first of all and foremost a political one; the military is not a problem, because the military are good at this, and I would like to see countries like Canada, for example, take the lead in this. First of all, they're not as threatening from a Russian standpoint, and second of all, I remember a long time ago, the Canadians knew a lot more about peacekeeping than most countries in the world have ever thought about. And I would like to see them playing a major role, perhaps having a peacekeeping academy there, having, running troops through it. Militarily, this is not a very difficult thing to do, recognizing the limitations on the Russians, it's really a political question, and a question of whether there's a political will, because it'll be frustrating. I've dealt with Russians all my life, military and civilian. They can be very frustrating, they can be very hard to deal with, and I suspect they would probably say the same thing about dealing with Americans. But we're talking about building a foundation, not the house. And we build the foundation first, and the house will come later.

JOHNSON: Back to Russian attitudes and perceptions. NATO expansion produced a negative reaction, the initiation of the war was very unpopular, and even the mission of Chernomyrdin had been widely condemned in Russia for sort of giving in to NATO, kind of being an errand boy for NATO, in communicating. And some of this may dissipate, but you know, as we look at the next six months, a year, some people have predicted that the nationalist or communist forces are going to do very well in elections now, in part because there's this growth of anti-Western sentiment. Is that your sense of what's going to happen from this point on? Is the discontent with NATO and the U.S. something that is going to be playing a significant role in Russian politics over the next year or two?

HERSPRING: Russian discontent with NATO and with NATO expansion will continue to be a problem, particularly if you start bringing the Baltics in, less of a problem if you talk about Romania and Slovenia. I think the situation is very serious, which is why I think we should be proactive, rather than reactive. We need to do things that will at least try and show that we're cooperative, and help dissipate to some degree that resentment. We won't get rid of it all; we have to realize, it's time for the American body politic to understand, we don't snap our fingers, and the rest of the world jumps to whatever tune we want. We have to make it, do actions, as one person once said, it's better to light a candle than curse the darkness. Now the candle may not light the whole building, but if we can do, the more, the greater the degree to which we are able to increase military-to-military cooperation, the greater degree to which we will provide support for the more moderate, the more reasonable parts of Russian society. That, I think, is absolutely critical for us, because the problem is serious, there is a lot of resentment, and I think that rather than sitting back and saying gee whiz, there's a lot of resentment, we have to ask ourselves, what can we do? Recognizing that we can't change water into wine when it comes to Russian attitudes; that's a Russian problem. A very serious problem as to what comes after Yeltsin. Yeltsin's primary accomplishment at present seems to be to change somebody every time they get a little bit of power, he changes somebody. And nothing is really, the country is not really moving in a positive direction. Is it going to be __________, __________, __________, __________? I don't have the foggiest idea, and all I can say is I'm in very good company, because nobody else does, either.

JOHNSON:You may not have a good idea about the personality, or the identity of the sort of successor to Yeltsin, and of course, he's dominated this whole period in such a way as sort of, he's the giant, and everyone else is a midget. Nevertheless, even though it looks like Russia has failed in many respects, especially economically, is, should Americans be looking with great trepidation to the post-Yeltsin era, or are there elements of optimism or a more positive attitude that we should be looking at?

HERSPRING: Looking at the post-Yeltsin era, all I see is complete confusion, which is why I don't' want us to wait until the post-Yeltsin era, I want us to get moving as soon as is politically feasible. I want us to start taking the kind of steps we need to be taking, so that when the post-Yeltsin era comes in, when they start fighting over who's going -- we're already there on the ground, doing things that are seen as having a positive impact, on the Russian populace, or in my area, especially on the Russian military, so that that can help to some degree ameliorate using the United States as the bogeyman for the current situation. That doesn't mean it won't happen, we know enough from our own politicians that they'll use whatever they can get away with, and some of them will do it, __________, __________ will clearly use it. But I think that if we can get moving now, and not sitting around, you know, twiddling our thumbs, but get moving now and get these programs into place, I think we can have a very positive impact in helping on the periphery, shape things.

JOHNSON:One of the big Russian complaints about the war in Yugoslavia has been the fact that this is sort of NATO in its new incarnation, going out into the world to work its will, outside of the United Nations, outside of the Security Council, and the Russians alleging that this in a sense is illegal; you need to get Security Council, back -- Is there an issue here? Is there a way in which the cooperation between Russia and U.S., between NATO and Russia, should be more sensitive to the United Nations, the Security Council?

HERSPRING: You raise, the question of the United Nations versus NATO, I guess I'm one of those old-timers who says international law, international organizations are a good idea, as long as they're useful to us, to further what policy we want. Certainly, the NATO, the UN was not going to be useful to us in the other aspect, and the way to handle this is to try and draw the Russians more closely into NATO, not to where they dominate NATO, not to where they have a veto over NATO, but where they have a feeling that they are having a positive impact, that they are being listened to. We may not always do what they want us to do, but I think that in the beginning, we didn't take enough consideration of them and the role they're playing. I think in recent weeks and months, we have, and I think you can already see the more positive reaction, and Chernomyrdin has taken flack, certainly from General __________, since he's come back to Moscow, for what he's done. But he's prepared to do it, and Yeltsin's prepared to do it, so, while there's an opening, seize it. As Chairman Mao used to say, you know, seize the moment, seize the second, seize the hour.

JOHNSON: I think when President Clinton was in Moscow last, one of the agreements that they were pursuing was some sort of cooperation on early warning. What was the shape of that, and has anything happened as far as you know?

HERSPRING: I'm not privy to the details of that. All I know about that is that we have been working on the Year 2000 Y2K problem. I know that we have been trying to be of assistance to them, in terms of dealing with a lot of these issues, so that they will understand what is and what is not a threat. I mean, the biggest danger we have right now with the Russians, from a military standpoint, is their conventional forces have collapsed, they are putting increased reliance on nuclear weapons, their command control __________ is not working -- we saw that with the Norwegian weather shot -- their missiles, it's not certain that they'll even leave the launch pad, let alone hit something. Their new missile, the __________, they're producing ten of them a year, and it's not clear that they're going to be working well. What is absolutely critical is that, whoever succeeds Yeltsin, is we have open lines of communication, because it's a very, very dangerous situation, if the only option you have to respond to a threat is to push a nuclear button. I mean, a nuclear weapon can ruin your whole day, and we don't want that situation, where the Russians feel that all they can do is to pop the button. And for that reason, I want people talking, I want Russian admirals to understand what American admirals are saying. I want American generals and Russian generals to be able to talk to one another. It's in our interest, frankly, to help them with their early warning system, so that they can understand what's coming and what's not coming. Because I don't want them going __________ level, just because they think that a weather satellite's headed to knock out Moscow.

JOHNSON: One of the Russian worries about the war in Yugoslavia is whether in the future there might be some occasion when, either in Russia itself or on its border, there could be an ethnic conflict, a kind of situation in which NATO might be tempted to feel that it should be involved militarily; this notion that, first it's Yugoslavia, then it's us. Is there any prospect that the collapse of the Russian military, with the disintegration of the economy, with the political uncertainty in Chechnya, and other events in the North Caucasus, is this scenario of Russians fearing NATO intervention in their affairs something of significance?

HERSPRING:I don't think NATO in its wildest dreams wants to get into something, wants to get into interfering in Russian internal affairs. If a country totally collapsed, and had nuclear weapons -- this is a, you know, worst case scenario -- who knows? Who knows? The Russians might well ask for outside assistance. The question of whether in Georgia or Azerbaijan, or this kind of -- Armenia -- the Russians have been doing their own intervention, and I don't think NATO really wants to get into that. I think that one thing that people are beginning to understand, is it's very important to take Russian concerns into consideration. Not necessarily to follow their recommendations, and I think to a large degree, NATO has been doing this. We're caught, of course, with the domestic situation in this country, with the Balts wanting NATO membership, the Russians being concerned about it, the Rumanians wanting membership, the Bulgarians -- Will we go that far? I don't know, but what's important is that as we move, we get the Russians to move with us, so that they don't feel like they're being left out.

JOHNSON: This is sort of big picture -- the sort of paradigm or model that we have been bringing to Russia as Americans, you know, was this sort of reformers versus the kind of anti-reform forces, and Boris Yeltsin is the sort of clod but sort of leader of this reform process. And, you know, many people would maybe think that the Clinton Administration's policy towards Russia hasn't been particularly successful. I don't know whether in the next presidential campaign there will be any debate about who lost Russia. Maybe the positive outcome of this war in Yugoslavia, in some respects, and the Russian role. How do you see Russia as an issue, being or not being an issue in American domestic politics? Is Russia really just almost completely off the radar screen as far as American, Americans are concerned?

HERSPRING:I don't think Russia is a major concern, will be a major concern in the election. I'm not even sure Kosovo will be. Remember, we had, George Bush did overwhelmingly well in the Gulf War, then come election time, he was popular, and at election time he lost. Russia is important primarily to a group of elites who understand what's at stake. When you get to the heartland, and you say, the Clinton Administration really didn't have a policy vis-a-vis Russia, because they didn't, it didn't, people say so what? Who cares? What's the price of wheat? What's the new unemployment level? Vietnam was probably the only foreign policy issue that ever determined an election. I think that in the main, maybe people in the East Coast elites, West Coast elites, who really concern themselves with foreign policy. This could hurt Gore, but I don't see it as a significant thing, because, when you play the Who Lost China game, we have the bad communists. Play the Who Lost Russia, who's going to take over, and who wants it, I mean if you want to really, you know, alienate your best friend, offer him Yeltsin's job.

JOHNSON: That's good. I think that's, anything else that you want to say that occurs to you that I haven't brought up?

HERSPRING: No, I can't think of anything.

JOHNSON: Okay.