JOHNSON: You're an American journalist who's spent quite a bit of time in Moscow...

MR. BERNSTEIN: Mmh-hmm.

JOHNSON: ...as in the past, what's it like being in Moscow these days?

BERNSTEIN: It's interesting because it's changed since August '98 and the financial crash in a -- I wouldn't say a dramatic way, but in a noticeable way -- and it's become more like it was when I first arrived there about '92, the end of 1992.

The reasons are obvious. There was a financial collapse, and people are a lot poorer, and you feel that on the streets of Moscow; you feel that walking around Moscow. And -- now, it was not as dramatic as some people might have thought here, because people were -- the people's perceptions here tend to lurch from extremes -- every -- either everything is going great or everything is miserable. But there's been a noticeable downturn in the standard of living and I --- and as a matter of fact, it's interesting but in the last month or so, and I've checked this with some of my expatriate friends there, there's a sense that there has been a recent downturn, more poor people, the level of pros -- open prostitution in the streets is ju -- is phenomenal, frankly.

And there's a sense of a deep socioeconomic crisis and you're talking about this in Moscow, which is the richest region of the Russian Federation, so...

JOHNSON: But also just notice of the reputation that Americans might have. Now, at one point there was some pretty loud demonstrations. So it -- are Americans safe, are they feeling safe?

BERNSTEIN: Yeah. I -- you know, there's -- again, I think the good thing to do when you're approaching Russia, no matter what, is not to go -- lurch to extremes like, you know, everything is coming up roses or the apocalypse is around the corner. But there's no question that since the NATO conflict in Yugoslavia started that there's been an upsurge in anti-Americanism.

I think -- I wouldn't exa -- I think you get more of that explicitly and more deeply held among the elite. Among ordinary people, they're less concerned with it, but there is no question that when people have an opinion on it, it's negative. I have never met a Russian who supports it -- not one, and I've talked to many.

JOHNSON: Anti-Americanism is a term that we use here. What does this mean? Can you put some meat on that phrase?

BERNSTEIN: Yeah, I can. I mean, I think in the Russian context it's not something except in exceptional cases or extreme cases that you might experience in some Latin-American countries. In other words, since Americans are more alien, there's not that more visceral hatred or dislike that you might get because of, you know, various historical circumstances between the United States and a country nearby.

But on the other hand, I think what's happened, it's more of a sort of a disillusionment, because when I first arrived in '92, '93, I think there was a noticeable pro- -- and at least in Moscow -- pro-American sentiment, and more pro-Western. There was a sense that, you know, the United States can help us and we want to be like you, et cetera.

That already began to wither away well before the Yugoslav war started, so I think that in some senses the Yugoslavs' war became merely a catalyst for things which had already been present for a while. And just that disillusionment had set in because of the failure of economic reform in Russia, that I'm quite sure of.

JOHNSON: The acceleration of discontent with the United States because of the war, what is it about what the U.S. was doing that has been particularly aggravate?

BERNSTEIN: Well, I think -- look, you know, some people will say to me, "Well, you know, why is it that the Russians are against it?" or they'll say, "Well, I know the Russians are against it because they're Slavs and the Serbians are Slavs, and they have this ethnic link," and that's undoubtedly part of it, but I think that there -- they don't like it for the same reason that a lot of Americans probably don't like or, or a lot of Europeans. They don't like it because they're against it and they think it's a -- it's an unjustified war.

I -- in other words, I'm -- but again, among the elite, I think it's fair to say there's a -- there is an element of envy of superpower loss. In other words, the America is now the sole superpower; it's throwing its weight around. We used to be one and we don't like this.

But for ordinary people, I think they just -- they're against the war because they don't think it's a justified war. Granted, there was some skewed media coverage, particularly at the beginning, but I -- you know, and I'm sort of ashamed to say this -- but I think that once it became more balanced, it was -- the coverage in Russia has been as balanced or more so than here or in the UK, where I was recently.

JOHNSON: One of the worries expressed by Russians was that, well, first NATO's going to go to war in Yugoslavia, then they might come here. What's your reading of this as a problem?

BERNSTEIN: Well, I've heard that sentiment expressed. I tend to think that that's a little bit paranoid, although, again, given Russia's history and given its -- yeah, given its past, you can see why that might develop. I -- I mean, I personally think it's -- it is a bit paranoid. But there is no question that you -- I've heard it a lot, and I've heard a lot from different types of people.

JOHNSON: Do you see any scenarios or areas where this could happen?

BERNSTEIN: Well, you know, oddly enough, I did -- I did think it was totally absurd, and I don't think it will happen now, but I'm af -- I'm worried that the way the peace agreement is implemented actually could -- might bring that about, because you have this uncertainty about Russians' mandate, the NATO forces' mandate -- this is as far as the peacekeepers are concerned. You have the KLA on the ground. And in fact, if things don't go well and a confrontation develops, then you have Russian troops and NATO troops in close proximity, and that's a bit worrisome. But I don't know how that'll turn out.

JOHNSON: In the former Soviet Union where they've had problems in the Caucuses and Armenia and et cetera, et cetera, and -- or Takistan, any of those areas where NATO might be drawn in -- were the Russians worrying about this?

BERNSTEIN: Yeah -- well, I think they have this worry because they believe that NATO originally was, you know, to be a defensive alliance and that's the way basically they were told NATO expansion was going to work. And now they do have a certain basis for thinking that it's -- that the mandate has been superannuated, that there's a new mandate, and I -- again, I don't think that that worry is, will materialize, but on the other hand, you can -- you can to some degree understand why they might think that. Where does the peacekeeping mission end?

JOHNSON: Another interpretation is that Russia and America have sort of cooperated in Yugoslavia. Russia has been sort of brought back from being in the background. Any prospect that this kind of cooperative approach to conflicts or possible conflicts could be replicated, could be a model?

BERNSTEIN: It depends. I think the thing -- the problem is, is that in the Yugoslav conflict, it's very unclear what the basis of cooperation is. In other words, I think it's -- if the cooperation works out, I think it's a good thing that it's working out. But on the other hand, I think that the Yeltsin Administration basically wanted to seize hold of the policy, take it back away from Primakov when he was running it, give it to Chernomyrdin. This is my sort of cynical view of this, but this is the way I think the Kremlin would be working, in order to use it as a bargaining chip for other things.

So I -- I mean, in other words, the cooperation will depend much on what they think they can get out of it and what they do get out of it. I think that includes funding from the International Monetary Fund and other international lending institutions from the G8 and then it may also include an understanding that if something doesn't quite go to democratic norms in Russia that we might look the other way. I'm guessing on that, but I have that gut feeling.

JOHNSON: There has been a flurry of pro-Yeltsin editorial comment when we were sort of getting not as in love with him as we had been; suddenly we're getting a lot of pro-Yeltsin feeling. So you're saying one consequence of this might be that we would get back into supporting him in the political realm. How do Russians perceive Yeltsin these days?

BERNSTEIN: Gee -- he is conc -- frankly, and I'm not editorializing here, I'm merely giving you my sense among Russians -- he's seen both as sort of a joke and with a certain amount of shame. And the comparisons are constantly made to the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, because Brezhnev was believed to be an -- and appeared to be in -- very bad physical health at the end of his years but he stayed in and there's lots of rumors that he was kept in power basically by, you know, sort of the best pharmacological science of the day. And there's a lots of rumors that that same thing is happening with Yeltsin.

His popularity rating at this point is down to 2%, in that range, so it's fairly clear that he -- you know, he's -- as far as public opinion is concerned, his day is long done. That's my overwhelming sense.

JOHNSON: Russians probably really didn't fear Brezhnev, but maybe they do fear Yeltsin. What he's capable of doing?

BERNSTEIN: Well, I don't know. You know, I mean, fear in the sense I think fear of more unpredictability. In other words, I think that there's a strong sense of nervousness both at the elite level, maybe less of a sense of nervousness at the mass level because people are just not that engaged in the politics; they just try to stay out of it. But there is a certain fear that they're not -- that this transition is coming up, that he's extremely ill, that there's a very active inner circle who are struggling for power and trying to use him in their struggle powers, an ailing leader, and that they're not sure that the June 2000 elections may -- will either come off at all, will come off in a democratic fashion, or what kind of games might be played in the walk up to that. I think that -- and you get a sense the atmosphere is much more nervous than I've seen it since perhaps '96 elec -- Presidential elections, or in '93, crisis, confrontation between the Parliament and Yeltsin.

JOHNSON: How would you describe what the United States has been trying to accomplish in Russia in this post-Soviet era? Of course, it's been basically working through President Yeltsin. A lot of people think that not much has been accomplished. But what has the U.S. been up to? Is it still up to the same goals? And how would you describe the gap between what it's been trying to accomplish and reality?

BERNSTEIN: Well, I think -- I think that the re -- the goals originally were probably reasonable goals, and I wouldn't know, but it was going too far because every country is really serving its self-interest, but not unreasonable goals, and they were ones actually that I shared. I still share them, the basic goal, but more specific goals I shared when I originally got there, arrived there, back in '92. But I came to renounce them in essence because the goals obviously were to build a democracy and a market system and -- but it became over time a -- the goal of supporting Yeltsin. It became a total investment in Yeltsin's Administration. And I think that that was intellectually an error and I think that it helped -- I'm not -- I'm not going to say that it was the sole reason, but it helped create a situation of basically unaccountable government in Russia, I mean which is nothing new in Russia, but I think it reinforced Yeltsin's worst tendencies.

He figured he had the backing of the United States and therefore the West, the financial institutions, almost no matter what he did, and there was no brake on his behavior, therefore. I think that was -- it was bad.

JOHNSON: Is there hope for Russia after Yeltsin? You know, for a long time, part of the Yeltsin mystique has been, well, I may be at fault, but I'm the best of what's...

BERNSTEIN: Sure.

JOHNSON: ...around, and it was hard to see what else was around, but -- and I'm sure we're going to have a lot of worries about this problem or whatever...

BERNSTEIN: Sure.

JOHNSON: ...is before us. What's your instinct about this?

BERNSTEIN: Well, I mean, I'm not utterly pessimistic and cynical about it, although it's very easy to be that way in Russia -- I -- depending upon various things.

I am worried that there is the possibility that he, if he is alive, if he stays alive, will try to stay in power, or that his entourage will try to keep him in power, and it's sort of a distinction without a difference, essentially. That scenario would be very negative, I think, because it would mean that Russia had not set the precedent of transferring executive power, which in Russia is total power virtually, from one administration to another, from one group of people to another group of people.

And there are lots of ways they could avoid doing that, and I think that the West, in watching this, should be very, very sort of vigilant in seeing what -- whether this electoral process is a genuine one, one which I didn't think they did properly in 1996, by the way.

If that transfer is made, even if it's to someone we may not like so well, and that could be, for instance, the Moscow mayor, Yuri Lushkov, who's looking like one of the frontrunners now, the precedent itself would be more important than who followed, because if we didn't like Lushkov or --- who knows -- I mean, I don't know; Lushkov might end up to be a better leader than we think -- but even if he wasn't, the precedent would already be set, and you would have the possibility to get someone better, or different down the line.

So I think the key thing at this point is that there is a democratic transfer of power in June 2000, and I don't think it's a sure bet at all that that's going to happen. I hope it does.

JOHNSON: Did the Primakov government sort of demonstrate, shall we say, the workability of a kind of more consensus, mainstream way of going about...

BERNSTEIN: I -- you know, I know some people have that view. I wasn't crazy about them, although I think that they had -- Primakov's Cabinet had -- certain virtues over previous ones in that it did go for more of a consensus.

But there was the -- Russia was experiencing acute economic problems that had to be dealt with, and it didn't deal with them. Neither did previous Cabinets for that matter, by the way, but -- so I -- it wasn't exclusively a sin of the -- the Primakov Cabinet.

But I think they -- I think it was basically a failed Cabinet that on the other -- a Cabinet, but on the other hand, there is little question that Yeltsin and his entourage were doing everything to make sure that it was a failed Cabinet.

And my sense about Primakov was that after the August 1998 financial collapse, Yeltsin and basically the ruling elite in the country had to do a tactical retreat because they had been hurt very badly. There was a strong backlash in the country to the policies that had gone before, so they had to hand over power to a quasi-coalition government for a while.

And then I think as soon as they came in, they immediately set about to make sure that they did get them out, and that -- it -- this was an eight-month period, and I think most of it was spent trying to get rid of and/or undermine the Primakov government.

So while I don't think Primakov accomplished that much, I -- it's not entirely his fault.

JOHNSON: Was the United States out to get rid of him, too?

BERNSTEIN: They -- you know, I think -- I think that they -- I'm not sure they were out to get him and they worked actively to do so. I think they were glad when he left, and I'm -- wouldn't be surprised if they made that known, largely for probably foreign policy considerations, because Primakov was seen as more anti-American and a hawk on foreign policy issues. So I'm not sure. I wouldn't say that there was direct interference, but I think that their views on the matter were known.

JOHNSON: When Russians look at the United States these days, what do they want from the United States? What would they like the U.S. to be doing?

BERNSTEIN: That's a tough question. It's a tough question because there really is a lot of disillusion. And I -- you know, I don't think it's fair to put everything on the United States. I mean, Russia has made, you know, its mistakes and it's mostly the onus is on them.

On the other hand, there was a sense that we could help them by showing them the way to some degree, and I think there's a large disappointment in what we ended up doing in showing the way. And I don't think that that's an altogether unreasonable feeling because of the things we discussed earlier about backing certain factions and backing this total commitment to Yeltsin.

Now it's difficult to say. I -- the thing I can't begin to emphasize enough is the total cynicism of the average person vis-a-vis politics, vis-a-vis the United States, vis-a-vis everything outside their own affairs of trying to get by in a very difficult economic situation. The cynicism, the gap between politics, politicians, in Russia and the ordinary person is -- it's always been great. It's huge now.

So I think there's a widespread disillusion that -- and in politics in general and there's a sense that it can bring nobody very much good. And that's too bad, but -- because there was this little budding sort of optimism which was -- which again is a rarity in Russia in that sort of trans -- early transitional period in '92, '93, and that is pretty much gone, I think.

JOHNSON: What should the -- what -- from your perspective, what can the U.S. do to help the situation?

BERNSTEIN: Well, you know, I think we have to -- you know, I'm not -- I do -- I am one who believes that most aid efforts when it comes to big ticket items, lots of money and aid to the international finance -- financial institutions have -- I think it's fairly clear that it's been money down a black hole because of the corruption problem, in roughly speaking the corruption problem -- misgovernment and corruption.

But I'm not one who believes, you know, in the total, you know, pulling out and isolation and saying, you know, the heck with it and not wanting to deal with Russia. But I think that the aid -- questions of large-scale foreign aid -- I think that is something that has to be looked at very carefully, and where it's done it has to be done on a smaller scale and with much more oversight.

Number two, there is a growing sense of working with regional leaders. This has sort of become the kind of the latest trend, sort of way of approa -- the trendy way of approaching Russia recently, and I don't think that's all bad. I mean, I think that Russia could actually do with a large amount of decentralization.

On the other hand, I think it would be a mistake to over-romanticize that and to be -- to pick certain regional leaders as the new, you know, knights in shining armor, because there are lots of regional leaders who are also extremely corrupt and not purveyors of good government.

So -- but I think that people-to-people exchanges, all of that kind of stuff, that never hurts, and I think that that should continue, particularly aimed at young people.

JOHNSON: Non-interference has been proclaimed as a desirable principle.

BERNSTEIN: I would agree with that. I think that's one that we should have done from the beginning.

Now, to say "non-interference" is not to say "non-engagement," but it should always have been, and should now be after what has happened, a hands-off attitude when it comes to the particular political struggles within the country. We should not take sides.

I mean, obviously if we were convinced that, you know, some horrendous sort of force was bubbling from somewhere and about to take over, I mean, you know, it would be foolish not to declare sides in that. But that's not the way Russia is today. I think we should be scrupulously neutral when it comes to their internal political battles and we should concentrate on building political institutions, democratic institutions, genuine market institutions, and when -- and if anybody tries to pull things off saying, "See, but we're doing the right thing; this is market --" and it's not, and it's theft or it's cheating in something, we should call that immediately and publicly and say we're not going to support that sort of thing. This is something we did not do repeatedly over the last eight years or so.

JOHNSON: You've been following the Western/American press in its coverage of Russia for most of this time. Has the press been doing a good job in covering Russia for Western audiences?

BERNSTEIN: No. No, I -- quite frankly, I don't think so.

I think that the Western press, which I follow very closely, came -- I don't know how it works in other parts of the world, by the way, this may be true everywhere -- but it came with preconceptions and almost an agenda. I don't mean an agenda that they were sent by someone there with this agenda, but they had their own set of preconceptions which did not accord with the realities of the country. They picked people to both concentrate on and to actually sort of support, or to focus on, et cetera, who were more -- who appeared to be more like them, and the Russians -- you know, Russian politicians, who are extremely cynical but by no means stupid, quite the contrary, played on this, and they manipulated the Western press to a certain degree, and it wouldn't be the first time that happened. It happened during the Soviet period also.

And I think that the result of that was that we had a -- we had an approach by the Western press in which the Russian political scene was divided up between good guys and bad guys and hawks and doves, and many in the Western mainstream press should have realized that this didn't make sense because people kept switching sides. I mean, good guys became bad guys, et cetera. But they kept using this approach.

At some point, a light should have gone off and said there's something wrong with the way we were approaching this subject, but it really didn't.

I think it may be getting better now. I think that August '98 was such -- the financial collapse, that is -- was such a watershed in terms of blowing away the myths that Russia was on the right track if the right track is defined as a market economy and a truly democratic system, that it was something of a wake-up call. And I think that -- I think that the Western press is -- the reporting has been better.

JOHNSON: Did you want to go back and...

BERNSTEIN: But -- I think that Russia proper, the Russian Federation, the Slavic part of the country, is not fraught with civil disorder or ethnic disorder because the ethnic divisions are not that great. You have Tartarstan in the middle of the country. But that -- they -- there's an accommodation there. But the Cauca -- the north Caucasus, the Caucasus in general, which is in southern Russia, is fraught with ethnic conflict and it's going to be a zone of ethnic conflict for the foreseeable future.

I mean, we've had the war in Chechnya. There is lots of violence in the republics adjacent to Chechnya and there's an increasing Islamic influence. And some of that is spilling into some of the other portions of southern Russia now.

So I think that, yes, there are ethnic hot spots in Russia where there might be the temptation to get into a peacekeeping role by an international peacekeeping force, although we did not do that in Chechnya. But now that the Yugoslav President is set, there are certainly spots where they may -- where someone may want to get involved.

The -- you know, my sense is that this would not be welcomed by the Russians, to put it mildly.

JOHNSON: How do Russians feel about their military these days?

BERNSTEIN: You know, the military is -- it's a terrible subject because, you know, whether you're American or not and what your view of the Russian military may be geostrategically, it's an obvious thing that the average person wants to have pride in the military of their country. And one of the sources I think of shame on the part of average Russians is the degree of decay of the Russian military.

And, I mean, not that they want to have -- that the average person is seeking a huge military to go out and, you know, engage in conquest -- not at all on the part of the average person. But you see -- you know, it's a situation where it's so bad and there's -- the material conditions for the average serviceman are so bad that you regularly see enlisted men begging in the streets of Moscow. This is a very, very disturbing thing to see, and I think it's a source of shame for a lot of Russians.

JOHNSON: Should Yeltsin have been impeached for this and other reasons?

BERNSTEIN: You know, that's a very, very tough one, because I went around about this with some of my friends and -- my gut level thinking -- if I were a Russian, how would I feel? -- would be yes. I mean, my sense was "look, if the West can look at Slobodan Milosevic and declare him a war criminal, you would think that the Russians themselves would have the same right to impeach their own President."

On the other hand, I'm not sure that the outcome of that would have been good. It may have destabilized the situation even more. So I was sort of, you know, on the borderline about that.

On the other hand, there is the argument that if you didn't -- if they didn't impeach him, and now if he does try to pull something off to stay in after June 2000, there will be people who will, with some justification, say, "We should have impeached him." So it's a tough one.

JOHNSON: He would have been impeached but for their fear that if they do it, he with his residual American backing, will...

BERNSTEIN: They might...

JOHNSON: ...do something crazy again.

BERNSTEIN: That might very well be the case. But what gets me, though, is the attitude where people -- you know, sort of editorial writers in the West, say, you know, "the Russians shouldn't impeach him because --" I mean, I think it was the New York Times who, in the editorial they said, "Well, maybe the crimes in Chechnya might quali --" And I'm thinking to myself, you want to indict Milosevic as a war criminal who killed -- but you don't even want to let them impeach -- I mean, this doesn't make any sense.