VAN DER VINK: Iris is a university research consortium. We are the, if you will, the collective effort of ninety, ninety-five universities that have come together to develop a large experiment in seismology. And, I'm director of planning for the consortium.

WILSON: Okay. Let's start talking about nuclear testing and seismology. How are those things related?

VAN DER VINK: Well, they, nuclear testing and seismology became related when we started testing nuclear weapons underground. And, when a nuclear explosion or a nuclear weapon is detonated underground, it creates seismic signals that travel through the earth much like an earthquake, and so we can record the motions created by an underground nuclear explosion using the same technologies that we use to study earthquakes.

WILSON: Okay. Is there anything else you want to add with the question -- seismology applicable to nuclear testing.

VAN DER VINK: We're going to go on in this. Do you want me to just keep talking about it, or --

WILSON: Yeah, sure.

VAN DER VINK: Okay, when explosion occurs underground, it creates seismic waves that travel through the earth and create ground motion, and we record those with seismometers. And, a seismometer works in a very, with a very basic principle. And, it's, this would be, we can go and come back to this, want me to do this later, or we --

WILSON: Uh, you can point to it if you want, that's fine.

VAN DER VINK: Okay. In this museum display, we have a piece of equipment that really shows the physical principals of how a seismometer works, and, it's basically a large mass suspended by a spring. And, when the ground motion occurs, it moves the frame of the instrument, but, the mask stays stationary because of its inertia. And, that motion between the mass and the frame is a measure of the ground motion.

Now, there's not, there's an interesting history to seismology. Seismology is inherently a cooperatively science, because you can't do anything with a single seismic station. You must exchange data with other scientists who are running other seismic stations. Also, seismology's a very interesting science because it's geographically dependent. You can't decide to have a seismic station in a particular city or a particular congressional district. You have to distribute seismic stations around the world because you have to record seismic waves at different locations where the arrive. And, seismic waves don't respect political boundaries.

What, we use seismic waves, when seismic waves occur, whether it be by an underground explosion, whether it occur by, happens by a naturally occurring earthquake, and they travel through the earth, they provide us with a way of sampling the earth because we can tell by the recordings of the seismic waves that the path that they took through the earth and the speed with which they traveled. And, from that information, we can determine the structure and the composition of much of the inside of the earth.

We've only, we've only drilled the top ten kilometers of the earth. Our whole understanding of the interior of our earth is based on seismology. One of the experiments that we're doing here at Iris is to develop a global seismographic network, a network of seismic stations distributed around the world. And, we will be using seismic waves and collecting them to determine what is the structure of the earth. And, from that, from determining the structure of the earth, we'll be able to figure out how this planet of ours evolved. And, as it continues to cool, what is driving the motion that we see on the surface through plate tectonics and what causes our earthquakes and what is forming our ocean basins and what's creating our mountain belts, and how our whole landscape has been formed.

WILSON: Will these stations also be able to detect nuclear tests?

VAN DER VINK: Yes, that's one of the advantages, and why there has been so much interest in the Iris global seismographic network is the same seismic stations that are being deployed and being used for scientific purposes for understanding the interior of the earth can also be used for understanding hazards that are caused by earthquakes and also for understanding or for detecting seismic waves that are produced by underground nuclear explosions.

WILSON: How accurate is it determining the difference between an earthquake and nuclear tests?

VAN DER VINK: [Laughter.] Let me go back, I want to, I mean, we're sort of jumping, jumping ahead. I probably should cover a couple of things first as well. When we see, at a particular seismic station, when we record ground motion, all we know is that there's been ground motion at that location. To detect a seismic event, whether it's an earthquake or an underground explosion, we need not only to see that there's some signal above the noise level, we need to be able to, when we say detect it that we mean not only to measure that there's been some signal above the noise level. What we mean is that we're also able to locate the event, determine the depth of that event, the latitude, the longitude, the depth, the time that it occurred. And, to characterize that seismic event.

Now, in terms of monitoring a comprehensive test ban treaty, there are several challenges. One is that earthquakes are always occurring. Earthquakes occur continuously, and, on any given day, a global network of seismic stations is going to detect dozens and perhaps even a hundred earthquakes. And, when I say detect those, I mean, both see that an event has occurred, but also measure the signal and determine the location of the seismic event.

Interviewer 2: I guess the one question, you were talking about before, the seismic stations, and then how the stations are being used for evaluating the earth's core and the mantle and all that, how they're also being used for nuclear testing, to __ nuclear tests. And, we go from there. It's about where we were. [Background talking.]

VAN DER VINK: ...that thing about Iris and putting the stations around the world. I'm sorry, I have a really hard time talking without using my hands. What do you want me to do there? Do you want me to -- [several talking] -- okay, because, are they coming in and out of the frame? I don't know how you --

VAN DER VINK: One of Iris's main activities is to develop a global network, a network of seismic stations distributed around the world, and we are going to be using these stations to record seismic ____ that travel through the earth and which sample the inside of the earth. We have only, we have only been able to drill into the top ten kilometers or so of the earth's crust, and, really, everything we know about the interior of the earth, the structure of the earth, and have inferred from that structure as to how our planet evolved, all of that information is obtained from seismology.

And, our experiment right now is to seismic stations around the world that will record earthquakes continuously. And, by recording those earthquakes and the different paths that they take through the earth and how they travel, we're going to be able to determine in a much higher resolution the structure of the earth's interior.

Interviewer 2: And, will those same stations be used for detecting nuclear tests?

VAN DER VINK: Those same stations that are able to record the seismic waves generated from earthquakes can also record the seismic waves generated from an underground explosion. And, this we see as a great strength to the monitoring and the verifiability of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Because, in addition to the official monitoring network, stations that are part of the international monitoring system for the CTBT, there will literally be thousands of other seismic stations out there are continuously monitoring ground motion.

And, with the amazing advances in technology, computer communication networks, the Internet, and digital data, and geosynchronous time, much of that data is now becoming available in real time. And, so, if you will, the seismic stations that are the official part of the monitoring system in the comprehensive test ban treaty, in many ways, those are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of resources that are out there and are available and have the potential to detect a clandestine underground nuclear explosion.

WILSON: Okay, so, how accurate are these stations in determining the difference between a nuclear test and an earthquake?

VAN DER VINK: The main task in monitoring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can really be thought of in a couple of steps. First of all, what you have to do is you have to detect that something occurred. Something caused the ground to move. Now, you don't know whether that was an earthquake, whether it was an explosion, whether it was cultural noise from a city, whether it was large, whether it was meteorite impact. I mean, it could be any number of things that caused the ground to move. So, the first step is to detect a signal above just the normal background noise level.

The challenge in seismology, and, particularly, detecting small events, it's not really a question of sensitive instruments. We have tremendously sensitive seismometers are available now. The challenge is that there is continuous seismic noise. There's seismic noise created by the tides of the earth, there's seismic noise created by waves crashing on beaches, when the wind blows and it pulls trees and it pulls on the roots and it sort of shakes the earth. And, all of that ground motion is recorded on very sensitive seismic stations. So, the real challenge in detecting very small seismic events is seeing the signal within that background noise.

Now, as you approach the task of monitoring a comprehensive test ban treaty, you have to not only detect that signal above the noise level, but you have to recognize that as coming from a discreet event. That this is just not background noise, that this was caused either by an earthquake or an explosion. And, to do that, you need data not just from a single station, but from several stations. Because, you're not, you're not just measuring a signal, but the noise level. You actually have to locate the origin of those seismic signals.

WILSON: Is this what happened in Finland? There were several stations that worked together?

VAN DER VINK: Yeah, let me, let me continue on with this a little more and then come back to that.

WILSON: Come right back, sure.

VAN DER VINK: After you detect an event and determine its location, the next task is to determine whether that seismic event, whether that signal that you see, was created by an earthquake or an underground nuclear explosion. And, there we have a little bit of help. And, that's because of the differences in how seismic waves are created by earthquakes versus those created by nuclear explosion.

In an underground nuclear explosion, if you imagine a nuclear weapon being detonated underground, the energy is released in a millionth of a second, less than a millionth of a second, you have all that energy released, and it creates this tremendous heat and pressure that pushes outward and you create seismic signals that are compressional and that are compressional and radiate out from that explosion. When we think of, so, when we think of explosions, we think of a point source underground creating compression in all directions, and instantaneous.

Earthquakes, on the other hand, are from the rupture of the tearing of rock, and this rupture usually occurs over a period of several seconds and over areas of square kilometers. We think of earthquakes often as a sliding of rock along a fault. And, so, there's a lot of shear motion associated with that sliding, and that shear motion is reflected in the seismic signal. So, when you see the seismic signal of an explosion and that of an earthquake, they differ. Explosion is compressional and has large compressional waves and large shear waves. Earthquakes are just the opposite. They have large shear waves and relatively small compressional waves. And, so by looking at the ratios of different kinds of waves that are produced, we can usually discriminate. Just by looking at the seismic signal, we can usually tell if that seismic signal was created by an earthquake or whether it was created by a explosion.

WILSON: So, when you say, usual, usually, are there instances where that can't be done?

VAN DER VINK: I say usually because the task gets much more difficult as you go down to smaller and smaller seismic signals. When we're talking about monitoring the comprehensive test ban treaty, the question isn't can we do it, the question is down to what threshold do we want to have confidence? Because, ultimately, there will be some level below which we just won't have confidence that we'll be able to detect the signals of an explosion.

WILSON: And, what is that threshold?

VAN DER VINK: Determining that threshold, while it sounds like a technical question, really isn't. The current monitoring system is designed to detect and characterize all seismic events that are magnitude four or larger. And, it seems that that's a very, and to locate those seismic events within an error of about a thousand kilometers. And, that's considered to be threshold of the monitoring system. Now, you can go down, that doesn't mean that we won't be able to detect and identify smaller seismic signals, but, as we go down in magnitude, there are, let's start over with this because I've sort of gotten myself into a line of argument that's -- to include something else is going to pretty convoluted.

WILSON: Okay, sure.

VAN DER VINK: Okay, the question is what is the -- I mean, let's come back with the challenges of monitoring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The challenges of monitoring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are that, as you go down in the scale, if you will, the Richter scale, as you start talking about monitoring seismic events with smaller and smaller magnitudes, you have many more of those. So, for every magnitude six, you have ten magnitude fives, a hundred magnitude fours, a thousand magnitude threes. The increase in the number of events is exponential for every step that you take in that magnitude scale. Also, earthquakes are occurring continuously. The earth is continuously in motion. Every day, there are earthquakes all around the world.

The current monitoring system for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is designed to detect and characterize all seismic events with magnitude four or larger. They're probably detecting close to a hundred events a day which they detect and locate and characterize those events. Now, the problem on the, the next step in monitoring is not just to determine whether that event was created by -- the next step, the next in monitoring is not just to determine that a seismic event occurred, but to determine whether or not that was an earthquake or it was a nuclear explosion. And, there we benefit because there are differences in how seismic waves are created by earthquakes and how seismic waves are created by nuclear explosions.

If we think of an earthquake, we generally think of two pieces of rock that are sliding past each other along a fault, and there's a lot of motion, a lot of shear motion, to that. When we think of an underground nuclear explosion, we think of a single point source, the weapon detonating underground, the force being exerted essentially instantaneously and creating pressure in all directions.

The difference between how that ground motion is created from the earthquake versus the explosion, we see that manifested in the seismic signal. The seismic signal produced by an earthquake has large shear motion and relatively small compressional motion. The seismic signal created by an explosion is just the opposite. It has a lot of compression and relatively small sheer motion. So, my looking at the ratio of those different seismic waves that, by looking at the seismic signal and looking at the ratio of the seismic waves created by compression versus those created by shear motion, we can usually distinguish the difference between earthquakes and nuclear explosions.

WILSON: Earlier you said, you talked about the difference, one way there's more, one way than the other. And, that's, that's perfect, that's very, that's what I was looking for. But, if you want to go in again, just real quick.

VAN DER VINK: Sure, I mean, I'll try it one more time just so you have another one to chose from. Okay. How do we tell the difference from explosions and ___ -- [voice drops]. Okay, we can tell the difference, we can tell the difference between -- we can look at the difference between.

WILSON: Would it help if I asked you a question?

VAN DER VINK: No, I'm trying to frame the response so I can do it very succinctly. We can tell the difference between the seismic signal created by an earthquake and that of the nuclear explosion by the characteristics of that signal. Explosions occur instantaneously and create pressure on all directions. Earthquakes occur over several seconds and require the shearing motion as rocks slide across a fault. The difference between those two mechanisms is demonstrated and can be seen in the characteristics of the seismic signal that they produce.

WILSON: And, what is the difference between the -- well, actually, you've already given us that, that's okay. Now, let's move on to, do you think it is, I mean, you talk about the threshold and they really look at stuff ___ and above, right?

VAN DER VINK: Yeah, this is the important part and we've got to get this in, so let me try this thing for one second. One of the challenges in monitoring a comprehensive test ban treaty occurs as we try and monitor smaller and smaller seismic events. Because, as we go down in scale, the number of events that occur increases exponentially.

WILSON: The real question I have now is how would you characterize a typical nuclear test explosion? Where would it appear on the Richter scale, most often, and how low could they go and still be called nuclear explosion?

VAN DER VINK: All right, so the real question in monitoring a comprehensive test ban treaty is not whether it can be done, but how low can you go? Down to what threshold do you want to establish the monitoring system, down to what level, down to what threshold do you want to -- to what extent do you want to create a monitoring system so the -- oh, okay, we've got to go -- down to what threshold do you want to be able to monitor seismic events to determine whether they were earthquakes or underground nuclear explosions. Now, where we were going?

WILSON: How would you characterize the typical nuclear test explosion? Where would it appear on the nuclear scale, and how low can the explosion go and still be called an explosion, and do you foresee a situation where there would be one so low that no can detect it?

VAN DER VINK: Okay, so as, the challenge will be, as you go down in scale and you want to monitor smaller and smaller events, there's an ever increasing number of those events. At some point, you can create nuclear explosions that essentially produce no seismic signal. And, such, you can, in principle, have essentially zero yield nuclear explosions. And, those might not even be done underground, they might be done in a laboratory. So, it really is drawing a line, down to what level, establishing a monitoring system down to what level you want to establish the monitoring system.

The current monitoring system is established so that, in rough terms, it should be able to monitor seismic events of magnitude four or larger and locate those within a thousand kilometer _____. A magnitude four seismic event corresponds to about one kiloton. We use the expression of a kiloton to describe the size of a nuclear explosion and a kiloton is meant to be roughly the explosive equivalent of a thousand tons of TNT. The bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, those were around fifteen to twenty kilotons.

We have weapons in the nuclear arsenal that are typically on the order of hundreds of kilotons, and weapons have been tested in the range of megatons. The Russians tested a fifty megaton, and that is, going from kilotons to megatons if kilotons is a thousand tons of TNT, megatons is a million tons of TNT. So, when I talk about megatons, that means thousands of kilotons. So, the Russians actually tested a weapon that was several megatons. We've tested weapons that have been several megatons. The Russians have tested, I think the largest weapons that was tested was up to fifty megatons and was meant to be a half scale size of a hundred megaton weapon. So, to give you a range in scale.

WILSON: To your knowledge, has their been a weapon tested under one kiloton? And, if not, is it possible?

VAN DER VINK: Yes, there have been tests I've done with nuclear explosions with less than, of less than one kiloton. In terms of monitoring the comprehensive test ban treaty, you have to ask what is the function and what is the role of such sub-kiloton tests. In the United States, most of those test have been of the sub-kiloton range, have been done to look at the effects of nuclear weapons and also to look a design elements that relate to the safety of the system. Those are not typically the types of test that you see for the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons.

WILSON: Okay. In light of that, do you think that --

VAN DER VINK: This, by the way, I know, let me just say this for your own information in case ___ you want to use it, we do routinely do sub-kiloton tests that really have generated no seismic signal. And, those, the function of those tests is really to look at the effects of nuclear weapons and the safety aspects.

WILSON: Okay. Cool. Next, I was going to probably ask you -- [tape changes sides] --

VAN DER VINK: Which is the, coincidentally, the limit the treaty calls for for an on-site inspection. [woman talking in background; difficult to hear] Yeah, that's one thing I haven't, I haven't mentioned is not only does it become more difficult as you go down in the threshold because there are more events, but also the differences between an earthquake and an explosion begin to get blurred.

VAN DER VINK: As you go down in magnitude along the scale and try and monitor smaller and smaller seismic events, the monitoring task becomes difficult because not only are there more events within which you have to distinguish that of a possible nuclear explosion, but also the differences that we discussed between an earthquake and a nuclear explosion, those differences become less apparent for smaller seismic signals. In addition, for very small explosions, it's possible to disguise the signal or conduct the explosion in such a way that it would be difficult for the monitoring system to detect the explosion. Or, if it was detected, to determine whether it was an earthquake or a nuclear explosion.

WILSON: Would these explosions be above four, if they were concealed?

VAN DER VINK: That's up to, the extent to which a country could do that, of course, is, in many ways, a judgment call. That's really not a technical issue. In principle, a nuclear explosion could be detonated in a large underground cavity, and the size of the signal produced from such an explosion, if it was muffled in a large underground cavity, the size of that explosion could be reduced by several fold, even perhaps up to a factor of seventy decrease in size.

Now, the, the question of how credible that is as an evasion scenario depends on how desperate the nation is that wants to conduct the test. The extent to which they're going to invest time and money to create such an evasion opportunity and how fearful they are of getting caught. Because, remember, the international monitoring system, while it has a tremendous capability, is also, in many ways, just the tip of the iceberg in terms of resources that are out there and can be used to monitor a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

While there are fifty primary and a 120 auxiliary stations that form the seismic part of the monitoring system, those hundred and twenty stations, if you will, are part of the core monitoring system, but there are literally thousands of seismic stations around the world, high quality seismic stations, that have the possibility of detecting a clandestine nuclear explosion. So, any country that was considering a nuclear explosion would have to not only worry about conducting it in such a way so that it wasn't detected by the official monitoring system, CTBT, but, they would also be concerned that such an event would be picked up by a seismic network that was designed for regional monitoring of earthquakes, earthquake hazards, or for scientific purposes.

WILSON: Okay, so, in light of that, do you think that it's an accurate, reliable, verification of the CTBT, and maybe somewhere in your answer if you can point out, like you just said to me, that four is the limit for the treaty.

VAN DER VINK: The official monitoring system for the, the international monitoring system for the comprehensive test ban treaty is designed to have the capability of about magnitude four, which is the equivalent of an explosion of about one kiloton, a thousand tons of TNT. We have, you know, we have detonated nuclear explosions of kilotons, sub-kilotons, hundreds of kilotons, thousands of kilotons, and tens of thousands of kilotons. That's not a good way to describe that. Do you want me to explain kiloton or can I just let that go?

WILSON: No, we can let that go if you already did.

VAN DER VINK: Okay, the current monitoring system is designed to have the capability that would detect and locate and characterize all seismic events of magnitude four or larger or larger and to be able to locate those events within a one thousand square kilometer of ____. That, that corresponds to a monitoring capability that would be equivalent to about one kiloton. If you look at countries that have developed a first generation nuclear weapon, our first test was about fifteen to twenty kilotons. Most nations, their first tests have been about fifteen to twenty kilotons.

Interviewer 2: So, I think this will probably be the last question, we can talk about this, is it reliable and accurate verification of it.

VAN DER VINK: And, how I'm going to answer that is I'm really going to say that it's a, you know, it's, I mean, it's a judgment call. And, what this really is is a question of cost benefit. How much money and time and effort you want to spend lowering by another half magnitude unit that detection threshold. You can always do it. You can always put out more seismic stations, record more events, you know, you can push that threshold from magnitude four, down to three and a half to three, to two and a half, but then you're recording hundreds and thousands of events. You could be recording several hundreds and perhaps thousands of events every day. And, the amount of effort required to discriminate those events and determine whether they were earthquakes or nuclear explosions, and even if your technical capability is 99.9 percent reliable, the more events you have, the more ambiguous events you're going to have to resolve.

So, the, in my personal judgment, I think the international monitoring system was set at a very reasonable and well thought out balance between what would be an appropriate monitoring system and how many resources you want to devote. And, keep in mind that the seismic part of the monitoring system is just one part of the monitoring system, and the official monitoring system is just only one part of the resources that are out there that could detect a clandestine nuclear explosion.

Just because the monitoring capability, or just because the technical capability is set at magnitude four, that doesn't mean you can test below that and have confidence that your tests will go undetected.

WILSON: And, that's because there's so many other seismic stations around.

VAN DER VINK: There are not only other seismic stations around, but there are many other methods for obtaining intelligence about a clandestine nuclear weapons test.

WILSON: Okay, so going back to India and Pakistan real quick, if you can tell us what they declared and what seismic stations said that it actually was, as demonstration of this technology.

VAN DER VINK: Okay, Chris, you may have to help me here, because I've forgotten some of the numbers on India and Pakistan, but this would be a good example. A great example of this has been the recent tests by India and Pakistan. And, the Indians, after that test occurred, the Indians declared that it had a yield of -- can we, we're going to have to --

WILSON: Yeah, can you just get the numbers and then we'll have to --

VAN DER VINK: Yeah, it's in our article --

WILSON: So, we'll do that, but then, real quick, we'll talk about the incident off of Norway, Russia, wherever it was.

VAN DER VINK: Okay. I mean, those are both examples that were resources other than the official monitoring system were used. [Background talking.]

WILSON: No, we still ____. How much money was spent on this verification regime?

VAN DER VINK: How much money the United States is spending on the international monitoring system or how much we have spent on the global seismographic network. Those are two different questions. I have to do a little homework here before, uh. In May, 43 12 and .2. And, what did we think they were? ___, 12 and .2. I'm not going to, I don't think there's a, see, if I start throwing around numbers, I've got to make sure that they're accurate. And, I'm not sure they have --

WILSON: Maybe a ballpark, or is there is there another way that you can explain it without numbers?

VAN DER VINK: Okay, okay. A recent example of this would be the test that India conducted last May and the test that they recorded, while it may --

WILSON: Actually, if we could start over, and rephrase the beginning, a good way to demonstrate the technology is an index --

VAN DER VINK: A good way to demonstrate this technology is the recent tests that were conducted by India and Pakistan. While the test may have taken us by surprise in that we didn't know in advance it was occurring, the seismic signals created by those explosions were well recorded by dozens of seismic stations around the world. And, we knew, literally, within hours of that event that a nuclear explosion had occurred at the Indian test site. Many of the best data from that, from the India nuclear test were obtained from a station in Pakistan. Now, that station in Pakistan, is not part of the official monitoring system for the CTBT. It's actually a station that was installed as part of the global seismographic network for, of the Iris consortium for looking at questions about the earth's interior and just for scientific purposes. However, that happened to be the closest station and the data from that station are available in real time by the Internet, so, literally, anyone with access to the Internet would have been able to obtain that data from that nuclear test within minutes of the event.

WILSON: Okay, let's talk about the -- I can't pronounce it, maybe you can help me -- the nora, the noriaga.

VAN DER VINK: Noviasimlia.

WILSON: Okay, let's talk about it a little bit. How is it mistaken for a nuclear test and what eventually clarified that it was just an earthquake?

VAN DER VINK: Okay. Trying to think about the argument to -- what was that, why was _____ -- that was in August of ninety-seven. Another example was the seismic event that occurred in the area around Noviasimlia in August of nineteen ninety-seven. And, that event, our initial interpretation of that event, was that it could have been an underground nuclear explosion, and there were press releases that were issued claiming that that event was a nuclear test that had been conducted by Russia in violation of the signed agreement of the comprehensive test ban treaty.

How that confusion occurred is, in many ways, just an example of how seismology is done. And, that is, seismology is an ____ process and it's how, it's also, frankly, how science is done, and that's we make, we draw the best conclusions that we can from the data that are available at the time.

The event that occurred near Noviasimlia was, in many ways, an amazing coincidence. According to press reports, there were activities at the Noviasimlia test site that appeared to the United States intelligence community as the type of activities that are seen prior to a nuclear test. Just at about the time that we would have expected to see a nuclear test, we recorded a seismic event that was characteristic and very similar to that of an underground nuclear explosion.

In addition, the preliminary analysis, based on that first bit of data that was available, indicated that that seismic event occurred a the distance that Noviasimlia was to that test site. So, we had the, we had the coincidence, if you will, of a seismic event occurring right at the same distance from that seismic station as a previously known nuclear explosion, and with a seismic signal which was very characteristic of it. So, it, it looked like a nuclear explosion, it had a seismic signal that was very similar to a nuclear explosion, from the preliminary analysis.

Unfortunately, it was just a coincidence. And, as we obtained additional data, we realized that the seismic event did not occur in Noviasimlia but rather occurred at the Kara Sea, over a hundred kilometers away from Noviasimlia. That additional data was not available at the time of the preliminary analysis was made, and so, originally, the concern was that this could have been a nuclear explosion and that concern became public before all the additional data became available and we realized that this was, in fact, not a nuclear explosion, but an earthquake that occurred at the Kara Sea.

WILSON: How long did it take for this data to become available to you guys? Twenty-four, forty-eight hours?

VAN DER VINK: See, we're not the ones who do the monitoring. In that case, much of the data that was able to just demonstrate that the seismic event was not an explosion but, rather, was a naturally occurring earthquake in the Kara Sea, came from additional seismic stations around the world that were not part of the official monitoring system. And, so, this is another example of how there are a tremendous number of resources out there and available that can be used to monitor compliance with the comprehensive test ban treaty, and to help us resolve these ambiguous events when they occur.

WILSON: Okay, let's talk about costs a little bit. You said there's two different costs. There's how much is the US spending on this and how much are they spending on the entire global set-up, too? Do you know anything about that, or --

VAN DER VINK: Yeah, it's hard to -- in the -- I mean, there are different, see, we're talking about the international monitoring system. There's also the system that the intelligence community uses and there's also the global network and there's overlap between them, so ____ out a single cost would be quite difficult.

In many ways, a lot of the monitoring of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, you could argue, is, comes without cost, and that's because many of the stations that are used as part of the monitoring system for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and that will be used as sources of data are seismic stations that are being established and maintained for scientific purposes.

We have those seismic stations out there and we're using them in our studies of the earth's interior and in our studies of earthquakes and how to mitigate earthquake hazards. And, these seismic stations have multiple applications.

We see that as a tremendous strength of the monitoring system, not just in terms of reducing its costs, but also in terms of the long-term sustainability of the verification system. Because, quite frankly, there are a lot of countries out there that are just not concerned about monitoring compliance with the CTBT and are not concerned about what US monitoring requirements might be. But, they are concerned about earthquake hazards, or they are concerned about being part of the international scientific community. And, so, they're interested in developing and operating and maintaining a seismic station over these long periods of time. It's going to be motivated by other factors other than a comprehensive test ban treaty. And, in our judgment, the broader base of support there is for these seismic stations, not only are they less expensive to maintain for any one purpose, but they're much more likely to be sustainable over the long run.

WILSON:: Okay, great. Do you guys have any other questions? I'm done.

Interviewer 2: Just one or two. As far as the CTBT, as far as CTBT, ___ look at Doug when you answer this, is should there be ratification of CTBT? What role do you think this will play in moving people away from testing nuclear weapons and, that argument that this is a progressive step to make as far as, you know, international cooperation? Are you allowed to have an opinion on that? Can you address that question?

VAN DER VINK: That's really not --

Interviewer 2: Out of your domain? Okay. That was just something that he had mentioned before we came over here.

VAN DER VINK: Who's he?

Interviewer 2: Sen. Bumpers. Uh, let's see --

VAN DER VINK: Oh, here's one, you might like this. One interesting point is, in the current state of the treaty, the treaty is signed but has not yet been ratified. As a result, it's in force in the extent of international law requires that we don't conduct any activities that would be counter to the purpose of the treaty unless we indicate our intention not to ratify the treaty. So, in many ways, we are in a situation right now, with the treaty signed, where we are constrained by the terms of the treaty. However, the provisions, the verification provisions of the treaty do not come into force until the treaty is ratified.

So, we are right now in this, in this, if you will, legal no man's land of a treaty that has been signed but not ratified. So, we are bound by the restrictions of the treaty, but we don't have the benefits and the advantages of the verification system because the treaty has not been ratified and those provisions have not come fully into force.

Interviewer 2: What would those benefits be?

VAN DER VINK: Uh, for example, without ratification, we can't call for an on-site inspection. We can't fully implement all of the verification agreements. And, we can't conduct some of the exchanges of data and information that will help us improve our monitoring capability.

Interviewer 2: Uh, just one more.

VAN DER VINK: That's, that is probably the most positive thing I can say in terms of moving forward with verification.

Interviewer 2: ...the last two, just two more things. No, because he said these things and I just want to -- no, I just want to make sure that we get them out of the way.

VAN DER VINK: Yeah, I know what he's looking for, I know what he's looking for. You can do this.

Interviewer 2: When people do a test, it costs a lot of money, an underground test.

VAN DER VINK: Yes, it does.

Interviewer 2: -- and, if we have computer models that can emulate that underground test, do you know anything about, like, you kept saying that a seismologists stations aren't in place, the cost is relatively already taken care of. Can you address that at all, once she's changed the batteries, and she has?

VAN DER VINK: Yes.

Interviewer 2: All right.

VAN DER VINK: Okay. One thing about the cost is that -- okay. So, the cost of the monitoring system has to be considered not just in terms of what it contributes to the CTBT, but also in terms of the value of the information that it provides for earthquake hazards and for basic scientific information. No matter how you consider it, though, the cost of the entire verification system is far less than even just the cost of a single underground nuclear weapons test.

Okay, one of the, one of the challenges for monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is because the seismic events are occurring all the time. For example, in this, in this display that was established as a museum display, you can see that today, there have been already three earthquakes that have occurred in different parts of the world, and this display here shows the seismic events are occurring continuously all around the world, each one of these dots represents the location of an earthquake that has occurred within thirty days.

In addition to the official resources of a, you can't laugh, okay. In addition to the -- all right, okay. In addition to the official monitoring system, there are a lot of other seismic stations around the world that could be used to detect a clandestine nuclear explosion. This display also contains, which was established for a museum and has some old drum recorders that we have just hooked up via the Internet to seismic stations in Guam, in Tucson, Arizona, and in Norway, and, these are right now receiving data and illustrating ground motion in real time from those locations. So, this is an accurate measurement and indicator of the ground motion that's occurring right now in Tucson, Arizona, in Guam, and in Norway.