VALASEK: What exactly is meant by the national security interest? What is the administration trying to accomplish in the Caucasus?

GOBLE: Well I think I would dissent from the idea that there has been a fundamental shift, perhaps a shift of emphasis but not a shift. The United states has traditionally had three sets of interests in this region, an economic interest of access to oil, a geo-political in terms of recreating stability in the region, and a political interest in seeing the social and political transformation of these countries in the post-communist environment. I think there is a greater recognition that the pursuit of any one of those while ignoring the other two almost guarantees failure in all three, and so I think Amb. Morningstar was simply emphasizing that we cannot achieve our interests in the economic area without being attentive to geo-political and also political transformational issues as well.

VALASEK: How do you, how does the pipeline construction for instance improve stability of the states in the region?

GOBLE: Well in principle if these countries can export natural resources and therefore earn more money, they will be in a better position to build the kind of social infrastructure that buys a kind of stability. Second that will give them greater flexibility in their foreign affairs and their relations with the Russian Federation and other with countries as well. Moreover, by creating American interest in their stability by having American companies in the region the United States acquires a greater stake in what happens there, and hence will be more involved in the political and geo-political realms as well.

VALASEK: Is this something we want to happen? This is a region with unresolved conflict in Nagarno-Karabakh, with conflicts in Abkahjia, Ajaria. What is the United States stand to gain?

GOBLE: Well I think the first thing is, the most important thing is, is if these countries become relatively stable that also helps Russia to stabilize. Russia is involved in all three of the conflicts you named, as a direct participant or as someone, a country that has armed one or in some cases even both sides so that promoting stability in the region we would be promoting stability more broadly in larger areas where we have greater equities.

VALASEK: Nevertheless, Russia opposes Baku-Ceyhan and on what grounds?

GOBLE: Russia opposes Baku-Ceyhan on a number of grounds, first the Russians would like the oil to go through the Russian Federation which would give them greater control. Second, the Russians are very concerned that if these countries gain economic resources they would be more independent of Russian influence. Third, if this oil revenue is not going to benefit all countries equally in the region, and Russia's closest ally in the region, Armenia, would be one of the big losers. That is one of the reasons why the Russians are not happy with the idea of Baku-Ceyhan or even Baku-Supsa.

VALASEK: Should we be concerned about the Russian reaction? I mean on the one hand we may gain stability in the Caucasus, if on the other hand we create a situation.

GOBLE: Well I must say I have heard since 1991 indeed even earlier, statements about we must not do X or Y about because the Russians would be unhappy. The first day there is an article in a Russian newspaper asking whether Russia should do something as to whether the Americans will be unhappy, maybe I will listen to those arguments. But the reality is the United States has on occasion acted in ways that people said the Russian's wouldn't like. We have expanded NATO, we have put pressure on Milosovich, and what has happened in every case? Russians and even more Americans, who want to support Russia, has said 'if we do these things, terrible things will occur.' In fact, whenever we have acted, the Russians have gone along and said 'we want to be a part of whatever is going.' And so I think the argument that the Unites States shouldn't do this or that because it will anger the Russians, is not a very strong one, although it does seem to carry an awful lot of weight in this city.

VALASEK: What role does Iran play in the competition for Caspian oil?

GOBLE: Well, because the United States, and to a lesser extent, West European countries, are not interested in having any pipeline cross Iran. Iran is playing a smaller role than would be the case if its government were in a more cooperative relationship with Western countries. Indeed, if Iran had a government that was fundamentally different and much more friendly to the Western powers, I think most of the pipelines would have gone straight South to the Gulf, rather than any discussion of Baku-Ceyhan, or Baku-Supsa.

VALASEK: During the Cold War the White House allowed Kuwaiti tankers to fly American flags when they were threatened by Iran. Is there, do you see the United States getting involved militarily in the Caucasus? Should the security of the pipelines be threatened?

GOBLE: Well, pipelines are very difficult to defend, it's very easy to blow up a pipeline, although it tends to be fairly easy to repair those kinds of breaks. I don't see any kind of projection of American military power in the region in the offing, in the foreseeable future. I suspect that in the United States and Western countries will consider giving military aid and assistance, in terms of advise, and possibly equipment, but I don't expect to see American personnel on the ground, nor do I think that we will do anything close to what we did with the Kuwaitis.

VALASEK: A related question, I already mentioned the conflict in Nagarno-Karabakh. What effect will the pipelines have on some of the regional conflict?

GOBLE: Well, first off I think that if the pipeline looks as if it is going to go through, and if Azerbaijan is going to be one of the winners by acquiring additional sources, there will be a great deal more pressure on Armenia to come to a settlement, because the longer this goes on the greater resources Azerbaijan will have relative to Armenia, and that will either force Russia to become more involved on the Armenian side, or more likely, to try to make a deal with Azerbaijan and leave Armenia in the cold. So Armenia finds itself in a situation where if it doesn't get a settlement soon the terms it will get in five years if Baku-Supsa or Baku-Ceyhan begins to work, will be a lot less good than they are today.

VALASEK: One thing that you hinted is the emergence of alliances in the region, on the one hand you have sort of the alliance with Georgia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, on the other hand there seems to be an with Russia, Iran to a certain extent and certainly Armenia, is this a trend that we should be worried about?

GOBLE: Well, one of the things we are seeing in the world is that it is possible to cooperate with one group of countries and not cooperate with others depending on the subject. The GUAM countries that you mentioned are all members of the C.I.S. and have some kind of cooperative relationship with Russia on some grounds. I think it should be a matter of concern to the United States that we are seeing a Russian/Armenian/Iranian cooperation because Iran is so clearly against American interests in so many ways. I was very concerned by the statement of the Armenian foreign policy aid to President Kocharian in Moscow, that promoting a Moscow/Yerevan/Tehran access -- his terms not mine -- was absolutely necessary to prevent a Tel-Aviv/Ankara/Baku access to being the dominant player in the Caucasus.

VALASEK: Is this that would be happening regardless of the pipelines, or is this something that the pipelines may have precipitated?

GOBLE: Oh no, I think that those, the Russian / Iranian relationship was something that's long standing, it reflects the interests and ideas of the Russian Prime Minister, Mr. Primakov, going back to his days as a international committee staffer for the Central Committee and TASS correspondent, and also as head of the K.G.B. Primakov has said as recently as two months ago that Moscow's current position of weakness should be based on building alliances with outcast states against Western influence, that is building ties with places like Iran, Libya and other countries that are on the 'outs' with Western states.

VALASEK: Given the existing conflicts in the region, the emerging alliances, what are the chances of success for developing Caspian oil resources in the future? I wasn't actually aware of the statement in Moscow, who was it?

GOBLE: The foreign policy aide, I mean I can get you the exact citation, but I mean the Armenian said this and the idea -- the term access -- was actually used, which I found especially troubling.

VALASEK: Given some of the difficulties we just mentioned, the emerging alliances, and the existing conflicts, what are the chances of the resources of the Caspian oil being actually developed?

GOBLE: First off the predictions in 1991 that the Caspian Basin was going to be the new Middle East, were never real, on the other hand I think these resources are going to be developed, I think the alliances of which you speak are not nearly as tight and definitive as the alliances we spoke of during the Cold War so I would expect to see some development of Caspian oil and gas, I don't think it is going to be as spectacular as many people think, but at the same time I think it is going to matter profoundly in the ability of these countries to solidify their independence and to link into the broader international community.

VALASEK: One question more or less out of curiosity, the U.S./Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce has I believe, three Secretaries of Defense on it's Board of Advisors, what interest does the security/defense establishment have in the Caspian region?

GOBLE: Well clearly many people are interested in the development of oil and gas as part of a way of making money from the sales, part of them are interested because they see this as a security interest of the United States if the Caspian oil and gas begins to flow to the West, then it follows that this region is far more likely to be integrated into Western values and to Western sphere rather than to continue to fall under Russian influence. And I think that many of the people believe as do I that it is terribly important that no one in Moscow thinks that the restoration of the empire is a real possibility with the development of Caspian oil and gas any chance that Moscow would re-project power in the case of a kind of revived Soviet Union, I think would be eliminated.

VALASEK: The Jane's Intelligence Review reported that in 1995 U.S. officials briefed NATO representatives on the possibility of extending U.S. security guarantees from the Gulf to the Caucasus region and the Central Asian region as well, would this be wise?

GOBLE: Security guarantees are not security guarantees, I mean they are not all the same, clearly the kinds of commitments the United States has under the NATO Treaty, the Article 5, is to be considered or at least discussed as an attack on all, are not the same as the kind of security guarantees that have been extended in the Middle East. I would like to see the United States play a positive role in promoting stability in this region. I would think that the kinds of things that we would be willing and indeed able to do either in the Caucasus or even more in Central Asia are much more limited than the kinds of things we could do in the Middle east. That doesn't mean there isn't a role for American power to play, I think there is, but security guarantees are not one thing, there is a whole range of things you might do.

VALASEK: What role can the U.S. military play in that region?

GOBLE: Well, military power as much as some people may not like it, is the ultra-marazzio in an international system which is fundamentally anarchic and it does matter if you have real power, but the idea that military force is the proper or the best way to project power in a particular region needs to be examined very carefully and I personally doubt that it would be military force in any direct way that would play that kind of role in this region.

VALASEK: What indirect role do you see for it?

GOBLE: Well as I have said, I can imagine that the United States would give advise, provide training that sort of thing, and that is utterly appropriate. I don't see American military bases or anything like that, so again it depends on what you mean when you say assistance.