VALASEK: Why is it that we see the U.S. administration with so closely involved see establishing, see the creation of the office of a special advisory on the Caspian energy or the Caspian based in energy, diplomacy , why is the United States so involved in the Caspian?

CLAWSON: In many parts of the world , development of the oil industry now can proceed like a normal business without special involvement by governments, but in the Caspian it is going to take quite a lot of effort on the part of governments to create the conditions to allow normal economic development to proceed and especially because of the conflicts in this region and because these countries are landlocked, so there will be complications in getting their oil to the world market, governments are going to have to get involved, that is what the U.S. government has become so involved in this Caspian oil development.

VALASEK: You mentioned conflicts, what, how much difference, what can the United States do to bring about the resolution of the conflicts or whatnot, is or actually let me back track, is the primary reasons why the United States involved in some of the conflict resolution, the means group, the pipelines and the oil or is there another reason?

CLAWSON: Well the United States is always interested in seeing conflicts anywhere in the world get resolved and conflicts that are on the border, the former Soviet Union are troubling because after all the Soviet Union remains the only other nuclear super power, its not a super power in all ways, but still a nuclear superpower, and so I think that the United States might be involved in some level in trying to resolve the conflicts in the Caspian region, even if there weren't oil.. But when we add to this mix the potential for American oil companies to invest and make billions of dollars, then there is all the more reason for the U.S. to become active in the area.

VALASEK: There are some pitfalls to our involvement and you mentioned in your study the dangerous rivalry emerging in the Caspian, what is you are referring to

CLAWSON: Unfortunately some of the countries in the Caspian seem to think that the U.S. involvement is detrimental to their interests and is designed to forestall them being important actors in the Caspian. Now with Iran it is true, the United States doesn't want Iran to earn a lot of money of Caspian oil development, because Iran is still pursuing its weapons of mass destruction and causing problems in the Arab/Israeli peace process and the like. But the Iranians are really quite paranoid about anything the U.S. does in the area. And as for Russia, I think the United States is quite eager to see Russia proceed with its economic development. But it is true that the U.S. is unpersuaded, that the best future for getting the oil out of this Caspian area is through Russia and thinks that routes that go East or West might be better.

VALASEK: What impact do you think this misperception of U.S. activities in the area and on the Russian side and the continued U.S. activities in area, what impact will it have on U.S. Russian relations in the future?

CLAWSON: The Caspian is not an essential issue for the United States it is probably more important however for Russia because they are quite concerned about the instability of all along their borders within the countries that are called Neo(inaudible) the former Soviet Union. So Russia is likely to give more importance to this issue than the United States does and Russians, some Russians seem to fear that the United States is really locked in an economic even rivalry with Russia rather than being a helping partner.

VALASEK: You brought the U.S. strategic point, does the United States, are there interests other than economic in the Caspian? We hear of Bakujahan pipeline playing geo-strategic roles, and Ambassador Morningstar said "It is in national security interests to see the pipeline built." What do they mean? What are the strategic games being played?

CLAWSON: I would be hard put to name national security interests we have in a region so far removed from our country as the Caspian, and I think it is most inappropriate for us to exaggerate the importance the Caspian will play on the world energy market, or to exaggerate how much we are prepared to do in order to help the countries of Central Asia. It is one thing for the United States to make an effort to resolve these matters, so that U.S. companies can benefit, countries in the area can benefit, it is another thing to inflate the importance of this area all beyond what it deserves.

VALASEK: And you think this is what we have done through the emphasis?

CLAWSON: There is certainly sometimes, some statements made by some officials which as is natural among people with a problem, to exaggerate the importance of the problem they are working on. But on the whole, the U.S. has not put the Caspian at the center of what it is doing, it has remained a sideshow, an interesting and potentially profitable and useful sideshow, but really a sideshow. If anything I think there has been too much emphasis though to this problem.

VALASEK: Should the United States extend the security guarantee to the Persian Gulf to the Caspian?

CLAWSON: For the United States to become involved in a new part of the world for security guarantee is a very serious matter, we should not do this lightly because that would call into question just how deeply we are committed to our existing security guarantee, we must show how the fullness of purpose with which we are going to carry out any of our security guarantees. And I can't see why we would want to extend any of our security guarantees to a region like the Caspian which is not central to our country's economic well being, especially given that there are lots of conflicts going on in the Caspian.

VALASEK: Let me give you one scenario, the U.S. companies already involved in building some of the pipelines, there is the company Aprazia, last week we saw or two weeks ago we saw and insurgency, mutiny in Georgia, and (inaudible) Bakujahan pipeline would go through the Kurdish territories. Is there a possibility that the pipelines themselves would come under attack from any of the groups, or not just the pipelines but the oil facilities? And if they do, would the United States provide military aid for their protection?

CLAWSON: It is quite, quite possible that the oil facilities and the oil pipelines in this part of the world would be attacked by various armed insurgents. So what is new about that? The pipelines in Colombia get blown up almost every week, and the oil companies in Colombia understand that this is a problem that they are going to have to deal with, it is the cost of doing business and working with the local authorities. It would not help pipeline companies and the oil producing companies if the U.S. got involved, because that would just make the likelihood of the attack all the greater! And it would endanger American lives needlessly. So I would say it is a bad idea for us to anyway suggest that the United States military would help U.S. oil companies, U.S. oil industry workers in the area if they came under attack.

VALASEK: What about NATO though, I know that the infrastructure and logistics division is already providing environmental security advise, there is talk, actual demands from Azerbaijan for NATO to provide operational security advise as well, which remains in affect advise on how to protect the pipelines and sending possibly people down on the ground as advisors. Do you see a potential for NATO getting involved?

CLAWSON: Certainly because Turkey is a NATO country and if this pipeline goes through NATO territory it is naturally going to be question of how can the Turks call upon their international allies to use their expertise to figure out what they can do for that part of the pipeline crossing the territory, natural thing, would this be a formal NATO involvement? I would hope that it would be more in the nature of assistance to a member state than anything else. And as for a NATO role in the Caspian countries themselves, well I think it is very appropriate for NATO to provide assistance to those governments, but it would be a bad idea for NATO assistance to take the form of soldiers who actually are in combat, to combat situations.

VALASEK: What impact would the pipeline developments have on the actual security situation in the region, among the Caspian countries? The Armenian foreign minister, (inaudible) Made a statement, months ago, saying Armenia may annex Nagorakarbak because it cannot wait for Azerbaijan to rebuild its army with petrol dollars and retain Nagorkarabak by force. There are arguments from the Ahrpraz authorities that they cannot wait and see, watch the Georgian authorities accumulate wealth invested into military, turning into military might and eventually try to settle the conflict forcefully. Will the pipelines have any impact on the conflicts either (inaudible) try to pre-empt any new oil bonanza by launching attacks on the Central governments?

CLAWSON: Its clear that the oil revenue would change the balance of forces in the area in favor of those governments that receive the oil revenue and against the insurgents by the U.S. governments. That provides us with a window of opportunity to settle these disputes to say to the insurgents 'You may now have the upper hand, but you won't necessarily have that for a long time, let's work out a deal now under which you compromise, give up what you have got now, knowing that's going to put you into a position that is better than you may be(inaudible) if this conflict drags on for ten years. And I hope that we are able to take advantage of that window of opportunity, to settle these conflicts now, because if we don't settle them now then the insurgents will have every incentive, every reason to to ahead and engage in (inaudible) attacks in order to disrupt these oil plans.

VALASEK: Would, uh, is there a potential that NATO would get involved at this point not for pipeline security anymore, but for purely military reasons if the region did erupt into a sort of a kaz of the swords of what you just outlined (sounds weird but that is what he said)

CLAWSON: If the finding of these various insurgencies were to intensify, there might well be cause for some kind of peacekeeping forces, and one can certainly mention scenarios in which a peacekeeping force in this area has to involve, not only a substantial Russian presence, but also a Western presence. And there it will be quite possible for the Western presence would be said to be through the ( inaudible) of the OSCE or some other kind of more neutral institution, we all know the real core of that contribution would have to come from NATO countries in using the procedure NATO has involved for coordination among those members. It may not be formally called a NATO operation but it is going to follow NATO procedure, NATO Standards, (inaudible) that cooperation experience that they have amassed.

VALASEK: All these countries Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan at least the caucuses countries are all a Partnership for Peace members and candidates for NATO membership. To what extent is their NATO membership drive relate to the old developments? To what extent is it a security driven movement?

CLAWSON: Well these countries are not going to become members of NATO until they move a long ways towards developing democratic governments and until they resolve conflicts between them and their neighbors, and their own domestic insurgencies, that may be made easier by having oil money, but we are still talking about a process which is more likely to take decades rather than years.