ROBERT OAKLEY: Since 1971, they haven't had a war. We in the United States have been very very afraid that they were going to go to war on several occasions. They've always found a way to back down. Because they know each other very very well. It's sort of a subterranean, implicit rather than explicit way of signalling. We set up all sorts of things with the Soviets so that we could work it out, particularly after the Cuban missile crisis. They have their own way of communicating, which is generally indirect, but they have a way of understanding each other and they can take it up to a certain point and then they back down. So they don't want an accident, and they don't want a war.

LOTTMAN: Is there really zero possibility? Is there planning in their military establishments to accommodate the nuclear capability, vis-a-vis each other or any other country?

OAKLEY: They're thinking about it. I wouldn't say they've gotten to the stage where they're planning. In India at the moment, it's like it was in the United States prior to the Korean War. The control of nuclear devices and the missiles is in the hands of the civilians, rather like our old Atomic Energy Commission. The military don't possess these things, therefore they are not able to use them. In Pakistan, no-one's ever thought of using them.

They are there as a deterrent. Both sides are now beginning the process of thinking, but there is a long way to go between thinking and planning.

LOTTMAN: Do the recent tests represent any break with history for Pakistan, or is this a logical progression up to this point?

OAKLEY: I think it's a logical progression for both of them in a sense. I mean, Indians having fought a war with China and seeing China test, they decided they'd better get the nuclear capability. Then there was a war between India and Pakistan, and Indians tested, so Pakistan said, 'we'd better have a nuclear capability.' It was only a matter of time having acquired the capability before one or the other tested, and after the first had tested, the other was bound to do the same.

LOTTMAN: It is looked upon as a region that is prone to armed conflict. Does nuclearization, does that have any impact on that? Is it now less prone to conflict, the higher stakes, how might that affect relations between the two countries generally?

OAKLEY: My guess is that it makes a deliberate decision to go to war still less likely. It's been unlikely, as I say, since 1971, and both sides have taken care not to do that. They've taken care to keep the temperature low enough so you wouldn't have spontaneous combustion or accidental war. But it certainly has made the idea of a deliberate decision to go to war much much less likely. I'd say almost zero. But there could be accidents, and that's what's dangerous. And if you have nuclear warheads on missiles and you just punch a button, then that's quite different than having the capability of producing a nuclear warhead and lowering it on to something after a few days.

LOTTMAN: So, they are still some ways away from that remote-control, push-the-button capability.

OAKLEY: That's right. That's what everyone hopes they will not do, and they're, they haven't made up their own minds whether they will or whether they won't.

LOTTMAN: What's your assessment of what the US is doing to, I don't know, I guess insert itself into the situation, to try to prevent that sort of occurrence--an accident or a miscalculation, trying to get the two sides to modify their behavior.... What's your assessment of the influence we're trying to have on the situation? Are there ways we can be more effective in that, or are there things we're doing that maybe we shouldn't be?

OAKLEY: I think that overall, we've been quite effective since the two sides set off their nuclear tests. The first thing we did was to rally the permanent members of the security council to join us in a communique that was very hard-hitting. Then we got the economic powers, including countries like Japan and also bring on board countries like South Africa and Argentina and Brazil who had nuclear weapons capability and given it up. And everyone who joined together to try to convince them that this is the wrong approach and try to get them not to weaponize, if you will--not to get to the stage where they actually have deployed nuclear weapons ready to fire on a moment's notice. Saying, 'hold it right there,' that's the important thing. I think that's happened, now we're trying to get them to take some concrete steps, and this is goint to take a little while. It took us and the Russians almost 20 years, and we're expecting India and Pakistan to do it in 6 months? That's the only part where I think we're sort of unrealistic. I think we've made a lot of progress.

LOTTMAN: So you think the face-off or the potential for nuclear competition between the two can be mitigated by outside intervention?

OAKLEY: I think outside persuasion, explanation, showing that we care, also pointing out the downside to it, saying, 'we're with you, calm down, there's nothing to be too scared of, neither country's taking advantage of the other, we're here watching it, we're gonna help you, we're not gonna put ourselves in the middle.' I wouldn't suggest we have talks with the Indians and the Pakistanis at Wye plantation, for example.

LOTTMAN: What about NGOs, do you see them getting involved in the situation or their reaction to it? What's your assessment of that?

OAKLEY: Yeah, the NGOs are very involved, particularly in the nuclear area, NGOs like the Stimson Center and Michael Krepon, they have very very good contacts with the Indian and Pakistani nuclear scientists, people in this are, they talk to all the time. And from that point of view, and with the intellectuals who are sort of the defense planners, thay talk to also, people outside the government. So I think what they have to say can be very very helpful, in terms of explaining the problems, looking at what we and the Soviets went through--we had some close calls like the Cuban missile crisis--which caused us to set up a whole variety of confidence-building methods, if you will. This kind of stuff can be helpful.

LOTTMAN: What about the sanctions? Are they an effective tool?

OAKLEY: I think it's an effective tool to get their attention. I think that experience has shown that if you apply sanctions too long, you reach the point of no return. After all, we had sanctions in place against Pakistan, almost full-scale sanctions for 8 years, and they still went ahead and tested. After awhile, you lose the value of the sanctions, but in the short term they can be very effective. Then you have to translate into something positive and stop thinking that you can get what you want merely by being punitive.

LOTTMAN: To refer to something that came out of another interview I did The idea that the tests were designed to draw more international attention to the disputes between India and Pakistan, over Kasmir. On the one hand, it has brought more attention to that. On the other hand, it opens the door for more low-intensity conflict in Kashmir, because they don't want a conventional war, but yet you can't respond to that sort of activity by dropping nuclear bombs on people. And so in a way, it invites more small-scale conflict.

OAKLEY: Well, let's talk about that. It's very interesting. I think the primary Indian motivation was desire to be seen and to be treated as a major power, analogous to China. They're very upset China has a permanent seat in the Security Council, China is allowed to buy nuclear technology from the United States including power plants and dual-use technology--although there's some debate in our Congress about the wisdom of that now. Nevertheless, China has been referred to by the Secretary of State as a strategic partner; India feels they should be treated the same way the Chinese are treated, they're burning with resentment that they haven't been. And I think this is the primary thing behind their nuclear tests, in addition to a sort of generalized fear of China, therefore to show that 'we have the capability to defend ourselves if the need may be' although but they haven't taken any action military, to even put any troops on the Chinese border. They're talking to the Chinese. So this is a long-term contingency feared. The main thing is desire for status, to show that India's strong and a great power, something India's always strove to, always tried to do. Pakistan on the other hand is bound to keep up with the Indians, both technologically and, 'if they've tested their nuclear devices, then we'd better make sure ours work, therefore we have to test also.' And when the Indian Interior minister said, well now we have the bomb, we'll take the rest of Kasmir, that part which is in Pakistan, the Pakistanis felt that just politically they had to go ahead. They couldn't not show the Indians 'we're ready'. But an unexpected outcome of this, so far as India is concerned has been an increase in international concern and focus on Kashmir, which is the last thing they wanted. So in a sense by showing they were a great power, the brought the concern of the international community down on their heads with respect to Kashmir, something they've always said should only be treated bilaterally. It's having an effect, in that both countries are seriously talking about Kashmir. Up until 10 days ago, they wouldn't even sit down at the table and talk about Kashmir. India would say, 'it's an internal Indian issue, therefore there's nothing to discuss.' This doesn't mean that there's gonna be an agreement, certainly not any time soon, but at least they're talking about it now. And I'm not so sure that it's gonna produce an increase in conflict, even of low-intensity variety, in and around Kashmir. It might, but on the other hand there's no need for it, necessarily. It depends on which way they want to go. I think at the moment both of them would like to keep the tensions down a little bit, rather than escalate them.

LOTTMAN: Does this come up in your work here at NDU? Does it come up in lectures? Has anything remarkable come out of that?

OAKLEY: Well, everyone's very concerned. You know, the Americans like to study everything to death, and come up with all sorts of solutions to other peoples' problems, which is useful up to a point. But beyond that, they're gonna have to work it out for themselves. I'm glad they've begun to talk to each other, and they've begun to talk to each other about just this. How they can have better early warning, how they could make sure they don't accidentally touch off a conflict by surprising the other side, more transparency, all these thinks which Michael Krepon and his crew have been working on for years are now on the agenda of the discussions between India and Pakistan I think is the best way to proceed.

LOTTMAN: What about their newfound willingness to talk about test-ban regimes or in finding a place in the international non-proliferation regimes?

OAKLEY: That's right. You know, it's funny, because when we were negotiating this big Comprehensive test-ban treaty, they set aside a category of states that were called 'near-nuclear', which included Pakistan, India and Israel, all of whom have to ratify before it can come into effect, because everyone assumes they have the capability of making nuclear weapons any time they want. And yet, orthodoxy says, 'you have the NPT which includes only 5 countries, and you can't go beyond that.' Well, that's like saying, 'outside today, even though the sun is shining, it's midnight.' Because those things exist in all three countries. And you have to find some way of recognizing them even if you don't officially modify the non-proliferation treaty, you have to find some way of recognizing the reality. Otherwise it just gets worse. As someone said, 'we have ways of amending our constitution, why shouldn't one find a way to amend the NPT?'

LOTTMAN: I don't think I have anything else.

OAKLEY: The non-proliferationists hate that. Article of faith for so many years we could only have 5 countries with nuclear capabilities, and I said well, fine, but it's there! It's not gonna go away. Argentina and Brazil were willing to give up their nuclear weapons when the tensions between them went down. And the governments inside both countries changes and they said, 'OK, together we'll do this.' And if ever it should happen in India and Pakistan, then they might be convinced to give up their nuclear weapons, although the Indians would still look at the Chinese. In South Africa, they were willing to give up their nuclear weapons when the world changed. The Soviets collapsed, the threat from other African states disappeared and therefore they didn't need it.

LOTTMAN: Do you agree that Kashmir is the central point of dispute between India and Pakistan?

OAKLEY: It is a point of dispute. There are lots of other points of dispute. Kashmir gets all the attention. I remember when I was the Ambassador to Pakistan in 1989, 1990, I looked very carefully. In 1989 there were a dozen meetings between prime ministers, ministers of defense, foreign ministers of India and Pakistan, and at not one of those meetings was Kashmir ever raised. Right now it's gotten very hot again as an issue, but it can cool down.

LOTTMAN: So, it's not moving inexorably toward a solution, then?

OAKLEY: No, it's not moving inexorably toward a solution, but nor is it moving inexorably toward a war.

LOTTMAN: So, there is potential for that to be resolved somehow?

OAKLEY: Well, there's certainly the potential for the tensions to go down, which I think is important. Later on, they may be able to resolve it. But the main thing is to cool the environment if you will, and I think that's possible.