MICHAEL KREPON: A lot of close South Asia watchers havefelt that India and Pakistan have had the capability to deliver a nuclear weapon by aircraft for a number of years, so they're adding to the pile.

LOTTMAN: So, they're looking at missiles to...

KREPON: They're looking at missiles to supplement their aircraft.

LOTTMAN: How would you assess the actual danger of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan?

KREPON: Neither country wants another conventional war. They can't afford it. It'll wreck their economies. Even more so in Pakistan. It'll slow down economic growth in India. Neither country wants a nuclear exchange, because everybody loses. The problem that we now face in South Asia is that overt nuclear capabilities have freed up unconventional capabilities. So there's more low-intensity conflict going on between India and Pakistan. So the fear is that the fighting that's going on now across the line of control that separates Kashmir will escalate in ways that neither side really wants, but that neither side has the capability to defuse.

LOTTMAN: So there's sort of a game of chicken going on?

KREPON: There's a very dangerous game of chicken going on in South Asia. Pakistan wants to call attention to the Kashmir dispute. It wants to call attention that South Asia constitutes a nuclear flashpoint. Kashmir wants help in its dealings with a larger neighbor, India. The mechanism that Pakistan is using to get help is to heat up the line of control. Did I say Kashmir wants help? Can I do that again?

LOTTMAN: Is there a game of chicken going on?

KREPON: There is a very dangerous game of chicken going on in South Asia. Pakistan wants international help in resolving the Kashmir dispute with India. Pakistan is seeking to get that help by pointing to the Kashmir dispute as a nuclear flashpoint. And to lend credence to that, Pakistan has heated up that line of control, with a lot of firing and a lot of violence. India has responded in kind. So it's a very dangerous game.

LOTTMAN: Is that the predominant scenario that could lead to a nuclear exchange between the twothe conflict in Kashmir?

KREPON: Kashmir is the heart of the problem in South Asia. It's not the only problem. But Pakistan has to find other ways to deal with the Kashmir issue other than by heating up the line of control. Kashmir needs to agree.... Pakistan needs to agree to nuclear risk reduction measures. This is a region of the world which Pakistan claims is a nuclear flashpoint. So, if Pakistan is serious about this it ought to accept nuclear risk reduction measures with India.

LOTTMAN: If there were an actual nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, do you have any insight as to how that would be prosecuted by one or both sides, in terms of targeting, etc. what would their approach be?

KREPON: There is no good target in South Asia for a nuclear weapon. If India were to use a nuclear weapon against Pakistan, it would be violating and polluting a sacred watershed area. The Ganges flows into India from the north. If Pakistan were to target any city in India, Pakistan would kill millions of Muslims. Because Muslims live in those cities. So there's no good targets.

LOTTMAN: Let's talk a little more about what the consequences would be.

KREPON: There have been some studies of the consequences of a nuclear exchange by South Asians. And they've all arrived at the same conclusion. That the use of a nuclear weapon is very likely to cause casualties far in excess of those that were incurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. You have to remember that the cities in this part of the world are very very crowded. And one could expect massive casualties for any use against built-up areas.

LOTTMAN: Does that include targets that would be looked upon as purely military? Do they all have population centers nearby?

KREPON: When one looks at military targets in South Asia, one can find nuclear installations, one can find airfields, one can find garrisons, where troops are concentrated. Sll of these targets could be hit by conventional weapons, without causing massive death in the subcontinent. A nuclear strike by either India or Pakistan does not make sense. There are very few Indians or Pakistanis that you could talk to that would disagree with that. The reason for the weapons has a lot to do with status. It has a lot to do with domestic politics. It doesn't really have that much to do with military security.

LOTTMAN: Looking at the present and maybe a little into the future, critique the US response to this situation. What are we doing and what more could we be doing? Are there things we're doing which we should stop doing? This is with a view toward whether this nuclear competition can be stopped by outside pressures.

KREPON: The Nuclear competition in South Asia cannot be stopped by external actors like the United States. It can only be stopped by the two countries themselves. They have to sit down together to negotiate nuclear risk reduction measures. They have to agree to these measures and they have to make them stick. And this is a real opportunity. India and Pakistan are sitting down in October--first time in a long time--to talk substance. And the world's gonna be watching whether or not they can come up with measures that reduce nuclear dangers. Up til now, the United States has been playing the role of an intermediary, because India and Pakistan haven't talked to each other any length of time after they tested nuclear weapons. So Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State has been shuttling back and forth, travelling long distances to try and encourage the two sides to accept nuclear risk reduction measures. The time has now come for the tow sides to speak directly to one another and negotiate these measures.

LOTTMAN: Do the sanctions on India and Pakistan compromise our ability to take that position? Or do they still look at us as a useful and trustworthy agent for that communication?

KREPON: The imposition of sanctions by the United States has not harmed Strobe Talbott's efforts as an intermediary. He's welcome in both countries. They'd like to see more of him. It's very rare for India and Pakistan to get the kind of high-level attention that they now have gotten from the executive branch. If they now play hard to get, and don't follow through with commitments or responsible steps to reduce nuclear dangers, I think future administrations are gonna have to ask themselves whether or not it's worth the effort.

LOTTMAN: What's your assessment of our policy of using sanctions? Is that useful? Should they be stronger, should they be removed?

KREPON: Sanctions have gotten a bum rap. It's now fashionable to be very very negative about sanctions. Public law required the President to impose very severe sanctions for nuclear tests. And he's done that. If the United States were to quickly turn around and say, "we didn't really mean it", there really are consequences here. That's sending a pretty bad message elsewhere, to other states that are contemplating other actions that increase nuclear danger. I like the analogy of a rheostat, the circular switch we have in our homes that turns up the heat or turns the air conditioning. I think the president needs the flexibility to respond proportionately, positively or negatively, to concrete steps taken by India or Pakistan. And I think the cogress is close to giving the president that waiver authority.

LOTTMAN: This is already a conflict-prone reagion, and now the stakes have been raised considerably, should the two go to war again. How do you think it might affect relations?

KREPON: Let me answer this way. There is a theory in academia that offsetting nuclear weapons capabilities promote stability and improves relation between states. I disagree. South Asia is a region that has had nuclear capabilities for most of the last decade. It's been under the table. It hasn't been over the table. During the last decade, relations between India and Pakistan have been pretty bad. And the level of violence across the dividing line of Kashmir has been very high and it's gotten much higher after the nuclear tests. So in effect what's happening here is, offsetting nuclear capabilities, now overt, have freed up options for unconventional warfare, for low-intensity conflict. Now that has within it a lot of dangers. The dangers of escalation, the dangers of crisis stability. And it makes serious, successful negotiations between the two sides harder. Doesn't make it easier. So we have a situation in South Asia today where nuclear dangers have increased. There's more of a need now than ever before for India and Pakistan to negotiate nuclear risk-reduction measures. But it's harder to do so, because the Kashmir issue is still front-and-center.

LOTTMAN: What measures in particular would be most constructive?

KREPON: Neither India nor Pakistan has the ability to read what each other is doing with its missile programs. They don't have the intelligence capabilities. And this is a very jittery region. So if a missile moves, if a missile is flight-tested, people go on edge. One nuclear-risk-reduction measures that makes sense for me is the two sides to agree not to move around their missiles in deployment areas, where the jitters are gonna be highest.

LOTTMAN: I've hear India's tests discussed as sort of a break with their history. Their attitude toward nuclear weapons. Is that true on the Pakistani side as well. Has their government's overall attitude toward nuclear weapons changed?

KREPON: I don't see much change in Pakistani attitudes. They don't wanna go first on matters pertaining to the nuclear options. But they will go second. And they've proven that last May.