ANDREW KOCH: The U. S. Government has said that the spot they most worry about nuclear war happening is in India and Pakistan. They've said that for the last few years, prior to the May 1998 nuclear tests. Now that the tests have occurred, is South Asia a dangerous place, a place where a nuclear war could occur?

SHIRIN TAHIR-KELLY: Well, India and Pakistan have been dangerous places for a while. The tests have highlighted a very sort of critical component of that policy and have added yet one more complication in a region that really requires none. In that sense, yes, I think it has. There are people who disagree that the nuclear testing really added anything further to either the rivalry or the likelihood of war in South Asia. I tend to disagree with that. I think it has done that because it has given us some additional issues to worry about.

KOCH: What are those issues?

TAHIR-KELLY: Well, it's a, it's a region which has had 2-1/2 outbreaks of war already, so in a sense, the psychological barrier against war isn't there in South Asia, although I'm not saying they would be more irresponsible with nuclear weapons than some other country. But there is--in the range of relationships between India and Pakistan, people tend not to discount war as readily as other countries that have had no experience with it. It's policy by other means, when it's necessary, either as a last resort, or when it's thrust upon the leadership, war is talked about, which is unsettling.

KOCH: What are some of the causes of tension between these two countries? What could take them to a point of wanting to go to war with each other?

TAHIR-KELLY: The most notable one is the presence of disputed territory--Kashmir, which sits on the border between India and Pakistan. Over the years, when relations between India and Pakistan have been good, the cycles that have been the good ones for the two countries, even those have not led to a solution in Kashmir or a willingness on the part of both countries to deal with this issue once and for all. What it has meant even in the good times is you put Kashmir aside, and then you get on with the other things you need to do, like trade, and commissions that look at exchanges, more visas, travel, etc. But when relations are poor, and they have been for a little while, unfortunately, then Kashmir becomes sort of the ultimate focus.

And since 1990, when the Kashmir insurgency started, the picture has been far more complicated. Indians have accused Pakistan of interfering quite directly, either using intelligence services, or others by proxy. In fact Indians have even called them as much as mercenaries. On the Pakistani side, these are freedom fighters who are finally looking for ways to achieve something the world had guaranteed them essentially by UN resolutions, and that is a plebiscite in Kashmir, and final self-determination. So it has, I think, the potential to spark a conflict. There are other ranges of difficulties than, the, between India and Pakistan, but Kashmir probably is of the most serious nature, I would say.

And, again, war by miscalculation is not unthinkable. It has nearly occurred in the past. You're building upon a huge legacy of mistrust, and assuming absolutely the worst motives on the part of the other side. Complicating that are intelligence agencies that are very aggressive on both sides--I'm not even sure how much they are really under the control of the governments, although governments will say that they are--who have a completely different agenda, who don't necessarily subscribe to better relations between India and Pakistan.

And on top of everything you have weak political governments... for whom it is not unthinkable to talk about, not necessarily war, but at least something short of that, and who look at each other with a rather jaundiced eye. So the mix is really rather volatile, I think, at present.

KOCH: How does nuclear weapons fit into that equation? Does it make war more possible, less possible, less likely?

TAHIR-KELLY: Well, the hope is that at least it will cause them to be more sober in their calculations, to realize that this is a weapon of horror, and the consequence in the sub-continental context, therefore, I think, there is an assumption that, as I mentioned, institutions like the intelligence agencies think they have much greater leeway than they might actually have, thinking the envelope is that much further to push. Because if war is unthinkable, that gives greater latitude. So in all ways I think it makes the potential for war more likely.

KOCH: If you look into the future, let's say, two years or five years. What sorts of developments are likely to occur vis a vis these two countries' nuclear weapons programs, and what kinds of consequences will those have?

TAHIR-KELLY: On the plus side, we have a little bit of a positive element to build on. India and Pakistan have had an agreement, despite the paucity of relationship subsequently, which they reached in the mid-1980s, I believe it was 1986, not to attack each others nuclear facilities, for example, which is absolutely going to be a cause for war. And that has been observed throughout the deterioration in the relationship. It has required and has led to exchanges of nuclear facilities..........each side charges the other. Nevertheless I think it's been a productive start. So if something like that can be achieved, they can begin to talk about arms control procedures.

If they could even talk about nuclear risk reduction centers because, often the escalation in tensions has been the result of faulty intelligence. And it's one thing to have this faulty intelligence occurring when you have a little bit of a safety margin, but when nuclear weapons are involved and when, for Pakistan at least, their doctrine may well be that, since they don't have much conventional capability that can stand up to India's, that they might resort to it sooner than later. And so, therefore, that margin is narrow. I think it would be very important for the two countries to sort of make the decision that, yes, they have achieved some kind of deterrent capability, but it's a limited one at this point, so it's not as difficult to agree to some measures of safety. Then it might be later on, if they have a whole, if they go through weaponization, miniaturization, deliverable systems missiles, it's at the beginning stages of capability at this point and there might be a possibility, at least, of trying to get some of these firebreaks in.

This is probably an area where countries such as the United States might be helpful because we have this vast experience in our own arms control talks with the Russians, and also the development of technologies for arms controls, which is very important. And rather than India and Pakistan recreating their own entire systems, we might be there if they should ever decide that this is the way they are going. There are more sober voices on both sides who say look, we're not going to be more irresponsible than other countries have been, they've already offered that they unilaterally will not be testing anymore, they don't require any more tests, they are willing to engage in fissile material cutoff talks, they have already pledged that they will not transfer the sensitive technology and know how. So they've at least individually taken some of the steps that could point in that direction. It would be much better, I think, if they could achieve some of these agreements bilaterally and institutionalize them.

KOCH: You mentioned the agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. During May of this year, it was reported out of Islamabad that the Pakistani government believed that India was about to strike against Pakistani territory, in fact Pakistani nuclear facilities. Can you tell me a little bit about this--do you think this was a true allegation, and if so is it instructive of some of the dangers?

TAHIR-KELLY: We have assumed all along that the non-attack issue is one that is being somewhat adequately dealt with and the panic which some say preceded the Pakistani decision to test sort of belied that sense of security. I don't know where that report surfaced. And the Pakistani system can on issues that are this fundamental be somewhat divisive. Perhaps some people believed that this was about to happen. It's not one that I would necessarily sign on to.

The Indians were conducting their test for their own reason, and surely the Indians recognized that the test would be met with a lot of international disapproval. To accompany that with an actual attack on Pakistan makes no sense, unless they wanted to make such a huge splash that there was no walking away from. So, it sounds like a report that surfaced somewhere, I don't know where, but I would not sign on to it.

KOCH: How has the US historically played a role in India and Pakistan's security, in their nuclear program. Do they have a history of playing a role in both sides' nuclear programs, going back to Atoms for Peace, what has their stance been and their position?

TAHIR-KELLY: The US has been very important to the nuclear programs of both countries. As you mentioned, the Atoms for Peace, and it was one of those exhibitions that captivated the hearts and minds of a lot of people in South Asia when it toured, in the Eisenhower Administration, both India and Pakistan. The concept at that time was really sort of, atoms for peaceful purposes, obviously, so people talked about what this would do to create energy in a perpetually energy-short region such as South Asia, where imports have been high. What it would do for medical research, for agriculture, and in fact institutes were set up where precisely those kinds of applications were focused on in India and Pakistan.

The other side of the coin, of course, the weapons side, sort of emerged in the mid-60s I think people started to focus on it, but certainly after the Chinese acquisition of that capability and the Sino-Indian war that had taken place in 1962. And once India had it it was one of those chain-reactions, Pakistan was not far behind. The training of the scientists suddenly became part and parcel of the weapons programs. It was in the West as well. Particularly for Pakistan. Canada, the US were two of the primary sources of training for the reactors. India has had a much greater indigenous capability and continues to do so. A much bigger scientific establishment, much better organized, just really first rate.

The Pakistanis have now begun to do that subsequently, particularly since the 70s and 80s when the international sanctions against their program became apparent, because they would not sign on to full-scope safeguards. They have been a little cut off from Western technological aspect of it. Some people in fact say, at another issue, that India and Pakistan's nuclear energy program has been put in jeopardy because they have been denied some of the safety features as a consequence of their nuclear programs and also their unwillingness to accept the safeguards. Dual technologies have been denied except on a case-by-case basis. So it's complicated the picture for them , I think, in that sense.

KOCH: What is the nature of the civilian technology? Civilian and military nuclear technology are very similar. Up to a point.

TAHIR-KELLY: The basis of it bring that the reactors that were got for research or for producing electricity. The diversion of the fuel that is required to run those reactors, towards the weapons programs, and then the justifications of those regular, open issues like energy programs to build a clandestine weapons program. For example, the Pakistani justification for a reprocessing plant that they wanted and signed on to with the French in the 1970s was expected to build a sufficient number of reactors and rely on nuclear energy as an important source. And therefore, they needed to reprocess the fuel. And the suspicion was that this was simply the cover for the weapons side of the same program. So the line has been thinned.

There is, some argue, a legitimate civilian energy component to both countries, because they are both energy short and going through some pretty serious shortages every single summer. In both countries, different regions come under virtual daily brownouts. Electricity is being shut off to certain parts of major cities with industrial bases.

KOCH: Can the west offer safety and other technologies to help with their power problems in exchange for supporting the CTBT. Is that still a viable option.

TAHIR-KELLY: I think the goalpost has sort of been raised on both sides. I think the Western side, with the US in the lead--but not just the US, other countries in the region like Australia, New Zealand, Japan are enormously angry about the tests of both countries. So it's not just the West holding it back. Even the Brazilians and Argentineans because they voluntarily gave up the capability, don't believe that either country should be "rewarded" for having tested by making it much easier for them. So I think that that makes it difficult.

It's not just the CTBT requirement. I think the whole host of other measures are being talked about that will be required. There will be an expectation that both India and Pakistan will subscribe to the fissile materials cutoff which sort of limits the capabilities of the program down the road, that they will not go in for deployment of nuclear weapons which means they can't keep ready-made systems and missiles on aircraft and ready to go--almost ready, perhaps, but not.... They will not be going in for missile programs delivery systems, and of course the issue of transfer of technology. As I said, some of these issues they are willing to engage in. But it will depend on the extent to which the outside world actually wants them to sign on to agreements rather than making unilateral declarations.

Because signing on means, for example if you take the case of India, India has for years said that this is, as they call it, a system of nuclear apartheid. In other words, perpetuating forever the situation where a group of countries, five countries, have a capability that is forever denied at all levels essentially in their book, to a country such as India. India has a particular problem because one of those five countries happens to be China. And India and China have had a border war. I think there is a feeling of insecurity in India versus China although in statements after the tests they talked about Pakistan. But India can deal much more adequately with a Pakistani capability, even now, than it can with the Chinese. So at one point, if China is in argument, does India begin to feel sufficiently comfortable that it will begin to sign on to an agreement on their side. So there are problems that Indian policy-makers have, there are problems that the outside policy-makers have, so this is a dialogue, I think, which will go on for a while.

KOCH: You mentioned that US doesn't want India to deploy missiles or proceed with advanced delivery systems. Yet India is going forward with the Agni-2 and Pakistan seems to be developing follow-ons to the Ghauri medium-range missile. Are the US goals realistic or attainable, are they verifiable? Is the US going to be able to verify that India does not in fact have nuclear bombs waiting in airfields?

TAHIR-KELLY: It's not going to be a completely foolproof system, I don't think, and you point out some of the dangers. But I'm one of those who believes firmly that US policy, while it may not have been successful and while it's being called not realistic at this point, has made it more difficult to go to the full range of the nuclear full-fledged option for both countries. And I think that is worthwhile, if you start from the premise, as most of us do, that nuclear weapons have made it inherently more unstable. So the harder it is to get to that capability in some ways, I think the better it has been.

It's also been an important requirement--the fact that the US is against it. That pressure on these countries will be greater should they proceed further down this track in the way of sanctions, in the way of denial of technology, denial of economic resources, etc. It has given sort of a fig leaf, if you will, to those particular people in the leadership in both countries who themselves understand that this is not necessarily in the best interests of their country. But it's much easier to say, in some ways, the opposition people, or whoever it is, who wants the sort of a gung-ho nuclear option that the price is high. The price has been laid out by the United States. The United States, which happens to be the only superpower, is intrinsically friendly to both countries. We're not looking to destroy India and Pakistan.

It I think strengthens the hands of those within the leadership who actually themselves see the instability that is caused by nuclear weapons, who otherwise might not be able to sustain that kind of a policy. I think that I'll be careful before just jettisoning American goals for a more realistic policy. If that means just go with the flow, that's not necessarily responsible international leadership for the US. The US really has a policy which has I think held up.

There have been countries who have crossed the threshold and encroached on the limits. But there haven't been hosts of them. They've been just a handful. And if we basically say, well, it's not good, it's not good for you, it's not healthy, you know, but there's not much one can do, I think that line would be crossed by additional countries with a lot more chaos even, and much greater dangers than in India and Pakistan.

KOCH: I have one last question. If you are a policy maker and you're looking at the dangers 5 or maybe 10 years down the road in South Asia, what would those dangers be, but more importantly, what could the US and the international community do to lessen them?

TAHIR-KELLY: I think that one of the most important things the United States and others in the international community can do is to very actively--not just encourage--but push India and Pakistan into normalization between the two of them. In the 1980s and up to I guess the cutoff of assistance to Pakistan in 1990 it was attempted very vigorously by the United States, and quite successfully. Between 1982 and 1990 the United States--particularly after 84--had a very strong relationship with Pakistan at the same time it started a whole, a new plateau of good relations with India. And it used those two sets of separate good relations to try to push them into better relations. This was the time when the nuclear non-attack agreement was signed. This was the time when India and Pakistan signed the use of hotlines agreement. This was the time when they had the subcommissions working, and it wasn't just by default. I mean, we pushed very very hard in the meetings that senior Americans had with senior Indians and Pakistanis. And I think it's unfortunate that that policy just sort of fell into disuse. There was a momentum there, the US has good reasons to want to have decent relations with both of those but those countries have unfortunately needed a fair amount of nudging. And I think that if nothing else, if we were able to do that, it would be one route to dealing with issues such as the nuclear issue, which is born out of a sense of insecurity and a fear of the future vis a vis each other that the two of them have. And I would say that it's manageable, it's doable, and it ought to be attempted again.

KOCH: Does the US have the leverage to convince New Delhi and Islamabad... If so, what is the leverage?

TAHIR-KELLY: The US, more than anybody else, has the leverage. I'm not sure that one would say the US has the capability to turn the switch on and off, but a steady amount of constant support-- not erratic visits, inspired focus-- would make that likely. For better or for worse, these countries do look to the US...

The US became in 1986 the major trading partner for India, and continues to be until this day. So even economically it's a very important country. For Pakistan, it's had a history of good relations with the United States, and there is an expectation and experience of looking to the US for issues. So when and of course that often used phrase--I hear it more often in Asia than in the United States--that the United States is the world's only remaining superpower, with all the magic that's supposed to conjure up, although we can't deliver necessarily on that. So the expectations are there, and I think the capabilities are very much there. As I mentioned, I think sustained focus, which I think has been attempted from time to time in this administration as well, and ability to look for new ways of doing this.

We always talk about the importance of cooperation, we haven't necessarily put money in it. I think that in the interaction, for example, in international financial institutions, the World Bank or the IMF have. I think if the US were to push these institutions to try and put a small amount of the monies that are given to India and Pakistan into joint ventures, for example. The US could be--using OPIC--be underwriting some of these ventures. India and Pakistan could be encouraged to be working on infrastructure issues which are non-contentious, on energy, on environment, and using technologies and fundings that are put aside for such enterprises. We haven't been terribly creative in the last decade. I think there have to be other ways of doing business in the next century, make it more lucrative if nothing else, for them to cooperate, and I think they would do that.

KOCH: Has the current administration taken South Asia seriously? Or has it been a lower priority than some areas of the world?

TAHIR-KELLY: Well, historically South Asia has been in a sense sort of like the stepchild, so it's not just this administration. But there have been times when I think South Asia was very important. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put Pakistan on the map, and the desire of President Reagan in fact to get India out of the Soviet Orbit sort of focused that. With the end of the Cold War, I think it slipped off. The creation of a special Bureau for South Asia, and I think it's assistant secretaries have been energetic. The President I think wanted to go to South Asia. However, I think the problem was that this Administration came in with a desire to do more with South Asia, and they did, but it was guided by that phrase that has become sort of legend, you know, "it's the economy, stupid." So it was assumed that trade would be the vehicle through which the focus would occur, and the Commerce Department was going to be one of the main actors. To some extent it was--the former secretary Ron Brown was quite involved and went out to India, and the Energy Secretary went out, etc. We have not...

Then came the nuclear tests and all that was sort of overthrown. Those of us who thought the political and strategic compunctions of the relationships remained, and remained really sort of secondary, sort of jumped to the forefront in a rather dramatic fashion, at a time when we had the least ability to influence them. So a steady state of focus in non-crisis times I think tends to deliver more. And I think for a long time the political-strategic will remain paramount no matter how much trade gets going. Look where... This region straddles the Gulf, where we say we have vital interests--the Persian Gulf--China, Russia, Central Asia--which has problems and prospects in terms of oil--and occupies areas in the vicinity of sort of important sea lines--lanes of communication. So it's obviously an area which I think will require a bit more.

A presidential visit was supposed to have unleashed a lot of interest and I understand it's now been put off or postponed, not necessarily canceled. But you have not seen the steady stream of visitors to Washington at the senior-most levels, as you saw during the 80s, when the prime ministers, presidents would come, etc., and there was an agenda. So I'm not quite sure what... that there's been enough focus on a common agenda, and maybe it'll be revived now, in the aftermath of the tests.