AMB. NARESH CHANDRA: The simple answer is that it is not justified. But it's a complex issue. And as your question itself reveals, there are two, three questions rolled into one. We have clarified that we viewed our nuclear capabilities as a deterrent, not as a means of projecting any aggressive designs on any neighbor. We have made it very plain that our nuclear program is not Pakistan-centered. It is as a result of our review over a period of time of what was happening in our neighborhood.

We have had disputes in the past and conflicts with Pakistan which with demilitarization of the Tibet region in the late 50s, as you know, and we had the '62 conflict with China. And we have been watching with growing concern, along with other weapon powers, the transfer of technology to them from many sources, including China, which is subject matter of investigation also in the House, there are reports to that effect. And the U.S. President had to apply the provisions of the Pressler Amendment to check some of that.

Well, despite these steps taken by U.S., to some extent the technology transfer continued. And we were sure that tested nuclear devices were available in Pakistan. So taking a overall review of the whole scene to our Northwest, and what was happening in the Bay of Bengal with the growing relationship between Myanmar and China, we had an arc of concern. As you would notice, we had no access to any pact or agreement with a nuclear weapon power for any kind of protection, which many other powers have.

So if you are dealing with the different security concerns of a billion people, you can't allow that state of affairs to continue. Our program has nothing whatever to do with Kashmir. I think the nuclear devices cannot possibly be used in Kashmir or nearabout, because people talk a lot of proximity of India and Pakistan. That also is insurance that nobody would attack each other with nuclear devices. But we are working things out and reducing whatever probability there is of conflict.

LOTTMAN: How might the Kashmir dispute be resolved?

AMB. CHANDRA: Well, there is a very long history, it is difficult to give all of it in a brief interview. But the fact remains that the state of Jammu and Kashmir is part of India. Not by force of arms or grabbing of this or that portion of it, but through constitutional means.

The India Independence Act was passed by the British House of Commons and it is according to the provisions contained in that act that we had the instrument of accession signed by the then-ruler, Maharaja Hari Seng, and that was accepted by Lord Mountbatten, who was then governor-general of India.

So integration with the Union of India was constitutionally complete. There were certain UN resolutions, which were not at all acted upon. The first set of steps had to be taken by Pakistan. They did not take it. And those resolutions became more or less a feat, that is what the UN officers reported also, that there is no hope of implementing those resolutions. So the people of Jammu and Kashmir formed themselves into a constituent assembly and passed a constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, providing for irrevocable accession with India, and they became a part of India. And that is also contained in Article 372 of the Constitution of India. So thereafter, Kashmir constitutionally has been a part of India although disputes have been raised by Pakistan.

In 1971, the President of Pakistan and the Prime minister of India agreed to the agreement at Simla. That is known as the Simla agreement of 1972. And that provides for discussion and resolution in a bilateral framework. No recourse to any other source for settling the dispute as two mature nations should do. It is in that spirit that we have been pursuing a possible dialogue with Pakistan, recently that dialogue has been resumed. And we are hopeful that the two governments can sit together and resolve all differences.

LOTTMAN: Going back to my first question: I think some of the concern stems from the perceived lack of a clear nuclear doctrine, lines of authority and control, and safety measures, the fact that outside observers don't know a lot about that as far as India's nuclear program is concerned. What kind of progress is being made in these areas?

AMB. CHANDRA: These are important questions. I think the terms that we adopt in this country or in Europe, and how WE perceive the whole thing are widely different, and that is what has come out in our discussions. Deployment here and deployment in the sub-continent have different connotations.

We have made it quite plain that we are not going to enter into any arms race. We have already said there will be no further testing. We have said that we will never undertake a first use. I know some powers don't think much of the no-first-use doctrine, but the fact remains that if you adopt it, it impinges on your deployment philosophy. We are not going in for a, say, launch-at-warning kind of a situation. We have also made it clear that what we are seeking is minimal deterrence. That is to say that nuclear weapons are not a part of any aggressive military strategy, but simply to deter action if some other power wishes or wants at any point of time to threaten India with use of nuclear weapons or devices.

So that reduces the size of the program, the degree of readiness that we want to infuse. These things are being addressed with a view to avoiding the mistakes of the Cold War, and our leaders have said we don't want to reinvent the Cold War mentality at all. And we will definitely, and in fact we are receiving information and experiences which are relevant in this regard. We have also put it as part of our agenda with Pakistan, because we do realize that as in all other matters, more so on this one, we should have broadened understanding, deepened understanding, and eliminate any possibility of misinformation or miscalculation or accident.

But we are still very far away from even having a button to push. So there is time. There is no hurry. Things are not proceeding in haste. They are being pursued in a very studied matter.

LOTTMAN: My final and perhaps my main question is, as a diplomat, what is your assessment of the diplomatic response to this situation--the world response, but the United States in particular. And, what can we do to play a constructive role?

AMB. CHANDRA: I think the non-proliferation regime is a very important part of U.S. foreign policy. And nobody expects that they will give it up in a hurry or modify it without proper study and going deep into the reasons for having that change. What had happened was that over a period of time, the view from Washington or Europe was that a non-proliferation regime was a good thing, that it checked proliferation of weapons technology. It has kept many states from pursuing this program. And it had also helped in some of the states giving up their nuclear weapons programs. Brazil, Argentine, Ukraine gave back. South Africa gave back. So there was a good feeling about the regime.

But our problem was that this regime was not working in our neighborhood at all. And most of the nuclear weapons states were not doing anything about it. Something was done by the United States. Pressler Amendment was applied. But U.S. has lots of priorities. They have the requirements of maintaining good economic and trade relations with China, for instance. Whenever they have to make a determination on merits and the law, they have to balance a variety of factors. And we found that where evidence had been produced by U.S. agencies to higher authorities, there was a lot of delay in making a determination, even when facts were staring everybody in the face. And that showed us that not only the regime was not working, but some of the parties to international agreements were violating the provisions of that agreement. And the enforcement was rather inadequate. Not to our satisfaction.

Now in such a situation, we had to take recourse to measures which definitely went against the wishes of the United States, no question about it. And with U.S. in the lead, the P-5 and the G-8 have made their position publicly known. But you would have noticed that at no point have they been able to point out what exactly has India violated. So there is a reference to norms that the world has come to accept, some norms. And those norms have not been adhered to. But we found that some of the words like reward and punishment and so on, were hopelessly out of context and misinformed the people, as if we have violated any law to which we were subject and there is a court which is now going to mete out punishment.

But luckily I found it personally, and so did my government, that channels of communication were open, and media, the think-tanks, academia, congressmen, were all available for discussion. I got a lot of understanding everywhere. And it can only happen in U.S. I think in no other country would the Ambassador have had such great opportunity to talk to people and present the case of his government, and I had to do that. And I got the opportunity and I am thankful for it. I also worked with useful tips from elders in that respect.

Today the position is that our dialogue with the U.S. has been proceeding quite well. And there is much greater understanding about India's legitimate security concerns. So the name of the game is that both sides have to see the interests of each other and narrow down differences as much as possible. We are proceeding in that direction. And as a result of these discussions, the government of India have refined their position, and that was contained in the statement to the general assembly on September 24, made by our prime minister.

Recently President [Clinton] has waived some of the conditions attaching to sanctions. We are happy about that. There are still some items left untouched, and they smack of discrimination, we have brought to the attention of the U.S. government that something more needs to be done, and the approach has to be further improved, so that we are able to make even better progress in our talks. That is exactly, in a nutshell, the position: that India has legitimate security concerns. U.S. has a commitment to the non-proliferation regime. And how we have to reconcile; I think there is increasing recognition of the fact that India has a very responsible democratic government. It has no wish to cause disturbance of any regime or disturb peace and tranquillity in any way. And once this is accepted, I think we should be able to evolve a mutually satisfactory arrangement, not only in Asia but globally.

LOTTMAN: You mentioned that there are ways that the relationship is improving and could continue to improve. Is there anything specific--in what ways could the relationship be improved? What steps could be taken?

AMB. CHANDRA: First is that both sides, in whichever field we have interacted, we have found it very satisfactory and beneficial. Whether it is business, investment relations, the exchanges between elected representatives on both sides, technology, information technology. There is an operational complementality if I could say. I think many American corporations find Indian operatives as good team members. And language being common, and many of our technology institutes are designed to U.S. syllabus, so they get offers straight away. In any case thousands of them come and take degrees in U.S. universities. That also helps. We have Indian-American families here who are doing a great job of convincing American institutions, elected representatives, and corporate chief executives that Indians you can work with. This is something which has been a plus and has given a great feeling.

So we are basically interested in working out arrangements for removing whatever hurdles that remain. On trade issues, we have sorted out most matters, even on the disputes with regard to intellectual property rights and so on has been addressed and nearly eliminated. Our import duty regime has also been liberalized, so there is hardly any hurdle to trade. Investment regime has been very much liberalized and areas of Indian economy have been opened up. But in the area of technology there are restrictions of a very artificial kind. We will have to concentrate there and see that the benefits of joint research and development and exchange of technological information is something we should not stop or interrupt.

We have had very good cooperation in space, for instance. Our space research organization and NASA have a very good relationship. Similarly we have had in the energy field and other areas, information technology, I think the human resource exchange is very considerable. There is hardly any company in the Fortune 500 which is not having its data processed directly or indirectly with Indian companies. So there is tremendous scope for expansion. Our trade is increasing, but is still very small. The potential is 20 times, 50 times the present volumes. And these are the things we are interested in.

Our demand for investment in infrastructure is in tens of billions of dollars. And many of the American companies are very pleased in taking advantage of the Telecom center. Petroleum and natural gas. Other areas of infrastructure like power, roads, civil aviation, and we are attracting many companies to mega-projects, big projects in India. And that is the focus that we wish to have. Our strategic dialogue is also likely to be resumed. We were having a good dialogue in '97, and we have every intention of reaching that position soon, so that we are able to realize the full potential that exists between cooperative, exists for cooperative relationship between India and the USA.