MR. BAKER: How do outside organizations and donor groups go about creating an incentive for armed combatants, particularly children, to put down arms and rejoin civil society in the first place?

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm. Well, it's an important question. I think globally that the estimate is about 450,000 children under the age of 15 are involved in, in carrying guns in armed conflict in various ways. And I think in that context we have to also look at the fact that this is largely a teenage problem--it really is 13-, 14-, 15-year-olds--and one of the motivations is economics. It's a struggle for livelihood, and sometimes picking up a gun and fighting is one of the ways you can ensure food, clothing, shelter.

So in the aftermath of these, these conflicts I think it's, it's very important to look at I think both the education and the economics of the situation. And by and large, whether they're in Liberia, whether they're in Sierra Leone, or other conflicts, want to be able to ensure some sort of independent productive life. And in, in this particular context I think, I think focusing on practical kinds of education is very, very important.

And I think it's safe to say unless we're able to break the cycle of violence, unless we're able to focus on this teenage population specifically, that if things go wrong in the economy, if things go wrong in the political systems, it'll be the teenager who picks up the gun and starts the next cycle.

MR. BAKER: Can you explain the sort of key steps in the demobilization-reintegration process. In other words, is it possible to break it down into phases that a view--might help a viewer better understand? I, I've heard people talk about, you know, assembly, discharge, reintegration.

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm. Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: Is there a way you can break the process down for us?

MR. BOOTHBY: Well, I think what you, what you find is, again, children are often invisible. Children who, who are, who are part of armed groups are, are, are invisible, and they, they often are an embarrassment either to the government forces or to the guerilla forces. And once, you know, the peace accord comes into play, there's a concerted effort often to kind of hide these children.

This was clearly the case in Mozambique, for example, where RENAMO had really probably somewhere in the neighborhood of 10,000 underaged children amongst its troops at one point in time, but when the peace accords came in they cut these children loose. And if you talk to kids in Mozambique, they'd say, you know, when, when you wanted us to fight you called us adults, but when it came time to actually be helped you're putting us back in the child category.

So I think one of the steps is to actually actively identify who these children are. And they may actually have to happen somewhat quietly because there's gonna be reluctance to being embarrassed. So I think identification.

And then some sort of sorting process, some sort of separate program where you actually get these kids out from the military, put them in a special sort of category, and then begin the process of looking for their parents, reunification.

Once they're back home, what's gonna happen with them? So I think here we're talking about livelihood skills, vocational training, perhaps even some sort of income generation so they can, you know, start some sort of livelihood.

MR. BAKER: What kind of psychological effects does the experience of soldiering have on children?

MR. BOOTHBY: Well, I think it's quite profound, and again it depends on, on the length of time they're actually in these, you know, combat troops, what they actually have done in that process. In some cases, boys that are six, seven, eight may just carry munitions, for example. In other cases children are put in charge of troops.

Some of the socialization process, for example, in, in, in northern Uganda with the __________'s resistance army is very active. There is a systematic indoctrination program which begins by, by having children march and do those sorts of routines, assembling, disassembling guns. They start often by killing animals. And then, before they actually go into combat, they're, they're asked to kill human beings.

If they persist in this activity--killing for, for a long period of time--it does have a, a very, I would say, profound impact on, on the emotions and the psychology of children and can, in fact, kind of become part of their character in a sense. And it's, it's, in my, I, I am a child psychologist, and I must say that after having been involved in these issues for 15 years I can't tell you what the internal life of these kids are, except it's often very troubled.

On the other hand, if given an opportunity on the other side, if they're able to move out of the situation and if there's something there for them, what we noticed in Mozambique, for example, when we spent about four years on this demobilization issue, is that by and large the majority of those kids were able to return to communities and function in families, go to school, and live, you know, relatively productive lives.

MR. BAKER: What are some of the other things you do to go about addressing whatever psychological injury--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm. Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --may have occurred? I mean one, obviously, creating opportunity.

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: Are there other things that, westerners tend to think of, you know, psychotherapy and things like that.

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: You know, you have a, take on whether that's appropriate--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm. Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --or not in this context--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --and you could address it.

MR. BOOTHBY: Well, I think that, you know, from the psychological perspective a lot of help is needed, so to speak. But the, the, the means of delivering that help I don't think western sit-down-talk-it-out psychotherapy is, is, is a practical tool in a place like Sierra Leone, for example, or Liberia, or northern Uganda because the culture's not oriented that way. And it's also, you can't, there's just not that kind of resource, human resource, out there. There aren't those kinds of practitioners.

So I think what you try to do is you try to look within the community, within the culture, what are the mechanisms that they, that they do, you know, deploy to deal with these sorts of issues. And you might end up working with traditional healers. You might end up working with health agents in the, in the community.

And I think in very general terms what, what you're trying to do, it's a, it's a twofold act in a sense, and I would say the overall context is forgiveness. That somehow you have to construct a scenario where the child is able to go back into his or her experience and recount what had happened. And if it involves killing, one has to get back to those moments of, of, of killing--and perhaps, even in those moments, the worst moments. I mean what was the most frightening, the most terrifying, or perhaps even the most thrilling, which is sometimes the case, act of, of, of, of violence or killing. And the child has to, I think, at some point come to a place of forgiveness within himself or herself, which is often quite difficult to, to, to construct.

But in many cases these children were forced into these sorts of situations. It wasn't an, a volunteer act. They were abducted in many cases, or recruited around ethnic loyalty. You know, if, if you join the force, you'll be saving your race, so to speak. But the, but the child has to come to some point in which he or she realizes that, that he was also a victim and forgive himself or herself.

And then the other act of forgiveness has to be community or collectively. One of the things that evolved in Mozambique is that the national government enacted an amnesty act. So instead of putting children in, in prisoner-of-war camps, which is what had happened before, they recognized the fact that these children were abducted, they were victims, and they were sort of forgiven through legislation, in a way.

And I think it's that twofold act of forgiveness--internal forgiveness, but also communal or collective forgiveness. If you can bring those two things together, then I think the act of healing can at least begin.

MR. BAKER: What are the long-term consequences for society in which many young people grow up as perpetrators of violence and maybe come to accept a certain level of it as, as normal? I mean do these children, again, maybe we're talking about the internal experience we can't relate to. But do they experience childhood and, or lose the experience of childhood?

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm. Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: And if so, what are the implications for the kind of--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --adult they will be?

MR. BOOTHBY: Well, I think it, I think in many cases they do lose what we would call childhood and, and I think what, what we feel is very precious to growing up to become a, a, you know a, a socially and morally capable individual, an adult. That, that really is in jeopardy, I would say.

And I recall, you know, some of these children in northern Uganda that had gone through the socialization process of, you know, indoctrination into killing, that, that when they reached the point in which they hadn't killed in a while they'd actually would go to their commanders and say when can I, when can I next do this. And I think when you, when you enter that realm you're, you're in serious danger of, of not only having troubled individuals, young individuals, but also collectively, as a society, if there's large numbers of these kids, it's a very, it's a very difficult situation.

When they leave these armies, often in the armies they're in a, a place of sort of social privilege. They have food, they have clothing, they have power. And when they reenter society, they lose these accoutrements and these statuses. And it's the, the, it's the, it's the decline or the loss of status which also can be quite pernacious. And that's again why I think opportunity is the key, whether that's education or vocationally-oriented. It's, it's quite important.

And I think what, what's at, what's at risk here in these war situations is, you know, most cultures, if not all cultures, have, I mean children are sort of held as, as, as precious creatures, in a sense. And there, there are formal and informal, legal and, and nonlegal norms out there that, that actually are oriented towards giving children special protection in situations. And what you have in these war situations is this whole morality is turned upside down==that instead of protecting children, children are being used in very pernacious ways.

So another thing that's at risk here is the whole sort of social, moral webbing of a community that's turned upside down. And part of the post-conflict reconciliation process has to rewrite that orbit, so to speak. And I think one of the important elements in that is these individuals who recruit kids and use kids as their, in their quest for power, or their quest for diamond mines, or their quest for whatever. These people have to be given a clear message by the international community that we don't tolerate this, that regardless of outcome we're not gonna support you, you're not gonna be the leader, you're not gonna join our social club, so to speak.

So there's many levels in which one can, can act, all of which are important. But there's a lot at risk here.

BAKER: Often young people have committed acts of violence against their own communities, and the members of the community might be understandably of allowing perpetrators back into the community without punishment.

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm. Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: How do you go about reconciling the dual roles of child combatants as both perpetrators and victims?

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm. Um hmm. It's, it's, it's a complicated act, and again, I think if we go back to this notion of, of forgiveness and look at the social sphere.

One has to get into communities and have conversations about how kids were, were, were recruited. If it was abduction, were they, were they perpetuators only or were they also victims in the beginning? It's very difficult when you start talking families who had lost, you know, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives, children through, you know, these, these child combatants. It's, it's quite complicated. But the conversation has to begin, the reconciliation process has to begin.

Teachers are often important tools in communities around reconciliation and child issues. The police, you know, we've done a lot of trainings with police. We've done a lot of trainings with, with soldiers about you do when you identify one of these children. So it's kind of a, an engagement at the community level. And also I would say at the national level, perhaps, through, through legislation in some cases, that you've got to recreate the context of forgiveness, as difficult as they may be.

MR. BAKER: Is the international community doing that to the best extent? I mean how can the aid organizations--government, nongovernment, groups, international groups--best go about contributing to the demobilization and reintegration efforts?

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: And perhaps not just child soldiers but combatants in general.

MR. BOOTHBY: Right. Right. Well, I think that as an international community, on the positive side what's happened is there is increased awareness on this issue. There have been much more ample documentation of the situation globally but also particular problems, such as northern Uganda. I mean in the United States we've had articles in The New Yorker magazine. I believe it's been on CNN. And this has generated quite a bit of, of attention and, hence, funding to do these things. And there's the mechanics of demobilization, you know: the sorting out of the kids, putting the guns down, transporting them back to the communities. Some of this has taken place in Angola, for example.

But what we don't know very much about is once the kid goes home, what should we do? What kinds of education is most, most important? What kinds of vocational skills or training? What kinds of, you know, livelihood skills are needed? And I think that's the area which we, we have a, a lot further to go on. What do, what do we do once they put down their guns to ensure they don't pick it up again?

MR. BAKER: It would seem that if there's no viable economic civil society functioning for them to return to--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --it's not a very appealing option. It's not an opportunity.

MR. BOOTHBY: It's not. That's for sure.

MR. BAKER: Mozambique has been cited by many for, for positive examples in post-conflict rebuilding.

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: Would you agree with that, first of all, (inaudible)?

MR. BOOTHBY: Well, I think in the overall context, yes. That, you know, first of all that when the peace accord finally came into existence and was negotiated--

MR. BAKER: Would you put Mozambique in your statement?

(TAPING INTERRUPTED)

MR. BAKER: Okay. Sorry I interrupted.

MR. BOOTHBY: It's okay.

MR. BAKER: We were talking about Mozambique. Is it a--I know I've been told not to use the word success, but one of the more positive examples of a--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --a rebuilding situation.

MR. BOOTHBY: Yeah.

MR. BAKER: Would you agree with that? And if so, what are the lessons learned--

MR. BOOTHBY: Okay.

MR. BAKER: --that we might point to?

MR. BOOTHBY: Well, I, I think, I think Mozambique is an example, a positive example, of post-conflict reconstruction. And I think we have to begin with the fact that the peace accord that was put into effect quite some time ago now has held, i.e., you know, that the different factions have not picked up guns again. And that's, of course, you know, the critical first step.

I think secondly the donor community--other governments--recognize that, that Mozambique would need substantial help after 16 years of war to rebuild itself, not only physically but socially, and economically, and morally in that, in that sense. And there was a lot of, I would say, generous donor contributions in Mozambique. Money wasn't a critical issue as it is, for example, right now in Liberia where, where donors, I would say, have been less generous.

So many, many good things happened.

I would say on the negative side of Mozambique is what they're learning now, quite some time later, is that it was the adolescent and youth population that was left out. And in that context it was in some cases the former child combatant that was left out. And again, when they wanted them to fight the child says, you know, you called me an adult. When it came time to divvying up the, the help at the end, the assistance, you put us back in the child category. And it's this youth population that didn't get education, that didn't get the livelihood skills that have now, in many cases, reformed into gangs and are carrying on in the same kinds of activities they were involved with before, but not necessarily politically motivated. They're economically motivated.

MR. BAKER: There are those that tend to talk about the lost generation and write off these young people as a lost cause.

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: How do you react to that?

MR. BOOTHBY: Well, I think we have to begin with the fact that, that, you know, picking up a gun and killing and doing that for a couple of years is not a good thing for a child and, and puts the child certainly at risk and can rearrange one's, you know, mental landscape and emotional landscape. But I, I think these, these generic terms, these, these stereotypes, these cliches that we use, such as lost generation, I think sometimes advocates use those terms to generate interest and public attention and, perhaps, some funding to, to address the issues.

But in doing so they write these kids off in ways that, that are not helpful. I mean they're, they're, the lost generation is a misnomer. The kids in Sierra Leone are not a lost generation, the kids in Liberia are not a lost generation unless we let them become lost with our inattention.

So I, I, I think we should shy away from terms like that. I think we have to be strong advocates, but we have to do justice, I think, to the fact that kids who face adversity and it happens, it happens, it's happened throughout humanity. In this country, you know, we had kids that rode railroad cars. We had kids that were in, you know, streets, immigrants that came here and lived very difficult lives. And, and many of these people have as adults been very successful. In Mozambique, despite the fact that youth was a neglected age group, there are many kids in Mozambique that are doing quite well because somebody was there with an opportunity.

So again I think lost generations and these kinds of cliches are, are not useful. What's useful is, is providing some opportunity.

MR. BAKER: And the, the youth have shown a remarkable resilience in, in many cases, or ability to overcome a difficult past?

MR. BOOTHBY: Yeah---I mean with some turmoil in between. But, but by and large children are, I would say, resilient, if we understand resilience as not something that magically exists, but it's the interaction of the child and the opportunity. So it's the interior and the ex--you know, the interior and the external that, that, that merge. And I think again our role in this is to recognize the fact that kids can overcome adversity, but they're not gonna do that necessarily on their own.

MR. BAKER: Are you in a position to talk about the World Bank's post-conflict reconstruction efforts?

MR. BOOTHBY: Not really. I know, I know a little bit about it.

MR. BAKER: Okay. I, I just know they've recently formed a post-conflict unit, even.

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm. Um hmm. Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: Are you able in any way to summarize the strengths and weaknesses of World Bank efforts in post-conflict reconstruction?

MR. BOOTHBY: I, I wouldn't attempt to talk about the strengths and weaknesses of the World Bank's post-conflict initiative. I do know that UNHCR has been very active in, in working with the World Bank to help focus attention on these issues and form a working group.

And in that context, given, for example, experiences like Mozambique, where the adolescent population was, was left out, UNHCR and some NGOs are working with the World Bank to actually focus on this question of what do we do for teenagers, in beginning of emergency through the post-conflict reconciliation process. What should we be doing early, in the middle, at the end to focus on this age group?

And I found, you know, I found the World Bank to be very engaged in these issues. It's a very important mechanism. It's very important to get them engaged. And I think there's a lot of earnest, good, creative thinking going on.

MR. BAKER: It's often said that international aid organizations in general sometimes contribute to the chaos in a wartorn society by having competing agendas--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --and so forth.

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: It, is this true in your experience? And, and if so, how can donors go about improving the way that they assist so that they help rather--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm. Um hmm. Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --than contribute to the situation, to the chaos?

MR. BOOTHBY: Well, as you can imagine, in the middle of a, of a war or a conflict, for example in the Great Lakes region of, of Africa, in Rwanda, where, where it's been nonstop stress and disorder and fighting and ethnic and killings since, since ninety-four until today--I mean there still is no security in Rwanda--that in that pressure cooker organizations are under stress. And, and sometimes under stress the, the inability to coordinate is, in fact, exaggerated, or heightened--exacerbated, I guess, is the word--and there is, there is a fair amount of, of struggle in this area.

I think it's, it's terribly important that there, that there be a lead organization, say, within the UN family, and that in that context the, the, the lead organization understands its leadership role is facilitation, not turf, in a sense, and brings the players together as a, as a, as a family. I think that coordination is very important.

Having said that, I think governments and donor governments contribute to the discoordination and we have situations, whether it be Angola or Liberia, where there's bilateral funding of situations. One entity will only fund the international NGOs from its continent, for example. And it's very difficult, for example, for UNHCR to coordinate the return and reintegration of refugees when NGOs don't necessarily have to go through UNHCR and don't have to look at things in that coordinated way.

So I think if we're gonna be honest about this issue, I think the UN has a long ways to go with respect to communication. I think NGOs have a long ways to go. But I also think donor countries have to reexamine their roles. And if they're, if they're serious about coordination and a concerted effort, they have to look at ways that they could be more helpful in this way as well.

MR. BAKER: When you say donor countries, you mean third-party governments?

MR. BOOTHBY: I think we're talking about countries from North America, for example, and, and Europe that traditionally give funding to UN organizations and NGOs. And I think, I think there's increasing discoordination amongst the donor countries.

MR. BAKER: My last thought is how does all--there's often a lot of money suddenly poured into one particular area. How do these, how does this aid administered in a way that engages the needs and desires as voiced by the local people themselves?

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: In other words, how, how do western aid groups, rather than imposing their will--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --(inaudible), you know, reconstructed colonial-type way--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --how do they go about--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --working with the local groups--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --and listening to them?

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm. Well, I think the, the, the notion, especially in the post-conflict reconciliation reconstruction situation, I mean the role of international organizations isn't to do it per se but it's to identify the, with the community, the issues and the actors and try to facilitate that process and coordinate it.

You know, having said that and having done this for about 17 years now, it's very difficult, in all honesty, to listen to the community because the community is often divided. And you'll hear interest groups emerge, just like you do here in Washington. You know, we have lobby groups and whatnot. At the community level in Liberia we have the same sort of interest. Teachers who were former teachers want to get employed again, you know. Ministers, some people just simply want to reconstruct the country to where it was. But is that good enough given the fact that it fell apart?

So listening to the community is extremely important. But I, but it is quite difficult because you often hear, you know, fragmented and differing voices. But nonetheless, that's the, that's the tact. But we have to be realistic that it's quite, it's quite a difficult process.

MR. BAKER: Is there anything else that you would like to add?

MR. BOOTHBY: I don't think so.

MR. BAKER: Dr. Boothby, thank you very much.

MR. BOOTHBY: You're welcome.

MR. BAKER: Does, does the Internet and that, and all these new kind of (inaudible) lightning-quick technology hold any promise for this sort of work? I was just in Africa and I wondered. There were no, hardly any computers there but--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm. Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --the place was so remote that it--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --struck me on a few occasions, like if these guys just had a, you know, a fiber optic line--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm.

MR. BAKER: --running around with instantaneous (inaudible). Does anybody look at that?

MR. BOOTHBY: Well, I think, I think communications and technology, computers and whatnot, is extremely important. At the moment in places like Africa it's mostly limited to the capital cities. So when we have field offices in other places in Liberia, for example, we don't have e-mail and we don't have those kinds of exchanges.

But I think, I think communications is key, but I think we have to look at it as a, a continuum from what can be done best, paper-pencil tasks in the field, on up through the more sophisticated kinds of technology that exist. But, for example, just in tracing the reunification of separated family members, computers, digital cameras can be extremely useful in terms of documenting a child in one area, creating an image in another country, even, where the parent can come forward and say, Aha! that's my daughter.

So there is a role. But as you know it's, it's, it's difficult in developing countries.

MR. BAKER: Yeah. That's exactly what I was thinking of in this.

MR. BOOTHBY: Yeah.

MR. BAKER: There's been a lot of talk in preventive action frameworks of virtual diplomacy and--

MR. BOOTHBY: Um hmm. Ah!

MR. BAKER: --you know, early warning systems--

MR. BOOTHBY: Yeah.

MR. BAKER: --using high computer, high technology.

MR. BOOTHBY: I think it would be interesting to do that. I mean different scenarios of, you know, you make a decision and then you've gotta, you've gotta live with the consequences and whatnot. Because in these situations, you know, there's, it's such an imperfect context that, you know, even the best of people that are, that are working extremely hard and extremely intelligent, you're forced to make extremely difficult decisions in situations where there is no safety and dignity on either side of the border, which was the problem in Rwanda and Zaire, for example. There was no safety or protection anywhere. And what do you do? It's not easy.

But it would be interesting to try to sort of document these lessons and put them through some sort of analytical framework, and--

MR. BAKER: It's very difficult to deal in generalizations.

MR. BOOTHBY: It is.

MR. BAKER: Yeah.

MR. BOOTHBY: That's for--

(END OF PROCEEDINGS AS RECORDED)