BAKER: In the past, you've said something to the effect of how the -- them Moon has an effect on administrations, or something like that. What exactly did you say?

SMITH: I said when I left the service in 1982 --

When I left the Foreign Service in 1982, yes, I remarked that Cuba seemed to have the same effect on American administrations that the full moon had once had on werewolves. Amer -- American administrations simply are unable to deal rationally with Cuba. I -- I'm not sure I -- Yeah?

BAKER: Do you think that's still the case?

SMITH: I made that remark in 1982 and I had reference to the Reagan administration and, to some extent, to the Carter administration. But, obviously, no administration since has been immune either. No one has been wearing wolfsbane. The Clinton administration's policy toward Cuba is every bit as irrational as that of Reagan, Bush, and the administrations before those.

BAKER: Why does the US continue to maintain a -- a Cold War foreign policy towards Cuba?

SMITH: It's difficult to say why the United States continues to maintain this policy. There really is no rational explanation for it, not even domestic politics. Some say that we simply need some little country against which we can lift high or continue to lift high the Cold War banners. I think there may be something to that. Another explanation is that it's simply very difficult for a great country to come to terms with a tiny little neighbor that still refuses to do its bidding.

BAKER: Does the US have any international support for its hardline stance?

SMITH: No, the United States is totally isolated in its Cuban policy, to such an extent that it's almost a national embarrassment. The vote against us in the United Nations last year was 101 to two against our embargo, the only country voting with us being Israel -- which trades with Cuba, has technical assistance missions there, has invested heavily in the citrus industry -- which means we're totally isolated. The European Community is not moving ahead to upgrade its economic relations with Cuba, so have the Latin American states. We are totally alone.

BAKER: What -- What threat does Cuba pose the United States today?

SMITH: Cuba poses no threat whatsoever to the United States today. I think during the Cold War years we had to take the possibility of a military threat mounted from Cuba seriously. It happened in 1962 with the Soviet missiles in place there. And so long as we were in this adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the fact that Cuba was its military ally was a matter of concern to us. But the Soviet Union has now collapsed. The Cold War is over. We are giving most favored nation treatment to China, lifted the embargo on Vietnam. We have a fulsome relationship with Russia. But we are tightening the embargo on Cuba.

BAKER: You've recently returned from -- from Cuba. Is there something -- some way you could generalize about the public mood there today?

SMITH: Yes. The mood in Cuba has changed dramatically over the past year, year and a half. And I was in the summer of '94, I think there was a mood of desperation almost on the part of the Cuban people. Foodstuffs were hard to come by. Blackouts were long. It was a hot summer. And most basically, the Cubans didn't see that the Cuban government was moving to address the problems and there was a sense of futility, hopelessness.

But since then the government has opened peasant markets, it has moved ahead to allow artisan markets. It is drafting a small business law, has expanded foreign investments and taken a number of other rather key steps toward a mixed economy, and the mood has changed. Now there's a sense -- we're still in economic difficulties, but the government is moving. It will take additional reforms and step by step, our way of life will be improved, so that hope has been reborn in Cuba.

BAKER: The US has maintained an embargo there for going on 35 years. Has the embargo worked?

SMITH: No, the embargo has not worked and no embargo can work when it is a unilateral embargo. Certainly the embargo couldn't work so long as Cuba was getting a subsidy from the Soviet Union and 13 million tons of petroleum from the Soviet Union. That's now over. The subsidy is gone. But Cuba can still trade with any other country in the world. Investments are now coming in from Canada, Spain, Mexico, Great Britain, France. And the Canadians are digging for oil in Cuba. So that if the United States is the only country in the world not to trade, then our embargo obviously will not work.

BAKER: The embargo, as I understand it, is somewhat unique in that it includes food and medicine.

SMITH: Yes, the embargo includes foods and medicine and it is the only embargo we have in the world that does. The embargo against Iraq does not contain foods and medicines. When we had an embargo against Vietnam, it did not include foods and medicines. In fact, inclusion of foods and medicines in a trade embargo is a violation of common international law.

I would think that proponents of the Cuban democracy act would argue, oh, no, we have lifted the embargo on the sale of medicines. Not true. The Cuban democracy -- democracy act says American pharmaceutical companies can sell medicine to Cuba with licenses, but there's the added proviso that only if the president, President Clinton, can certify on the basis of on-site inspection that every component of a medical shipment to Cuba is used for the purpose intended.

In other words, you would have to have inspectors following every box of medicine in a given shipment as it's distributed to hospitals all over the island. American pharmaceutical companies say that's impossible, they can't trade under those conditions, and so that the embargo is still effectively in place. And the embargo on the sale of foodstuffs is totally in place.

BAKER: Well, since it is a unilateral embargo, they are getting materials from other countries --

SMITH: Yes.

BAKER: Really, what -- what kind of effect does the -- this embargo with food and medicine, what -- what impact does it have on the average Cuban?

SMITH: True, they can buy foods and medicines in other countries, but often at a much increased price. If there are only, let's say, two or three companies in the world that manufacture a given medicine and the other one or two know that the American companies can't trade, they raise their prices. There's also added transportation costs.

And, in some cases, there are medicines it's almost impossible to obtain outside the United States, and there, they're simply blocked. Or, parts to medical equipment, such dialysis machines that can only come from the United States. And so, the equipment stands idle for months at a time while they try to get a license to bring it in from the United States. This is not humane. Medicines never should have been included in the embargo and they should not be a part of the embargo now.

BAKER: The Helms-Burton bill to which you referred before is designed to further tighten the embargo and -- and do a number of other things. Is this bill in the best interests of the United States?

SMITH: No. The Helms-Burton bill is an embarrassment to the United States. It is a violation of international law. It is clearly counterproductive and clearly is not doable. One thing, for example, that the Helms-Burton bill would do is to have the president work through the Security Council to make our embargo multilateral. In other words, try to force the United Nations to adopt our embargo, despite the fact that he vote against us last year was 101 to two. I think in this case, even Israel would not -- would not support us.

This is a terrible piece of legislation which, hopefully the Senate will vote down. But I find it humiliating that the Helms-Burton bill as a sort of a no-nothing piece of legislation was ever brought before the US Congress.

BAKER: Is it true that one side effect of it would be to keep the Queen of England from visiting America, or something like that?

SMITH: Yeah. One of the clauses of the Helms-Burton bill would deny visas to anyone who has an interest in a company or an entity that has trafficked in properties that once belonged to Cuban Americans or to Americans, and so forth. So that since the royal family has an interest in some of these holding companies in Europe that -- that do own or have an interest in some of these properties, the Queen of England would not be able to get a visa to come to the United States.

BAKER: Supporters of the embargo contend that the Cuban economy is on the verge of collapse and that tightening the squeeze a little bit more will serve to topple Castro. Do facts bear out this view?

SMITH: No, facts do not suggest --

No. The fact of the case do not bear out the assertion that the Cuban economy is on the verge of collapse. And I well recall Congressman Robert Torricelli of New Jersey, who told us in December of 1992 after passage of his Cuban Democracy Act, that as a result of that act, Castro would be gone within weeks. Well, three years have gone by. Not only has Castro not gone, not only has the Cuban economy not collapsed, but it is now beginning to recuperate. It registered almost 1 percent of growth last year. This year it probably will register 3 or 4 percent. It's not much, to be sure. They have a long way to go to climb back and they haven't yet carried out the reforms they must carry out if they are fully to recuperate. But they are on the way. So that rather than being on the verge of collapse, they are now beginning to recover.

And the Helms-Burton bill will not change that in any way because, as I said earlier, unilateral embargoes never work. And this one is unilateral and will remain unilateral. No other country in the world is going to cooperate with us.

BAKER: How might the US -- does the US go about aiding a transition to democracy in Cuba?

SMITH: I think the best thing we can do is to live up to earlier commitments. We have indicated to the Cubans that if they got their troops out of Africa, they stopped meddling in revolutionary situations, they reduce their ties with the Soviet Union -- well, now those ties are a thing of the past since there is no more Soviet Union-- that we would move ahead to improve relations. I think we should now do so.

We should make it clear to them that there will be some quid for their quo. Let us begin by lifting the embargo on the sale of foods and medicines, which never should have been a part of the embargo, lifting travel controls, which are unconstitu- tional in any event, and then indicate to the Cubans we understand the Cold War is over and we are prepared to have a new relationship with them, but much will depend upon -- upon how they move ahead in their own interest and in their own sovereign -- wait a minute -- how they move ahead in their own interest and within their own sovereign right to carry out the reforms, their own internal adjustments. But that we are prepared for a new relationship and we are begin -- we are prepared to sit down and begin to discuss bilateral issues with them that need to be addressed if we are to have a more normal relationship.

BAKER: Do you favor an immediate and -- and total lifting of the embargo and immediate normalization of relations or a more gradual approach?

SMITH: I would favor a total lifting of the embargo and immediate normalization of relations. However, it may be that that is not politically possible in the United States. So, I come to the fallback position of saying we should immediately lift the embargo on the sale of foods and medicines, lift travel controls, close TV Marti, which is never seen and is a total waste of the taxpayers' money, and irresponsible waste on the part of the Congress of the taxpayers' money, and then indicate to the Cubans we are prepared for a new relationship. Let's sit down, let's begin to talk, let's begin a dialogue.

BAKER: Does the embargo provide any benefit to Castro?

SMITH: The embargo gives Castro the substance or --

The embargo fleshes out Castro's claim to have an external threat, an external foe against which he must maintain internal discipline, and so forth. The United States doesn't intend to invade Cuba, but so long as we maintain the embargo and so long as people in Washington, Helms -- Senator Helms and Representative Burton, are trying to tighten it and are even talking about this new legislation as meant to get rid of the Castro government, then Castro can point to that and say, you see, the Americans still have a hostile intent toward us and, therefore, we can't afford to relax.

I think the best thing we could do to encourage internal relaxation in Cuba would be to begin to relax our own policy toward Cuba.

BAKER: Is it in our interest to reform our relations with Cuba while Castro's still in power?

SMITH: Let me put it this way. I think a peaceful transi-tional process in Spain could only have taken place if Franco initiated the process and led it. I think a peaceful transi-tional process in Cuba can only take place if Castro initiates and leads it. He has initiated the process. He hasn't gone nearly far enough, fast enough, but he has initiated the process. Castro is something of a guarantee of continuity and stability in Cuba. So, we must -- if we wish to see that peaceful transitional process, we must engage while Castro is still -- is still president of Cuba.

And, after all, so long as things are moving in the right direction, so long as the process is taking place, what do we care whether Castro's there or not?

BAKER: Last year Clinton made a change in Cuban immigration policy that allowed the admission of 20,000 refugees from Guantanamo and repatriation (inaudible) boat people. Do you think this is a positive step or a hopeful sign for future changes in this policy?

SMITH: I think Clinton's change in the immigration policy was a needed step, a painful one. No one likes to send people back to their own countries when they're trying to flee, but we can't accept everyone in the world. And I think it was an intelligent way of halting the very dangerous flow of rafters across the Straits of Florida. So, I think, yes, a positive step.

On the other hand, at the same time, Clinton closed off travel for American academics, he rescinded the general license under which American academics and Cuban Americans had been able to travel to Cuba. And despite the fact that the refugee crisis was resolved, Clinton did not return to the status quo ante, he kept those restrictions on the books. I -- I think the restriction on travel of American academics, regulations under which they must present their research proposals to the Treasury Department for its approval is a clear First Amendment violation. And those restrictions should be, must be lifted.

And also, the restrictions that prevent Cuban Americans from visiting their families. How can the administration tell us, on the one hand, that it favors opening up communications with the Cubans, reaching out to the Cuban people, broadening contacts and so forth and, at the same time, closing off academic travel, not go ahead with cultural exchanges, and even stop Cuban Americans from visiting their family members on the island? It's outrageous.

BAKER: It looks like the two track is a one-way road, huh?

SMITH: Yeah. I would say that the two track is, has always been a farce, but it need not be. Track two, if taken seriously, as this administration has not taken it, certainly as Congressman Torricelli did not, it -- it could be an important component in a reasonable policy toward Cuba.

BAKER: Let me go back, we mentioned refugees. The -- It seems to me that the goals of the embargo, even if they were achieved, talking about bringing a toppling Cuban society. What would be some of the effects, ramifications if the embargo achieved its intended goals?

SMITH: Yeah. Well, that's a very good question. The administration says that its objective is a peaceful transitional process in Cuba. And yet it's policy of trying to isolate Cuba, keep the pressure on is more designed to bring about an explosion in Cuba than that peaceful transitional process. And clearly, Senator Helms, Congressman Burton and the proponents of the Helms-Burton legislation do intend -- their objective is a bloody end game in Cuba. They say that the purpose is to carry Castro out either feet -- feet first or vertically, they don't care which, but to carry him out.

In other words, that implies a bloody civil war. A bloody civil war is the last thing that would be in the interests of the United States. It would result in tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of refugees ending up on our shores, pressure on us to go in and stop the fighting, restore order, bog down in a morass in Cuba. That's the last thing we should want to see.

BAKER: Many claim that the only reason the Clinton administration remains hard line on Cuba is money and votes, the power of the Cuban American lobby. Is that lobby a monolithic as it's been made out to be?

SMITH: No. I -- I think the assertion -- not assertion --

I think the assertion that the administration must hold to the hard line position on Cuba because of the power of the Cuban American bloc in Florida is and always has been absurd. The Cuban American community, the Cuban American bloc in Florida does not determine the outcome of elections in Florida, has never and never will. It's not that big. Clinton embraced this -- this idea in 1992 and he ended up with exactly the same percentage of the vote that Dukakis had gotten four years before, 39 percent.

He won in Dade County without the Cuban American vote. Most of the Cuban Americans live in Dade County, so you would think that was the one county he wouldn't have carried. He carried it because it's more liberal. It has a Jewish community, a black community, other Hispanics. He only got 18 percent of the Cuban American vote, but won anyway. He'd lost Florida, not in Dade County where the Cuban Americans live, but in the northern counties over issues -- where almost no Cuban American live and over issues that had nothing to do with Cuba.

So, if the Clinton administration is holding to the hard line policy because of some calculation that this will help them win Florida, it's a gross miscalculation.

BAKER: If he were to win reelection in '96, do you think we might see a change?

SMITH: I think -- I think that we are likely to see a change in Cuban policy over the next three or four years almost no matter who's elected because of the growing insistence of the American business community to be allowed to compete with their foreign competitors.

BAKER: (Chitchat.) We've recently normalized with Vietnam, as you mentioned, despite a communist government with human rights abuses. Does our change in policy with Vietnam represent a good model for modifying relations with other remaining communist countries?

SMITH: Well, lifting the embargo and moving ahead to dialogue and a more reasonable approach, yes, it does. There's no reason we couldn't do that with Cuba. Cuba, at this point, I would say is virtually sui generis and almost no matter what the Cubans do, our response is very much the same, continued hostility.

At one point, we told them our concerns were of a foreign policy nature. Those have all been addressed. It hasn't brought about any change at all. Then we said, well, yes, but if you would begin to bring some changes, open peasant markets and so forth, then we could respond. They did that. We haven't responded.

I -- I think the Cubans have concluded that no matter what they do, the United States will always move the goal post and that there will never be any response from the United States. I think to break that pattern, the United States now should make some gesture -- lifting the embargo on foods and medicines, whatever it is, to indicate that we are capable of -- what Secretary Christopher has called carefully calibrated responses.

BAKER: Even with North Korea, perhaps our most bellicose communist enemy, we're now finding some success through diplomacy and engagement. Do you think there are lessons we can draw from that experience, in general, in the post-Cold War era that might be relevant to Cuba?

SMITH: Well, we certainly should be able to draw some lessons from that. Good Lord, if we can talk to the North Koreans, surely we can talk to the Cubans. I fought in the Korean War and I find it ironic that we can talk to the North Koreans, negotiated with the North Koreans, but that we maintain travel controls on Cuba based on the national emergency occasioned by the Korean War.

The trading with the enemy act of 1917 on which all these travel controls are based can only be imposed in time of war or national emergency. There is no war, what's the national emergency? The Korean War of 1950. That's the basis for it at the same time that we're talking to the Koreans. Speaking of irrationality, I think that's the best illustration.

BAKER: In that same vein, you know, during the Cold War our foreign policy often consisted of military confrontation and intimidation. Is that approach effective today?

SMITH: You mean with respect to Cuba?

BAKER: With respect to -- to anywhere. I guess, in general, I'm trying to elicit something to do with the notion of engagement versus intimidation.

SMITH: Yeah. Military confrontation is no longer necessary I mean, there may be occasions when you have to show some military muscle. But by and large, military confrontation is no longer necessary and increasingly, I think, is an option that the United States would have to consider as -- certainly as a last -- as a last resort. It -- It's almost a precondition now for any kind of US military intervention that there be no casualties. That's very difficult to bring about in an armed conflict, so we need to avoid armed conflicts where -- wherever we can, and we should try to avoid armed conflict and try to base ourselves more and more on negotiations, dialogue, the peaceful settlement of disputes.

BAKER: (Breaks. Tape not on for query.)

SMITH: Well, in the post-Cold War world, I think the United States should rely more and more on diplomacy and negotiations. And certainly, if we look at Cuba, there's no reason not to. There's no threat from Cuba. There's no problem here that would require military force and use of military force would be extremely bloody.

I mean, the cost would be out of all proportion to the problem. An invasion would be bloody. Declaring an embargo -- a blockade, rather, around the island would be an act of war that would get us in trouble with our allies. Why not try through negotiations to bring about the kind of transition in Cuba that we would like to see. That's what we should be concentrating on.

We should be concentrating on encouraging the peaceful transitional process. What US policy is doing rather than that is to say when you have become a market economy and when you have achieved a perfect democracy, then perhaps we'll talk to you. What's the purpose of diplomacy? I mean, why talk to them after they've done everything you wanted? I thought that the purpose of diplomacy was to bring about, to work toward the objectives that you wished through negotiations, dialogue, quid pro quos.

BAKER: Thank you very much.

[End of interview.]