MR. BAKER: Admiral, what was the purpose of the meetings you held with senior Cuban military officials last October?

MR. CARROLL: We went down to have free, candid, open discussions of the, let me start that over again. We went down to have free, open, very candid discussions with members of the Cuban military as well as members of the Cuban foreign ministry. We went to their war college, we went to some of the military bases. We wanted to get a clear picture of the Cuban posture, both militarily and diplomatically and also economically. I got a good look at elements of their economy, and we also wanted to provide information from our viewpoint up here. The Cubans have a hard time talking to our official representatives. We're not very communicative officially. So, when they can get a group who are here in Washington and who want to exchange information, they can get an idea of what's going on up here as we see it.

MR. BAKER: When you sat down with the Admiral Benton Corp and the others of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the revolution, what were some of the issues, the key issues that they were most concerned with?

MR. CARROLL: The embargo. Helms Burton embargo is very, very high on their list of concerns, and it is hurting them. Of course, it hurts the Cuban people more than it hurts the government, but they are very troubled by the way in which we restrict their ability to trade with other nations. I think it's alright in their mind if the United States wants to be cut off, wants to cut itself off. But, they really are troubled by the restrictions we put on other nations trading with Cuba. They are very concerned about a thing called the Graham amendment. Senator Graham had introduced into the defense bill an amendment which declared Cuba an enemy of the United States and ordered the Pentagon to say that they had studied the Cuban military capabilities and had plans to deal with a threat from Cuba. Of course, this is ludicrous. Everyone knows that Cuba doesn't pose any military threat. They don't have the means to threaten the United States, and yet here was an official act of Congress declaring them an enemy. We had many discussions with many groups. It was widespread knowledge that this had happened, and tried to dissuade them of their concerns, pointing out that it was an act of a senator pandering to the Cuban emigres in Florida so that he could say that he had introduced the Graham amendment, and it didn't mean anything in the Pentagon or to the White House.

MR. BAKER: That's very hard to convince them of, though. You can see it in black and white in the Congressional Record.

MR. CARROLL: It was alarming almost the extent to which they had taken that to heart. They went to the Cuban war college, and here some of the bright young minds in the middle level of the Cuban government and military and they were all obviously concerned that the United States would declare Cuba an enemy and was having plans to deal with Cuba militarily.

MR. BAKER: What value do you see for, do you see in these types of contacts both for, for both sides?

MR. CARROLL: It helps to clear the air a little bit. We can bring --

MR. BAKER: -- start over again...say meetings, or these kind of -- put in your answer, like, these types of meetings or something like that help to clear the air.

MR. CARROLL: Oh, okay. Our meetings with the Cubans help to clear the air on both sides. We can give them the impressions and knowledge that we have what's going on up here and what it means to Cuba. They can tell us what they're doing, what they're concerned about. And, in this exchange of information -- in this exchange of information, we both sort of -- I'm having trouble with this thought.

MR. BAKER: Take your time to formulate it again.

MR. CARROLL: Yeah. In these exchanges, I think we add to the knowledge on both sides, and we can gain a little confidence about what's going on between the two countries. The impasse between the Cuban government and the United States government is so severe that there's no communications, they simply cut each other off. We demand that Cuba, in effect, surrender. Change its form of government, change its economy, and then we'll talk to them, and they say we will talk to you tomorrow as an equal. Just sit down and talk, but we're not going to surrender first.

MR. BAKER: Now, some might get the impression that there's no, that they're all in agreement in these meetings. Are there points of contention that you have between your side and theirs?

MR. CARROLL: It's typical of meeting with them that we will get inklings of differing points of view or differing priorities. But, by and large, you get a pretty steady picture of people who are very much concerned about the poor relations between Cuba and the United States, and concerned about defending Cuba against the United States. They see evidence in everything the United States is doing that we really plan, someday, to invade them. To take over Cuba. We have visited their fortifications and their preparations for our invasion. They've dug thousands of kilometers of tunnels and stored weapons that they say they will bring out once we have invaded and fight us. They call this the war of the peoples. War of all the peoples, to defend socialism. And, clearly, they have no hope of winning but their strategy is to make the victory for the United States so costly that it won't have been worth the price we will have to pay.

MR. BAKER: Talk a little bit about the Cuban military capability. Again, you, they put on a demonstration during the previous visit. You went there. Can you tell us a little bit about the capability and the posture of the Cuban armed forces?

MR. CARROLL: Every nation with a military service has a way to display that service in a very favorable light. We went to one of the top Cuban military schools and they use some of the brightest young professionals in the Cuban military to put on a demonstration of defensive tactics. This war of the peoples they're going to fight against invaders. It's all defensive. Of no means of projecting any power outside of Cuba at all. So, they show us the tactics they're going to use to defend Cuba and try to impress upon us how much power they possess on their own territory. When they're defending the motherland, they have the means to, to fight and fight tenaciously.

MR. BAKER: Now, what value do the Cubans get, do you think, out of these meetings? Do they get a sense that they're getting a little closer to US government policy or policy leaders through you?

MR. CARROLL: It's a two-way benefit. They listen to what we have to say and get some information. They also expect that the information we gather will be communicated back up here in one way or another. They know that we have contacts with the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency. So, they can, in effect, send a message to be sure that people up here know what they're thinking and saying and doing. We also do, I think, add a little confidence in their part that the situation isn't quite as bleak as they see it. The Helms Burton embargo is hurting them. The Graham amendment frightened them. And, by being able to communicate to them a sense that most Americans really want to see a restoration of formal relations and friendly relations with Cuba as a natural thing, they get a little hope for the future. But, at the moment, everything is frozen in a confrontation that neither side wants to give on.

MR. BAKER: Now, people in the State Department or DIA may not admit it, but do they reap benefit from -- indirectly -- from your meetings?

MR. CARROLL: It's hard to say. In most cases, I get the sense that the information we bring back is well known to them. After all, we photograph Cuba every day. We keep track electronically of what's going on there. There aren't many surprises in Cuba, so that all they're getting is a up-to-date report of what the Cubans are saying and doing in their military preparations and their economic posture and in their diplomatic positions.

MR. BAKER: Now, you have had the opportunity to make a number of visits, such as this, over the course of a decade or more. What general trends do you sense in recent time or changes?

MR. CARROLL: This has been a very traumatic period for Cuba. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, they lost all of the support that the Soviets gave them in terms of military equipment, military support, subsides for their sugar crop and so on. And, they went in to a real nose dive as far as their economy was concerned. It was so bad, they used the phrase the special times. They didn't have oil for their power plants. Transportation was mostly by bicycles and ox carts. It was really tough when I saw them in ninety-three. By the time I got back in ninety-six, you could see they were pulling out of it. They had liberalized their economic programs. They had invited foreign capital in. They allowed foreign businesses to take route in Cuba. They had open farmers markets. They had permitted families to open private businesses, which they've never done before. And, Cuba was coming along and quite proud of themselves. We went to a meeting in San Fuegos with some of the local boosters there and they were so enthusiastic and seemed like they wanted to sign you up -- come visit and spend time with us. Going back again in ninety-seven, late ninety-seven, things had sort of flattened out a little bit. The Helms Burton embargo was biting. And, they were still making progress, they were still expanding their economy, but they just didn't have the same spirit of enthusiasm about it. They were digging. Their three biggest industries are tourism, sugar, and money from the United States of America. People sending remittances back to their families in Cuba. It's estimated as much as eight hundred million dollars reach Cubans from their families in the United States. And, that makes it probably the third ranking source of wealth in Cuba today. So, they, they see the need for improved relations with the United States. They want to be friends. They just won't surrender. If anybody came to the United States and said we'll talk to you about something once you've done what we want you to do, we wouldn't agree. We'd say no, we'll talk on an equal basis and we'll decide what we're going to do in the future together. The Cubans are in exactly that position. We will not change our form of government. We will not meet the demands you're making on us as the price of talking about our future relations.

MR. BAKER: That's all I have, Admiral. Thank you very much.

MR. CARROLL: Okay.

[END OF PROCEEDINGS AS RECORDED]