Interviewer: ...Chemical Weapons Convention. And you have described the treaty as extraordinary and unprecedented as an arms control achievement. Why is it extraordinary and unprecedented?

HOLUM: Well, the key thing that's extraordinary is that for the first time we have completely abolished an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, and chemical weapons are particurlarly indiscriminate and inhumane in the way they function. They kill and maim by blistering and choking and asphyxiating. And the world community since 1925 has concluded that they should be abolished, but we've never done so effectively until the Chemical Weapons Convention that was negotiated in the waning days of the Bush administration, so it's extraordinary in that sense.

It's also extraordinary in the sense that for the first time we have a very wide-ranging and intrusive inspection regime, a verification regime that will enable international inspectors to look into sensitive national facilities -- ours as well as other countries'. So, it has the most farreaching verification provisions that we've ever negotiated.

Interviewer: As you're probably aware, some have criticized the treaty. And specifically, Frank Gaffney and others have said that the treaty is not global, it's not verifiable, and it's not comprehensive. What is your response to these charges? AndÜ` Weapons Convention global?

HOLUM: Well, I think it will be. We won't know until it's entered into force and we start the process toward ratification by the requisite numbers of countries. But these treaties, and I think the non-proliferation -- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as my cue, tend to develop very wide adherence when the international community is behind them. There are not 163 countries that are -- or, no, 164 that are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

We do know that 156 countries, including many of the countries we're concerned about in terms of chemical weapons, have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and we expect them to ratify it. So, I think this will be a global treaty. And, of course, the alternative of saying, well, it doesn't go far enough is to have nothing at all. So, to the extent that we bring in some, a significant number of the countries of concern, it's a very important step forward.

Interviewer How can holdout nations be persuaded to sign the treaty? Are there incentives and disincentives?

HOLUM: There are. The one thing that's an incentive that is often overlooked is the political isolation that goes with being outside of a global non-proliferation regime, and that has a very tangible impact. It does work on countries to gradually bring them in. It's what happened in the case of the treaty. For example, denying trade in certain precursor chemicals that also have important civil and industrial uses. Unless a country is a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention, it won't have access to trade in those chemicals. So, there are tangible, as well as political incentives.

Interviewer: Let's talk for a minute about verification. Can compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention be verified? What's to keep a nation from signing and ratifying the treaty, but then secretly not complying with it?

HOLUM: It would be very difficult for a country to do that. And we should start from the proposition that there are countries of concern to us in the chemical weapons sphere that we are now monitoring, that we are now examining with available intelligence assets to see what their capabilities are. And we know about a number of countries that we believe have chemical weapons capabilities.

Under the existing circumstance, that's all we can do, is gather what we can with available resources, national, technical and other resources. And once we know or believe we know that the have a chemical weapons capability, there's noting we can do about it, because it's not against any international legal principle.

What the Chemical Weapons Convention will do is two chemical weapons activities. And secondly, make those activities, once detected, a violation of the law. So, there's an incentive for countries not to maintain these weapons -- because of the likelihood that they'll suffer sanctions or other costs as a result.

Now the verification regime includes challenge inspections. So that if we believe there are chemical weapons activities occurring at a specific site, we can instigate challenge inspections of that site to see what's going on there. So, there's a web of detection that goes way beyond what we have now. That's why CIA Director Woolsey testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee several weeks ago that this treaty would enhance our ability to detect chemical weapons, and therefore, was in our national interest.

Interviewer: At least one critic described the endorsement by the US intelligence community as lukewarm. Do you agree with that?

HOLUM: No, I don't agree with that. What we should keep in mind is what the intelligence community is very careful to do is to not take policy positions, but rather to express their view of our intelligence assets and their relationship to a specific international undertaking such as this treaty. So, they explain what they can under existing circumstances and what the treaty will help us to in addition.

But the question of whether a treaty is verifiable or -- judgment in a political sense whether you have adequate information in order to launch a process for sanctions. And that's a political judgment.

What the CIA has done, I think properly, is give us its unvarnished and straight forward ssessment of the monitoring difficulties that this treaty entails. It will be hard and it will challenge us. The ability to detect any specific event, one single event, in violation of the treaty is problematic. But over course of time, as a country develops a weaponized capability to actually use chemical weapons in a militarily significant way, that -- they will take a number of steps that we'll be able to, with increasing confidence, detect and challenge.

So, from the standpoint of verification, the government I think has a good basis upon which to proceed.

Interviewer: A third criticism that the Chemical Weapons Convention is not comprehensive. Does the treaty cover all chemicals and facilities that are capable of being made into or used to make chemical weapons?

HOLUM: Well, it does. As you know, the treaty contains specific schedules of three specific schedules varying according to the commercial utility on one end and the utility from the weapons standpoint on the other, from a military standpoint. So, it's open ended in the sense that over time, if you find that a country is beginning to use chemicals not contemplated in the convention for weapons purposes, those also would be prohibited.

Interviewer: Some have criticized the Chemical Weapons Convention on the grounds that it will prove excessively costly and burdensome for the commercial chemical industry. What impact with the CWC have on industry? What are the industry's primary concerns?

HOLUM:: Well, the -- I should first say that the chemical weapons industry and the various associations that represent it have been deeply involved in the process of negotiating the convention and have supported it and find that the costs of compliance will be reasonable. There will be some costs associated with the initial declarations. Countries that produce chemicals that are on the -- on the schedules will have to provide initial declarations and those will have to be verified. Subsequently, there can be challenge inspections, or routine inspections at those -- a number of those facilities, particurlarly the Schedule I and Schedule II, the more risky chemicals.

Over time, we believe that will -- will prove not to be a burden and well worth it, in terms of the security benefits to the United States. There are some differences over -- between some in the chemical industry and some in the government over estimated costs of implementation. My own suspicion is that the costs will prove to be less than many people think.

Interviewer: Is the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency making an effort to educate industry about this treaty?

HOLUM: We are. And that's been a very important part of the reason I think why industry supports the treaty. We have, both last year and this year, engaged in a series of seminars around the country, basically describing the terms, what's expected, what's required of private industry that may be subject to inspections under the convention.

And I have to say that, based on those -- participation in those events -- and the turnouts have been good and the questions have been solid and substantive -- we think industry will be -- will be satisfied with the convention.

Interviewer: Now if we could move on to what I think might be the most serious problem in the Senate debate: The situation in Russia. Some critics argue that Russia cannot be trusted to abide by the treaty or that they will be unable to destroy its chemical weapons, and that Russia has provided inadequate data about its chemical weapons programs, some of which may be ongoing. Is the United States committing itself to an agreement that it knows the other major possessor of chemical weapons either won't or can't comply with?

HOLUM: There are a number of points I would make -- the bulk of our own chemical weapons stockpiles, because the proper answer militarily to chemical weapons, as General Shalikasvili, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently testified, is not chemical weapons in return, but a very effective counter-chemical weapons strategy, using conventional -- conventional capabilities. So, we're already going to do this. And to the extent we get the rest of the -- the world community to participate with us, it's all to the good.

Now the -- whether or not Russia proceeds, and again I would cite General Kashvili -- Shalikashvili as my source, it is in our national interests to proceed because of the other chemical weapons-capable countries that we can bring into this global norm, whether or not Russia ratifies it. And those are countries of concern. To the extent that we can eliminate chemical weapons there, we'll enhance our national security and that of our allies.

Now with respect to the Russians. It seems to me that the way we put additional pressure on them is not to hold out and join them in non-participation in this agreement, but rather to participate, to get it into force, to get the necessary 65 countries that have ratified it, whether or not the Russians are -- are included in that, and get the world community behind it. Obviously, we're going to -- If any other treaty, we're going to insist on effective verification of their compliance with their treaty obligations. Now we have had some difficulties and I take very seriously the Russians' inability under separate agreements -- the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding that provides for information-sharing and some inspections -- to -- to be forthcoming about their chemical weapons programs. And we are continuously engaged in increasingly high level contacts with the Russians to insist that they comply with those obligations.

But it's interesting, the Wyoming memorandum that we're trying to implement here is not an enforceable agreement; it's a transparency agreement. If we have the Chemical Weapons Convention in force, we'll have recourse. Other than shouting back and forth and, and protesting, we'll have recourse to a disciplinary implementation process under the convention.

It is going to be difficult, assuming the best of good faith, for the Russians to implement this -- this convention. It's going to be difficult for us to destroy our chemical weapons stocks. That's going to be costly. But we believe that they can do it within the 10-year period provided for in the treaty. There is the possibility in the -- in the treaty of another five-year extension on top of the initial 10 years, but I think it's _______ Russians to ratify and implement.

There may be some need for -- for US assistance in that process through the Nunn Lugar program. To the extent there is, I think that's money well spent. Anytime we can spend our money to take down weapons that otherwise might be aimed at us, I think we're well off doing it.

Interviewer: Some who are concerned about incineration of chemical weapons in this country would prefer to develop -- wait and develop alternative technologies. Why should we be in a hurry to get rid of our chemical weapons? What is pushing us?

HOLUM: Well, one of the main things that's pushing us is the fact that the weapons are becoming more dangerous to store. They are -- The casings are disintegrating and -- and they're becoming a threat just sitting there at the storage sites around the country.

I would certainly like to look at, and the government would be prepared to look at, alternative technologies over time, but I think we should begin the process now. And, in fact, Congress has mandated that we go ahead with that. The National -- Natural Resources -- National Resources -- Research Council. I'm sorry -- did an -- did an excellent study on this subject. I think it's laid to rest a lot of the concern by pointing out that the incineration method, because we can begin it now and because any other step or any other method we would use would still have -- of handling the chemical weapons, getting them to the site of destruction, that the -- that the method of incineration is as safe as anything we know of.

Also, there are -- there's some concern that some of the other -- other methods weren't -- wouldn't be effective in terms of the convention. They have to completely destroy the agents.

Interviewer: Some argue that it's important for the United States to have an in kind deterrent to chemical attack. After the last US chemical weapon has been destroyed, what will deter other nations from attacking American soldiers or civilians with chemical weapons?

HOLUM: Well, the fact that they will be -- that -- that any chemical weapons strategy will be defeated by superior convenªtional firepower. As you know, there was a lot of concern at the outset of the Gulf War that the Iraqis would be using chemical weapons, and we were prepared for it. We did not in that circumªstance, expecting the possibility of chemical weapons being used, we did not deploy chemical weapons of our own to the Persian Gulf theater. We made no plans -- and this was a sound military judgment -- to use chemical weapons in retaliation in that specific context because the conventional responses are more effective and -- and more controllable.

One of the difficulties with chemical weapons use... is that they're very difficult to control on the battlefield. And if the wind shifts, you can endanger your own forces as much as you can endanger the ©© the enemy. So, we have no interest in using chemical weapons in deterrence to chemical weapons or in response to them. And again, this is a -- this is a point testified to with particular force by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff several weeks ago.

Interviewer: Another criticism of the Chemical Weapons Convention is that it will give us a false sense of security, that it will create the illusion that the threat no longer exists -- exists and, as a result, we will relax and let our guard down. So, I want to ask you what impact, if any, will the CWC have on America's ability to defend against chemical attack?

HOLUM: Oh, I don't think it'll reduce at all. In fact, what we will -- will do through the verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, added to by the -- our own national technical means, is have a much better picture of where the chemical weapons threat exists, how large it is, as well as having a -- an arms control method for going after it for countries that have ratified the convention. So, we'll have more knowledge. And the more knowledge you have about a threat, the more likely you are to prepare effectively against it, to know specifically what the response should be.

So, I think, if anything, to the extent that countries... that it will enhance our abilities to defend.

Interviewer: One point you touched on I'd just like to come back to. Given that Congress has already separately mandated the destrucªtion of US chemical weapons, isn't it in America's interest to get other countries to do what the US is already legally obliged to do?

HOLUM: That's really one of the best arguments in favor of ratification, because we are -- we have already made this decision for ourselves. And to the extent we can use that decision, which we've made in our own national interest as part of our military strategy, as leverage in order to get other countries to do the same thing, and thereby reduce this threat worldwide, it seems to me it's all to the good.

Interviewer: What do you see as being the primary keys to the success of the Chemical Weapons Convention and how important is US leadership?

HOLUM: I think US leadership is vital. At this point, there are now I believe eight countries who have ratified the convention. There need to be 65 before it can enter into force. Then it'll enter into force six months later. As we understand it, and we've been in -- in regular contact with the -- with the Provisional Technical Secretariat, the implementing body in the Hague or the provisional implementing body, there are many countries who are waiting to see what the United States does. ...in bringing this convention into force. And that's why we've made a major effort on Capitol Hill and are grateful for the efforts of both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Intelligence Committee to -- to proceed on this -- on this effort in a timely way.

Interviewer: Okay. Why is it in the interest of the United States to support the Chemical Weapons Convention?

HOLUM: Well, for a couple of reasons. It will cause many other countries, and we hope all countries, to do what we've already decided to do for ourselves, which is to eliminate chemical weapons. And secondly, it will dramatically enhance our ability to detect chemical weapons developments anywhere in the world by countries that are parties to the convention. So, it will increase the amount of information we have and it'll also establish a binding legal norm against development of chemical weapons.

Interviewer: Why is that important, a global norm against chemical weapons?

HOLUM:: Well, we found in a variety of regimes that the establishment of an international standard of behavior -- behavior does have an impact. For example, with the Nuclear NonªProliferation Treaty, there are now 164 countries who participate in that treaty. When that treaty was first negotiated, many -- In fact, there are only the original five and several threshold states. And the -- It's the widest and more effective arms control agreement in history. We think the Chemical Weapons Convention has the same potential.

Interviewer: Will the Chemical Weapons Convention rid the world of chemical weapons?

HOLUM: Well, it will go a long way in that direction. There's no way to know prior to entry into force, before we know how many countries will actually participate. But it's very important to note that of the 25 or 20 countries that we believe have a chemical weapons potential or capability, three-quarters of those countries have signed the convention and would expect to ratify. So, it will make a major bite -- take a major bite out of the most worrisome countries.

Interviewer: If the world is ready for a Chemical Weapons Convention, might it not also be ready for a nuclear weapons convention?

HOLUM: ...elimination of nuclear weapons is in our interest. And -- But I think that still remains a distant -- ah -- a distant objection, the reason being we don't know how the relationship with the former Soviet Union, with Russia is going to evolve. We have -- We are eliminating nuclear weapons at the rapidest [sic] pace we can, now around 2000 a year. And at this pace, it'll take us to till the year 2000 to get down to the -- at best to get down to the lements -- limits in both the United States and Russia of the START treaties we've already agreed to.

We don't know how the non-proliferation risk in North Korea and other parts of the world is going to evolve. So, until we've resolved those problems, I suspect nuclear weapons will play some role in our national security for some time to come. I would say, however, that today nuclear weapons play less of a role in our national security planning than at anytime since they were first conceived.

Interviewer: So, you think the Chemical Weapons Convention might serve as a useful model in other arms control areas?

HOLUM: I think it can, both in the -- in the nuclear weapons area and also in the biological weapons area, where we are just beginning this year in a -- in a review conference in the next month -- or in September to examine how can we make the biological weapons convention verifiable.

Interviewer: Thank you.