MR. EISENBERG: Professor Howe, how do you define a mercenary?

MR. HOWE: Well traditionally a mercenary has been defined as a foreign soldier who fights for pay in another country but it's a fairly wide definition. Some people have fought for very little money, for example, Americans fighting in, in Rhodesia. Usually we think of the mercenary as being a destabilizing force in that country as he fights, but with groups like Executive Outcomes some people make the argument that this foreign force is there to promote stability rather than instability in that country. So it's a very wide definition, and usually I think people use the term "mercenary" when they don't like that particular individual or group.

MR. EISENBERG: Based on your study and analysis have groups like Executive Outcomes been getting an unfair rap with regard to their operations in Africa?

MR. HOWE: Well Executive Outcomes, which has been heavily involved in Angola and Sierra Leone during recent civil wars in those countries, I think has done a limited amount of good. And I emphasize the limited as much (TAPE SKIPS HERE) as good. They've brought a certain amount of stability to those countries.

In Angola, Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the rebel UNITA group, had walked out of free and fair elections because he had been losing those elections and so he went back on the warpath. Executive Outcomes came back in, did what the Angolan government couldn't do, and forced Savimbi to sign a peace settlement. In Sierra Leone Executive Outcomes went in and forced a pretty bad rebel group to accommodate for a peace settlement, and very soon thereafter there were democratic elections and the new government came in.

The groups like Executive Outcomes, on the other hand they do fight for profit and usually on behalf of international mining companies. And there are serious questions about what does Executive Outcomes' undoubted military expertise get in terms of a future mining concessions. Is there kind of a Faustian pact that a government, to save its, its soul will bring in these foreign soldiers who do a very good job, but in the meantime the British mineral companies that they're working for may be getting undisclosed, very, very favorable concessions that will hurt that country economically in the future.

MR. EISENBERG: So is it possible they are then mortgaging their long-term interests or prospects for long-term economic development in order to get a short-term gain on the battlefield?

MR. HOWE: Yeah. There's certainly a worry that a particular government, in order to save its own hide, will call in Executive Outcomes or another group but at the expenses of the people of that nation five, ten, fifteen years down the road. That's certainly a fear that a lot of people have.

MR. EISENBERG: Do you have any idea exactly what in the way of concessions governments in Angola and Sierra Leone have granted Executive Outcomes?

MR. HOWE: A lot of it is, is, is, is uncertain. A lot of it is not really disclosed right now. But it can be, I think, fairly well assumed that a country that has its back up against the wall and can be rescued only by a force like Executive Outcomes will probably grant especially favorable treatment to these companies, to the mining companies, in return for Executive Outcomes.

MR. EISENBERG: Now a group like Executive Outcomes is very closely connected in and of itself to some of these corporations or industries, energy companies, or mining interests. They have certain interlocking connections in terms of board of directors or other connections, do they not?

MR. HOWE: They do. It's a little bit uncertain and, and these companies are not forthcoming in terms of what the direct connections are. It's a sense of interlocking directorships, for example. But there's a group in England called The Plaza Group, and that has very, very close relations with Executive Outcomes. The Plaza Group has, among other things, a couple of mining companies.

And so here you have an economic and a military force in a fragile African country. Who's got the real power? The government that's on the ropes, or this multinational economic and military force? It's an interesting question: Who really rules the country?

MR. EISENBERG: You mentioned that The Plaza Group in England had some specific companies. Can you name them?

MR. HOWE: One of the major companies under Plaza is called Branch Mining, or Branch Energy. And that has had a number of oil--I'm sorry--

CAMERAMAN:Take it from the top?

MR. HOWE: Yeah. Right. Sorry. I was just thinking about the Branch--

MR. EISENBERG: (inaudible). Go, go ahead. Take the time you need.

MR. HOWE: Yeah. Yeah. I haven't looked at this for a while, what the companies are.

MR. EISENBERG: It's Buckingham, right?

MR. HOWE: Yeah. (inaudible) Yeah.

MR. EISENBERG: And then there's Canadian, Freedland, and (inaudible)--

MR. HOWE: Yeah. I, this gets really complicated because Branch sold a number of its concessions to, to Freedland, to Diamond Works, and then became the biggest single holder in Diamond Works. And it, why don't we just say that, that The Plaza Group has a number of companies underneath it. One of the major ones is Branch, which, at least until recently had a number of, of major minerals, especially diamond concessions, in Angola, Sierra Leone, and a couple of other African countries.

It's also has Heritage Oil, and Heritage Oil has oil concessions in, among other places, Angola.

MR. EISENBERG: Some have alleged that the close connection between some of these corporations and groups like Executive Outcomes presents a certain unfair advantage for those companies, that they are more easily able to establish a monopolistic position in the market as opposed to firms that don't have their own private armies. Do you think that's a valid concern?

MR. HOWE: Yeah. It certainly gives companies like Branch a leg up. It's willing to go into a very unstable area during, let's say, a civil war, and start exploiting those resources because it knows it will have the protection of a very good military force, such as Executive Outcomes. Other mining companies won't be able to get that concession or be able to exploit it because they can't rely on a security group like Executive Outcomes.

There's a major question: Will more and more international mining companies seek the services, or maybe promote private militaries? And one of the problems of private militaries is that they might represent a real challenge to the power of the state.

MR. EISENBERG: What do you see the role of these firms currently--or, let me take that from the top, Mark.

How do you assess the role of these firms currently, and what role do you see them playing in the evolving international order?

MR. HOWE: I think to a limited extent these groups perform commendable security functions, but I think that's mostly in the area of guarding important economic concessions. And there they do a very good job.

When they actually get into combat military operations, I think there should be more question directed at these groups. There is a fear about human rights violations by these groups. There's the fear that they're operating as kind of the thin edge of a larger multinational economic wedge going into the country, and that increasingly that particular country may lost some sovereignty, either security or economic sovereignty, to this multinational force.

MR. EISENBERG: There have been a series of reports by a UN special (inaudible) on the question who cites the prospect of human rights violations as well as the violation of the nation's right to self-determination as a very serious problem with regard to the use of mercenary and mercenary organizations. Do you think that is, in fact, a significant concern?

MR. HOWE: I think on the issue of human rights there's a mixed record. Executive Outcomes apparently was involved in some human rights abuses in Angola but did fairly well in Sierra Leone, and much better than Sierra Leone in military or the guerilla insurgency, called the RUF (R-U-F).

In terms of a nation state, I think you can argue that first of all a nation state, a government like Angola or Sierra Leone, should have the right to call upon whatever security force it needs. In this case it called upon Executive Outcomes. It did a good military job and then left the country.

I think there's however an issue involved on how effective an Executive Outcomes victory is by a foreign force. When they left SL, shortly afterwards there was a military coup. So what Executive Outcomes can go in and do may be a very temporary solution to the problem.

MR. EISENBERG: You said that the people who carried out the coup in Sierra Leone were in fact some of the same people who had been trained by Executive Outcomes.

MR. HOWE: That's (inaudible).

MR. EISENBERG: Is that the case?

MR. HOWE: No, that's bullshit.

MR. EISENBERG: Okay.

MR. HOWE: For the most part.

MR. EISENBERG: Okay.

MR. HOWE: (inaudible) Christine Adampur(?) I think went into that.

MR. EISENBERG: Um hmm.

MR. HOWE: Essentially what happened very quickly was that Executive Outcomes built up a parallel military force called the COMAJOS(?), and the regular military force was pissed off at that because it was kind of you know--

MR. EISENBERG: Competing on their turf.

MR. HOWE: And so the first thing the coup leaders when they took over power was to get rid of the COMAJOS. I don't think Executive Outcomes was responsible for that coup.

MR. EISENBERG: Hmm. Do you think there's any danger or prospect that private mercenary firms (or private security firms, as they often like to call themselves) might end up working for someone unsavory, a so-called rogue government, a terrorist group, a subnational group?

MR. HOWE: Well we've certainly seen throughout history individuals and maybe small groups work for rogue governments. We've certainly had some Americans working for Qaddafi some 15, 20 years ago. There is that worry, and I think there should be some sort of regulation or at least very close monitoring of international mercenary or private security groups.

One of the problems of governments' monitoring of mercenary groups is that governments sometimes want to have the, the chance to use private security groups. And I think that may explain the close relationship of the United States with MPRI in Alexandria, Virginia. It's a very, I think, close relationship. The South African government, many of whose members suffered from treatment of people presently in Executive Outcomes during the apartheid period, the Mandela government has allowed Executive Outcomes to remain in South Africa. And I think one of the reasons for that is that Executive Outcomes has done things which the South African government wants to have done but is unwilling or unable to do by itself. In other words, private security groups, rather than threatening national interests, will sometimes advance a particular government's national interests.

MR. EISENBERG: So a government might see this as just another foreign policy option or tool between doing nothing and going to war.

MR. HOWE: Exactly.

MR. EISENBERG: Much like paramilitaries have done for intelligence communities in various states here in the western world.

MR. HOWE: Yeah.

MR. EISENBERG: Okay.

MR. HOWE: I don't want to get into, into that, okay?

MR. EISENBERG: Okay. All right. Let, let me revisit a question we raised previously. Basically the prospect of private military working, private military firms working primarily for transnational corporations as opposed to states, is that something that we should be worried about?

MR. HOWE: Private security groups working for multinational corporations, if they're guarding installations I think it's fine. But if they're going in and doing combat operations, I think there should be some concern on that.

I think, however, private security groups may be employed increasingly by states and maybe international organizations. For example, private relief groups since 1990 have suffered at the hands of, of, of bandit or insurgency groups. We certainly saw that in Somalia, we saw that in Liberia and Sierra Leone. And increasingly these relief groups are hiring private security groups to protect them as they administer food and relief to the suffering populations. That's one area where I think private security groups are going to operate increasingly.

I think also you, we're going to see closer connections between various governments and, and private security groups to do what those governments would like to have done but won't do themselves. In that regard it's possible also that international organizations, or maybe governments, could hire a private security combat group to do into a really hot situation and stop the fighting, at which time the private security group would then leave and be replaced by more traditional peacekeeping groups belonging to multinational coalition, be replaced by technicians who can get the water going, turn on the electricity, pave the roads, etc.

So could private security groups be part of a layered response to international conflict? At the present time no government wants to send its troops into a Rwanda situation, where hundreds of thousands of people are being killed. It's too big a military and political risk for those states. But what about hiring a private security group over which we have you know definite powers, have them go in, clean up the situation, then have them pull back and be replaced by a more layered approach of, of peacekeepers and, and technicians. To me that's an interesting idea.

MR. EISENBERG: So it does seem reasonable to assume in certain situations they could be used as a substitute for, or at least a complement to, traditional peacekeepers--UN blue helmets or regional multinational forces--and then as the OAU did or tried to do in Liberia, for example.

MR. HOWE: Peacekeepers will go into countries where there's a peace to keep, but how does one establish a peace in the country? And if private security groups would be the only option available, should we at least consider their use rather than throwing up our hands when another Rwanda occurs and waiting for all the killing to subside before we come in with our humanitarian supplies?

MR. EISENBERG: So you think that would be a reasonable option in situations such as you've just described.

MR. HOWE: I think it's something that the West and that African states, perhaps, should consider. If there's no other combat capability going into a country, what about hiring a private security group?

MR. EISENBERG: Where do you see the market for these groups? Have they reached market saturation? Do you think the demand will increase for them? Do you think there'll be groups like EO will be operating outside of Africa in future years, or are they doing that already?

MR. HOWE: I think that, that the market for, for mercenaries or private security groups obviously depends upon prevailing political, economic, social situation in each country, and that obviously is, is impossible to predict. I think it's fair to say, though, that in, in sections of Africa we're going to see a continuing need for security. Some people are saying that there's a coming anarchy evolving in, in Africa. I doubt it, but I think there's going to be a lot of, of social and political unrest. And as long as national militaries are incapable of, of controlling that unrest there's gonna be a market in some form or other for private security groups--not just Africa but throughout the world.

MR. EISENBERG: There are a lot of private security groups or private mercenary firms (however one characterizes them). By one count we did recently, probably close to a hundred just in Africa alone. But are groups like we've been talking about--Executive Outcomes, Sandline(?), MPRI here in the US--are these in a distinct category all their own? Are they a cut above or a cut away from the others?

MR. HOWE: I think that there're different kind of, of categories of present-day private security groups. Executive Outcomes, for example, is the only large combat operation going on. It could field probably within a month's notice a, a thousand people in, into a particular country. Most of the other private security groups are more advising and, and much smaller numbers going into the country as a result. There are a couple that are capable of combat support operations.

So I think you have maybe a three-tier structure: training and advising, combat support, and then actual combat capability.

MR. EISENBERG: By combat support, are you talking about things like perhaps artillery fire or more logistical in nature?

MR. HOWE: It's, it's, it's you know. How, how does (inaudible).

MR. EISENBERG: (inaudible)

MR. HOWE: Some, some people say logistics. Other people say direct combat would be you know artillery or (inaudible) you know, all that.

MR. EISENBERG: Okay.

MR. HOWE: You're the military man here.

MR. EISENBERG: Mark, just a moment. Do you feel, before we get to that--okay, are we back on?

CAMERAMAN:Let, let me do a quick focus check. Okay.

MR. EISENBERG: You mentioned earlier that there may be a need for a heightened level of scrutiny of these groups. Who should do such a scrutiny? Should it be, should it be launched in the United Nations, something similar to the registered conventional arms they do for arms sales, only this for (inaudible) selling of battlefield skills. Or, how would that work?

MR. HOWE: Well I know the United Nations really doesn't want to get involved in that in part because it would be sanctioning these groups, a kind of saying they're okay as long as they're regulated, and I don't think the UN wants to get into that. But whether it's private human rights groups--Human Rights Watch, for example--or whether it's governments, I would like to see some watchdog and surveillance over these, these groups so they don't step too much out of the bounds of, of, of, of civilized behavior.

MR. EISENBERG: Do you think there's some minimum level of standards or qualifications, some sort of minimum level of code of conduct such groups should have to subscribe to?

MR. HOWE: South Africa recently introduced a bill, the regulation of foreign military assistance, and it had various criteria, one of which was that such private groups have to operate within the national interests of, of the host government, in this case South Africa. But other things such as it, it cannot be involved in, in, in genocide, in racial or in criminal behavior. It should not, or cannot, traffic in, in arms. And I think all these are, are reasonable criteria to place upon any private military group. I would like to see more restrictions placed on them and more enforcement, including perhaps revocation of, of, of passports.

CAMERAMAN:Professor, would you crane a little bit on your, on your side, sort of just take your head--yeah, just a little bit. Thank you.

MR. HOWE: Okay?

CAMERAMAN:Yeah.

MR. HOWE: I don't wanna look like some hippy or something.

CAMERAMAN:Right. No, you look okay. Just (inaudible).

MR. HOWE: Okay.

MR. EISENBERG: Is it okay?

CAMERAMAN:Yeah.

MR. EISENBERG: Good. As you're aware, earlier this year the government of Papua New Guinea attempted to hire one of these groups, the United Kingdom firm Sandline, which, of course, is affiliated with Executive Outcomes. That fell through for various reasons, but can you tell us what exactly the government hoped to accomplish, what they specifically hired Sandline to do?

MR. EISENBERG: The government of Papua New Guinea was faced with a rebellion that had been going on for about ten years. And its military was unable to put down the Bougainville resistance army, and so it called in Executive Outcomes. The government claimed that Executive Outcomes was only there as, as a training, maybe combat support but not combat, force.

It turns out, however, that, that Executive Outcomes and some other people within this intervention force would probably have done a fair amount of, of fighting. And we don't know simply because Executive Outcomes got there and then very quickly thereafter there was a coup from the military, which forced--or threatened coup, which forced Prime Minister Chan to step down.

There are several reasons I think as to why the army was so upset by this. I think one of the reasons was that they felt threatened by Executive Outcomes, their being shown up by a vastly superior military force, which, by the way, was also getting paid much, much more per person than was the Papua New Guinea army. So I think there was the sense of, of rivalry, plus envy, that led the military to say Executive Outcomes, get out of the country, and for the prime minister to step down.

MR. EISENBERG: What exactly is the nature of the relationship between Executive Outcomes and, and Sandline?

MR. HOWE: It's a little bit unclear what that relationship has been or will be. Sandline is, is part of The Plaza Group and it is very, it had very, very close ties with Executive Outcomes. It would subcontract Executive Outcomes, for example, to go into Papua New Guinea, or into Sierra Leone. I don't think it's the same organization. I think there is some personality, there have been some personality differences, strong personality differences, between people in Branch, or Plaza, and Executive Outcomes. As for the future, nobody is, knows just what that relationship will be.

MR. EISENBERG: Recently there was a change in leadership of Executive Outcomes. Is Executive Outcomes changing in terms of the type of work it's doing or who it's doing it for, and where do you expect to see Executive Outcomes in future years?

MR. HOWE: Executive Outcomes right now I think is, is really in a period of transition. The founder of Executive Outcomes, Evan Barlow, and the person in charge of recruitment will step down within 10 days of South Africa introducing its legislation which would regulate mercenary behavior. So with Evan Barlow leaving Executive Outcomes, it's unclear as to where Executive Outcomes will go. It's expressed strong interest in going in, into the Middle East and down to Latin America, perhaps for drug interdiction.

MR. EISENBERG: There's been a certain amount of increased public awareness of the existence and operation of these groups in the past couple of years. A lot of it's been critical. Do you think that's having any kind of effect on Executive Outcomes and other groups? Do you think that, that (inaudible) being either unfairly criticized or they're getting wider publicity and they don't like it?

MR. HOWE: Well I think publicity works both ways for a group like Executive Outcomes. The more publicity there is, the more governments will know about Executive Outcomes. And that's important. Reportedly the former head of Sierra Leone, when he was governing Sierra Leone, first learned about Executive Outcomes by reading an article in Soldier of Fortune magazine about Executive Outcomes. So maybe publicity can help get business and attract combat-capable soldiers to Executive Outcomes.

On the other hand, the more publicity there is about this group perhaps some international businesses will be more reluctant to align themselves with Executive Outcomes, in large part because of Executive Outcomes' apartheid background. Most of the members of Executive Outcomes served the old South African military, which throughout southern Africa really enforced a certain form of racial segregation.

MR. EISENBERG: Yeah. From what you tell me, there's enough differentiation between these groups that there's not really a whole lot of competition. They seem to operate for different clients, to do different tasks, to try and complete different objectives. Is, is that an accurate depiction?

MR. HOWE: I think sometimes between these groups there's competition; other times there's cooperation. In one case a British firm was told about Papua New Guinea. It said, no, we don't think we want to go in, but they passed the information on, on to, on to Sandline. On the other hand, if they'd wanted that contract I think they certainly would've been competing, rather than cooperating, for it.

A lot of the people in these, in these private firms, a lot of the people associated with these private firms aren't employed permanently by them. They'll be employed only when there's an opportunity to go into another country. So they might float around between the different companies. Somebody might fight for Executive Outcomes in one conflict and then go over to another private security company when that company gets a contract to go somewhere. So there's perhaps not that much loyalty that a soldier will have towards his employer, in part because he knows it's gonna be a temporary employment.

MR. EISENBERG: There have been various attempts internationally to regulate or prescribe the use of mercenaries. There's an existing international legal treaty which of course has been pushed by the United Nations. Is this something which is either effective or desirable?

MR. HOWE: There are groups that are working for the elimination of mercenary behavior. I think that somebody can, too, perhaps working for the elimination of prostitution. It sounds good but I don't think it's ever going to happen because I think there're always going to be customers for private security groups.

You referred to international agreements, but very few countries have signed onto those international agreements, I think in part because they always want to have the option if they need to of employing mercenaries sometime in the future. Some of the countries who signed international agreements against mercenaries subsequently have hired mercenaries for their own national interests. So I think private security groups or, pejoratively, mercenaries, will always be around.

I think therefore the question is how does one, either a nation or an international organization like the UN, regulate mercenary behavior so that it's a stabilizing rather than a destabilizing force in the world today.

MR. EISENBERG: You mentioned the word "pejoratively." Definitionally of course we've said earlier on, and I think we agreed, that mercenaries at its basics are groups or individuals generally working on a profit basis as opposed to working for a state or ideological reasons. Is it unfair to call these groups mercenary groups? I mean is that insulting or inaccurate? Should we not call them that?

MR. HOWE: I don't think any private security groups like the term mercenaries. They might refer their, to themselves as security consultants. Mercenary has, has a pejorative connotation.

MR. EISENBERG: Um hmm. But it--

CAMERAMAN:A matter of (inaudible)?

MR. EISENBERG: Oh, we're just talking among ourselves here.

(END OF SIDE ONE, TAPE C)

--set it up you know like the long-term effect you'd kind of talked about this with, with respect to the layered approach but short-term––long-term is an allusion. I mean what's the real long-term benefit to bringing them in? I'll, I'll go ahead and ask it.

One final question. Some people have said that the utility of using these groups is extremely limited because it doesn't address fundamental concerns or issues necessary to a peaceful, stable government in, in country issues of economic development, political stability, democratization. A group comes in, it settles the immediate military conflict, but the issues which gave rise to the conflict still exist and it breaks out later. Is that a valid concern, and if so how should it be addressed?

MR. HOWE: Well in a way it's a valid concern. And Executive Outcomes went into Sierra Leone, stopped the fighting, and helped pave the way for a democratic elections in Sierra Leone. Several months after Executive Outcomes left Sierra Leone there was a coup, and that country is probably in a worse position than it was during the war. And therefore a lot of people say Executive Outcomes really didn't serve a function.

But Executive Outcomes will say, hey, we're a military group. We're not an economic development or a political development group. And we went in there and did the job, and now groups after us, economic support groups, technicians, democratization experts, should come in after us and kind of keep the ball rolling, keep support going to stabilize these countries. We can't do everything, Executive Outcomes will say, but we can solve the immediate military problem which will give a breathing space for later experts, technicians, whatever, to come in, to stabilize.

MR. EISENBERG: Okay. Thank you.

(END OF INTERVIEW)