INTERVIEWER: ...In your estimation, what are the most pressing direct threats to US national security in Asia?

SELIG HARRISON: Well, I think the greatest danger the United States faces in Asia is the possible drift into a conflict with China over Taiwan. The -- There are a lot of political forces in Taiwan that are pushing Taiwan in the direction of seeking over independence as against what we now have, which is a de facto independence. These forces pushing for a sovereign, independent Taiwan could provoke a war with China in which political factors in the United States and in China could accelerate the danger of a conflict.

You have in the aftermath of Deng Xiaoping's death a political competition going on in China. It may not lead to changes in the government right away, but there are different contenders for power and influence who might well use the issue of Chinese nationalism and the desire to incorporate Taiwan in some way with a one-China framework as an issue in the political power game in China.

And as China -- If China were to adopt a -- a -- a belligerent posture in response to provocations from Taiwan in the form of an independent -- a declaration of independence, or threats to declare independence, or efforts to get a UN seat, then that could lead American public opinion to polarize between those who would say we've got to help Taiwan, we've got to help defend it in the event of war with China and others who would say that the American interest with -- in good relations with this tremendous country of -- the People's Republic of China is the paramount factor. So, I think there is a danger. It's probably -- I think it's a very real danger.

It may not threaten us in the immediate future because Chi -- mainland China doesn't now have the amphibious capability necessary to actually engage in a serious conflict with Taiwan, But each that passes the danger will grow greater. And in the period between five and ten years from now, I think the danger of a war with China over Taiwan is a very real one unless the United States makes very clear to Taiwan that the US will stay out of the unfinished Chinese civil war, will not get involved in a war between China and Taiwan and wants Taiwan to avoid provoking one by declaring sovereign independence. (Interruption, noise.)

I think that many of the security -- Many -- Many of the security threats that are often mentioned, such as the danger of getting involved in a Korean war, a new Korean War are not as serious as they're often presented to be. There is a danger of a conflict in Korea once again, but I don't think North Korea wants one.

And therefore, the picture of an aggressive North Korea bent on invad -- invading South Korea, provoking trouble with South Korea I think is completely out of date, reflects obsolete Cold War thinking that bears no relationship to the present situation in which North Korea wants to improve its relations with the US, needs to do so for economic reasons now that it has lost the Soviet Union and China as its patrons, which they -- they had in the course during the Cold War, getting all kinds of food and fuel from them at subsidized prices. But now North Korea really wants to be friends with the United States and gradually as it establishes more normal relations with the United States, I think it will become more friendly with South Korea.

But there is a danger of an accidental conflict of a series of events leading to escalation. There is a hardline group in North Korea in the military there. We've got to be very careful to -- not to strengthen that group by maintaining obsolete Cold War policies in Korea. But I think the danger of a war in Korea is much less than the danger of a war over Taiwan. Those are the two places where a serious conflict could break out. And of the two, I would say Taiwan is, by far, the most menacing.

INTERVIEWER: ...One of the issues being that East Asia is the only region since the end of the Cold War -- this, you know, 12 percent increase in arms sales and the US is the primary contributor. There's an argument that says if -- if we don't sell them arms, somebody else... Is that a valid justification for continued arms sales, high levels of arms sales to --

HARRISON: On the whole, I think the United States should be very careful to keep out of conflict -- potential conflict situations by maintaining a very restricted arms transfers to contending parties. For example, there was a period when we thought we should sell arms to China because they were going to be our surrogate vis a vis -- with respect to the Soviet Union, a conflict with the Soviet Union. Now we are com -- committed to -- Now we are selling arms on a large scale to Taiwan, which makes Red -- communist China angry.

So, it seems to me we should stay out of the conflict between China and Taiwan and we should be phasing out our arms sales to Taiwan in accordance with the 1982 so-called "Second Shanghai Communique," in which we pledged to phase them out. So, we should have a detached posture there and shouldn't sell to China either. And in the case of India and Pakistan, we've had various carry-overs from the previous Cold War arms transfers to Pakistan, military aid and -- the -- that led us to transfer $400 million worth just last year to Taiwan.

So, I think that's a great mistake and in -- in general, I think while you can't rule out all sales of military hardware, the basic standard should be that where countries are potential rivals, we shouldn't fan the fires of conflict by selling arms.

INTERVIEWER: ...US policy in Asia in contradictory. The official position of the US...multilateral solutions, regional problems...continue to rely on bilateral alliances, arms sales to ensure stability and security. Is this problematic for you?

HARRISON: I think there's a -- a -- a real contradiction between the perpetuation of alliance relationships in Asia, such as those with Japan and with South Korea, and, on the other hand, our constant emphasis on the creation of multilateral security dialogues in Asia. Of course, the US Government position is that these do not conflict, that in fact they rein -- reinforce each other, but the fact is that they -- they do conflict. And what's more important I think is that while we talk about multilateral security dialogues in Asia, we're telling them what they should do without any reference to what we should do.

The United States maintains forces in Asia, despite the fact that the Soviet -- first the Soviet Union, and now Russia offers to reduce its -- to engage in mutual force reductions in Asia, negotiate naval limitations between the US and -- and Russia. We have turned them down and -- and adopted a unilateral force presence. And then we talk about arms control in Asia and China says, well, we're not going to engage in arms control discussions to reduce our forces in Asia vis a vis those of Japan, for example, if the United States and Russia are still free to do whatever they want to do in maintaining forces in Asia, even though they're external powers, powers external to Asia.

So, if we want the countries of Asia to stand down -- to -- to avoid escalation of their armament, to avoid a naval arms race between China and Japan, which I think is a very serious possibility in the future, the United States has to be willing to engage in arms control discussions with the countries of the region in which we also would scale down our forces as part of a mutual process designed to avoid arms races in Asia and reduce tensions in Asia. And we -- we can't have it both ways, say that we're going to be in Asia as a global power, but you guys have to reduce your forces regardless of where -- how many forces we have there. China will certainly not accept that and China is the key to getting any kind of mutual process of -- of military -- of tension reduction in Asia.

INTERVIEWER: Should the idea of a US nuclear security blanket over Asia like we have with Japan and, to a extent, South Korea, should it be reconsidered in light of changes in Asia in the post-Cold War era?

HARRISON: I think that as a result of the end of the Cold War there's a great need to reexamine the basic assumptions of the American military presence in Asia. We have a security treaty with Japan which -- in which we're continuing to hang on for dear life to whatever we've got in the way of a military presence of Japan, regardless of the fact that the political ground is coming out from under us in Japan.

There's a strong consensus in Japan already that the US ground forces, the Marines in Okinawa -- 27,000 out of 60,000 forces in Japan -- should -- should get out. And it's not just because of the rape case that we heard so much about and other tensions on the ground, but because Japanese public is increasingly questioning why, with the Cold War over, the United States should still be maintaining such large forces in Japan. I think that even the question of our future naval and air forces in Japan is going to be increasingly debated as the years go by and I think that some scaling back there is going to become urgent in the next few years unless we want to wait until we're asked to leave.

So, that -- the -- there's no conceivable -- there's no clear threat. If you decide you're going to make China the threat, then Japan will itself be deeply divided because some people in Japan, the last thing they want is to be in conflict with China, whereas there's a hardline, a right wing that would like nothing less -- nothing better than having tension with China and it would justify a nuclear Japan.

I mean, there is a danger of nuclear weapons being adopted by Japan, but the danger is not because of our leaving our military relationship with Japan over time or reducing it, but rather the danger comes from an atmosphere in -- would come from an atmosphere in Asia in which tensions between the US and China grow, tensions between the US and Japan grow. And in that context, then the advocates of a nuclear Japan would become stronger. So, I think with the Cold War over, the US should be reconsidering how much of our military presence in Asia we really need.

In Korea, we have an opportunity for a new relationship with North Korea which we're not taking advantage of. There's much talk about the United States engaging North Korea now as distinct from the old policy, refusing to talk to them at all. Well, it's true that we're talking to them now, but we're not responding to their conception of what our future relationship should be.

For example, we're maintaining economic sanctions that we had all during the Cold War against North Korea as if the Cold War was still continuing. And the result -- And that influences our ability to get peace negotiations going on in the Korean Peninsula, because the North Koreans say, well, you promised to end economic sanctions. As part of the pro -- of the process of becoming friendly with us in the nuclear freeze agreement, the North Koreans say, the United States agreed to end economic sanctions.

So, we're -- we haven't really made up our minds whether we're really prepared to -- to deal with North Korea as a country that's going to be there for awhile or whether we want North Korea to collapse, as East Germany did, with the hope that South Korea will absorb it. As a result, we have a very ambivalent policy in the Korean Peninsula, and it -- it -- it makes it impossible to get peace negotiations going. If they did get going, then the possibility of American forces in Korea being reduced and gradually removed would grow.

And certainly there's no reason why all these years after the Korean War, US forces should still be a tripwire in Korea. It's one thing to have some US forces there with South Korean forces taking the brunt of the early -- any early fighting in Korea, maybe backed up by US air and naval forces, but with US ground forces in the back, only coming in a very extreme situation. It's quite another thing to have the US forces there as a tripwire.

So, I think it's high time that we reexamined the nature of our presence in Korea, our relations with North Korea, the possibility of setting the stage for real peace negotiations, ending the formal state of war we still have all these years after the Korean War, and then setting the stage for US reduction of forces, withdrawal of forces.

Basically, the -- the -- the issue cutting across all this is that we have economic interests in Asia that we've always subordinated to our military -- perceived military needs. During the Cold War we thought, well, we want to keep Japan as an ally, we can't push them too hard on trade issues or they'll break the alliance, and we -- we consciously subordinated our economic interests during the Cold War. Now we -- Every once in awhile some -- somebody like a -- Bill Clinton has said he's going to get tough with Japan, but then -- when we get to the brink, they don't get tough because they're afraid they'll lose the security relationship.

Well, the point is that we now don't need the security relationship in the way we did during the Cold War. We want to keep some forces in Asia as a sort of insurance policy, some Seventh Fleet presence. But it can be greatly reduced and we could afford to have Japan get mad at us over trade issues and make threats that we're going to be asked to reduce our force presence 'cause we don't need the same force presence we needed during the Cold War.

INTERVIEWER: Is the continued deployment of large numbers of forward troops, as you were just alluding to, is it an adequate answer? How should the US use military deployment to achieve its national security goals and economic goals? Are troops a viable option to gain economic leverage?

HARRISON: No. I don't think we should be threatening -- I don't think we should be allowing our desire for military access to certain countries to influence our security -- our economic relations with them. We're going to have to adopt a very tough economic bargaining posture with China, for example. We should have a much -- because that's the biggest trade deficit we're going to have in Asia. We certainly have to bargain much more aggressively with Japan.

Now in the case of China, we can be tough on trade issues without getting into a hostile political relationship if we recognize -- if we -- if we stop stepping on China's toes on the important political issues. And there are two important political issues involving the sovereignty of China. One is Taiwan, where we should not be in -- any way encourage an independent Taiwan. We should discourage Taiwan from provoking China on the Taiwan issue. We shouldn't do things like allow the president of Taiwan to come to Cornell, ostensibly for an honorary degree, but actually to make some controversial statements about the future of Taiwan.

If we're careful on the Taiwan issue, if we recognize that the nature of China's internal system -- how them keep order in this tremendous, diverse country with an enormous hunk of the human race, managing it -- that society, keeping it organized and unified is a big -- if a very difficult job, and it's none of our business to tell the Chinese you can't arrest this guy and you can't do that. That's their responsibility and if we recognize that human rights in China will improve over time, if we have good relations that lead it to open up more and more, as it already has basically been opening up more and more, then I think the danger of a conflict with China over trade will be -- will be marginalized.

So, we can't have political conflict, security conflict and trade conflict. And in my view, our policies in Asia should be focussed on our -- no our economic interests, in equitable trade relations with the principal countries of Asia, which we don't have now, and we shouldn't allow our econ -- our -- our perceived military needs to get in the way of aggressive pursuit of our economic interests because the Cold War is over and there is not -- it's not necessary to have conflict with any of the countries of Asia if we avoid stepping on their toes, infringing on their sovereignty and asking for trouble. And we were asking for trouble when we sent carriers offshore Taiwan at the time of the crisis last year.

The result of that, which made Americans feel great -- we're tough -- was the China simply strengthened its capability to deal with our carriers in any future conflict over Taiwan. So, we have to be very careful not to provoke trouble that is not really on the horizon, concentrate on the areas where there are conflicts which are in the economic field, and -- and basically just stop thinking in Cold War terms.

INTERVIEWER: The use of the Seventh Fleet, there's a danger that it could be used as a police force, particularly with the South China Sea and territorial disputes, natural resources. How do you see the Seventh Fleet playing into Asian regional politics?

HARRISON: Well, I don't want it to -- I don't want to see the -- I want to see the -- the Seventh Fleet remain in Asia. But I think the -- the -- the size of our deployments there can be greatly reduced, so that it is ex -- can be expanded in time of any unexpected trouble. I view it as a kind of an insurance policy, a contribution to keeping the sea lanes open, which we need in Asia, and a -- a -- a way of safeguarding against unpredictable future developments that could pose security threats to us that don't now exist.

We shouldn't have deployments based on the assumption that we now have security threats that we can identify, but simply the nucleus of a force that can be expanded in the future if necessary. I certainly don't want to see the Seventh Fleet getting involved in the internal politics of the Asian countries. I don't want us to go around showing the flag and -- and misusing the military strength that we should keep in Asia.

In a case like the South China Sea, for example, there are peaceful solutions possible to that conflict that developed when China sent a few naval [background voices here] officers and units on to the (Mischief?) Reef. This is a -- a problem that China's offered to settle peacefully. I think it can be settled peacefully. Basically, it has to do with oil, in my opinion. The -- China is ready to work out a negotiated settlement, it'll take time, but I don't see any inevitable confrontation in the South China Sea or -- or anywhere else in that part of the world that should draw in the Seventh Fleet.

INTERVIEWER: ...With -- With the US emphasis upon multinational organizations and solutions, they've largely sidestepped ASEAN and the ARF, whereas has become -- they took part in the ARF discussions, also Russia took part in those. What role do you see the United States playing opposed to ASEAN or ARF, as far as the level of involvement?

HARRISON: Well, it -- there -- you know, there are -- there are -- has been a slow movement toward the creation of some multilateral regional groupings in Asia, which are looking in a very cautious way at security issues, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, and there's discussion of a regional association in Northeast Asia. But I don't think these organizations are -- are likely to develop into very solid groups that will have peacekeeping capabilities that could substitute for the UN's role in peacekeeping missions.

I think that the -- the United States should support the United Nations and its humanitarian -- Department of Humanitarian Affairs, so that it can intervene when there are humanitarian crises. And it should support the peacekeeping program which the present Secretary General Kofi Annan has been directly connected with, so that the UN can decide in any -- should any crisis develop in Asia, in Southeast Asia -- Timor, for example, or any number of places -- what is the best way to deal with that. I don't think that -- And I think that that could involve cooperation or working through regional bodies in Asia, but I think that the American emphasis should be on the United Nations, and then let the United Nations decide how it wants to relate to whatever groupings may exist in -- in -- in Asia.

Basically, I think the United States should avoid interposing itself in Asia in ways that would bring it into conflict with the interests of the major powers in Asia, particularly China and Japan. And I think our effort should be to gradually, consistent with the desires of the countries concerned, disengage our military presence from the region and the -- from -- the -- the forward combat presence on the ground, while retaining some air and naval capability as a possible basis for returning to Asia in a critical situation.

In the case of Korea, we have a more complex situation because you can say, well, South Korea will tell us to stay forever because it makes it cheaper for them to main -- to -- it gives them an economic cushion. And the middle class and the upper class in South Korea is used to -- getting its -- the security much less expensively than would be the case if the US were not there. One of the consequences of that is that there's no compulsion on South Korea to seek a friendship with North Korea because it gets along just fine with the United States underwriting its defense, and I'm afraid things will just go on in a stale -- as a stalemate in -- in Korea if we are there forever.

At the same time, we can't just suddenly pull out of Korea because it's a very explosive situation and we -- we have to be very careful in the way that we disengage from the Korean Peninsula, but I think our goal should be to try to reduce tensions and participate in a North-South peacekeeping structure, which North Korea wants, and gradually reposition our own forces so they don't bear the brunt of any war that might accidentally break out. And then within a foreseeable period of time, such as ten years, which I recently suggested in an article of mine in Foreign Policy magazine, we should be aiming to get out of Korea.

And so, I think our role in Asia should be a more detached role with a military capability in the form of the Seventh Fleet and some air units in Japan, possibly, that could be expanded and reactivated if an unforeseen crisis should develop.

INTERVIEWER: Okay.

HARRISON: The incipient arms races in Asia are fueled by the fact that many of the countries are doing very well economically. They're not really doing well in the sense that their poorer -- the majority of their people, in some of the cases of Southeast Asia, for example, are still impoverished and the countries shouldn't be spending so much on defense, but they -- they have ready cash because they've been getting into the world market. And -- And -- And some of these countries in Asia have more ready cash than many countries in other parts of the world and are, therefore, able to build up their armed forces, which often helps the regimes in power.

In the case of China and Taiwan, you have a civil war that's unfinished, so both sides are trying to -- to buy more arms. China can get some from Russia. Taiwan gets a lot from the United States and has, of course, the third highest foreign exchange reserves in the world. As a result of the help they've had from the US and their own strong self-help measures over the years, they've got all this cash, so they go out and buy weapons. I think that the -- the case of the two -- two Koreas, South Korea has been successful as an exporter and has a lot of money around, so -- but North Korea doesn't. So, in that case, they -- they are not buying more arms; they're trying how to get -- get South Korea to agree to a reduction in arms.

So, it's basically the -- the -- The danger of arms races in Asia results from the amount of cash around and the political motives of the governments concerned.

INTERVIEWER: Good.

[End of interview.]