GLENN BAKER: Many people say that ultimately the problems of Burundi must be solved by the Burundians themselves. What steps can an outside organization do to best facilitate the peace process in a country so torn by internal distrust and strife?

Pres. JIMMY CARTER: Well, the role that the Carter Center has played has been to bring the Burundians and different elements together with their neighbors, the leaders from Rwanda, the leaders from Tanzania, from Uganda, from Zaire together in two definitive and major conferences -- very private, but free-wheeling and -- and with adequate ability to express themselves -- to discuss the basic problems of the two related countries, Burundi and -- and Rwanda. Also, we know that what happens in Tanzania, what happens in Zaire also affects the people in Burundi.

Another thing is for someone like me to go there and to meet with not only the incumbent leaders in the Burundi government, but also the -- you might say what are generally called extreme -- extremists on both sides, the leaders who are very conservative, the leaders who are very liberal, who don't trust the existing government. And this makes you open up an -- an element of conversation.

Then, obviously, the third thing is to make sure that you include people who are knowledgeable about Africa, knowledge -- able about the Great Lakes Region, including Burundi and Rwanda, and who are trusted by the people there. So, we brought into our group Archbishop Desmond Tutu from South Africa, a former president, Julius Ny -- Nyere (phonetic) from Tanzania, and former President Toure from Mali to join me in this effort, so that the African leaders, who may not trust an American, had a better trust in the four of us collectively.

BAKER: You've somewhat answered my second question and I'd like maybe to look at it a little more closely. In Burundi we see a very polarized political situation, where often outsiders, if they talk to one group first, are accused of being biased already. How, in this kind of a situation, does an outside group achieve a position of neutrality in the eyes of the local population?

CARTER: Well, one way that I always use is to make sure that when I go into a country, I make a public statement that I'm there just to explore the situation, I'm not mediating, I'm on a pre-mediating mission, and then to meet with a wide range of people and let my meetings be well known. I met with I think dif -- 26 different leaders of factions or political parties or groups in Bujumbura when I was in Burundi last fall. Then, of course, this does build up an element of trust in me as an outside.

But within Buj --- Burundi is where the major problem lies. Because the -- the -- the Hutus who are in the vast majority, about 85 percent of the total population, fear the Tutsi army, almost totally controlled and dominated by Tutsis. The Tutsi minority, about 15 percent, feel a possible massacre on the part of the Hutus, so they -- this element of distrust is something that -- that no one from outside, even from nearby in Tanzania can alleviate. It has to be alleviated by the Burundians themselves.

How to do this, to have a stable society where both ethnic groups can have an adequate trust of the others, is -- part of that trust has to come from an organization or a government structure, part of it has to come from the international community, either localized or broadbased, with economic persuasion and even with some military restraints on occasion, those are the factors that have to be used.

BAKER: We've seen that in -- in some cases, the conflict goes on, you can't even get people to the negotiating table. In order to get both, in this case, the army and various militia groups to the negotiating table, they all need to believe they have more to gain from negotiation than from a continuing military campaign. How do you go about convincing all the sides that negotiation serves their best interests?

CARTER: (Laughs.) Well, the basis premise of mediation is to make sure that everytime any side makes a concession that the benefits exceed what they give up. And you have to have a constant realization that no agreement, no matter how nice it might look on paper is going to last unless both sides feel that they have won. It has to be a win-win situation.

In the case of Burundi, where as you know Major Buyoya took over, there the immediate neighbors -- I think very constructively, decided that they should make sure that they forced the Buyoya faction and the (Angola's?) faction to approach the negotiating table and to realize that -- that armed conflict meant that both sides lost. And by the imposition of -- of an -- of a trade embargo on the people of Burundi, some progress has been made.

On October the 12th in (place name) there was a -- a meeting of the leaders of that region and both Buyoya and Ngoma (phonetic) at least gave written commitment to start talking directly to each other and to give up what was patently unacceptable prerequisites or preconditions for talks. Whether they'll go through with those talks, it still remains to be seen. At the same time, the imposition of -- of an embargo or economic constraints on a country for a long period of time invariably tends to strengthen the incumbent leaders whom you're trying to punish and begins to punish the people who are already suffering. So, along with the imposition of economic constraints have to go the sustained imposition, but also a carrot or a promise that if you do make constructive steps, then the elements of the -- of the trade restraints will be lifted. So, there has to be a -- a -- a benefit to be derived from a leader who is being punished by the economic constraints.

BAKER: President Clinton has recently proposed an African Crisis Response Force to be made up of African troops and funded by the United States and other Western countries. What are your thoughts? Do you think this is a good idea and do you think it's a good idea for Burundi?

CARTER: Well, for the last three or four years, in my fairly frequent trips to the -- to the eastern part of Africa, I've had leaders in different countries propose such a force, particularly Minister Inowe (phonetic) in Ethiopia, who happens to be the head of the OAU this year. The OAU leaders themselves, who are stationed in Addis Ababa -- President (name) in Uganda and others have said we need a force that can be marshalled when the time comes that's already -- that's already organized and trained and -- and has the communication capability of working in harmony among the different elements that come from different countries.

And I think recently the effort by Secretary of State Christopher as he went to Africa was a very constructive opportunity at least to implement what the Africans themselves had been proposing for several years.

One of the downsides to it is that when America unilaterally proposes publicly a -- a step like this, even when the African leaders might -- it might be their idea, they tend to react adversely. And some of the leaders from whom I have heard in the last few days say that they would respond more avidly to the proposal if it was more broadly financed and supported from not only America and Europe, but also was vetted through the United Nations Security Council, so they could accept something that came from the United Nations and not just something that came from Washington.

So, the idea is good and I think it would be very -- very fine to have a few thousand troops, say from Malawi, or a few thousand maybe from Zimbabwe, or a few thousand maybe from Ethiopia, maybe some additional ones from -- from Kenya to be standing by and -- and adequately equipped and fairly well trained, so that the -- the Burundians would know that this force might come into their country in the case of an extreme violent case or just act as a -- as a constructive element if they were invited into the country.

BAKER: In following up on that. Many of the -- the Tutsis that I've heard from are quite opposed to foreign troops coming in, fearing that it would expose them to a certain amount of violence from the majority. How do we get around that kind of fear on their side and implement such a force so that it would provide security for all concerned?

CARTER: I'm not sure that you could ever get completely around it. You know, there -- there is a -- a dominant military and political and e -- and economic force in Bujumbura, in -- in Burundi heavily influenced, if not controlled by the military. And for them -- for them to give up that -- that privileged leadership role might be something that they would never voluntarily accept.

On the other hand, if there was some kind of a coalition government put together, if the Tutsi army could basically stay intact, but add over a period of time more and more Hutu soldiers into the ranks, if maybe some internal police force could be established that -- that might be possibly dominated by the Hutus, there -- there could be a working relationship built up there that would make a better society.

Now if you did all those things you would have less need to send in a force. But I think just the fact that the force does exist and if you had a resurrection, a resumption of a -- of a holocaust as occurred in -- in Rwanda, knowing that the foreign troops would come in might be a deterrent to the excessive use of violence by the army. So, the fact that the force exists doesn't mean it is going to be used. The fact it -- that it exists might very well preclude the need for it to be used. But I don't think we should let the Tutsi army have a veto power over whether or not the international effort should be exerted.

BAKER: Looking more broadly now, you've had successful -- negotiated successful resolutions to problems that many considered intractable in places such as Haiti or North Korea. What are the keys to successful negotiation in such cases? Or is negotiation even the right word for it?

CARTER: Well, sometimes there's a negotiation, sometimes just mediation, and sometimes we do what we call pre-mediation work. One of the key elements is being trusted by the people who are there. We have massive programs in agriculture, in health care, things of that kind, which lets the leaders of -- of a country, either the ruling party or opposition forces, develop an awareness of what we do and a trust in me personally and in what the Carter Center can do. So, I think the trust of the participants or the disputants in the mediator is a prerequisite.

Secondly, you have to know the science or technique or art of mediation, and these are not secret. They're known by scholars at the university, or at Harvard and different places, and we know them here at the Carter Center. I have mentioned a couple of them already.

You have to make sure that when you are mediating between two groups, who may not ever see each other, that both sides feel that every time they make a concession that the benefits that they derive will be greater than what they give up. And they have to know that toward the end, they're going to succeed in achieving their major goals.

There's an underlying pressure almost invariably on the part of military leaders who are at war from people who are suffering who want to see the violence ended. These are mothers who's lost their children, or farmers who've lost their homes, or soldiers who are dying on the battlefield, or they had -- they've suffered the ravages of landmines, or starvation, or deprivation of shelter. I mean, folks want to go back to a normal life, it doesn't matter where they are. And to build on that desire that exists among the -- the general population is quite often a pressure that can be put on military leaders, who may not be suffering at all, to come to the negotiating table.

Even when people know each other fairly well -- For instance, at Camp David, I stayed there 13 days with -- with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat. They were completely incompatible personally. For the last 10 days they never saw each other. I went back and forth between them. But I had a single document, they both knew, and they knew that I wouldn't lie to them, and eventually we got down to the point where they could both agree on the same text. And that's -- that's basically the approach that I've taken in every place I go.

When I went to North Korea, when I went to Haiti, later when I went to Bosnia, I'd -- I studied the issue thoroughly. I typed out what I thought was a fair settlement and I went back and forth until I got modifications to my draft that were suitable to both sides. Sometimes you fail, sometimes you succeed.

But the two antagonists have to believe what the mediator tells them: 'This is same exact words that I'm showing to your adversary and this is what I propose that -- that we change in the wording that will suit you and might be acceptable to the other side.' And if you keep on doing that until you finally reach success, that's the best approach that I know.

BAKER: Are there advantages to being a private citizen rather than a government representative or a government organization in achieving that trust?

CARTER: Well, in the case -- Well, let's just take 1994, for instance, when I went to North Korea. It was impossible because of our government's policy to have any American official go to Pyongyang and talk to any North Korean official, so the communications was zero, and -- and I was able to go as a totally private professor at Emory University and representing only the Carter Center. And the White House made clear that they announced to the public that I did not represent the United States of America. When I got there, of course, Kim Il Sung realized that I had some authority and some voice.

And the same thing happened in Port-o-Prince later on that same year, in September of 1974 [sic], when the US ambassador in Port-o-Prince was totally prohibited from even exchanging a written note with Emile Jonnaissant (phonetic), who was acting as the president of the government, the head of the government in Haiti. But General Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn and I were not constrained by that same prohibition, so I was able to negotiate freely with the leader and the cabinet of the group that had overthrown President Aristide.

Again, later that same year, as a matter of fact, in December we went to Bosnia. And although our government had not been willing to have any conversation with the Bosnian Serbs, I was free to go to Pale and to go to Sarajevo, go back and forth and eventually worked out a single document that both the Bosnian leaders and also the Serb leaders signed.

All this was done, I might add quickly, and I think necessarily with approval from President Clinton. I mean, I don't dash into a sensitive area like that with no authority from the government. I first get permission from the president. And when I don't get it, I don't go. For instance, I had been invited for three years to go to Pyongyang and I had been invited for three years by President Aristide and also the military leaders to come down to Haiti. But I couldn't get permission from Washington, so I didn't go. So, in every case you have to have permission as a private citizen to inject yourself into a very sensitive area like this. (Pause for adjustment.)

BAKER: Switching gears a little bit. Most of the regional conflicts we see plaguing the world today are fought with weapons purchased from other countries or that flow in from various means, many of them from the West, including the United States. Should US restraint in arms sales abroad be part of an overall strategy of conflict prevention?

CARTER: It certainly should. You know, although we don't -- we aren't the only arms supplier, obviously. You have the Soviet Union, you have Israel, you have even Austria and Switzerland, everyone else wants to sell weapons, the French, the US leadership is crucial, is a crucial factor. For instance, let me give you one vivid example that exists now, in October of -- of 1996.

When I went into office in 1977, I issued a -- a presidential directive that no advanced weapons would be sold to any government in Latin America because I didn't want to escalate the arms race and I wanted to see their limited funds be spent on humanitarian causes, of schools, and hospitals, and health -- and health care, and housing, and so forth. So, I issued that directive. It was honored by President Reagan and also by President Bush.

Now in Washington there's a -- there's a big discussion going on about whether we should lift that restraint altogether and begin selling, say F-16s to Chile. Chile doesn't need F-16s, but if Chile does spend a large portion of its -- of its free budget funds on F-16s, it's almost inevitable that Argentina would have to buy F-16s just for some future contingency when they didn't get along with Chile.

This would then spread to Brazil and the first thing you know, South America will covered with F-16s and other advanced weaponry, electronics, defense techniques to defend yourself against F-16s. So, here you -- you have a new massive drain of -- of precious and very scarce funds just to go into the pockets of American equipment manufacturers. And -- And that's where the initiative for this change in policy originates.

I noticed in the news reports that the president of Argentina has publicly announced that he does not want to see the American restraint on the sale of advanced military capabilities lifted, he wants to see my restraints continued. Whether our government will decide to maintain that policy that's now been followed by three presidents, I don't know.

BAKER: Some argue that even when policymakers are presented with overwhelming early warning signs of impending conflict, that governments, in particular, are slow to take effective preventive action that could save lives and millions in relief dollars. Do you -- How do we go about generating the political will among governments to invest in preventive action in regions that seem to lack strategic value, such as the Great Lakes Region?

CARTER: Mm-hmm. Well, I would like to see every government -- I would say certainly in Europe, the United States, and a major country like, say Japan -- have within its own bureaucracy a similar operation to what we have here at the Carter Center. With -- Primarily with undergraduate and graduate students at Emory University, we analyze all the potential conflicts and existing conflicts. There are about 110 of them. In an average year, about 70 erupt into violence. In 1995, there were 71. Thirty of those are major conflicts.

We define a major conflict as one within which a thousand or more soldiers are killed on the battlefield. And for every soldier killed in modern-day warfare in a civil war, about nine civilians perish from landmines, and stray bullets, and bombs, and from deliberate starvation or exposure to the weather, or -- so forth. Well, most governments don't do this. It would be rare for a government to do it.

But -- We have very limited financial resources here, but it would be very nice if the United States Government would have a -- a peace commitment, which wouldn't cost all that much -- money just to analyze every trouble spot in the world and let those people in that little nation know that the vast resources and influence of the US Government would be available to them if they wanted to mediate or resolve the conflict peacefully. And -- And this is the kind of thing that can be possible.

Also, there's a very handy technique that we use in an increasing way. And that is to substitute an honest democratic election instead of negotiation or mediation. Sometimes you can't mediate. They won't communicate with each other even through me. So, what we do is -- is capitalize on a -- on a principle of politics.

Politics is a science of self-delusion. You know, anyone who runs for mayor or for governor or for president believes if they're honest -- if the election is just honest and the people know me and know these other jokers, surely they're gonna vote for me. So, we try to induce both leaders, military leaders, why don't you let us come in and -- with others and try to have an honest election and let the people vote and decide who should be the president, and sometimes it works.

And -- And this is increasingly a technique used by us, and the National Democratic Institute, and -- and sometimes the UN, United Nations, and -- and others to -- to be a substitute for a war and a substitute even for mediation, is the holding of an -- an election. And then the next thing, of course, is that after the election is over, on election night, sometimes I have to stay two or three days and -- and mediate between the victor in the election and the losers to make sure that the victor is gracious in -- in -- in triumph and the losers will accept the results of the voting. Well, this is just part of mediation and I think is a very interesting new, developing facet.

The -- The thing that needs to be understood, too, is that now in -- in the world, almost every one of the wars are civil wars. They're -- They're not between two nations anymore. And the United Nations was founded and was organized to deal with -- with conflicts between two nations, not inside a country. So, this means that most of the wars that I've described earlier in this conversation don't have a welcoming atmosphere for a UN official to come in. And it's totally inappropriate for a UN official even to communicate with a revolutionary group just trying to overthrow a government that's a member of the UN. So, this means that unofficial groups like the Carter Center, I hope, will be used more and more in the future.

The most triumphant illustration of this was in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, where you had the government of Norway and -- and a social science group working hand-in-hand to bring the two opposing factions together. The United States was not involved at all and -- and hardly knew that the negotiations were going on until they were successful. But a bunch of social scientists who were working on the lifestyle of Palestinians in Gaza were the ones that opened up the opportunity for governments later to move in and consummate an agreement that had already been negotiated.

So, there are some very exciting things taking place around the world and I think it has to include non-officials.

BAKER: President Carter, thank you very much.