 |
 |
|
|
|
|
|
 |
| About CDI > Staff > Bruce Blair > Selected Publications |
|
|
|
De-Alerting Strategic Forces Bruce Blair c. 90 pp. / 2000 Paper 0-8157-1007-0 The Strategic Arms Reductions Talks between the United States and Russia call for the de-alerting of certain types of strategic missiles prior to their final elimination. Lowering the alert level of missiles by mutual agreement is a new form of arms control. In this book, Bruce Blair describes various options for de-alerting and analyzes their implications for strategic balance and safety. These options offer an important step toward fulfilling START obligations and, even more importantly, toward the elimination of the "hair trigger" on thousands of strategic weapons poised for immediate launch. Blair calls for the early implementation of de-alerting measures in order to alleviate the current danger of mistaken or accidental launch of strategic missiles, particularly Russian forces whose command-control and early warning systems continue to deteriorate. Russia's growing reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons in a crisis poses additional risks of inadvertent or unauthorized launch. According to Blair, the United States also depends too heavily on the quick launch of strategic forces in response to attack warning indications. De-alerting in parallel by both countries provides a means of reducing nuclear tensions and increasing the safety of deployed forces. The former adversaries could and should adopt partial de-alerting measures immediately with a view to eventually going to zero alert.
|
