#21 - RW 5-14-04 - RW Home
Moscow Times
May 13, 2004
Can Misha Score Hat Trick?
By Boris Kagarlitsky

A general once said that every generation needs to have its war. I don't remember who came up with this memorable idea or what exactly the general was referring to, but his insight certainly helps to explain training practices in the military.

The political culture of independent Georgia seems to be built on the same principle. Each new president begins his tenure by instigating an armed conflict between the central government and the leadership of one of the country's autonomous regions. When Zviad Gamsakhurdia came to power he started and lost a war with South Ossetia. He was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, who lost no time starting and losing a war with Abkhazia. Next came Mikheil Saakashvili, who decided to take on Adzharian leader Aslan Abashidze.

Another fact of Georgian politics is that all new presidents enjoy a remarkable honeymoon period after taking office. The Georgian people were overjoyed when the talented Gamsakhurdia came to power. They were relieved when the experienced Shevardnadze returned to take the reins in Tbilisi. And they expressed unprecedented enthusiasm for the young Saakashvili.

The honeymoon doesn't last forever, of course. Saakashvili's predecessors eventually became the victims of coups (or revolutions, if you prefer). And since the same scenario seems to be played out over and over in Georgian politics, you might be tempted to predict that Saakashvili is next in line to be deposed.

But this is where the merry-go-round stops. Saakashvili has learned the lessons of recent history and is consciously attempting to alter the established pattern. He has cleared the first hurdle. Saakashvili went out on a limb when he squared off against Abashidze, but he knew what he was doing.

His calculated risk was a complete success. Unlike the leaders of Georgia's other autonomous regions, Abashidze fled to Moscow without putting up much of a fight. Saakashvili triumphed where his predecessors had failed. His victory opens up the possibility of resolving Tbilisi's conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The military option in Abkhazia is out of the question. The self-proclaimed republic possesses a significant military capability, and Russia is heavily involved in the region. Only serious concessions can return Abkhazia to the fold, but until now this would have been both psychologically and politically impossible for the regime in Tbilisi. Now that Saakashvili has made a show of strength in Adzharia, he is in a position to propose a compromise acceptable to the Abkhaz leadership without losing face. His task is simplified somewhat by Sukhumi's gradual realization that international recognition of Abkhazia's sovereignty and its annexation to Russia are pipe dreams, and that a way out of the current crisis must be found. Only peace will bring back the tourists on which this Black Sea region has traditionally relied for its livelihood.

If Saakashvili manages to hammer out an agreement with the separatist regime in Sukhumi and to secure at least a recognition in principle of Georgian sovereignty in the republic, the conflict with South Ossetia could be quickly resolved in the same manner. Should that happen, Saakashvili would go down in history as the leader who restored the country after 10 years of hardship. The people would forgive him even if the economy remained in the same miserable state as before.

Saakashvili's political future is probably secure even if his ambitious plans come to nothing, however. His predecessors were not removed from office because of their military setbacks. If Saakashvili fails in his bid to reunite the country, the people would be plunged once more into the depression from which they began to emerge during the Rose Revolution that swept him to power. Thus demoralized, the people would hardly be capable of bringing down the government.

For his part, the young and energetic Saakashvili has no intention of giving up what he has won. Even if he doesn't go down in history as a hero, he should be able to remain in power for years to come. It is no coincidence that Shevardnadze regarded Saakashvili as his successor. That the transfer of power from the old leader to the new didn't exactly happen the way Shevardnadze had planned only testifies to the new president's political cunning.

Whoever becomes Georgia's next president, the old pattern has been repeated for the last time. After all, Georgia has only three autonomous regions.

Boris Kagarlitsky is director of the Institute of Globalization Studies.