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CDI Russia Weekly Home Edited by David Johnson

#13 - RW 263
Izvestia
June 25, 2003
TO MAKE THINGS INTERESTING
Russia-US cooperation on missile defense is difficult, but possible

Author: Pavel Podvig, Arms Control Studies Center at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

THE PATH TO REAL JOINT PROJECTS LIES THROUGH STIMULATION AND FACILITATION OF DIRECT CONTRACTS BETWEEN RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN OR EUROPEAN COMPANIES, RATHER THAN POLITICAL DECLARATIONS. COOPERATION NEEDS TO OVERCOME VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONAL, BUREAUCRATIC, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL BARRIERS.

The interest in cooperation in the sphere of missile defense is explicable. This topic has always been popular in Russia, where it's thought that the standard of Russian (and, actually, Soviet) research in this field is high enough to offer real competition to US researchers.

Indeed, the only strategic missile defense system now in existence is deployed around Moscow, and Russia has some substantial projects in the non-strategic field. It is no wonder that many in Russia believe that teamwork with the US could once again demonstrate Russia's ability to produce advanced hardware of the highest class.

From the political point of view, this sphere of cooperation is beyond compare. Differences related to the role of the missile defense and the ABM Treaty had been the focus of Russia-US dialog for many years, and America's withdrawal from the treaty drew a sensitive response both in Russia and in the US.

Teamwork would be the best way to prove that reciprocal relations have changed. To all appearances, both Moscow and Washington are coming to understand this, which explains the level of interest in this issue.

However, in order to reap the political rewards of this cooperation, political declarations of intentions are insufficient unless they are implemented in the "specific joint projects" which the two presidents recently discussed in St. Petersburg. And here Russia and the US will inevitably run up against the problem that the attention of politicians usually proves a serious obstacle to cooperation, rather than helping it.

The history of Russia-US relations has a few very serious joint projects, their funding fluctuating between tens and hundreds of millions of dollars annually. The transaction of selling depleted uranium to the US has been the biggest deal of that kind. The joint threat reduction program, within the framework of which the US has been aiding Russia to eliminate the strategic arms reduced. However, cooperation in the creation of the ISS seems to be the only successful, actually high-end program realized now. It is also significant that, although Russia is independently financing its participation in the project, the contracts obtained in the preparations of the ISS for its launch have brought serious benefits to the space industry of Russia.

Cooperation in the sphere of missile defense seems to be optimistic, but a closer look shows: these projects are more likely to be successful due to serious concern of all ministries and departments involved in this process, which proved to be ready to maintain their projects at all levels, rather than the political support.

The fate of the Russia-US Joint Data Exchange Center shows what happens when the parties have no concern for it. The Russian and US presidents signed an agreement on the creation of the center as far back as 2000. The intention to open the center was confirmed in 2001. However, no progress was attained in this cause, formally due to the unsettled tax matters. In fact, however, it seems that nobody is interested in the work of this center, neither in Russia, nor in the US. The presidents' commissions haven't go beyond wishes.

RAMOS program, which envisages joint work of one Russian and one US satellite, is another example. Following years of uncertainty and balancing on the verge of being closed down, the program has finally obtained sure financial sources, but this way could be much shorter if the immediate participants didn't have to deal with the additional "bureaucratic structure." In the US, this program was given under control of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which proved to be poorly prepared and didn't actually show its serious concern for the program.

Quite possibly, fixed attention on the part of politicians to the RAMOS program would be appropriate. Moreover, the program is a quite real and, as of now, the only example of Russia-US cooperation in the sphere of missile defense: the satellites to be created will be practicing the technology of detecting launches of ballistic missiles. At the same time, any politically significant project is becoming a target for various kinds of coordination and terms. This is what has occurred with, for instance, the ISS after the US Congress had linked any contracts with Russia within the framework of this project to fulfillment a series of terms, related to Russia-Iran cooperation. Such terms can actually ruin even the most promising joint project.

To succeed in the joint work, participants in the project must have an interest in it and have a wish to overcome various organizational, bureaucratic, cultural and political barriers. Any similar terms are out of the sphere of the missile defense. The organization, which is supposed to be in charge of this work in the US, has shown its inadequacy for this role. In Russia, no organization, which could be made responsible for implementation of the joint work, is evident either. However, vulnerability of these plans to diverse political pressure is the main obstacle.

All of the preceding doesn't actually mean that Russia-US cooperation in the sphere of missile defense is impossible, in theory. On the contrary. However, the path to real joint projects involves promoting and facilitating direct contracts between Russian and American (or European) companies, rather than political declarations. Plenty of successful projects exist, for instance the Sea Launch project or a project of delivering Russian-made rocket engines for the US carrier rockets Atlas. The latter is noteworthy, since it will be the first time when Russian-made equipment will be used in a US military program - it is planned to use Atlas carrier rockets to place military satellites into orbit. This instance shows that Russia and the US have already entered into a new kind of relationship and it would be better to enable Russian companies to use the new opportunities, rather than confirming this in a president's address. If Russian missile system researchers are given the opportunity to work independently, "specific joint projects in the sphere of missile defense" will undoubtedly appear, without waiting for a president's announcements.

(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)

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