#6
Trud
No. 26
February 2003
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY HAS OPTIONS ON IRAQI PROBLEM
By Alexei PUSHKOV, member of the Presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy

Up until now all internal Russian debates on Iraq have focused on how Russia should react to the Bush war policy in relation to Iraq. With the emergence of the French-German plan of Iraq's peaceful disarmament with the assistance of the UN blue helmets, new options have appeared for Russian diplomacy.

Vladimir Putin's decision to join cautiously the French-German Entente shows that he has decided to make use of these opportunities.

The Iraqi gambit is an extremely intricate thing. The Russian President is also in a difficult situation. As the author of the doctrine of Russia's economic foreign policy, Putin cannot simply shut his eyes at Russia's large economic interests in Iraq. Russia has already signed large-scale oil contracts with the incumbent Iraqi government. It is not clear whether these contracts will remain valid under a new Iraqi government, in the event of the US victory in the war. However, most likely, these contracts will hardly survive.

On the other hand, Putin wants to preserve the current level of personal relations with the US President, which is high enough. Therefore, any radical decisions, like the veto right at the UN Security Council against the military action, are undesirable for Russia. Paris can threaten with such a veto: in any way France is an old-standing US ally and a NATO member. Even if France quarrels with Washington, the Americans will in the final account forgive France its capricious behavior. However, things are different with Russia: Russia is not a NATO member and its direct confrontation with the USA on the issue of Iraq can cost it much.

At the same time, it is not proper for Putin to turn into America's vassal either. First of all, this would strongly affect Russia's big European game aimed at political and economic integration with the European Union. The USA is far away, while Europe is close by. It is true, though, that Europe is split on the Iraqi issue. It is not accidental that US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld directly opposed "old Europe" led by France and Germany to "new Europe," i.e. the East European countries which have recently joined or are dreaming of joining NATO. Rumsfeld can be easily understood: of course, he likes "new Europe" looking at him with excitement more than he likes Schroeder and Chirac. But which Europe is more important for Russia? The EU political and economic engine is represented precisely by France and Germany rather than by feeble East European countries that are dependent in all respects.

However, there is also a different opinion: it is necessary to agree with the USA on the future of the Iraqi oil now that the USA needs Russia's support and then participate in the division of this oil after the war. It looks reasonable, but is this so?

Apart from that, this tactics may fail to work during the division of Iraqi oil. First of all, in the case of victory, the USA will boost its own appetite and strong temptation to establish full control of Iraqi oil. The US entrepreneurs and electors will expect from Bush a sharp decrease in oil prices and Bush will hardly ignore these expectations before the elections.

Secondly, it is not clear, what precisely to agree upon and what precisely to bargain about. The Bush administration promises Russia to take into account Russia's economic interests in Iraq after the war but avoids specifying its promises. This is all but understandable: the USA cannot give Russia full guarantees because the Americans do not know themselves how the situation will develop in Iraq after the war.

Finally, there is the question of the extent, to which Russia can trust the USA. It has just become known that the latest proofs of Iraq's guilt before the world community produced by Colin Powell at the UN are nothing but false information copied from the public press. The British Observer magazine has directly accused the US administration of fact juggling.

The French-German plan provides new opportunities for Putin to maintain a proper balance. It is not accidental that Putin has decided to rely on this plan. Naturally, the Rumsfeld team in Washington will hardly like that. But, in the final account, Putin has no less important spectators in Russia, Europe and Asia.

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