#11
From: Donald Jensen <JensenD@rferl.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2003
Subject: Putin: A Midterm Assessment

If Putin shows his weakness, the "centers of power" will immediately begin a struggle for power in Russia.

Donald Jensen has been the director of Communications at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty since June 2002. He spent 12 years working for the U.S. State Department and held posts at embassies in Moscow and Sofia. From 1980 to 1984, he taught at Stanford University.

Question: Has the West's view of Russian President Vladimir Putin changed?

Jensen: It all began with an attempt to find an answer to that famous question posed three years ago, when Vladimir Putin first appeared on the international scene: "Who are you, Mr. Putin?" We began to fill in some of the blanks in his resume. Gradually, the West stopped looking for an answer to this question, even as its view of Putin has evolved. First, many people developed a fear that Putin would be a dictator, because he is a former member of the KGB and tried to centralize power. A little later, another point of view appeared that many share today, to a greater or lesser degree. They think Putin is a person with whom it is possible to do business, that he is a reformer, etc. You can read about this every day in "The Washington Post" or "The New York Times"…We also simplify the situation at the top by speaking about the "Chekists" from St. Petersburg and the members of the "Family." While a convenient, and sometimes accurate way to divide the elite, the divisions among each grouping shift as coalitions form and reform over specific issues. It sometimes results in combinations that cut across a simple "chekisty" vs. "Family" divide.

In any case, people often try to understand Putin role, or events in Russia, by mirror-imaging the US historical experience or trying to determine whether Russia is a "democracy." Our experience is of only limited usefulness. I don't find trying to measure whether Russia is now, or ever will be a democracy, to be of much analytical help. Perhaps it might become one. Perhaps not. The key question is, what are the current trends, and in which direction are those vectors heading. Beyond that we are discussing theology.

Question: Putin has been running Russia for half his presidential term. How can we evaluate the results of his work?

Jensen: We should begin by answering the old, simple question: "How is he doing?" Or better yet, "What is he doing?" Answering that will enable us to evaluate his presidency. My answer to this question, I think, differs significantly from that of the majority of observers in Washington. Russia today is sometimes referred to as a "managed democracy." Looking at what Putin is doing, I'd have to say I see Russia as neither a democracy (as analytically useless as saying that is) and far from managed.

Above all, one ought to begin to answer the question by considering the legacy that Boris Yeltsin left behind and what Putin has changed. I think Yeltsin left to his successor a strong legacy, more than most people believe. And this was part of a broader set of values and behaviors Putin inherited from the Russian and Soviet past. This legacy gives us reason to take a pessimistic view of Russia's chances to move in the direction the US would like - whatever you call it -- anytime soon. The continuities include a patrimonial view of the relationship between the state and society, the personalization of authority, and the weakness of the rule of law and civil society. In some ways Putin has deepened these trends. In any case, it is very important not to compare Putin with the Yeltsin of 1998. It is possible and even necessary to compare him with the powerful and healthy Yeltsin of 1993 or 1994.

What has changed? People say the country has become more stable. Personally, I 'm not sure what this means, but there is in Russia now a relatively more balanced system of sometimes contradictory forces, at least compared to, say, 1999. It is quieter. Putin is, of course, younger and more physically fit than his predecessor, and this has political significance. But as I said, it is much more difficult to say what fundamentally has changed from the Yeltsin Administration. While the centers of power -- the bureaucracy, big business, the governors, the security apparatus, and the army -- have somewhat rearranged themselves around the President, they are still where power lies. Putin has not changed the rules by which the elites play and these rules remain unwritten, with little relationship to the established legal order. It is one thing to note some promising signs of judicial independence recently, quite another to see the law never applied to some business moguls. Let me give you another example. A few years ago, Putin created new federal structures and took other centralizing measures in the hope of reining in the regional governors, who he believed had enjoyed too much autonomy under Yeltsin. It hasn't worked too well, since most governors have come up with strategies to maintain their autonomy. As under Yeltsin, each federation unit seems to be carving out a unique relationship with the federal center.

But let's discuss more about the essence of the system, which has a strongly patrimonial element quite different than ours. This is because, in Russia, money is power, and power is money. The lines between public and private, between corruption and crime are quite blurred and not clearly marked. The Railroad and Atomic Energy ministries often act on their own, more like private corporations than parts of the government. The cliché in Washington is that Putin has told the business oligarchs that he will let them make money if they stay out of politics. But in Russia business is politics. It is often said that the security services oppose Big Business, but in many cases I don't see a difference, because the FSB has a very broad involvement in commerce. The so-called Family, moreover, is an additional center of power laying a claim on the same resources. This sounds cynical, but I think I've described the situation accurately. Thus, not only is the business of Russia business, to paraphrase Calvin Coolidge. The Russian system in many ways is itself a business.

The situation has not changed much since the time of Yeltsin's rule or earlier in Russian history. People say, "Look at Enron, money corrupts US politics too." I agree, but there are two important differences. First, the management of Enron is on its way to jail; the corrupt management of any number of large Russian firms, is not. Second, as James Madison noted in the Federalist, our system provides many places where groups can bring pressure to counter the demands of single, powerful lobby. In Russia, Big Business has access to the top echelons of power virtually unimpeded.

We should also talk about the role of public opinion in Russia. Public opinion is important, because it legitimizes the rule of the elected monarch. Public opinion in Russia, however, is significantly weaker and less organized than public opinion in the West. Americans have tried to compare the ratings of Putin, [U.S. President George W.] Bush, and [British Prime Minister Tony] Blair, but this is not a fair comparison. Public opinion in Russia, though volatile, is not strong enough to have an immediate, direct influence on politics because it is largely unorganized and the gap between the elites and society is huge.

Let us return to the issue of the limits on Putin's authority. In the US, we often talk about Putin's authority as though his strong, formal Presidential powers work in real life as they do on paper. But in Russia, as was the case in the Yeltsin era and in Soviet times, informal political connections play a more important a role than formal relationships. And so, we should ask not, "What sort of formal authority [power?] does Putin have?", but, "How does this authority function in real life? Here we see all the kinds of practical limitations on Putin's power. One could more properly speak of the Virtual President, or Virtual Putin, since the power centers are popularly seen to be carrying out Putin's wishes even when they act against each other, against him, or are otherwise obstacles to the achievement of what Putin says he wants. Nevertheless, it is important for the system's legitimacy - and for the President personally -- that these power centers be seen to be acting in Putin's name, even if this is not always the case. The practical effect is often that policy zigzags, as these players act on their own or Putin arbitrates among them. Putin's economic program, for example, is a sometimes inconsistent mix of policies advocated by those in the government who want a strong state role in the economy and those who want a more liberal economy. This is very bad for Putin, because he is trying to look like a person who has everything under control. Yeltsin, by the way, played much the same balancing role.

Another limit: many Russians were counting on Putin to eliminate the business oligarchs. Instead, it becomes more noticeable every day that Putin not only cannot do this, he actually needs them, or at least some of them: for money, policy implementation, and other reasons. The Slavneft auction two months ago, where that firm was auctioned off to an oligarch close to the Kremlin for far less than market value, was straight out of the Yeltsin era. Another example of the limits on Putin's power has been the postponement of reforms in the electricity monopoly, RAO EES [Unified Energy Systems]. People have been talking about a breakup for three or four years already, but still nothing has happened, since there is such bureaucratic resistance and Putin's ability to force change from above is limited.

Finally, Putin promised to strengthen the state, but what did he mean by this? What has happened? In fact, I would suggest that Putin has weakened the state as we in the West understand it, by undermining its juridical basis, which was not strong before he came to power in any even. What Putin has strengthened, I would argue, are the coercive elements of parts of the official bureaucracy and allowed the government's police powers to be exercised in a highly personalized, arbitrary way. That, in the long run, won't strengthen the state at all and does great damage to the rule of law.

So where is all this going? On the one hand, Putin can continue along current path, almost certainly gain reelection and preside over a country that will drift at home, and whose problems may even worsen. On the other hand, he can try to mobilize the country -- and by this I mean the Russian public - to put direct pressure to change on the system I have described. (By this I mean far more direct pressure than just being reelected in 2004). This is an uphill fight at best and the chance for him to do this probably has already passed. It is also politically dangerous.

Question: Do you understand the reasons for Putin's actions?

Jensen: I'm not sure that I understand what Putin wants, beyond staying in power. It seems he wants to bring Russia into the 21st Century through a combination of market reform and centralizing limits on political pluralism. These are contradictory, to a considerable extent and so far he has not been very successful at either. As I said, it is just as important to speculate about the actions of those around him.

Question: How do you foresee the future of Russia following the next presidential elections?

Jensen: Most likely the elites will continue to be more interested in strengthening themselves than in carrying out genuine reforms, although whatever polices they follow will be called reform. Nor may Putin be able to continue to avoid dealing with some of the problems he has avoided so far. If the price of oil drops, the country's economic position will become seriously worse. His pro-Western foreign policy has serious, though quiet domestic opposition and must pay off for Russia soon. In any discussion of Putin's political prospects, moreover, it is important to keep in mind another parallel with Yeltsin. I think that as Putin begins to show his personal political weakness, other elite players will immediately begin undermine him, especially over who will succeed him. We see some signs of that already. So far, Putin has been lucky and perhaps that will continue. The price of oil remains high. In foreign policy he has played a weak hand well. Her still benefits from the contrast with the disorder of the late Yeltsin years. In any case the constant redivision of property, a central characteristic of Russian elite politics, is likely to continue. The struggle will become bitterer as there are fewer resources to divide.

Question: Some of Putin's critics claim that Putin is building a state with several characteristics of the Nazi state.

Jensen: I don't think this is an accurate comparison. We could, perhaps compare Russia with Argentina during the era of President Peron, though there are significant differences. First, Putin's regime does not want to mobilize the population behind certain causes. Second, the racist or chauvinist component is largely absent from the Russian government (I would exclude its handling of the Chechnya issue). These people are moderate nationalists. Russia today is a centralized, bureaucratic, state.

This interview with Donald Jensen reflects his personal opinions, not those of RFE/RL

Adapted from Washington Profile, February 3, 2003

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