#9
US Department of State
19 July 2002
Byliner: U.S.-Russia Relations "Surprisingly Successful" So Far
(But much remains to be done, says Brookings' O'Hanlon) (2090)
(The following article by Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, appeared in the latest issue of "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda," devoted to the topic "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The New Strategic Framework." This article and the rest of the electronic journal, which was published on July 18, may be viewed on the Web at: http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0702/ijpe/ijpe0702.htm. There are no republication restrictions.)

THE NEW U.S.-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK:
A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
By Michael O'Hanlon

(The new U.S.-Russian strategic framework "has been surprisingly successful to date," but "much still has to be done" to address the nuclear safety and nuclear nonproliferation agenda, says Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.)

In 2002, the Bush and Putin administrations concluded an important strategic nuclear arms reduction accord even as the United States prepared to withdraw formally from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Taking these two important decisions, along with other nuclear-related policies of both countries, as the definition of the new U.S.-Russian strategic framework, how well can we say it is working so far, and how promising is its future?

This is a complex question with a number of aspects. On the whole, my assessment is that, so far as it goes, the new framework has been surprisingly successful to date. The combined effects of ending the ABM Treaty and agreeing to cut deployed long-range nuclear forces in each country to about 2,000 warheads by 2012 should be stabilizing on balance, while also respecting the spirit of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's calls for gradual nuclear disarmament. For many of us who worried greatly about the effects of the ABM Treaty withdrawal decision in particular, these developments have been greatly reassuring. President Vladimir Putin may deserve the lion's share of the credit for this situation, given his willingness to negotiate further offensive arms reductions even as he accepted the demise of the ABM Treaty due to a U.S. decision. But President George W. Bush also deserves credit for a firm approach to negotiations and for his successful efforts to build trust with the Russian president. For Russia in particular, the new strategic framework should help it save money within its defense budget by reducing offensive forces. For Washington, it will facilitate building missile defenses, which if deployed at modest levels can provide useful protection for the United States and its allies -- and perhaps Russia as well.

However, in a broader sense, the new strategic framework must be judged only an interim or partial success. For one thing, Russians besides Mr. Putin are less happy with it; should their political influence increase within Russia in the coming years, a counter-reaction could result. This concern is not itself reason to change the offensive and defensive elements of the new framework, or to judge them a failure, but it is real nonetheless. Vigilance will be needed.

A greater worry concerns the remaining nuclear agenda that the new accord does not address. Superpower nuclear forces remain on high alert, ready for rapid launch. They also continue to contain tens of thousands of nuclear weapons that, if not properly secured, could lead to the unthinkable result of a nuclear device in the hands of al-Qaida terrorists. The new strategic offensive and defensive framework developed by Bush and Putin will not be a direct cause of such an outcome. But to the extent the leaders of the two countries mistakenly consider their nuclear-related work now to be done, there could be enormously dangerous consequences.

Traditional Issues: Strategic Offenses and Missile Defenses

As noted above, the Bush-Putin approach to traditional arms control issues seems successful, at least in a narrow sense. Substantial reductions in deployed warheads were negotiated. The United States insisted on the right to keep a reserve of warheads, and to exceed the ceiling of 1,700 to 2,200 strategic warheads not only prior to 2012, but after the treaty ceases to bind the two parties as well. In that sense, the accord has relatively few teeth. But importantly, it gives Russia cover to make nuclear reductions that are necessary, given its economic situation. Russia will probably now do so. Moreover, the chances that the United States will actually add more warheads to its nuclear forces in the coming years are extremely remote, given the limited utility of nuclear weapons and the Pentagon's desire to use strategic weapons launchers for conventional purposes. Given the improvement in the superpower relationship, and the new international security agenda that features much greater worries about terrorism than superpower nuclear war, an old-fashioned treaty with severely binding provisions seems unneeded -- at least within the strategic offensive sphere.

The scale of reductions of the new accord is unremarkable, given that it is essentially identical to what was contemplated by Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton in a broad START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) III framework in 1997. But since those presidents were never able to move below START I constraints, due to the opposition of their respective legislatures and other factors, Bush and Putin have nonetheless taken an important step in devising an accord that is likely to take real effect in the near future.

As for the ABM Treaty, its demise was worrisome chiefly because of its possible effects on Russia and thus on the broader superpower nuclear relationship. Moscow might have viewed the decision as a renewed U.S. pursuit of strategic nuclear advantage, despite Washington's claims that it sought no such edge and wanted defenses only for the rogue-state problem. Since Russia chose not to react strongly to the withdrawal decision and not to allow a deterioration in that relationship, the loss of the ABM Treaty per se seems not to pose a major problem. In my judgment, it would have been preferable if Washington had proposed a modification to the treaty allowing limited defenses, rather than insisting on withdrawal or abrogation. But in light of Moscow's mild reaction, Mr. Bush's approach appears to have been nearly as good in effect, and considerably simpler in implementation, than such a renegotiation.

Problems could still emerge. The ABM Treaty withdrawal decision could still lead to problems in the U.S.-China relationship. The concept of unlimited ballistic missile defense could also lead to waste in the U.S. defense budget. Somewhere down the road, once defenses are actually deployed, there could even be problems in the U.S.-Russia relationship as a result, particularly if Mr. Putin is no longer in power and a more traditional leader is in the Kremlin. But these concerns can probably be allayed by a defense that is limited in actual size once deployed.

The Broader Nuclear and Strategic Agenda

But it would be too narrow to assess the new strategic framework based on old standards. Just as this new framework was much easier to create than previous superpower accords, given the diminished importance of the strategic nuclear balance, it is insufficient as a guide to 21st century nuclear policy. We should applaud Bush and Putin, but not too long -- for much still has to be done. Particularly in the age of terrorism, any effective nuclear framework must vigorously address the nuclear safety and nuclear nonproliferation agenda. These broad concerns imply that attention must be given to the hair-trigger status of nuclear forces. Even more, they require sustained attention to protecting and securing nuclear materials.

As for U.S. and Russian nuclear alert levels, they remain too high. Each side assures its citizens that nuclear forces are safe from accidental or unauthorized launch, and emphasizes that sufficient safeguards have been preserved in the post-Cold War era. The latter point may be true, but only by the standards of the Cold War, when we accepted a substantial degree of nuclear danger within the bilateral nuclear relationship. In this era, there is no plausible need to do so. Given the excellent survivability of American submarines and reasonably good survivability of silo-based Russian missiles, each side can remain confident of its second-strike deterrent capabilities even if its forces would require hours or days to be prepared for launch. There are a number of ways to reduce alert levels; they should be seriously pursued, partly through unilateral measures and partly through mutual U.S.-Russian agreement, whether formal or informal.

As important as the alert issue is, however, the much more pressing issue is to protect the vast array of excess Russian nuclear warheads and materials strewn throughout that country. Deployed strategic warheads are not the primary problem; poorly guarded and widely dispersed tactical warheads, as well as excess plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, are the main concern. This is especially true given Russia's difficult economic conditions and the frayed state of its security forces. Under such circumstances, the chances of dangerous materials being stolen or sold to terrorist organizations are uncomfortably high.

What to do under these circumstances? Nuclear experts including Matt Bunn at Harvard University and the Baker-Cutler Commission in Washington have outlined steps that might be taken, building on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts of the last decade but going much further. Tactical warheads and fissile materials need to be brought to fewer sites, put under better physical and human controls, exactly inventoried and accounted for, and gradually destroyed. The scientific infrastructure that created these capabilities needs to be sustainably converted, with individuals reemployed in other occupations. Beyond Russia, the world's nuclear reactors need to be put under more comprehensive and rigorous safeguards. The sum total of these requirements may necessitate spending between $1 billion ($1,000 million) and $2 billion ($2,000 million) more a year, in addition to the existing effort involving roughly $1 billion ($1,000 million) annually in U.S. funds. European and Japanese aid might be joined with increased U.S. assistance. Greater Russian contributions might be induced, for example, with debt-for-nonproliferation "swaps." Under such agreements, Russia would be forgiven a share of its international debts if it agreed to increase spending on nuclear safety and security.

In addition, Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran is a major concern. It may not be realistic to stop it entirely. But the United States can make progress by adopting a somewhat more nuanced approach. First, it can stop opposing most conventional arms sales by Russia to Iran; these are generally not nearly as dangerous as nuclear-related transfers, and some even have a self-defense rationale for the regime in Tehran. Second, Washington can push Moscow to insist on much tighter safeguards for its Iranian program.

Conclusion

The new strategic arms accord between Russia and the United States, though lacking the teeth of previous agreements, seems likely to provide a framework in which both sides will reduce their deployed offensive forces, save money, comply with their international nonproliferation requirements, and continue to defuse the legacy of their nuclear confrontation. The fact that it was reached despite the nearly simultaneous demise of the ABM Treaty is testament to the wisdom and flexibility of President Putin as well as to the negotiating efforts of the Bush administration.

However, the Bush administration's attention to nonproliferation issues has been variable and insufficient to date. After coming into office threatening to cut, rather than expand the Nunn-Lugar and related programs, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was finally convinced to sustain ongoing activities. Admittedly, they are not always completely effective, and the programs involve some waste, but the stakes are too high and the issue too urgent to expect or await a more perfect program.

Sustaining the programs at their previous levels does not suffice, however. Now the danger is that Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin will wish to claim the nuclear problem largely solved, pointing to their new framework on traditional offensive and defensive issues, just as Presidents Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev or George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev expected the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) and START efforts to solidify their places in the history books.

However, that type of old-fashioned negotiation success will not suffice. If anything, it was the easy and the less important part of the equation. The Bush administration, in particular, needs to view the accomplishments of the May 2002 Moscow summit as no more than the first page in the new U.S.-Russian nuclear framework, and get back to work soon.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.

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