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stratfor.com
Russia Warily Finesses China Ties
24 July 2002

Summary

Russia is rethinking its security outlook as it tightens economic and political ties with Europe and the United States. Moscow recently said that Russia's security threats no longer come from the west but from the south and east -- from the Caucasus through Central Asia and, by extension, China. With Russia's population concentrated west of the Urals and its military just a shadow of its former Soviet self, defending the vast eastern territories will require a less traditional approach.

Analysis

In an extremely rare meeting of Russia's ambassadors, Russian President Vladimir Putin recently explained Moscow's closer ties with the United States and Europe -- calling the emerging partnership between Moscow and Washington one of Russia's top priorities and urging the creation of a "common economic space" encompassing Europe and Russia, according to Interfax. The president's message is an outgrowth of a solidifying foreign policy initiative that links Russia's future -- at least over the next five to 10 years -- firmly to Europe and the United States.

This political and economic initiative also has a security component that is evident in Russia's new arrangement with NATO, Moscow's cooperation with Washington in Central Asia and the common view of an "Islamic militant threat" shared with the United States. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov expanded on this component in a July 10 interview with Russian daily Izvestiya, explaining that Moscow sees Afghanistan as a more realistic threat than a "global nuclear catastrophe or aggression by the United States and NATO." In short, Ivanov said, "The threat to Russia lies in the Caucasus and on the Asian border."

Although Ivanov did not name China directly as a perceived threat and in fact tried to put a friendly face on Moscow-Beijing ties, it is clear that Russia's already wary view of China is becoming more so. With most of its population located west of the Urals and its military a mere shadow of the former Soviet force, Russia has little ability to defend its eastern reaches by traditional means. Instead, Moscow appears ready to use China's naval ambitions and Washington's Pacific concerns to keep China occupied to the west and south, rather than focusing north on Russia.

The Russian-Chinese relationship has been mixed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and even long before. In the early 1990s, Moscow wavered between seeking support from the West and establishing a strategic partnership with Beijing to counter Washington's unchallenged power. Beijing did not fully commit to the partnership either, keeping one hand out to the West for investment and trade while the other was reaching for Moscow. But China's rapid economic expansion during the late 1990s and into the 21st Century contrasted sharply with Russia's rapid decline, and the collapse of the Russian economy left Beijing with little reason to care for its former rival.

China and Russia continued to negotiate, but Beijing began to see itself as the stronger partner of any relationship. This raised concerns in Russia that China posed a very real, albeit future, threat to Russia's resource-rich but population-poor eastern territories. Yet with Putin's inauguration, Russia began to seriously rethink its strategic global position -- and as Putin tightened his control at home, he began to portray Russia's future as intimately tied to Europe and the West. The events of Sept. 11 provided the perfect opportunity for Putin to put his plan fully in motion: Russia quickly joined in with Washington's anti-terrorism war, offering support, intelligence and a conciliatory attitude toward the U.S. presence in the former Soviet states of Central Asia.

Putin's strategic calculation was to integrate Russia economically into Europe while downplaying his nation's threat to U.S. interests, thus ensuring Moscow's security and opening a channel for economic assistance and investment. Although this required several apparent "concessions" to the West -- not the least of which was dialing back opposition to Washington's missile defense plans -- Putin determined that he could control the expected internal backlash so long as he could demonstrate clear authority and prove the tangible benefits of his Westward-looking initiative.

Aside from the old-school, hard-line Communists and the right-wing Russian nationalists, the group most clearly distraught with Putin's plans are Chinese leaders. Although Beijing had treated Moscow as a second-tier power in their strategic partnership, the rapidly shifting global order after Sept. 11 left China out in the cold. Even as the United States was accepting the legitimacy of Russia's campaign against the Muslim Chechens, Washington was criticizing Beijing's continued crackdown on the Muslim Uighurs from the western Xinjiang province.

Whereas China had been the center of U.S. attention -- both as an emerging economic power and as a political and even military competitor in Asia -- before Sept. 11, it quickly slid off Washington's radar screen after the attacks. The nation's importance as a new World Trade Organization member also has paled amid the global economic slump, leaving Beijing struggling with the domestic social consequences of its more liberal market policies. With most of the world siding with the U.S. war against terrorism -- whether out of fear, desire for rewards or true sympathy -- China became a lone voice in the wilderness crying out against Washington's hegemonic goals, while its erstwhile partner was handing the keys to the former Soviet empire over to Washington's expeditionary forces in Central Asia.

Beijing always has been wary of Putin, and his apparent sell-out to the West along with Moscow's tacit acknowledgement of the "China threat" only confirmed leaders' suspicions about the KGB-agent-turned-president. Suddenly, with Moscow making moves like announcing that China was interested in taking over the Lourdes base in Cuba, it became clear to Beijing that Russia was setting it up to butt heads with the United States.

And this is apparently what Moscow intends, now that it is firmly moving toward reaping economic benefits from its Westward orientation. For Russia, China represents a clear security threat: a competing Asian land power, overpopulated and sitting astride the wide expanses of Russia's far east, where energy and other natural resources abound. With Moscow clearly unable to protect these borders through military means and with its nuclear deterrent insufficient to halt creeping migration from China, Russia needs a backstop in Asia -- something or someone to keep China in check long enough for Russia to re-emerge as a regional, if not global, power a decade or two down the road.

The obvious choice would be to come to terms with Japan, using the historical enmity between Tokyo and Beijing to protect Russia's eastern flank. But Moscow cannot trust Japan to keep its own imperial desires in check, so any work with Tokyo must be managed carefully. Moscow also has some leverage with China's other eastern neighbor, North Korea, but the hermit kingdom poses little threat to Beijing. Moreover, Russia's ties with Seoul are souring over Moscow's overdue debt to South Korea, making any partnership there even more unlikely than usual.

For Russia, aligning with another power to contain China presents another problem: It could expose the latent antagonism between the two nations and thus turn China's attention to countering Russia. Instead, Russia can avoid fully alerting Beijing to its goals and keep China off-balance with a carefully targeted program of military sales. Although Moscow and Beijing have deals in the works that include SU-30 multi-role attack fighters, most newer arms deals are designed to enhance China's naval capabilities. From Sovremenny destroyers with advanced ship-to-ship missiles to new Kilo-class submarines, Moscow is feeding Beijing's voracious appetite for new naval technology.

China's naval modernization is fueled by Beijing's desire to never again be constrained by Washington's naval prowess -- as it was in 1996, when the United States dispatched two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait in response to Chinese missile tests. China fears that crucial supplies shipped by sea could be interdicted, particularly the oil it imports from the Middle East. Beijing also wants to expand its strategic reach to the South China Sea and beyond, not to mention build up a military force capable of truly defeating Taiwan's defenses.

Although China will continue to keep a wary eye on Russia, modern naval technology will prove too tempting to turn down. Yet Beijing's naval enhancements inevitably will drive Taiwan and other Asian nations to improve their own naval capabilities, and this will in turn bring in the United States, which will see China's naval expansion as a challenge to its own control of the Pacific.

With an occasional nudge here and there, Moscow can keep Washington and Beijing at each other's throats while Russia rebuilds its economy and eventually its military with help from Europe.

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